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18. Prosecutorial Ethics and 
Preliminary Examinations at the ICC 
Alexander Heinze and Shannon Fyfe* 
18.1. Introduction 
The increased power and independence of the Office of the Prosecutor 
(‘OTP’, or the ‘Office’), especially in the preliminary examination phase, 
has brought more attention to the ways in which prosecutors can exercise 
discretion in choosing which situations warrant investigation by the Inter-
national Criminal Court (‘ICC’).1 Under Article 15 of the ICC Statute, the 
Prosecutor has the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu on the 
basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. There 
                                                   
*  Alexander Heinze is a lawyer and an assistant professor of law at the University of Göt-
tingen, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in International Criminal Law (with honours), received 
his master’s in International and Comparative Law from Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, 
with distinction, and published various papers on topics such as International Criminal 
Law and Procedure, Media Law, Comparative Criminal Law, Human Rights Law and Ju-
risprudence. His book International Criminal Procedure and Disclosure (Duncker & 
Humblot, 2014) won three awards. He is a member of the ILA’s Committee on Comple-
mentarity in ICL, editor of the German Law Journal and book review editor of the Crimi-
nal Law Forum, has been working for the Appeals Chamber of the ICC as a visiting pro-
fessional and was recently appointed as an expert of the Committee for Legal Affairs and 
Consumer Protection of the German Parliament in the public hearing of the draft law on 
the abolishment of Section 103 of the German Criminal Code (defamation of organs and 
representatives of foreign States). Shannon Fyfe is a lawyer and a Ph.D. candidate in phi-
losophy at Vanderbilt University, where she obtained her J.D. in 2010. Her prior experi-
ence includes an internship with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Office 
of the Prosecutor, the American Society of International Law’s Arthur C. Helton Fellow-
ship for international human rights law in Tanzania, and a fellowship with the Syria Justice 
and Accountability Centre. She recently published International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Normative Defense (with Larry May) with Cambridge University Press, 2017. The authors 
thank Dov Jacobs, Morten Bergsmo, Carsten Stahn, Gregory S. Gordon, and Christopher B. 
Mahony for their valuable comments and CHAN Ho Shing Icarus for his assistance.  
1  See Carsten Stahn, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques 
of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 413–34. 
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are no specific requirements as to where the Prosecutor is to get this in-
formation or how she is to analyse the seriousness of the information re-
ceived. Similar concerns are raised with regard to other trigger mecha-
nisms. Although the requirement that the Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) must 
grant an authorization for a proprio motu investigation constrains the 
Prosecutor’s discretion, there are generally no checks on her determina-
tion that there is (or is not) a reasonable basis to proceed with an investi-
gation. The regulations of the OTP entered into force in 2009 and the 
OTP’s Code of Conduct only entered into force in September 2013, large-
ly as a reference to the staff rules of the ICC. 
We argue that the influence of political considerations is most ap-
parent in prosecutorial discretion exercised during the preliminary exami-
nation phase, and that the permissible invocation of these political consid-
erations generates significant concerns about fairness. Evaluations of se-
lection decisions are much more important for the ICC’s legitimacy than 
for that of most national criminal law systems, where prosecutors’ discre-
tionary decisions not to prosecute very rarely spark a challenge to the 
legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. In contrast, since the ICC 
can only prosecute a handful of cases, each decision can be seen as a 
statement about how the Court views its role in the world. 
In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of the normative founda-
tions of prosecutorial ethics. We acknowledge that in most stages of a 
criminal trial, deontological constraints on the prosecution should be pri-
mary, but that consequentialist considerations should play a larger role in 
the pre-trial phase of a criminal trial. In the third section, we turn to pros-
ecutorial ethics in international law, analysing the normative considera-
tions that should underpin the ethical rules and accountability mechanisms 
that currently govern the OTP. Then, we turn to the preliminary examina-
tion phase – a form of a pre-investigation that precedes the actual ‘formal’ 
investigation of a situation and subsequently a case before the ICC2 – and 
                                                   
2  Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: International Criminal 
Procedure, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 335–36; Héctor Olásolo, Corte Pe-
nal Internacional: ¿Dónde Investigar?: Especial Referencia a la Fscalía en el Proceso de 
Activación, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2003, pp. 118–19; Ignaz Stegmiller, The Pre-
Investigation Stage of the ICC: Criteria for Situation Selection, Duncker & Humblot, Ber-
lin, 2011, p. 57; Ignaz Stegmiller, “The ICC and Mali: Towards more Transparency in In-
ternational Criminal Law Investigations”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2013, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 
485 ff. 
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analyse the OTP’s use of prosecutorial discretion pursuant to Article 53(1). 
We argue that the Prosecutor’s discretion to invoke political considera-
tions when analysing whether a case is in the “interests of justice” should 
be limited by both deontological and consequentialist constraints, and that 
consequentialist political considerations should sometimes be prioritized 
to ensure the functioning of the ICC. Finally, we offer several broad sug-
gestions regarding changes to the ethical rules governing the OTP, and 
argue that the OTP must be accountable to more specific ethical standards 
applicable at the preliminary examination phase to ensure the legitimacy 
and fairness of the Court, both in terms of perception and actual practice. 
18.2. Prosecutorial Ethics  
In this section, we consider the broad normative foundations of prosecuto-
rial ethics, briefly exploring the relationship between law and morality, 
the concepts of justice and fairness3 in criminal trials, and the normative 
ethical theories that inform different kinds of prosecutorial obligations. 
18.2.1. The Relationship between Law and Morality 
When we say we are ‘obligated’4 to do something, we generally mean this 
in one of two ways. First, we might mean that we are legally obligated to 
do something. We may have a positive duty to act in a certain way based 
on a contract we have signed, or we may have a negative duty not to act in 
a certain way based on the existence of a law that constrains our behav-
iour. The other way we might use the term ‘obligation’ is with respect to a 
moral duty.5 Moral obligations can also be positive or negative, demand-
ing or prohibiting certain actions, but a failure to abide by a purely moral 
obligation does not result in legal sanctions. Moral failures may result in 
community-based, social, or interpersonal sanctions.  
Both moral and legal obligations usually correspond to rights: if one 
has a right to something, then there is a corresponding obligation on the 
part of someone, or some entity or institution. So to say that one has a 
right to the performance of a contract means that someone else has an 
                                                   
3  About the role of fairness in legal ethics, see Paolo Moro, “Rhetoric and Fair Play: The 
Cultural Background of Legal Ethics”, in US-China Law Review, 2017, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 
72 ff. 
4  We use the terms ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ interchangeably.  
5 For the purposes of this article, we use the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ interchangeably.  
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obligation to perform under that contract, and to say that one has a right to 
medical care means that some institution has an obligation to provide such 
medical care. 
There is no consensus as to how to distinguish the law as a system 
of norms from morality as a system of norms.6 There are two main con-
ceptual theories about how to understand legal norms: those who affirm 
that there is a necessary conceptual relationship between law and morality, 
and those who deny it. The former – natural law theorists going back to 
the Greek philosophers and Aquinas – argue that a concept of law cannot 
be fully articulated without some reference to morals (“lex injusta non est 
lex”).7 William Blackstone gives the argument for natural law by claiming 
that it is “binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no 
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are 
valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediate-
ly, from this original”. 8  Two modern legal theorists, Lon Fuller and 
Ronald Dworkin, maintain that the concept of law is imbued with morali-
ty of a certain kind (Dworkin) or contains an inner morality (Fuller).  
Positivists argue that because law and morality are conceptually dis-
tinct, a legal system with no moral constraints on legal validity could exist. 
                                                   
6  This is given that these systems are relatively autonomous as promoted by Niklas Luh-
mann and Gunther Teubner. See Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 1: Aufsätze 
zur Theorie sozialer Systeme, 8th edition, Springer, Cham, 2009, p. 226; Gunther Teubner, 
Recht als autopoietisches System, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1989; Niklas Luhmann, 
“Introduction to Autopoietic Law”, in Niklas Luhmann (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Ap-
proach to Law and Society, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1988, pp. 1, 3; Niklas Luhmann, Einfüh-
rung in die Systemtheorie, 4th edition, Carl-Auer, Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 50 ff. (6th edition, 
2011, p. 111); Brian H. Bix, Legal Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 18; 
Roger Cotterrell, “Law in Social Theory and Social Theory in the Study of Law”, in Austin 
Sarat (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society, Blackwell, Malden, 2007, pp. 
16, 22; Clemens Mattheis, “The System Theory of Niklas Luhmann and the Constitutional-
ization of the World Society”, in Goettingen Journal of International Law, 2012, vol. 4, no. 
2, pp. 626 ff. 
7  See Plato, Thomas L. Pangle (trans.), The Laws of Plato, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1980, book IV; Marcus Tullius Cicero, Clinton Walker Keyes (trans.), De Re 
Publica: De Legibus; with an English Translation by Clinton Walker Keyes, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge (MA), 1988; Augustine, Thomas Williams (trans.), On Free 
Choice of the Will, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1993; St. Thomas Aquinas, 
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Burns Oates & Washbourne, London, 1912. 
8  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1979, p. 41.  
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John L. Austin claims that there is a difference between what law is and 
what it ought to be, that “the existence of law is one thing; its merit or 
demerit is another”.9 H.L.A. Hart notes that law and morals are certainly 
related in some ways, but he disputes the idea that “a legal system must 
exhibit some specific conformity with morality or justice, or must rest on 
a widely diffused conviction that there is a moral obligation to obey it”.10 
Instead, he argues that the criteria for what makes a law valid does not 
have to include a “reference to morality or justice”.11 Realists also argue 
that law and morality are conceptually distinct, but they challenge the idea 
that legal decision-making can be explained purely by reference to posi-
tive law. Instead, realists draw from social interests and public policy 
when determining what constitutes the law.12 
Whether or not we can explain or justify the law without morality, 
there is definitely a relationship between the professional obligations13 of 
lawyers and morality. Lawyers are expected to abide by laws, professional 
rules, and informal professional norms, and in many jurisdictions, they are 
also required to abide by a professional code of conduct.14 Professional 
legal ethics involve a recognition that the lawyers are often confronted 
with ethical dilemmas. Criminal lawyers in particular face “conflicting 
                                                   
9 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Library of Ideas edition, Wei-
denfeld and Nicolson, London, 1954, p. 184. 
10  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 185. 
11  Ibid. 
12  See, for example, Myres S. McDougal, “Law and Power”, in American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 1952, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 102–14; Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, 
“Criteria for a Theory About Law”, in Southern California Law Review, 1970, vol. 44, no. 
2, pp. 362–94; Brian Leiter, “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurispru-
dence”, in Texas Law Review, 1997, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 267–315; Anja Matwijkiw and 
Bronik Matwijkiw, “A Modern Perspective on International Criminal Law: Accountability 
as a Meta-Right”, in Leila Nadya Sadat and Michael P. Scharf (eds.), The Theory and 
Practice of International Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008, pp. 19–79. 
13  See David Luban and W. Bradley Wendel, “Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate 
History”, in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 2017, vol. 30, pp. 337-364; see also 
Hugh Breakey, “Building Ethics Regimes: Capabilities, Obstacles and Supports for Profes-
sional Ethical Decision-Making”, in University of New South Wales Law Journal, 2017, 
vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 322–52. 
14  See Donald Nicolson, “Making Lawyers Moral? Ethical Codes and Moral Character”, in 
Legal Studies, 2005, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 601–26. 
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values, aims and interests”.15 They are expected, however, to separate the 
“morality in their representation” from the “morality of the client’s 
cause”.16 A criminal lawyer is expected to vigorously argue for her side of 
the case, whether as a defence lawyer or a prosecution lawyer, and wheth-
er or not she thinks that she in fact has the most compelling argument. But 
this vigour remains limited by ethical constraints, such as the moral re-
quirement to respect the dignity of all persons involved in a criminal trial, 
and the moral prohibition on lying to advance a client’s interests. While a 
defence lawyer may have little control over criminal justice proceedings 
other than determining how best to advocate for his client, a prosecutor 
has additional ethical obligations due to her ability to select defendants for 
trial and determine the scope of the criminal justice process.17  
There is one final point to make about the relationship between le-
gal obligations and moral obligations, specifically in the realm of legal 
ethics. A lawyer’s moral obligations may in fact be legally binding, if they 
are also legal obligations, and these obligations may correspond with legal 
accountability mechanisms. But even in cases where a moral obligation 
has been clearly violated by a prosecutor, the legal obligation may be too 
vague to ensure that the legal accountability mechanisms can prevent or 
punish the violation. So while we will identify legal accountability mech-
anisms at points throughout the chapter, our focus will remain on prosecu-
torial ethics as moral and legal obligations.  
18.2.2. Justice and Fair Trials 
The normative foundations of prosecutorial ethics consist of two main 
concepts: a prosecutor’s general duty to seek justice,18 and the moral theo-
ries that inform the corresponding, specific ethical obligations of the pros-
                                                   
15  Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, “The Ethics of Prosecution Lawyers”, in Legal Eth-
ics, 2004, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 190–209. 
16  David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2007, p. 20. 
17  This of course applies more to the criminal justice process in the legal tradition of the 
common law than to a civil-law criminal process, cf. Alexander Heinze, International 
Criminal Procedure and Disclosure, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2014, pp. 107 ff. 
18  See Fred C. Zacharias, “Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prose-
cutors Do Justice?”, in Vanderbilt Law Review, 1991, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 45 ff. 
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ecutor. In both adversarial and inquisitorial systems of law,19 regardless of 
other specific duties, the prosecutor is expected to seek justice.20 While 
the particular features of what constitutes justice vary between, and some-
times within, criminal legal systems, we adopt the view that it is always 
tied to the concept of fairness.21  
There are three main types of fairness that we will consider in this 
chapter: substantive, procedural, and distributive. First, substantive fair-
ness involves the protection of substantive rights, such as the right to bod-
ily autonomy, liberty from confinement, or a trial that does not result in a 
mistaken conviction.22 A trial that results in an absurd outcome or one that 
is intuitively immoral or arbitrary would be considered substantively un-
                                                   
19  About the meaning of terms ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ in more detail, see Heinze, 
2014, pp. 117 ff., see supra note 17; Kai Ambos and Alexander Heinze, “Abbreviated Pro-
cedures in Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Structural Approach with a View to Inter-
national Criminal Procedure”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Abbreviated Criminal Procedures 
for Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 27, 
28 ff. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/9-bergsmo). 
20 Shawn Marie Boyne, The German Prosecution Service, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,  
2014, p. 5 (“[P]rosecutors possess an ethical obligation to pursue justice”). The fact that 
the search for truth in inquisitorial systems is a constitutive feature (Heinze, 2014, p. 107, 
see supra note 17) does not render justice as an ethical obligation of the prosecutor less 
relevant. In inquisitorial systems too, truth is a means to the end of justice, as Karl Peters 
famously pointed out in his seminal work about the German criminal process (Karl Peters, 
Strafprozeß, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 1985, p. 82 (“Das Strafverfahren kann das Ziel der 
Gerechtigkeit nur erreichen, wenn es die Wahrheit findet”)). In the same vein, see Theo-
dore L. Kubicek, Adversarial Justice: America’s Court System on Trial, Algora, New York, 
2006, p. 37 with further references. See also Barton L. Ingraham, The Structure of Crimi-
nal Procedure, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, p. 13. 
21 See, for example, ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Luban-
ga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, ICC-
01/04-01/06-772, para. 37 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1505f7/): “Where fair trial be-
comes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the ac-
cused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the person on trial. 
Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do justice. If no fair trial can be 
held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and the process must be stopped”. See 
also Catherine S. Namakula, “The Human Rights Mandate of a Prosecutor of an Interna-
tional Criminal Trial”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2017, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 935, 
936. 
22 See, for example, Larry Alexander, “Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive 
Rights?”, in Law and Philosophy, 1998, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 19. 
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fair.23 Second, procedural fairness can be assessed on the basis of a sys-
tem’s rules.24 Rights that are guaranteed by procedures “allow for a sys-
tem of law to emerge out of a set of substantive rules and […] minimize 
arbitrariness”.25 If the same established rules and procedures are applied 
to all defendants and (potential) suspects without bias, then a system 
could be said to be procedurally fair, regardless of outcomes. Third, dis-
tributive fairness in a criminal justice system involves who is actually 
tried for crimes, out of the group of all those who could possibly be tried 
before the court system.26 We might think that a criminal justice system is 
fair with respect to distribution if it is willing and able to try all parties 
who deserve to be tried. It seems that we should care at least somewhat 
about all three types of fairness, yet sometimes they will be at odds with 
one another. We return to our concerns with justice and fairness later in 
the chapter, when we consider the system of international criminal law 
and its particular aims. But for now, we will use a broad concept of fair-
ness as the main goal of a criminal prosecutor. 
18.2.3. Normative Foundations for Specific Prosecutorial Duties 
The prosecutor’s specific obligations for guaranteeing fair trials can be 
thought of in terms of deontological norms and consequentialist norms.27 
                                                   
23  Larry May, “Habeas Corpus and the Normative Jurisprudence of International Law”, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 2010, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 297-299; Lon L. Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (Revised Edition), Yale University Press, New Haven (CT), 1969, pp. 152 
ff.  
24  See, for example, ibid.; Yvonne McDermott, Fairness in International Trials, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2016, pp. 22 ff. Lon Fuller and others argue that procedural 
fairness contains substantive requirements as well, but for the moment we will consider 
each type of fairness in isolation. See Fuller, 1969, supra note 23. 
25  Larry May, Global Justice and Due Process, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2011, p. 52. 
26  Frédéric Mégret, “The Anxieties of International Criminal Justice”, in Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 2016, vol. 29, no. 1, p. 211. 
27  Some have argued that virtue theory can and should inform prosecutorial ethics. See, for 
example, R. Michael Cassidy, “Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us 
About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Justice”, in Notre Dame Law Review, 2006, vol. 
82, no. 2, p. 635. We would argue that virtue ethics and its focus on the character of a 
prosecutor, rather than her decisions, does not provide clear deontic verdicts for how to act. 
We also assume that the duty to act with integrity is incumbent upon all participants in a 
criminal justice system. Therefore, we will only consider the tension between consequen-
tialist and deontological norms here.  
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Consequentialism “takes the good to be primary and identifies right action 
as action that promotes value”.28 Right actions are determined solely by 
the outcomes they produce, so with respect to consequentialist norms, 
they evaluate end-states independent of the path by which the end-states 
were achieved. For purposes of this chapter, we will adopt a broad version 
of consequentialism, a theory which holds that the right action is the ac-
tion that maximizes the good. The promotion of ‘the good’, however, re-
quires a conception of what is good and therefore worthy of promotion. In 
a criminal trial, we would probably conceive of goodness in terms of the 
substantive results of the trial. We might think a criminal trial was ‘good’, 
or fair, if the person who committed a crime is correctly convicted 
through the criminal trial process. So a prosecutor who attempts to reach 
the correct substantive outcome in every case, and considers this to be the 
standard of what constitutes a fair trial, adopts a purely consequentialist 
view of her ethical obligations.  
Deontology, conversely, “takes right action to be the primary evalu-
ative notion; it recognizes various actions as obligatory, prohibited, or 
permitted on the basis of their intrinsic natures and independently of the 
value they produce”.29 Unlike consequentialism, a deontological ethical 
theory may permit, and even require, that agents sometimes not maximize 
the good.30  Rather, deontological constraints identify what actions are 
impermissible because they violate duties, in the form of prohibitions on 
what we may do, specifically prohibiting harming people in various 
ways.31 For instance, Kant argues that one should: “[a]ct so that you use 
humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, 
always at the same time as end and never merely as means”.32 We may 
incur particular responsibilities due to special relationships, which may 
require us to take actions that do not maximize the good.33 Beyond the 
                                                   
28  David O. Brink, “Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism”, in David Copp (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 381.  
29  Ibid.  
30  David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Deontology”, in David Copp (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 424. 
31  Ibid., p. 425.  
32  Immanuel Kant, Allen W. Wood (ed., trans.), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Yale University Press, New Haven (CT), 2002, G4:429. 
33  Ibid., G4:425. 
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actions that are specifically required by duty, deontology allows for free-
dom of choice in our actions.34 For a strict deontologist, there is no gen-
eral duty to ‘do good’ beyond the duties we have to abide by the con-
straints and duties of special relationships. A moderate deontologist, on 
the other hand, will be willing to forgo some duties, in service of good 
outcomes, when abiding by strict deontology will result in a disastrous 
outcome. In a criminal trial, deontological constraints on a prosecutor will 
align more with considerations of procedural fairness. A prosecutor who is 
focused on deontological norms will be concerned with the way choices 
are made, defendants’ rights are respected, and trials are conducted, inde-
pendent of the end-states the trials produce. 
Deontological constraints are well suited to play the primary role in 
shaping prosecutorial ethics and promoting fair trials. Allison M. Danner 
has argued that prosecutorial decisions will be both actually legitimate 
and perceived as such if they are taken in a principled, reasoned, and im-
partial manner.35 As we shall see, the OTP has adopted this approach in 
several policy papers. The duty to treat every individual as an end in her-
self and thus apply the same rules without bias or concern about outcomes 
lends itself to ensuring procedural fairness. The prosecutor is constrained 
by “rules which apply in an all-or-nothing, categorical manner without 
reference to the particular context or consequences of the prohibited or 
required behaviour”.36 The impartiality demanded by deontological con-
straints applies “separately to every relation between persons”, which 
means that no one’s rights may be violated, even if the violation could be 
“offset by benefits that arise elsewhere” in the justice system.37 Deonto-
logical considerations support the view that: “as the prosecutor has abided 
by a number of sign posts, and even if the results may, with the benefit of 
hindsight, look less than ideal, then s/he is effectively considered to have 
acted ethically”.38 These signposts can be part of the criminal procedure 
                                                   
34  Ibid., G4:426. 
35  Allison M. Danner, “Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion at the International Criminal Court”, in American Journal of International Law, 
2003, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 536–37. 
36  Nicolson, 2005, p. 606, see supra note 14. 
37 Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age, 
Princeton University Press, New York, 2010, p. 7. 
38  Frédéric Mégret, “International Prosecutors: Accountability and Ethics”, in Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 18, 2008, p. 8. 
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of the justice system, but they can also involve internal constraints on 
prosecutors, such as formal or informal policies, strategies, standards, or 
regulations.39 Deontological constraints can also support certain substan-
tive rights, such as habeas corpus. We see these deontological constraints 
as crucial to the foundations of prosecutorial ethics and procedural fair-
ness. While strict deontological lines cannot always be drawn, we agree 
that the rights of individual defendants should not be violated in service of 
achieving a particular outcome.  
On the other hand, concerns about the substantive outcomes of 
criminal trials, the overall performance or record of a prosecutor, or the 
social and political impacts of criminal trials will likely involve more con-
sequentialist considerations.40 A prosecutor with an impeccable record of 
respect for defendants’ rights, faced with the prospect of removal due to 
her failure to convict several of these defendants, must consider whether 
she should treat a few defendants as means to her end of staying em-
ployed. Another prosecutor, tasked with determining which members of a 
large criminal enterprise should be indicted and which should receive plea 
deals, will certainly take the results of his decisions into account – and 
will likely be unable to achieve a ‘distributively’ fair result.  
Here we can see the tension between deontological and consequen-
tialist considerations, as well as the varying types of justice, as it will not 
always be possible for a prosecutor to abide by strict deontological duties 
while also striving to convict every defendant who is guilty. Consequen-
tialist considerations will be inappropriate at many points in a criminal 
trial, because they will constitute an impermissible failure of procedural 
fairness. A prosecutor who has been prevented by the applicable criminal 
procedure from presenting the most compelling evidence at a murder trial 
cannot go on to bribe a judge to rule in her favour, even if the murder 
conviction would serve an important social purpose in consoling the mur-
der victim’s family. We maintain that consequentialist considerations 
should be impermissible during a criminal trial phase when they are in-
compatible with deontological constraints. 
Yet in most criminal justice systems, including the ICC, there are 
specific sites of prosecutorial discretion, and some of these are appropri-
                                                   
39  Ibid., p. 7. 
40  Ibid., p. 8. 
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ate sites for the influence of consequentialist ethical considerations. In an 
ideal system of criminal justice, each suspect is subject to a fourth kind of 
justice – retributive justice – in line with the wrongfulness of the respec-
tive conduct and the ensuing blame (culpa) to be accorded to her. Yet the 
uniform delivery of this classical, retributive justice is not possible in any 
criminal justice system. There are simply too many individuals who could 
be investigated and tried for prosecutors to take on every single situation 
or case. In practically all domestic criminal justice systems, justice is dis-
tributed selectively according to certain, often policy-based, criteria.41 As 
we will see in the next section, this is also the case at the ICC.  
Prosecutorial discretion may be appropriate in other parts of a trial 
as well. In the sentencing phase, for instance, it may be appropriate to 
consider a defendant’s particular circumstances before determining the 
best method and duration of punishment. This offers an opportunity for 
the prosecutor to respond to concerns about general deterrence, as well as 
deterring the specific individual, and it can also allow for a prosecutor to 
mitigate or intensify the political impact of the criminal conviction within 
the community.  
We argue, however, that the most appropriate site for an expanded 
use of consequentialist considerations is prior to the trial. A prosecutor’s 
office might have a deontological aim of prosecuting all crimes that are of 
the same gravity, and attempt to seek distributive justice. Yet resources are 
always limited, in terms of time, money, personnel, and access to evi-
dence. It is impossible for a prosecutor to treat every potential defendant 
equally, even if it is possible to treat every actual defendant equally.42 
While a prosecutor’s conduct should always be limited by deontological 
constraints prohibiting bias and the use of individuals as means rather 
                                                   
41 See Jörg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade, Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice 
Systems: the Rise of Prosecutorial Power across Europe, Springer, Berlin, 2006, pp. 24, 
60–61; see also Mirjan R. Damaška, “What is the Point of International Criminal Law?”, 
in Chicago Kent Law Review, 2008, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 362–63, referring to the discrimina-
tion from a historical perspective; from a comparative perspective, with a view to manda-
tory prosecution or prosecutorial discretion (principle of opportunity), see Hanna 
Kuczyńska, The Accusation Model before the International Criminal Court, Springer, 
Cham, 2015, pp. 94–106. 
42  See, in a similar vein, Andre Vartan Armenian, “Selectivity in International Criminal Law: 
An Assessment of the ‘Progress Narrative’”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2016, 
vol. 16, no. 4, p. 646. 
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than respecting them as ends, it is appropriate, and perhaps even obligato-
ry in some instances, for a prosecutor to consider the potential conse-
quences of the decisions she makes regarding which situations to investi-
gate and which individuals to prosecute. In Sections 18.3. and 18.4., we 
expand this argument and apply it to the preliminary examination phase at 
the ICC. 
18.3. Prosecutorial Ethics in International Criminal Law  
In the previous section, we explored prosecutorial ethics generally, as it 
might play out for domestic prosecutors in a well-established criminal 
justice system. There are, however, at least two reasons why we might 
have more to consider when we turn to the specific ethical issues facing 
international prosecutors.  
First, the institutions that purport to carry out international criminal 
law remain in their early stages. There are still concerns about both inter-
nal and external acceptance of the institutions, and so prosecutors will 
sometimes need to take into account how their decisions will influence the 
system of international criminal justice as a whole. This is also a concern 
for prosecutors in States with fledgling domestic criminal legal systems, 
in that the system must be seen as legitimate by a State’s people for it to 
function effectively.43  
Second, international criminal law exists as a complement to do-
mestic criminal law, and therefore it cannot simply claim jurisdiction over 
any situation or case without considering the interests and positions of 
sovereign States. Domestic criminal law is often tiered as well, in States 
containing both federal and local laws and systems of accountability. Yet 
in most States, the federal jurisdiction takes priority over any local or re-
gional jurisdictional claims. This is not necessarily so in the relationship 
between domestic and international criminal law, and thus international 
prosecutors have additional ethical factors to consider when exercising 
discretion.  
Additionally, there are a variety of domestic criminal laws and prin-
ciples that underlie international criminal law, so it is not always easy to 
identify what principles should prevail when international criminal prose-
cutors are asked to balance competing values or interests. In this section, 
                                                   
43  Ibid., pp. 644–45. 
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we will explore the particular features of ethics in international criminal 
law. We begin by exploring the system of international criminal law gen-
erally, in terms of the purpose of and power to punish. We then turn to 
foundational moral and political questions of international criminal law, 
namely how we should conceive of the shared jurisdiction between do-
mestic and international criminal legal systems. Finally, we turn to the 
OTP at the ICC and analyse the specific ethical rules that govern this par-
ticular body’s functioning.  
18.3.1. Ius Puniendi and Purpose of Punishment in International 
Criminal Law 
As we have seen, the prosecutor’s work necessarily interferes with the 
rights of suspects and accused persons. The power of the prosecutor as a 
State agent/organ can only be justified by the State’s power to punish (ius 
puniendi) and eventually by certain purposes of punishment. We lean to-
wards translating ius puniendi as ‘power’ and not ‘right’ to punish, to 
avoid confusion with ius poenale. Reinhard Maurach and Heinz Zipf dis-
tinguish ius poenale and ius puniendi as the objective and subjective right 
to punish, respectively.44 Ius poenale describes the sum of rules about 
offences, sentences and other forms of punishment; ius puniendi is the 
State power to punish, that is, the State’s capacity – resulting from its sov-
ereignty – to declare certain conduct as punishable and to determine a 
sentence.45 Thus, ius poenale is the result of ius puniendi.46  
Others also distinguish between the subjective and objective right to 
punish, but for them, the subjective right to punish is more of a right and 
less of an inherent power.47 Their premise is different from ours: while we 
believe that ius poenale presupposes ius puniendi, for Franz von Holtzen-
                                                   
44  See Reinhard Maurach and Heinz Zipf, Strafrecht – Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. 1: Grundlehren 
des Strafrechts und Aufbau der Straftat, 8th edition, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 1992, p. 3. 
45  Ibid. 
46  See, in a similar vein, Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, 3rd edition, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1978, p. 8: “Das Strafrecht beruht auf der Strafgewalt (‘ius 
puniendi’) des Staates, und diese ist wiederum Teil der Staatsgewalt” (emphasis in the 
original, footnote omitted). 
47  See Hilde Kaufmann, Strafanspruch und Strafklagerecht, Otto Schwartz & Co, Göttingen, 
1969, pp. 71–72 with further references.  
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dorff, for example, it is the other way around.48 In other words, only when 
there exists a body of rules about offences, sentences, and other forms of 
punishment, does the State have the right to punish. This goes to Wesley 
Hohfeld’s classical analysis of ‘right’ that includes – among other things – 
a power. More concretely, that is to say that the right to punish comprises 
both the normative power and the State’s permissibility to punish.49 Espe-
cially a State’s jurisdiction – and eventually universal jurisdiction, as we 
elaborate in more detail below – stems from a State’s power to punish and 
only indirectly from a right.50  
For three reasons, however, the emanation of a power to punish (ius 
puniendi) from a right to punish (ius poenale) is not convincing. First, the 
Hobbesian ‘right’ to punish should not be confused with a Hohfeldian 
‘right’ to punish.51 According to Hobbes, State punishment stems from the 
right to self-preservation.52 Even though, strictly speaking, this right be-
                                                   
48  Franz von Holtzendorff, “Einleitung in das Strafrecht”, in Franz von Holtzendorff (ed.), 
Handbuch des deutschen Strafrechts in Einzelbeiträgen: Vol. 1: Die geschichtlichen und 
philosophischen Grundlagen des Strafrechts, Lüderitz’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin, 
1871, p. 3: “Jedes staatliche Recht auf Bestrafung (jus puniendi) ist an das Vorhandensein 
eines positiven Rechtssatzes (jus poenale) geknüpft, durch welchen eine Handlung als 
verbrecherisch erklärt und die darauf anzuwendende Strafe bestimmt wird”; Kaufmann, 
1969, p. 72, see supra note 47. 
49  Alejandro Chehtman, “Jurisdiction”, in Markus D. Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 402. 
50  Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey), 
Judgment, 7 September 1927, para. 45: “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the con-
trary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this 
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territo-
ry except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a con-
vention”. (emphasis added) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a6fa72/). This was overlooked 
by Anthony R. Reeves, “Liability to International Prosecution: The Nature of Universal Ju-
risdiction”, in European Journal of International Law, 2018, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 1047–
1067. 
51  Alice Ristroph, “Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory”, in California Law Re-
view, 2009, vol. 97, no. 2, p. 603, footnote 8. 
52  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003, p. 214: “[E]very man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever be thought 
necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. 
And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every Common-
wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down 
theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them 
all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set 
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longs to all natural, mortal humans, the sovereign possesses it through the 
State’s existence in a specific state of nature vis-à-vis a natural person.53 
Second, especially at an extraterritorial and/or international level, beyond 
a right to punish, “we must also account for a specific body having the 
authority to exercise that right”.54 Third, should ius puniendi really pre-
suppose ius poenale, the question of why a State has the right to punish is 
obsolete – a classical vicious cycle.55  
Here, the development of the term ‘ius puniendi’ deserves closer 
consideration. It originally only described the power to punish, also 
known as ‘potestas criminalis’, and included the State’s power to punish, 
resulting from superiority (Selbstherrlichkeit, Imperium), a superior right 
and duty to protect (hoheitliches Schutzrecht mit Schutzpflicht) or ius emi-
nens, comparable with Hobbes’ right to self-preservation.56 The power to 
punish had a pre-positive origin57 and became successively intertwined 
with the positive right to punish as result of the triumph of liberal criminal 
law,58 constructing juridical relationships between the State as a (criminal 
law) legislator, and the State as possessing the right to punish.59 This, 
however, ignores that ius poenale can hardly have the function of being 
both the criminal law (right), which is addressed to the citizens, and the 
basis of punishment (power), at the same time.  
Nevertheless, both theoretical elements – ius puniendi and the pur-
pose of punishment – are highly disputed on an international level. Inter-
national criminal law lacks a consolidated punitive power in its own right, 
since it does not operate pursuant to a legislative body, but instead claims 
                                                                                                                        
him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every 
one against this neighbour”; see also ibid., pp. 613–14. 
53  Ristroph, 2009, p. 615, see supra note 51. 
54  Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 6. 
55  In the same vein, see Peter Klose, “‘Ius puniendi’ und Grundgesetz”, in Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 1974, vol. 86, p. 36. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Heinrich Luden, Handbuch des teutschen gemeinen und particularen Strafrechts, vol. 1, 
Friedrich Luden, Jena, 1847, p. 6. 
58  Klose, 1974, pp. 39–41, see supra note 55. 
59  Karl Binding, Handbuch des Strafrechts, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1885, p. 191. 
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the ability to punish without the status of a sovereign nation.60 This alone 
renders the OTP’s broad discretionary power theoretically unfounded. In 
fact, what we have said earlier about the definition of law might well be 
used as arguments against prosecutorial discretion on an international 
level: (a) at the international level, a normative order is absent where 
norms are recognized by the society as a whole and determine social 
communication, which is required for the power to punish (Günther Jak-
obs);61 (b) law cannot exist without the State (Thomas Hobbes);62 and (c) 
law cannot exist without a public power to enforce it (Immanuel Kant) – 
for Kant, law implies the Rechtsstaat and “a republican form of govern-
ance”,63 which is not necessarily limited to the institutional form of a na-
tion State but “allows for the creation, interpretation, and, where neces-
sary, enforcement of law”.64  
However, a more fundamental question arises as to whether it 
makes sense at all to apply the theories of validity of norms, developed 
with classical sovereign nations in mind, to a supranational order that 
follows different rules of organization.65 Here, the enforcement of funda-
mental human rights by international criminal law comes to the rescue of 
the international community’s ius puniendi, eventually blurring the lines 
                                                   
60  Kai Ambos, “Punishment without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue of International 
Criminal Law: A First Contribution towards a Consistent Theory of International Criminal 
Law”, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2013, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 298. 
61  Günther Jakobs, “Untaten des Staates – Unrecht im Staat”, in Goltdammer’s Archiv für 
Strafrecht, 1994, pp. 13–14. Jakobs expressis verbis refers to the state’s ‘power’ and not 
‘right’ to punish, since a power to punish is a necessary requirement for the right to punish. 
In Jakobs’ own words: “Ohne staatliche Gewalt gibt es kein staatliches Recht” (p. 13). See 
also Kenneth Anderson, “The ICC Would Increase Its Prevention Ability If the Prosecu-
tor’s Discretion Were More Visibly Limited”, in Richard H. Steinberg (ed.), Contemporary 
Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2016, p. 
188 (“Since I do not regard what passes for the international community as constituting a 
social order – a society, in Weber’s sense – it seems to me mere metaphor and analogy to 
consider that the ICC can play a role globally that criminal courts play domestically”). See 
generally Ambos, 2013, pp. 299–300, see supra note 60 with further references.  
62  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, J.C.A. Gaskin (ed.), 1998 (1651) Oxford University Press, 
London, pp. 114 ff. 
63  Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 124 [313]. 
64  Interpretation by Patrick Capps and Julian Rivers, “Kant’s Concept of International Law”, 
in Legal Theory, 2011, vol. 16, p. 229, 234.  
65  Ambos, 2013, p. 303, see supra note 60. 
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between the community’s obligation to protect human rights abuses and 
its power to punish.  
As previously mentioned, it was Immanuel Kant who had the idea 
of human dignity as a source of fundamental human (civil) rights66 that, 
ultimately, must be enforced by a supra- or transnational (criminal) law.67 
Kant’s conception of human dignity is complemented by his view of ‘per-
petual peace’.68 Klaus Günther follows from Kant’s Third Definitive Arti-
cle (“Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal 
Hospitality (principle of cosmopolitan right)”), that the application of 
public human rights is a necessary precondition for a permanent peace.69 
                                                   
66  Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (ed., trans.), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 15 [402]. See also Marie E. Newhouse, 
“Two Types of Legal Wrongdoing”, in Legal Theory, 2017, vol. 22, pp. 59 ff.; Ulfried 
Neumann, “Das Rechtsprinzip der Menschenwürde als Schutz elementarer menschlicher 
Bedürfnisse. Versuch einer Eingrenzung”, in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie, 
2017, vol. 103, p. 293; Thomas Gutmann and Michael Quante, “Menschenwürde, 
Selbstbestimmung und Pluralismus: Zwischen sittlicher Vorgabe und deontologischer 
Konstruktion", in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilospie, 2017, vol. 103, no. 3, pp. 322 ff.; 
Laura Valentini, “Dignity and Human Rights: A Reconceptualisation”, in Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, vol. 37, no. 4, p. 867. 
67  Ambos, 2013, p. 304, see supra note 60. 
68  The structure of his work Toward Perpetual Peace is as follows: six “Preliminary Articles” 
ban treacherous dealings among States, including preparation for war (Immanuel Kant, 
“Perpetual Peace”, in Hans Reiss (ed.), H.B. Nisbet (trans.), Immanuel Kant, Political 
Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 93 ff.). They describe steps 
that can be taken to ‘wind down’ a war and avoid armed conflict. Kant’s preliminary arti-
cles basically “seek to ground the federation on measures of good faith, self-determination 
and non-interference” (interpretation by Garrett Wallace Brown, “Kantian Cosmopolitan 
Law and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution”, in History of Political Thought, 2006, 
vol. 27, pp. 661, 678). Three “Definitive Articles” establish actions and institutions 
deemed necessary for a cosmopolitan system to sustain itself over time and end a war: 1. 
The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican (principle of civil right); 2. The 
Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States (principle of international 
right); 3. Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality (prin-
ciple of cosmopolitan right) (Kant, ibid., p. 98). Compared to the Preliminary Articles, the 
Definitive Articles present “stronger terms for membership [in the federation] and the 
normative conditions upon which the federation stands” (Brown, ibid., p. 681). For a both 
historical and conceptual account of Kant’s understanding of war and peace see Philipp 
Gisbertz, “The Concepts of ‘War’ and ‘Peace’ in the Context of Transnational Terrorism”, 
in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 2018, vol. 104, no. 1, pp. 3, 9. 
69  Klaus Günther, “Falscher Friede durch repressives Völkerstrafrecht?", in Werner Beulke et 
al. (eds.), Das Dilemma des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 
Berlin, 2009, p. 84.  
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Kant justifies this precondition through a two-step argument: First, “[The] 
universal law of Right [Rechtsgesetz], so act externally that the free use of 
your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with 
a universal law, is indeed a law [Gesetz], which lays an obligation on me, 
but it does not at all expect, far less demand, that I myself should limit my 
freedom to those conditions just for the sake of this obligation; […]”.70 
Second, “if (as must be the case in such a constitution) the agreement of 
the citizens is required to decide whether or not one ought to wage war, 
then nothing is more natural than that they would consider very carefully 
whether to enter into such a terrible game, since they would have to re-
solve to bring the hardships of war upon themselves […]”.71 In sum, with 
this conception, Kant laid the foundations for all current conceptions of 
human dignity and world peace, an “international rule of law”.72  
This not only gives the world community ius puniendi – it also af-
fects the purposes of punishment and eventually the theoretical basis of 
the prosecutor’s ethical obligations. The argument goes thus: prosecutorial 
ethics at the ICC are shaped by both the justification of the world com-
munity’s ius puniendi and the mandate of the ICC, that is, its goals and 
purposes of punishment.73 The justification of ius puniendi can have either 
a deontological (human dignity as a source of fundamental human (civil) 
rights) or consequentialist (confirmation and reinforcement of fundamen-
tal human rights norms) aspect. The same applies to the mandate of the 
ICC. While retribution as a purpose of punishment has a moral dimension, 
it is fair to say that most of the ICC’s goals are consequentialist in nature. 
                                                   
70  Immanuel Kant, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 56 [231], emphasis added. 
71  Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and 
History, Yale University Press, London, 2006, [8:351], emphasis added. 
72  Wade L. Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image”, in International Studies Quarterly, 1996, vol. 40, 
pp. 45, 49; Alec Stone Sweet, “A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and 
Rights Adjudication in Europe”, in Global Constitutionalism, 2012, vol. 1, pp. 53, 58; Jor-
rik Fulda, “Eine legitime Globalverfassung? Die US-Hegemonie und die 
weltgesellschaftlich gerechte Vollendung des Kantischen Projektes”, in Archiv des 
Völkerrechts, 2016, vol. 54, pp. 334, 345. About the role of human dignity in International 
Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law, see Stefanie Schmahl, “Human Digni-
ty in International Human Rights, Humanitarian and International Criminal Law: A Com-
parative Approach”, in Eric Hilgendorf and Mordechai Kremnitzer (eds.), Human Dignity 
and Criminal Law, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2018, pp. 79 ff.  
73  See, in a similar vein, Reeves, 2018, p. 1047, supra note 50. 
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This is especially true for the expressivist purpose of punishment. 74 
Moreover, the mere existence and work of the Court help to promote hu-
man rights by: creating a historical record for past wrongs;75 offering a 
forum for victims to voice their opinions and receive satisfaction and 
compensation for past violations;76 creating judicial precedent; and deter-
ring potential violators of the gravest crimes77 while punishing past of-
fenders.78 Thus, human rights norms in the ICC Statute “provide a blue-
print for the common good of a community”.79 
18.3.2. Ethics and International Criminal Law 
18.3.2.1. Normative Moral Foundations for International Criminal 
Law  
Hugo Grotius and other early natural law theorists drew a distinction be-
tween voluntary law (ius dispositivum) and obligatory law (ius scrip-
                                                   
74  See, for example, David Luban, “Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality and the 
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law”, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), 
The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 576; Di-
ane Marie Amann, “Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide”, in International 
Criminal Law Review, 2002, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 117.  
75  Statement of Judge Claude Jorda, U.N. SCOR, 55th session, 4161st meeting, UN Doc. 
S/PV.4161, 20 June, 2000, p. 3; Jens D. Ohlin, “A Meta-Theory of International Criminal 
Procedure, Vindicating the Rule of Law”, in UCLA Journal of International Law and For-
eign Affairs, 2009, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 86 ff.; in more detail Heinze, 2014, pp. 218 ff., see 
supra note 17. 
76  Bert Swart, “Damaska and the Faces of International Criminal Justice”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2008, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 100; Minna Schrag, “Lessons 
Learned from ICTY Experience”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2004, vol. 
2, no. 2, p. 428. For Ralph, this helps to constitute a world society, Jason Ralph, “Interna-
tional Society, the International Criminal Court and American Foreign Policy”, in Review 
of International Studies, 2005, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 28, 39. 
77  Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: vol. 1: Foundations and General 
Part, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 71. 
78  ICTR, Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Trial Chamber, Sentence, 5 February 1999, ICTR-
98-39-S, para. 20 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e2dddb/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutagan-
da, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 6 December 1999, ICTR-96-3-T, para. 455 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/f0dbbb/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Trial Chamber, Judge-
ment, 15 July 2004, ICTR-2001-71-I, para. 498 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/272b55/); 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karera, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 7 December 2007, ICTR-01-74-T, 
para. 571 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7bc57f/). 
79  John M. Czarnetzky and Ronald J. Rychlak, “An Empire of Law: Legalism and the Inter-
national Criminal Court”, in Notre Dame Law Review, 2003, vol. 79, no. 1, p. 110. 
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tum).80 Hugo Grotius claimed that the necessary principles of natural law 
were “the dictate of right reason involving moral necessity, independent 
of any institution – human or divine”.81 As John Finnis notes, Grotius and 
his counterparts believed that a determination of right or wrong “depends 
on the nature of things (and what is conveniens to such nature), and not on 
a decree of God; but the normative or motivating significance of moral 
rightness and wrongness”.82 Grotius saw that there was an international 
community of sovereign States for whom these necessary principles were 
non-voluntary laws.83 He and his contemporaries “laid down unreservedly 
that Natural Law is the code of states, and thus put in operation a process 
which has continued almost down to our own day, the process of engraft-
ing on the international system rules which are supposed to have been 
evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception of Nature”.84 
One particularly important aspect of this natural law doctrine was the idea 
that since men are, by nature, all equal, so too are the “independent com-
munities, however different in size and power”, that make up the interna-
tional order.85  
An additional concept is the creation of a civitas maxima – which 
Christian Wolff described as an organic whole uniting all nations on the 
basis of the universal natural law86 – that lies within the so-called revolu-
                                                   
80  Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens”, in Yale Jour-
nal of International Law, 2009, vol. 34, no. 2, p. 334. 
81  Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical 
Development, Criteria, Present Status, Coronet Books Inc., Helsinki, 1988, p. 30. 
82  John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2011, p. 44. Italics in original. 
83  Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, 1625, 1, chap. 1, sect. X, para. 5; see also 
Rafael Nieto-Navia, “International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Hu-
manitarian Law”, in Lal Chand Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on 
International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese, International Humanitarian Law Series, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, pp. 595–640. 
84  Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, Lex-
ington, 2013, p. 30. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Christian L.B. Wolff, Institutiones Juris Naturae et Gentium in Quibus ex Ipsa Hominis 
Natura Continuo Nexu Omnes Obligationes et Jura Omnia Deducuntur, Apud F. ex N. 
Pezzana, Venetiis, 1769, part IV, cap. I, sect. 1090: “Quemadmodum vero lex naturae 
praestat consensum in civitatem maximam; ita eadam quoque eumdem supplet in 
condendis legibus”. This rather rough translation was provided by Armin von Bogdandi 
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tionist tradition, for which Kant is identified as a forerunner,87 although 
both concepts – Grotius’ and Kant’s – overlap in certain regards.88 The 
revolutionist view of a “world society” is “identified by those rights 
claims of individuals and non-State groups that are asserted by ‘a third 
image of international [or cosmopolitan] law’ and enforced by global in-
stitutions when states are unwilling and unable to do so”.89 The different 
notions of the international community are mirrored in the ICC Statute. 
For legal positivists, the existence of a legal system depends on the 
procedures and structures that created the legal system, not on the content 
of the laws. In the realm of international law, this means that law could 
only exist as part of a system with accepted procedures and structures. 
Alberico Gentili, one of the earliest scholars of international law, argued 
that international law was based on the consent of States and attempted to 
show that “the [codified] Roman law was valid in the extra-European 
domain and between sovereign polities and empires”.90 He claimed that 
“it was possible to apply rules taken from the Roman law of the Institutes 
and the Digest to the relations between different European polities and to 
some relations beyond Europe”.91 Jeremy Bentham talked of “internation-
al jurisprudence” in reference to “mutual transactions between sover-
eigns”,92 and other positivists who followed pointed to State recognition 
of customs and treaty obligations. 
                                                                                                                        
and Sergio Dellavalle, “Universalism and Particularism”, in Stefan Kadelbach et al. (eds.), 
System, Order, and International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 489.  
87  Ralph, 2005, p. 34, see supra note 76; Barry Buzan, “The English School: An Underex-
ploited Resource in IR”, in Review of International Studies, 2001, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 475. 
88  Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations”, in Review of 
International Studies, 1999, vol. 16, no. 3, p. 200.  
89  Ralph, 2005, p. 34, see supra note 76, citing Andrew Hurrell, “Conclusion International 
Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society”, in Michael Byers (ed.), The 
Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 337. 
90  Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, “State of Nature Versus Commercial Socia-
bility as the Basis of International Law: Reflections on the Roman Foundations and Cur-
rent Interpretations of the International Political and Legal Thought of Grotius, Hobbes, 
and Pufendorf”, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of Interna-
tional Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 38. 
91  Ibid. Italics in the original. 
92  Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Batoche 
Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 236. 
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Although legal positivism has overshadowed natural law theory 
since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it remains the case that we 
think, even without international positive law, that States cannot avoid 
certain obligations to the international community. Natural law theories 
remain the most straightforward way to justify an international legal sys-
tem, especially one that has expanded to include claims of authority over 
a much wider range of issues, including criminal law and mass atrocity. 
The moral underpinnings of international criminal law reflect the continu-
ing influence of natural law theory at least through the twentieth century. 
In the wake of World War II, as the international community sought to 
impose accountability for atrocities on individual actors, there was no 
positive international criminal law to assist with such an undertaking. 
Thus, one of the main justifications for the International Military Tribunal 
(‘IMT’) was a shared understanding within the international community 
that the atrocities of World War II were exceptionally serious. The indi-
vidual trials were an expression of the universal moral judgment of the 
wrongness and seriousness of the crimes. While positive international 
criminal law has proliferated in the years since the IMT, the purported 
universal condemnation of genocide and crimes against humanity remains 
a source of respect for both the positive law and the norms against such 
crimes.  
Moreover, contrary to the Nuremberg International Military Tribu-
nal, the Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal (before it was turned into a national tribunal),93 
‘ordinary’ international criminal tribunals94 depend, as a general rule, on 
the co-operation of the relevant territorial State(s), with regard to both the 
investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed on the State territo-
                                                   
93  Annalisa Ciampi, “Other Forms of Cooperation”, in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 2, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 1711–12. 
94  Generally on the ICC’s approach to co-operation, see Rod Rastan, “The Responsibility to 
Enforce – Connecting Justice with Unity”, in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, pp. 171 ff.; 
Karin N. Calvo-Goller, La Procédure et la Jurisprudence de la Cour Pénale Internationale, 
Gazette du Palais, Paris, 2012, p. 133. 
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ry, and the enforcement of the respective sentences.95 States are and re-
main the key actors in co-operation with respect to criminal matters.96 In 
this regard, the ICC Statute promotes the Grotian solidary international 
society.97 
Some claim that legal positivist theories are unable to pass moral 
judgment on ‘bad’ State or individual actors, and that we should instead 
rely on these natural law theories. But as international criminal law has 
grown over the last half century, positive law theorists have gained force 
in passing legal judgments on such ‘bad’ actors. Many of the documents 
creating international criminal law are filled with moral language, reflect-
ing expressions of the global community as to the wrongness of certain 
types of heinous crimes. This influence on the positive law seems to deny 
that positive law has to be free of moral judgment, but even if the moral 
language in the documents is ignored, States remain in a position to pass 
moral judgment as individual States while working within the internation-
al criminal justice systems to pass legal judgment. 
18.3.2.2. Universal Jurisdiction 
From the time of the IMT, holding individuals accountable under interna-
tional criminal law has been related to the idea that those who commit 
international crimes do so not just against individuals, or ethnic groups, or 
States, but against humanity (the political community/global public) as a 
whole.98 The concept of universal jurisdiction is premised on the moral 
argument that some crimes are “so calculated, so malignant, and so devas-
tating, and civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it can-
                                                   
95  See, generally, Claus Kreß and Kimberly Prost, “Part 9 – Preliminary Remarks”, in Otto 
Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, 3rd edition, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2016, marginal no. 1. 
96  Darryl Robinson, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win”, 
in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 339.  
97  Ralph, 2005, p. 37, see supra note 76. 
98  See Luigi D.A. Corrias and Geoffrey M. Gordon, “Judging in the Name of Humanity: 
International Criminal Tribunals and the Representation of a Global Public”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2015, vol. 13, no.1, pp. 98 ff.; Anthony Duff, “Authority 
and Responsibility in International Criminal Law”, in Samantha Besson and John Tasiou-
las (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 595 ff.; 
see also Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Pen-
guin Books, New York, 2006, p. 251. 
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not survive their being repeated”.99 When the whole of civilization or hu-
manity is identified as the relevant entity who has been harmed by a crime, 
some argue that this should correspond with universal jurisdiction, which 
allows any State to prosecute individuals, no matter where the crime was 
committed.100 Grotius, for instance, argued that every State should have 
jurisdiction over “gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, 
done to other States and subjects”.101 The concept of universal jurisdiction 
has foundations in natural law, but with the proliferation of positive inter-
national criminal law, it can be defended (and challenged) by theorists in 
both camps.102 
18.3.2.3. Normative Moral Foundations for the ICC 
The ICC was established with the concepts of universal jurisdiction in 
mind, although some of the parties who worked on the ICC Statute reject-
ed the idea.103 The Preamble of the Statute notes that the purpose of the 
ICC was to have jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole”, and that the aim of the ICC is to 
“guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international jus-
                                                   
99  As noted in Justice Robert Jackson’s opening statement before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
speaking on behalf of the prosecution team. Justice Jackson’s opening statement is pub-
lished in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 
2, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947, pp. 98–155. About the moral basis of 
universal jurisdiction in more detail, see Jochen Bung, “Naturrecht – Völkerrecht – 
Weltrecht: Der Code des Hugo Grotius”, in Archiv des Völkerrechts, 2017, vol. 55, no. 2, 
pp. 126 ff.  
100  See Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kreß, “Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court”, in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 1999, vol. 
2, pp. 143–75; see also Claus Kreß, “Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and 
the Institut De Droit International”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 4, no. 
3, 2006, pp. 561–85.  
101  Hugo Grotius, Archibald C. Campbell (trans.), The Rights of War and Peace, Including the 
Law of Nature and of Nations, Elibron Classics reprint, M. Walter Dunne, Washington and 
London, 1901, book II, chap. XX, para. XL, p. 247.  
102  This diversity of the concept is overlooked by Reeves, 2018, pp. 1047-1067, see supra 
note 50, whose attempt to combine the ius puniendi question with the justification for uni-
versal jurisdiction is laudable but both lacks an examination of the literature on the ius pu-
niendi of the international community (Reeves uses the rather anodyne term of “preroga-
tive” [to prosecute] and superelevates it metaphysically) and demonstrates a rather selec-
tive analysis of the existing views on universal jurisdiction. 
103  See Kaul and Kreß, 1999, supra note 100. 
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tice”.104 The ICC Statute is not only the “culmination of international law-
making”.105 Rather, it codifies the customary international humanitarian 
laws,106 and the jurisprudence of previously established international or 
internationalised tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR.107 Thus, the 
law with regard to grave international crimes, customary and treaty-based 
international law, the applicable general principles of law and internation-
ally recognised human rights, “consolidated over a century’s worth of 
jurisprudence and customary law”, have been ‘constitutionalized’ by the 
ICC Statute.108  
These declarations are significant, but they are vague in terms of 
how they should inform the specific ethical commitments of institutions 
like the ICC. If seeking justice is the aim of all adversarial, inquisitorial, 
and international criminal justice systems, then we need to know more 
about what the ICC is seeking when it seeks justice. We return to this 
question when we explore the parameters of the prosecutor’s discretionary 
powers during the preliminary examination phase in Section 18.4. The 
most important thing to identify at this point is that it is necessary for the 
OTP to exercise these discretionary powers within a system of prosecuto-
rial ethical obligations. 
18.3.3. Ethical Obligations for the OTP 
The OTP at the ICC is governed by several different sets of ethical rules 
relating to professional conduct and ethics. We focus on the ICC Statute 
and the OTP Code of Conduct, the latter of which was adopted in 2013, 
but the OTP is also bound by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
Regulations of the Court, and the Prosecution Regulations.109 While we 
                                                   
104  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 
July 2002, Preamble (‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
105  Marc Weller, “Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the Inter-
national Criminal Court”, in International Affairs, 2002, vol. 78, no. 4, p. 693. 
106  Errol P. Mendes, Peace and Justice at the International Criminal Court, Elgar, Chelten-
ham, 2010, p. 22. 
107  Ibid., p. 24. 
108  Ibid., pp. 15, 21–22. 
109  The applicable provisions in each of these documents were identified by the Trial Chamber 
V(B) in ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence application concerning professional ethics appli-
cable to prosecution lawyers, 31 May 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-747, para. 10 (http://www.
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briefly identify some of the corresponding external accountability mecha-
nisms, such as disciplinary measures and judicial review, our focus is on 
specific obligations of the OTP. Therefore, the only accountability mech-
anisms that we discuss in any detail are those that create new obligations 
on the part of the OTP.  
18.3.3.1. General Ethical Rules 
18.3.3.1.1. The ICC Statute 
The ICC Statute contains specific ethical requirements110 of the OTP in 
several sections of the Statute. Article 42(2) gives the Prosecutor “full 
authority over the management and administration of the Office, including 
the staff, facilities and other resources thereof”,111  while Article 42(3) 
notes that the “Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons of 
high moral character”.112 This kind of institutional independence of the 
OTP, supported by a strong administrative autonomy, is a novelty.113 Its 
purpose is to prevent a factual dependency of the OTP on the Registry, 
which occurred in the early stages of the ICTR.114  
                                                                                                                        
legal-tools.org/doc/d27ea0/). The case also referred to ICC Staff Rules and Regulations, 
which we have not considered here due to the high-level nature of the ethical obligations 
we are considering. 
110  On the ethical obligations of all legal professionals in international criminal courts and 
tribunals, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, in Vesselin Popovski (ed.), International Rule of Law 
and Professional Ethics, Ashgate Publishing, 2014, pp. 171-188. 
111  ICC Statute, Article 42(2), see supra note 104. See, in detail, Hector Olásolo, “Issues 
Regarding Article 42”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), 
Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 423 ff. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-
song). 
112  ICC Statute, Article 42(3), see supra note 104. 
113  See also John R.W.D. Jones, “The Office of the Prosecutor”, in Antonio Cassese et al. 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 1, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 273; Jan Wouters, Sten Verhoeven and Bruno 
Demeyere, “The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor: Navigating be-
tween Independence and Accountability”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2008, vol. 
8, no. 1, p. 277; William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 
5th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 372; Namakula, 2017, pp. 
937-938, see supra note 21. 
114  See Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services (Annex), UN Doc. A/51/789, 6 February 1997, para. 8 (“The Registrar has de-
clined to meet administrative requests from the judges or the Office of the Prosecutor 
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The Court’s internal dimension of independence is complemented 
by the rule according to which no OTP member115 shall “seek or act on 
instructions from any external source”.116 Similar provisions can be found 
in the law of the ad hoc and mixed international criminal tribunals.117 
They reaffirm that the OTP shall exercise its authority on its own behalf 
and without external influence or pressure from governments, internation-
al organizations, NGOs or individuals.118  
                                                                                                                        
where in his judgement they were insufficiently justified. […] Because of this perception, 
almost no decision can be taken by the other organs of the Tribunal that does not receive 
his review and agreement or rejection.”); in more detail Luc Côté, “Independence and Im-
partiality”, in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), International Prose-
cutors, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 335–36, see also Jones, 2002, p. 273, 
see supra note 113; Héctor Olásolo et al., Assessing the Role of the Independent Oversight 
Mechanism in Enhancing the Efficiency and Economy of the ICC, Universiteit Utrecht, 
Utrecht, 2011, p. 54; Philipp Ambach and Klaus Rackwitz, “A Model Of International Ju-
dicial Administration? The Evolution of Managerial Practices at the International Criminal 
Court”, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 2013, vol. 76, no. 3 and 4, p. 142. 
115  This provision applies to the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, staff and gratis personal; 
see William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 740.  
116  ICC Statute, Article 42(1) clause 3, see supra note 104 (emphasis added). cf. also Yvonne 
McDermott, “Article 42”, in Mark Klamberg, Commentary on the Law of the International 
Criminal Court, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, para. 1 (https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e2b/). 
117  Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993 by 
Security Council resolution 827, Article 16(2) (‘ICTY Statute’) (https://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/b4f63b/); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted 8 November 
1994 by Security Council resolution 955, Article 15(2) (‘ICTR Statute’) (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8732d6/); Statute of the United Nations Mechanism for International Crimi-
nal Tribunals, adopted 22 September 2010 by Security Council resolution 1966, Article 
14(2) (‘UNMICT Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/30782d/); Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, enacted 16 January 2002, in force 1 July 2002, Article 15(1) 
(‘SCSL Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e20/); Statute of the Residual Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, in force 12 August 2012, Article 14(2) (‘RSCSL Statute’); Law on 
the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 27 October 
2004, Article 19 (‘ECCC Law’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9b12f0/); Statute of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, adopted 30 May 2007 by Security Council resolution 1757, 
Article 11(2) (‘STL Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/da0bbb/). 
118  ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecution’s 
Reply on the Applications for Participation 01/04-1/dp to 01/04-6/dp, 15 August 2005, 
ICC-01/04-84, para. 32 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4aa811/); in a similar vein Fabricio 
Guariglia, “The Selection of Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court”, in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 212; Côté, 2012, p. 337, see supra 
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As to the OTP’s external independence, the Prosecutor and the 
Deputy Prosecutors must refrain from engaging in any activity that is like-
ly to interfere with their prosecutorial functions or to affect confidence in 
their independence.119 Moreover, they must not engage “in any other oc-
cupation of a professional nature”.120 These requirements are deontologi-
cal, in that they require that the OTP hold itself to a high standard of self-
respect and refuse to permit others to bias their decisions. Yet they also 
reflect a consequentialist concern about the likely result, unfairness, of 
permitting such biases to influence the OTP. 
Article 44 provides for the appointment of staff, including the re-
quirement that the OTP “shall ensure the highest standards of efficiency, 
competency and integrity” in its employment of staff.121  
Article 54(1) relates to the investigations phase and requires that the 
Prosecutor “investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally”,122 take measures to “respect the interests and personal circum-
stances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender as defined in Arti-
cle 7, paragraph 3, and health, and take into account the nature of the 
crime, in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence or 
violence against children” in the investigations,123 and “[f]ully respect the 
                                                                                                                        
note 114. See also ICC, Staff rules of the International Criminal Court, adopted 21 April 
2005, entry into force 3 December 2005, Rule 101.3(a) (“Staff members shall ensure their 
independence from any person, entity or authority outside the Court.”) (‘ICC Staff Rules’) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/10f5c7/); Wu Wei, Rolle des Anklägers eines internatio-
nalen Strafgerichtshofs, Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2007, p. 13; Hilde Farthofer, “The 
Prosecutor”, in Christoph Safferling (ed.), International Criminal Procedure, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 151; Margaret M. deGuzman and William A. Schabas, “Ini-
tiation of Investigations and Selection of Cases”, in Göran Sluiter et al. (eds.), Internation-
al Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 
167. Article 42(1)(3) of the ICC Statute does not, of course, forbid the Prosecution to seek 
assistance from external sources, in particular from member states, see SCSL, Prosecutor v. 
Sesay et al., Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 March 2009, SCSL-04-15-T, para. 44 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7f05b7/). 
119  ICC Statute, Article 42(5), see supra note 104. 
120  See also Stefanie Bock, Das Opfer vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof, Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 2010, p. 215; Schabas, 2016, p. 741, see supra note 115; Isabelle Moulier, 
“Article 42”, in Julian Fernandez and Xavier Pacreau (eds.), Statut de Rome de la Cour 
Pénale Internationale, vol. 1, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 2012, p. 1024. 
121  ICC Statute, Article 44(2), see supra note 104. 
122  Ibid., Article 54(1)(a). 
123  Ibid., Article 54(1)(b). 
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rights of persons arising under this Statute”.124 Article 54(1)(a) draws on 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals in making impartiality and ob-
jectivity statutory obligations.125  In particular, the Prosecutor’s duty to 
search actively for exonerating information may be regarded as a measure 
to achieve factual equality of arms between the prosecution and defence, 
since the latter may lack the necessary resources and powers to conduct 
extensive investigations on its own.126 The obligations under Article 54(1) 
are deontological, where they correspond to specific procedural require-
ments or the rights of individuals. Yet they also involve some amount of 
discretion, which means that the OTP should consider the results of their 
decisions when balancing deontological obligations to defendants with 
deontological obligations to victims and witnesses.  
                                                   
124  Ibid., Article 54(1)(c). 
125  See, in more detail, Fabricio Guariglia, “Policy and Organisational Questions”, in Berg-
smo, Rackwitz and SONG (eds.), 2017, pp. 286 ff., supra note 111. See also Bock, 2010, p. 
216, see supra note 120; Côté, 2012, pp. 359–60, see supra note 114; Heinze, 2014, pp. 
257–58, see supra note 17. 
126  See also Caroline Buisman, “The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and 
Exonerating Circumstances Equally – Illusion or Reality?”, in Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 2014, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 206; Vanessa Thalmann, “The Role of the Judge and 
the Parties in Proceedings”, in Robert Kolb and Damien Scalia (eds.), Droit International 
Pénal, 2nd edition, Helbing Lichtenhahn, Bâle, 2012, p. 467; Hanna Kuczyńska, 2015, p. 
52, see supra note 41. This appears to resemble more a civil law (‘inquisitorial’) than a 
common law (‘adversarial’) type of prosecutor. For, although the prosecution in the adver-
sarial system is also obliged to follow the principles of truth and objectivity, the adversarial 
two-case approach entails that the submission of evidence by the prosecution is separated 
from the one by the defence, thereby forcing the prosecutor more in a partisan party posi-
tion; cf. Mirjan R. Damaška, “Problematic Features of International Criminal Procedure”, 
in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion of International Criminal Justice, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 176, arguing that “it becomes difficult” for the 
Prosecutor “to refrain from using […] evidence selectively, focusing only on information 
favourable to their allegations”; see also Håkan Friman, “Investigation and Prosecution”, 
in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley (NY), 2001, p. 537; Vladimir 
Tochilovsky, “Legal Systems and Cultures in the ICC”, in Horst Fischer et al. (eds.), Inter-
national and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law: Current Develop-
ments, Berlin-Verlag Spitz, Berlin, 2001, p. 637; Christoph Safferling, Towards an Interna-
tional Criminal Procedure, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 79, 86; Kai Ambos 
and Stefanie Bock, “Procedural Regimes”, in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryn-
gaert (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 489; 
Heinze, 2014, pp. 250, 253, see supra note 17. 
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Some critics argue that the Prosecution has so far “largely ignored 
its obligation under Article 54(1)(a)”, “failed to investigate any of its cas-
es with the thoroughness expected from a diligent prosecutor”, and failed 
to acknowledge the weaknesses of certain cases.127 In Gbagbo, the PTC, 
quite straightforwardly, expressed doubts whether the Prosecutor really 
had followed “all relevant incriminating and exonerating lines of investi-
gation in order to establish the truth”.128 The Mbarushimana PTC charac-
terised the OTP’s interrogation technique, which involved manipulative 
feedback on witness testimony with frequent leading questions, as “utterly 
inappropriate when viewed in light of the objective, set out in Article 
54(1)(a) of the Statute, to establish the truth by ‘investigating incriminat-
ing and exonerating circumstances equally’”.129  Seeking the truth is a 
strict deontological obligation on the part of the OTP, and these cases 
demonstrate ethical failures on the part of the OTP.130 Kant demanded that 
respect for the dignity of oneself and the dignity of others could never 
                                                   
127  Buisman, 2014, pp. 223, 226, see supra note 126. See also ICC, Situation in the Democrat-
ic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial Chamber, Closing Submission of the 
Defence, 15 July 2011, ICC-01/04-01/06-2773, para. 13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
ca1fcd/), arguing that the OTP has seriously failed to fulfil its obligation to investigate ex-
culpatory circumstances. Similar complaints were made in ICC, Situation in the Republic 
of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of 
Final Written Observations of the Defence Team of Ambassador Francis K. Muthaura on 
the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, 2 December 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-374, paras. 71–
72 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/be93c9/); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. 
Abu Garda, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, 
ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, paras. 46–47 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cb3614/); ICC, 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., William Samoei Ruto De-
fence Brief following the Confirmation of the Charges Hearing, 24 October 2011, ICC-
01/09-01/11-355, paras. 19–23 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3977e1/); Antonio Cassese 
et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 
344 (“the prosecutor is every bit as partisan as his counterparts at the ICTY and ICTR”). 
128  ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision adjourning the hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 3 June 2013, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, para. 37 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/2682d8/). 
129  ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, ICC-01/04-
01/10-465, para. 51 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/63028f/). 
130  For a psychological, legal and sociological account of truth and international fact-finding, 
see Shiri Krebs, “The Legalization of Truth in International Fact-Finding”, in Chicago 
Journal of International Law, 2017, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 83 ff. 
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permit lying.131 He does, however, limit this unconditional duty to explicit 
lies, or “intentionally untrue declaration[s] to another”.132 Failures to dis-
close to the truth may be permissible unless they are intentional decep-
tions. It is clear that under Article 54, there is a specific obligation to ex-
plore and disclose “all relevant incriminating and exonerating lines of 
investigation”,133 and any failure to do so would constitute a violation of a 
strict deontological duty. 
There are other specific ethical obligations that the OTP incurs indi-
rectly, such as those from sections of the ICC Statute that grant rights on 
other parties. Article 55, for instance, provides for specific rights on the 
part of persons during an investigation. These rights create corresponding 
deontological obligations on the part of the OTP, such as the obligation 
that the OTP not subject an individual “to arbitrary arrest or detention”, 
nor deprive an individual “of his or her liberty except on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedures as are established in this Stat-
ute”.134  
18.3.3.1.2. The OTP Code of Conduct 
Like the ABA Model Rules for Professional Conduct in the United 
States,135 the ICC also has Codes of Conduct that ensure the compliance 
of trial participants with ethical rules and values. The ICC has three Codes 
of Conduct: the Code of Judicial Ethics, the Code of Professional Conduct 
for counsel, and the Code of Conduct for the OTP (‘OTP Code’). The 
Code of Judicial Ethics was adopted by the judges pursuant to Regulation 
126 of the Regulations of the Court.136 The Code of Professional Conduct 
                                                   
131  Immanuel Kant, Mary Gregor (ed., trans.), The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, New York, 1996, 6:429; see also Immanuel Kant, “On a Supposed Right to 
Lie from Philanthropy”, in Mary Gregor (ed., trans.), Practical Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1996, 8:427. 
132  Kant, 1996, supra note 131. 
133  ICC Statute, Article 54(1)(a), see supra note 104. 
134  Ibid., Article 55(1)(d). 
135  See Heinze, 2014, pp. 432 ff., see supra note 17. 
136  ICC Code of Judicial Ethics, 9 March 2005, Article 1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
383f8f/). ICC, Regulations of the Court, 26 May 2004, Regulation 126 (‘RegCourt’) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2988d1/) reads: “1. The Presidency shall draw up a Code 
of Judicial Ethics, after having consulted the judges. 2. The draft Code shall then be trans-
mitted to the judges meeting in plenary session for the purpose of adoption by the majority 
of the judges”. 
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for Counsel was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties (‘ASP’) and 
applies “to defence counsel, counsel acting for States, amici curiae and 
counsel or legal representatives for victims and witnesses practising at the 
International Criminal Court”.137 Since the Prosecutor was given the au-
thority to set up his own office,138 the Code of Professional Conduct for 
Counsel does not apply to the OTP.139 Furthermore, Rule 9 of the ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’) provides that it is the Prosecu-
tor’s responsibility to “govern the operation of the office”, including 
whether or not he would have a code of conduct and regulations.140 There-
fore, when the OTP started working, it had neither regulations nor a code 
of conduct (which was still the case when the first stay of the proceedings 
was imposed by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case in June 2008).141 
The OTP eventually published regulations on 23 April 2009, and one can 
only assume that it is linked to the disclosure failures in the Lubanga case. 
On 5 September 2013, the OTP Code was adopted to regulate the 
ethical conduct of the individuals working at the OTP.142 Prior to 2013, 
there was no set of ethical standards “specifically regulat[ing] the conduct 
of members of the OTP”.143 Many of the rules and regulations listed in the 
following sub-sections, which were in place prior to the adoption of the 
OTP Code, were “general in scope and not tailored to apply to the specific 
                                                   
137  Cf. Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, 2 December 2005, Article 1. 
138  Cf. ICC Statute, Article 42(2), see supra note 104. 
139  See also Theresa Roosevelt, “Ethics for the Ethical: A Code of Conduct for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor”, in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 
2011, vol. 24, no. 1, p. 840, who also provides an interesting reason for this: “The Prosecu-
tor may have been given the responsibility to set up his own office as a carrot to take the 
job. Negotiations over how to set up the OTP took a great deal of time at the conference 
where the ICC Statute was drafted. It was difficult to recruit someone for the position of 
Prosecutor because there were many uncertainties about how much support he or she 
would have from states. This would mean the Prosecutor would be operating in a new, in-
ternational arena, possibly without a government behind him or her.” (footnote omitted). 
140  Ibid. 
141  See Heinze, 2014, pp. 454 ff., see supra note 17. 
142  Ibid. 
143  Lawrence Pacewicz, “Introductory Note to International Criminal Court Code of Conduct 
for the Office of the Prosecutor”, in International Legal Materials, 2014, vol. 53, no. 2, p. 
397. 
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role that the OTP plays at the ICC and the specific obligations and duties 
which that role entails”.144  
The OTP Code was drafted by the OTP and provides for internal 
enforcement of its provisions.145 It involves many general deontological 
constraints on the conduct of the OTP that are also applied to other coun-
sel acting before the ICC, such as those related to faithfulness, conscien-
tiousness, impartiality, independence, confidentiality, and conflicts of 
interest.146 The OTP Code includes ethical obligations related to the duty 
to establish the truth under Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, which are 
deontological as they relate to procedural requirements for a fair trial and 
the investigation of incriminating and exonerating circumstances equal-
ly.147 But it also includes the requirement to consider all relevant circum-
stances, and the requirement that investigations be conducted “with the 
goal of establishing the truth, and in the interests of justice”, each of 
which involves discretion and potentially consequentialist considera-
tions.148 The OTP Code contains other deontological constraints on the 
effective investigation and prosecution practices of the OTP, including the 
requirements to: 
1. act with competence and diligence, make impartial judgments based 
on the evidence and consider foremost the interests of justice in de-
termining whether or not to proceed; 
2. fully respect the rights of persons under investigation and the ac-
cused and ensure that proceedings are conducted in a fair manner; 
3. refrain from prosecuting any person whom they believe to be inno-
cent of the charges;  
4. refrain from proffering evidence reasonably believed to have been 
obtained by means of a violation of the Statute or internationally 
recognised human rights if the violation casts substantial doubt on 
the reliability of the evidence or the admission of evidence would 
                                                   
144  Ibid.  
145  Ibid. 
146  ICC, Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2013, chap. 2 (‘OTP 
Code’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3e11eb/).  
147  Ibid., chap. 3, Section 1. 
148  Ibid. 
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be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the 
proceedings.149 
The OTP Code also contains deontological provisions related to 
disclosure,150 handling of information and evidence,151 and security.152 It 
has been argued that while the OTP Code contains a more comprehensive 
set of ethical guidelines for the OTP, it is still too vague to account for 
significant ethical concerns.153 We will address this question in Section 
18.5., when we present our recommendations for ensuring prosecutorial 
ethics in the preliminary examination phase. 
18.3.3.1.3. Strategy and Policy Papers 
Regulation 14 of the Regulations of the OTP obliges the OTP to make 
public its strategy and make use of policy papers that reflect the key prin-
ciples and criteria of this strategy.154 The OTP currently combines strategy 
papers, which clarify the Office’s strategic objectives for a time period of 
three to four years, with policy papers addressing particular fundamental 
issues on which the Office wants to provide more clarity and transparency. 
We address these papers within the context of the OTP’s application of 
Article 53, regarding the initiation of an investigation during the prelimi-
nary examination phase. The strategy papers are useful working agendas, 
                                                   
149  Ibid., chap. 3, Section 2. 
150  Ibid., chap. 3, Section 3. 
151  Ibid., chap. 3, Section 4. 
152  Ibid., chap. 3, Section 5. 
153  See Pacewicz, 2014, p. 398, see supra note 143; see also Anna Oriolo, “The ‘Inherent 
Power’ of Judges: An Ethical Yardstick to Assess Prosecutorial Conduct at the ICC”, in In-
ternational Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 307. About vagueness and pros-
ecutorial discretion from a domestic (US) perspective, see George D. Brown, “McDonnell 
and the Criminalization of Politics”, in Virginia Journal of Criminal Law, 2017, vol. 5, no. 
1, pp. 8–11. 
154  This corresponds to No. 17 of the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (“In countries 
where prosecutors are vested with discretionary functions, the law or published rules or 
regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance fairness and consistency of approach in 
taking decisions in the prosecution process, including institution or waiver of prosecu-
tion.”). A good example in this regard is ICC-OTP, OTP Report on Preliminary Examina-
tion Activities 2013, 25 November 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dbf75e/) setting 
out the principles and criteria of preliminary examinations (paras. 1 ff.) and aiming to 
promote transparency (para. 15). See recently ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018 (2015), 
especially para. 36, referring to the policy paper on preliminary examinations and to case 
identification and prioritisation within a formal investigation.  
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which – due to their temporal limitation – also give the OTP the oppor-
tunity to critically evaluate and, if necessary, adjust its strategy on a regu-
lar basis. The policy papers clarify key issues such as the “interests of 
justice”,155 victim’s participation,156 preliminary examinations157 and the 
prosecution of sexual and gender based crimes.158 The OTP recently pub-
lished policy papers on children159 and ‘case selection’.160 This practice 
involves a broad ethical obligation on the part of the OTP, which could be 
considered deontological in that the duty might be seen as reflective of an 
obligation to be transparent with the international community, the general 
public, and all possible defendants that could come before the ICC. This 
commitment to transparency can also be seen as consequentialist, as one 
of its aims might be to support the appearance of the legitimacy of the 
ICC.161 
18.3.3.2. Accountability Mechanisms 
In this section, we analyse internal accountability mechanisms, including 
those previously identified in Section 18.3.2.1, and briefly identify some 
of the external accountability mechanisms that serve an important legal 
                                                   
155  ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/bb02e5/). 
156  ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation, 12 April 2010 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/3c204f/). 
157  ICC-OTP, 2013, see supra note 154; on the respective draft paper, see Kai Ambos and 
Ignaz Stegmiller, “Prosecuting International Crimes at the International Criminal Court: Is 
there a Coherent and Comprehensive Prosecution Strategy?”, in Crime, Law and Social 
Change, 2012, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 397–99; see also the OTP’s annual reports on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2011-2016. 
158  ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 6 June 2014 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c/). 
159  ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, 15 November 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c2652b/). 
160  ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205/). For a detailed analysis see Nadia Bernaz, “An Analysis 
of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization 
from the Perspective of Business and Human Rights”, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 527-542. 
161  Stahn, too, seems to view transparency (including publicity) as involving consequentialist 
considerations, when he points out: “Publicity is in line with the public nature of criminal 
proceedings. It may facilitate the alert effect and strengthen prevention”, Stahn, 2017, p. 18, 
see supra note 1.  
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purpose in encouraging OTP compliance with ethical obligations. As not-
ed previously, we do not go into any detail about external accountability 
mechanisms. 
18.3.3.2.1. Internal Accountability Mechanisms 
It is first and foremost the Prosecutor herself162 who has to ensure that the 
OTP staff respect the legal rules and the principles of good professional 
practice.163 The OTP Code provides for internal measures to ensure ethi-
cal behaviour within the OTP Rule 74 addresses the disciplinary measures 
that may be taken in light of prosecutorial misconduct within the OTP, 
noting that such instances shall be addressed “in accordance with Staff 
Rule 110.1, or listed as unsatisfactory in Section 5(3) of the Code of Con-
duct for Staff Members”.164 Disciplinary measures can also be directed 
against the OTP pursuant to the Staff Rules of the ICC. The Staff Rules 
are directed especially at alleged wrongdoing within the Prosecutor’s of-
fice and situations when this wrongdoing falls within the Prosecutor’s 
own disciplinary powers.165 Since neither the ICC Statute nor the RPE 
specifically define a violation of the Staff Rules as “serious misconduct” 
or “a serious breach of duty”, a violation of the Staff Rules alone cannot 
serve as a basis for the ASP to remove the Prosecutor or the Deputy Pros-
ecutor.166 However, the Prosecutor is responsible for determining whether 
                                                   
162  On external, civil society control (by NGOs), see Carsten Stahn, “Judicial Review of Pros-
ecutorial Discretion”, in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of 
the International Criminal Court, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 261; on informal sanc-
tions/control mechanisms, see Jenia I. Turner, “Accountability of International Prosecu-
tors”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 402–04. 
163  Frédéric Mégret, “Accountability and Ethics”, in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 457; 
see also Milan Markovic, “The ICC Prosecutor’s Missing Code of Conduct”, in Texas In-
ternational Law Journal, 2011–12, vol. 47, no. 1, p. 206; Jenia I. Turner, “Policing Interna-
tional Prosecutors”, in New York University Journal International Law & Political Scienc-
es, 2012, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 256; Turner, 2015, pp. 386–87, see supra note 162; Olásolo et 
al., 2011, p. 65, see supra note 114. The Prosecutor, however, must delegate his or her dis-
ciplinary powers if s/he has a personal interest in the case, see Mr C.P. v ICC, Judgement 
No. 2757 of the ILO Administrative Tribunal, 9 July 2008, para. 19 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/73bd48/). 
164  OTP Code, chap. 5, Section 2, Rule 74, see supra note 146 (italics added). 
165  Cf. Mégret, 2012, p. 477, see supra note 163 (italics added). 
166  Markovic, 2011–12, p. 207, see supra note 163. 
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OTP staff members have violated the Staff Rules and what disciplinary 
measures should be imposed.167 Disciplinary proceedings can be instituted 
in case a staff member fails to act “in accordance with any official docu-
ment of the Court governing rights and obligations of staff members” or 
fails “to observe the standards of conduct expected of an international 
civil servant”, which amounts to “unsatisfactory conduct”.168  
These internal mechanisms for discipline are related to the Prosecu-
tor’s obligation to respect her staff in her dealings with them, but the obli-
gations they create are not deontological in the sense that we generally 
associate deontology with retributive punishment. Disciplinary measures 
are not like criminal punishment, where a retributive view would tell us 
that each individual should get the punishment they are owed, in accord-
ance with the wrongfulness of their conduct. They may involve some sorts 
of deontological fairness considerations, so that similar actors receive 
similar punishments. But disciplinary measures likely involve more con-
sequentialist considerations, aimed at preventing future misconduct and 
ensuring a respectful and efficient work environment. These goals will 
support the larger OTP aims of seeking justice and fair trials. 
18.3.3.2.2. External Accountability Mechanisms 
The OTP is subject to external accountability mechanisms, in the form of 
disciplinary measures and judicial review, which do not generate new 
ethical obligations on the part of the OTP. Article 70 of the ICC Statute 
gives the ICC jurisdiction over intentional offences against the ICC’s ad-
ministration of justice,169 while Article 71 provides for sanctions against 
persons who commit misconduct related to proceedings before the ICC.170 
Article 47 of the ICC Statute and Rule 25 of the RPE provide that Prose-
cutors and Deputy Prosecutors, among others, are subject to disciplinary 
measures for: “(i) Interfering in the exercise of the functions of a person 
referred to in Article 47; or (ii) Repeatedly failing to comply with or ig-
noring requests made by the Presiding Judge or by the Presidency in the 
                                                   
167  Ibid., p. 206. 
168  ICC Staff Rules, Rule 110.1, see supra note 107. 
169  ICC Statute, Article 70, see supra note 104. 
170  Ibid., Article 71. 
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exercise of their lawful authority”.171 The aforementioned disclosure fail-
ures in Gbagbo and Mbarushimana certainly meet the threshold for fail-
ure in Rule 25(1)(a)(ii) of the RPE. Rule 26 of the RPE directs complaints 
about Article 47 misconduct to the Presidency, which has the discretion to 
either initiate proceedings against an individual or set aside complaints.172  
Arguably, the only new ethical obligation that this complaint proce-
dure places on the OTP is in the case of misconduct by a Deputy Prosecu-
tor. If disciplinary measures against a Deputy Prosecutor are requested by 
the Presidency, “[a]ny decision to give a reprimand shall be taken by the 
Prosecutor”173 and “[a]ny decision to impose a pecuniary sanction shall be 
taken by an absolute majority of the Bureau of the Assembly of States 
Parties upon the recommendation of the Prosecutor”.174 This obligation 
mirrors other mixed deontological and consequentialist general obliga-
tions on the part of the Prosecutor in her role as the leader of the OTP. She 
must treat all of her staff impartially, with respect and dignity, and use her 
best judgment about the expected consequences of using formal or infor-
mal mechanisms to discipline and redirect her staff.  
Another external tool to investigate the alleged misconduct of staff 
and elected officials of the ICC is the Independent Oversight Mechanism 
(‘IOM’), which was established by the ASP175 in accordance with Article 
112(4) of the ICC Statute.176 The IOM “may receive and investigate re-
ports of misconduct or serious misconduct” on the part of ICC staff and 
elected officials, including OTP staff.177 The results of investigations con-
                                                   
171  ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002, Rule 25 (‘ICC RPE’) (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f/). 
172  Ibid., Rule 26(2). 
173  Ibid., Rule 30(3)(a). 
174  Ibid., Rule 30(3)(b). 
175  Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Eighth session, The Hague, 18–26 November 2009 (ICC-ASP/8/20), vol. 
1, part II, ICC ASP/8/Res.1. 
176  “The Assembly may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an 
independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, 
in order to enhance its efficiency and economy.” 
177  Including “staff subject to the Staff and Financial Regulations and Rules of the Court […] 
and all contractors and/or consultants retained by the Court and working on its behalf”, see 
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5, adopted at the fifth plenary meeting (10 December 
2010), Annex, para. 2. Interestingly, the term ‘contractor’ or ‘consultant’ does not include 
an ‘intermediary’, see ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5, adopted at the fifth plenary 
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ducted by the IOM related to the OTP include “recommendations for con-
sideration of possible disciplinary or jurisdictional action”.178 Interestingly, 
the IOM has the power to “recommend that the Court refer [a] matter for 
possible criminal prosecution to relevant national authorities, such as 
those of the State where the suspected criminal act was committed, the 
State of the suspect’s nationality, the State of the victim’s nationality and, 
where applicable, of the host State of the seat of the Court”.179 Thus, the 
IOM may have the ability to sanction prosecutorial misconduct through 
domestic criminal prosecution, although the ASP has taken steps to limit 
the independence of the IOM.180 The IOM does not generate any specific 
ethical obligations on the part of the OTP. 
Now that we have explored the general ethical rules and corre-
sponding accountability mechanisms that apply to the OTP, we turn to the 
crux of the chapter, namely the ethical considerations for the OTP as they 
play out in the preliminary examination phase. 
18.4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Preliminary Examinations at the 
ICC 
18.4.1. Legal Principles of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Given the high number of international crimes committed in crises, it is 
not possible to prosecute all potential perpetrators at the international lev-
el. After more than 10 years, it has become clear that not even those who 
are most responsible for mass atrocities will all face international criminal 
justice.  
As we noted earlier, domestic criminal justice systems face similar 
challenges. There are different methods of dealing with the case overload, 
by balancing procedural principles like the search for the objective or 
                                                                                                                        
meeting (10 December 2010), Annex, para. 2 with fn. 3. About intermediaries and disclo-
sure in more detail see Heinze, 2014, pp. 458 ff., see supra note 17. 
178  Ibid., Annex, para. 4. 
179  Ibid., Annex, para. 31. In that case, the IOM is also entitled to recommend that “privileges 
and immunities be waived”, see ibid., Annex, para. 32. 
180  Turner, 2012, pp. 181, 243–44, see supra note 163; see also ASP, Resolution ICC-
ASP/9/Res.5, adopted at the fifth plenary meeting (10 December 2010), Annex, paras. 21–
22. 
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material truth, the principle of full judicial clarification of the facts,181 the 
principle of legality (legalité de poursuites – mandatory prosecution) and 
the principle of opportunity (opportunité des poursuites – prosecutorial 
discretion). Thus, some legal systems rest on the idea of ‘legality’ or 
‘compulsory/mandatory prosecution’, whereby the relevant official agen-
cies are expected to act upon a formal standard when dealing with all 
breaches of criminal law that come to their knowledge.182  
In some countries, like Italy, the principle of legality (principio di 
legalità) is primarily related to the substantive (material) criminal law, 
thus prohibiting the punishment of a crime that was not explicitly punish-
able at the time it was committed.183 The (procedural) principle of legality 
is either subject to important exceptions or qualified by prosecutorial dis-
cretion.184 Thus, most countries operate in practice on both legality and 
opportunity principles, as they each have advantages and disadvantages. 
The opportunity principle “allows prosecutors to target resources for seri-
ous offences; it is effective against organised crime by facilitating charge-
bargaining and opens up opportunities for diversionary185 disposal of of-
                                                   
181  See Strafprozessordnung (The German Code of Criminal Procedure), 12 September 1950, 
Section 244(2) (‘StPO’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/741f12/; http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/19df38/): “In order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the 
taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the decision” (translated to 
English in Brian Duffett and Monika Ebinger (trans.), authorised by the German Federal 
Ministry of Justice). 
182  See generally Kuczyńska, 2015, pp. 94–106, see supra note 126; Christopher Harding and 
Gavin Dingwall, Diversion in the Criminal Process, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1998, p. 
1. About the application of the principles of mandatory prosecution and discretion on the 
level of International Criminal Justice see Kai Ambos, “The International Criminal Justice 
System and Prosecutorial Selection Policy”, in Bruce Ackerman, Kai Ambos and Hrvoje 
Sikirić (eds.), Visions of Justice: Liber Amicorum Mirjan Damaška, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin, 2016, p. 30; Kuczyńska, 2015, pp. 106–11, see supra note 41. 
183  Ferrando Mantovani, Diritto Penale, Parte Generale, 6th edition, CEDAM, Padova, 2009, 
p. 3; however, there are procedural forms of the principle of legality in Italy, namely ‘the 
principle of the legitimate judge’ and the ‘principle of legality’. On the distinction between 
legality in substantive and procedural law, see also Michele Caianiello, “Disclosure before 
the ICC: The Emergence of a New Form of Policies Implementation in International Crim-
inal Justice?”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2010, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 98.  
184  Harding and Dingwall, 1998, p. 1, see supra note 182. 
185  For a detailed analysis of ‘diversion’ see Kai Ambos and Alexander Heinze, “Abbreviated 
Procedures in Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Structural Approach with a View to In-
ternational Criminal Procedure”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Abbreviated Criminal Proce-
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fenders”.186 On the other hand, there is a danger of “inappropriate gov-
ernment interference” and the risk of “corrupt decision-making”.187 While 
the legality principle does not share these disadvantages, when considered 
with the principle of full clarification of the facts, the legality principle 
can be seen as a kind of luxury in an overloaded criminal justice system, 
generating “a backlog of cases, which can be destructive of the right to a 
fair and speedy trial”188 and effectively impeding alternative procedures 
that may expedite trial proceedings.189  
The rational and transparent selection and prioritization of cases at 
the ICC, accompanied by a coherent prosecution strategy, is of utmost 
importance for the success and legitimacy of any international criminal 
tribunal,190 and the international criminal justice system as a whole.191 
                                                                                                                        
dures for Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, 
pp. 77 ff. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/9-bergsmo). 
186  Richard Vogler and Barbara Huber, Criminal Procedure in Europe, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin, 2008, p. 25; see also Kuczyńska, 2015, p. 94, see supra note 41. 
187  Ibid. 
188  Ibid. 
189  Gerhard Fezer, “Inquisitionsprozess ohne Ende? Zur Struktur des neuen Verständi-
gungsgesetzes”, in Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 2010, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 177. 
190  For an instructive comparative evaluation of the selection policies and practices of interna-
tional criminal tribunals, see Guariglia, 2017, pp. 284 ff., see supra note 125; Christopher 
Keith Hall, “Prosecutorial Policy, Strategy and External Relations”, in Bergsmo, Rackwitz 
and SONG (eds.), 2017, pp. 293 ff., see supra note 111. About various forms of selectivity 
Celestine Nchekwube Ezennia, “The of the International Criminal Court System: An Im-
partial or a Selective Justice Regime?”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 
16, no. 3, pp. 450 ff.; Frederick de Vlaming, “Selection of Defendants”, in Luc Reydams, 
Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 547–70; deGuzman and Schabas, 2013, pp. 133–54, see supra 
note 118; also Jeffrey Locke, “Indictments”, in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 
607–12; specifically on the ICTY, see Claudia Angermaier, “Case Selection and Prioritiza-
tion Criteria in the Work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, 
in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes 
Cases, 2nd edition, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2010, pp. 27–43 (http://
www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/4-bergsmo-second); on the ICTR, see Alex Obote-Odora, “Case Se-
lection and Prioritization Criteria at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”, in 
ibid., pp. 45–67. 
191  See previously Ambos and Stegmiller, 2012, p. 392, see supra note 157. See also Human 
Rights Watch, The Selection of Situations and Cases for Trial before the International 
Criminal Court, 2006, p. 7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/753e9b/); Human Rights Watch, 
Unfinished Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, 2011, pp. 4, 46 (http://
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This holds particularly true for the ICC, given that its Prosecutor192 has 
not only the power to select individual defendants, but also – for the first 
time in history – entire situations for investigation.193 Accordingly, the 
complex process of selecting defendants and concrete charges194 can be 
divided into two main steps: first, the primary selection of situations, and 
                                                                                                                        
www.legal-tools.org/doc/738f10/); Morten Bergsmo, “The Theme of Selection and Priori-
tization Criteria and Why it Is Relevant”, in Bergsmo (ed.), 2010, pp. 8, 12, 14, supra note 
190; Vlaming, 2012, pp. 542–43, see supra note 190; Locke, 2012, p. 614, see supra note 
190; Côté, 2012, pp. 354–55, see supra note 114; deGuzman and Schabas, 2013, pp. 131–
32, see supra note 118; from a victims’ perspective, see Richard Dicker, “Making Justice 
Meaningful for Victims”, in Bergsmo (ed.), 2010, pp. 267–68, supra note 190; Bock, 2010, 
p. 606, see supra note 120; Thompson, “The Role of the International Prosecutor as a Cus-
todian of Global Morality”, in Charles C. Jalloh and Alhagi B.M. Marong (eds.), Promot-
ing Accountability under International Law for Gross Human Rights Violations in Africa: 
Essays in Honour of Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2015, p. 54. 
192  See also ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v Bemba, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Decision on Request for Leave to Submit Amicus Curiae Observations Pursuant 
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 17 July 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-453, 
para. 10, leaving the “issue of selection of cases” to the Prosecutor (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/351d29/). 
193  Ambos and Stegmiller, 2012, p. 392, see supra note 157; see also Ambos and Bock, 2012, 
pp. 532, 541, see supra note 126; Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn and Barbora Hola, 
“The Selection of Situations by the ICC – An Empirically Based Evaluation of the OTP’s 
Performance”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2015, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 2. 
194  In the case against Lubanga, the Prosecutor decided to concentrate on the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers and suspended investigations concerning other alleged crimes, in par-
ticular sex crimes; ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v 
Lubanga, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigations, 28 June 2006, ICC-01/04-
01/06-170, para. 7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e668a0/). As expected the OTP did not 
bring additional charges in the course of the appellate proceedings. Thus, the first case fin-
ished at the ICC has already shown that the selection of charges entails another discretion-
ary decision that might enlarge the impunity gap; see Bock, 2010, pp. 322–23, see supra 
note 120; Ambos and Bock, 2012, p. 538, see supra note 126; also Paul Seils, “The Selec-
tion and Prioritization of Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Crimi-
nal Court”, in Bergsmo (ed.), 2010, pp. 73–75, supra note 190; generally on the OTP’s 
failure to charge Lubanga with sex crimes, see Kai Ambos, “The First Judgment of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal 
Issues”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2012, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 137–38 with fn. 
156; on its impact on the reparation decision, see Stefanie Bock, “Wiedergutmachung im 
Völkerstrafverfahren vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof nach Lubanga”, in 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2013, vol. 8, no. 7–8, pp. 302–03. 
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second, the subsequent extraction of cases from these situations.195 We 
focus on the latter, which is a core issue for prosecutorial coherence.  
It follows from the principles of equality before the law and non-
discrimination196 that selection decisions must not be “based on imper-
missible motives such as, inter alia, race, colour, religion, opinion, na-
tional or ethnic origin”.197 Accordingly, the Prosecutor is required to in-
vestigate, as a rule,198 all sides of a conflict without favour or bias toward 
any person or groups.199 This is, in fact, necessary to overcome the stigma 
of victor’s justice, which has been attached to international criminal jus-
tice since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.200 Apart from these con-
                                                   
195  ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, entry into force 23 April 2009, Regula-
tions 34–35 (‘RegOTP’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/); see Smeulers, We-
erdesteijn and Hola, 2015, p. 3, see supra note 193. 
196  ICC Statute, Articles 21(3), 67(1) see supra note 104. 
197  ICTY, Prosecutor v Delalić et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 20 February 2001, IT-96-
21-A, para. 605 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/051554/); see also ICTR, Prosecutor v 
Bizimungu et al., Decision on Defence Motions for Stay of Proceedings and for Adjourn-
ment of the Trial, including Reasons in Support of the Chamber’s Oral Ruling delivered on 
Monday 20 September, 24 September 2004, ICTR-2000-56-T, para. 26 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/cf6400/); Côté, 2012, pp. 364, 366–70, see supra note 114; deGuzman and 
Schabas, 2013, pp. 146, 167, see supra note 118; also Thompson, 2015, p. 55, see supra 
note 191. 
198  An exception is that the investigation is limited to the alleged perpetrators if jurisdiction is 
based on active personality pursuant to Article 12(2)(b) ICC Statute; thereto Rod Rastan, 
“Jurisdiction”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and Practice of the International Criminal 
Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 152 and generally Ambos, 2016, pp. 244 
ff., see supra note 2. 
199  Côté, 2012, p. 370, see supra note 114; deGuzman and Schabas, 2013, p. 167, see supra 
note 118; see also Mégret, 2012, p. 439, see supra note 163; Hitomi Takemura, “Prosecu-
torial Discretion in International Criminal Justice: Between Fragmentation and Unifica-
tion”, in Larissa J. van den Herik and Carsten Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and Frag-
mentation of International Criminal Law, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2012, p. 643. Against this back-
ground, the decision of the ICTY Prosecution not to investigate alleged war crimes com-
mitted by NATO Forces during ‘Operation Allied Forces’ was heavily criticized; see Am-
bos and Bock, 2012, p. 502 with further references, see supra note 126. In general, on the 
difficulty and necessity of prosecuting peacekeepers on the international level, see Melanie 
O’Brien, “Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peace-
keepers by the International Criminal Court”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
2012, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 525. 
200  Côté, 2012, p. 370, see supra note 114. In more detail on the limited competencies of the 
IMT and the IMTFE which had no jurisdiction over alleged war crimes of the Allies, see 
Ambos and Bock, 2012, pp. 491–92, 497–98 with further references, see supra note 126. 
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straints, which are drawn from human rights norms, the Prosecutor is 
largely free to develop her own prosecutorial policy.  
18.4.2. Preliminary Examinations and Article 53(1) 
We briefly explain the legal framework of Article 53(1) and the OTP’s 
approach to preliminary examinations in this sub-section. The two sub-
sections that follow focus on the specific ethical obligations related to 
Article 53(1)(c) and the “interests of justice”, and the judicial review that 
aims to hold the OTP accountable for following through on its ethical 
obligations, respectively. 
The preliminary examination phase at the ICC is solely directed to-
ward determining whether there are sufficient grounds (a “reasonable 
basis”) to commence a formal investigation.201 Thus, it acts as a kind of 
procedural filter for the OTP.202 While the OTP has recently added a sepa-
rate section on preliminary examinations to its website,203 this phase still 
lacks transparency, and it is impossible for an ‘outsider’ to know about or 
evaluate the fate of the thousands of communications sent to the OTP. 
Although the term ‘preliminary examination’ is only explicitly referenced 
in Article 15(6) of the ICC Statute and Regulations 25-31 of the Regula-
tions of the OTP,204 all proceedings contain a preliminary examination, 
regardless of the trigger mechanism used to bring the situation before the 
ICC, that is, whether it comes through a referral by a State Party, referral 
by the UN Security Council, or by a proprio motu initiation of the Prose-
cutor.205 
                                                   
201  Ambos, 2016, p. 336, see supra note 2; Stefan van Heeck, Die Weiterentwicklung des 
formellen Völkerstrafrechts: Von den ad hoc Tribunalen der Vereinten Nationen zum 
ständigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshof unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Ermittlungsverfahrens, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2006, pp. 181–82; deGuzman and 
Schabas, 2013, p. 144, see supra note 118, stressing the reasonable basis requirement; 
Kuczyńska, 2015, p. 74, see supra note 41. 
202  Stegmiller, 2013, p. 486 (“procedural filtering tool”), see supra note 2. 
203  ICC, “Office of the Prosecutor: Preliminary Examinations” (available on its web site). 
204  Cf. Stahn, 2017, p. 2, see supra note 1. 
205  Ambos, 2016, pp. 336–37, see supra note 2; ICC-OTP, Annex to the “Paper on some 
policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications”, p. 7 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5df43d/); Wouters, Verhoeven, and Demeyere, 2008, p. 
294, see supra note 113; Jan Wouters, Sten Verhoeven, and Bruno Demeyere, “The Inter-
national Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor: Navigating between Independence and 
Accountability?”, in José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser and M. Cherif Bassiouni (eds.), The 
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The OTP’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations206 explains 
the structure of a preliminary examination in four phases.207 Phase 1 is 
concerned with the evaluation of the ‘communications’, that is, the infor-
mation submitted on alleged crimes received in accordance with Article 
15(1) (“information on alleged crimes”).208 Phase 2 represents the formal 
commencement of a preliminary examination209 and consists of the thor-
ough assessment of the preconditions of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12 
of the ICC Statute, and an inquiry as to whether the alleged crimes fall 
within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Phase 3 is concerned with 
the admissibility of ‘potential’ cases – since defined cases do not exist at 
this stage210 – in terms of complementarity and gravity according to Arti-
                                                                                                                        
Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor 
Blishchenko, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 365; Karel de Meester, Kelly Pitcher, Rod Rastan 
and Göran Sluiter, “Investigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest and Surrender”, in Göran 
Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 182; David Bosco, “Discretion and State Influence at the 
International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor’s Preliminary Examinations”, in American 
Journal of International Law, 2017, vol. 111, no. 2, pp. 395-414; Ambos and Stegmiller, 
2012, pp. 420 ff., see supra note 157; on the three trigger mechanisms, see Ambos, 2016, 
pp. 255 ff., see supra note 2. 
206  ICC-OTP, 2013, paras. 77–84, see supra note 154; summarising ICC-OTP, Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities, 2013, para. 14, see supra note 142; see also RegOTP, 
Regulations 25–31, see supra note 195; for a detailed analysis see Ambos, 2016, pp. 337 
ff., see supra note 2; see also Stegmiller, 2013, p. 487, see supra note 2. On the OTP’s pre-
vious practical approach, see Kai Ambos, “Prosecuting International Crimes at the Nation-
al and International Level: Between Justice and Realpolitik”, in Wolfgang Kaleck et al. 
(eds.), International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes, Springer, Berlin, 2006, pp. 56 
ff.; Kai Ambos, “The Structure of International Criminal Procedure”, in Michael Bohland-
er (ed.), International Criminal Justice: a Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures, 
Cameron May, London, 2007, pp. 435 ff.; Kai Ambos, “Die Rolle des Internationalen 
Strafgerichtshofs”, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2006, vol. 42, pp. 14–15; Stegmiller, 
2013, pp. 486–87, see supra note 2. 
207  See also the analysis by Stahn, 2017, p. 16 with further references, see supra note 1. 
208  ICC-ASP, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor, 17 Sep-
tember 2015, ICC-ASP/14/21 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b27d2a/). 
209  Ibid. 
210  ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request for Authorisation of 
an Investigation pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3, paras. 51, 107 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c63dcc/); and ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the Authorization 
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-
01/09-19, paras. 50, 182, 188 (assessment of admissibility “against certain criteria defining 
a ‘potential case’”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/). 
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cle 17 of the ICC Statute.211 Phase 4 analyses the “interests of justice” 
pursuant to Article 53 (1)(c),212 and results in an ‘Article 53(1) report’.213 
This report contains an “initial legal characterization of the alleged 
crimes” and a preliminary summary of the basic facts, indicating the tem-
poral and geographical circumstances of the alleged commission, and the 
persons and/or groups involved. 214  It serves as a basis to determine 
whether to commence a formal investigation in accordance with Article 
53(1), or to stop proceedings based on the “interests of justice”.215  
The OTP recently issued a Policy Paper on Case Selection and Pri-
oritisation,216 which states that the Prosecutor is only bound by the general 
principles of equality before the law and non-discrimination, that is, she 
must act independently, impartially 217  and objectively investigating all 
parties to a conflict without favouring or discriminating against any of 
them.218 Otherwise, she has a broad discretion that may be guided by poli-
cy criteria regarding selection and prioritization.219 “Broad discretion” is a 
phrase the OTP itself used in a previous draft of the Policy Paper: “None-
theless, the Office has broad discretion in selecting individual cases for 
                                                   
211  ICC-ASP, 2015, p. 39, see supra note 208; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2016, 14 November 2016, para. 15 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f30a53/); 
about this report, see also Stahn, 2017, p. 3, see supra note 1. Sa. Andre V. Armenian, “Se-
lectivity in International Criminal Law: An Assessment of the ‘Progress Narrative’”, in In-
ternational Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 16, no 4, pp. 642 ff.; Celestine N. Ezennia, 
“The Modus Operandi of the International Criminal Court System: An Impartial or a Se-
lective Justice Regime?”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 
448 ff. 
212  ICC-ASP, 2015, p. 40, see supra note 208; ICC-OTP, 2016, para. 15, see supra note 211. 
213  Cf. RegOTP, Regulation 29(1), see supra note 195; also referring to ICC Statute, Article 
15(3). 
214  Ambos, 2016, p. 339, see supra note 2. 
215  Cf. RegOTP, Regulations 29, 31, see supra note 195. 
216  ICC-OTP, 2016, see supra note 160. 
217 ‘Impartiality’ can be understood, however, in either procedural or political terms. See 
Sophie T. Rosenberg, “The International Criminal Court in Côte d’Ivoire: Impartiality at 
Stake?”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 471-490. 
218  Ibid., para. 16–23.  
219  On the governing principles of the selection process by the OTP, see also Fabricio 
Guariglia and Emeric Rogier, “Selection of Situations and Cases by the OTP of the ICC”, 
in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 358–59; Kuczyńska, 2015, pp. 112–15, see supra note 41. 
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investigation and prosecution”.220 However, this sentence does not appear 
in the final version of the Policy Paper.221 The relevant criteria, with re-
spect to case selection and prioritization, include focusing on those who 
are “most responsible”;222 focusing on specific crimes with a special in-
ternational/public interest/expressivist function (for example, sexual and 
gender-based crimes and crimes against children);223 focusing on gravity 
of the crimes;224 focusing on certain qualitative considerations; focusing 
                                                   
220  ICC OTP, 2016, para. 4 in fine, see supra note 160. 
221  See ibid. 
222  Cf., for example, ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 188, see supra 
note 210; RegOTP, Regulations 34(1), see supra note 195. This may include “lower level-
perpetrators where their conduct has been particularly grave or notorious”, ICC-OTP, 2016, 
para. 42, see supra note 160. See also, regarding other tribunals, ICTY, Rules on Procedure 
and Evidence, adopted on 11 February 1994, Rule 28(A) (‘ICTY-RPE’) (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/02712f/) (additional screening of indictment, introduced as part of comple-
tion strategy in 2004, to ensure that it “concentrates on one or more of the most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible […]”; thereto Håkan Friman, Helen Brady, 
Matteo Costi, Francisco Guariglia and Carl-Friederich Stuckenberg, “Charges”, in Göran 
Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 385) and SCSL Statute, Article 1(1), see supra note 117 
(limiting the mandate to “persons who bear the greatest responsibility”); Guariglia and 
Rogier, 2015, pp. 351–52 (regarding ICTY), 360–61, see supra note 219. 
223  Cf. ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, paras. 58–63; as well as OTP, 
Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 6 July 2015, paras. 40, 49 ff.; and Annex I, paras. 22 ff. regard-
ing the results of the Strategic Plan 2012-2015. About the Strategic Plan 2012-2015, see 
also Fatou Bensouda, “The Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes Policy Paper of the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court”, in Charles C. Jalloh and Alhagi B.M. 
Marong (eds.), Promoting Accountability under International Law for Gross Human 
Rights Violations in Africa: Essays in Honour of Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar, Brill Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2015, pp. 329 ff.; critics on “thematic prosecution of sex crimes”, that is, the pri-
mary selection and prioritization of these crimes over others: Kai Ambos, “Thematic In-
vestigations and Prosecution: Some Critical Comments from a Theoretical and Compara-
tive Perspective”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex 
Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2nd edition, Brussels, 2018, pp. 301 ff. 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/13-bergsmo-second); critics of the ICC practice so far, but 
optimistic because of the new course under Prosecutor Bensouda as evidenced by the OTP 
policy paper: Niamh Hayes, “La Lutte Continue: Investigating and Prosecuting Sexual Vi-
olence at the ICC”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and Practice of the International Criminal 
Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 801 ff. 
224  Cf. RegOTP, Regulation 29(2), see supra note 195; ICC-OTP, 2013, paras. 9, 59 ff., see 
supra note 206; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examinations Activities 2014, 2 Decem-
ber 2014, para. 7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3594b3/); Guariglia and Rogier, 2015, pp. 
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on incidents that are “most representative of the scale and impact of the 
crimes” and on “crimes that have been traditionally under-prosecuted”;225 
balancing the interests of justice within the meaning of Article 53; and 
identifying practical considerations.226 The ultimate selection or prioritiza-
tion decision remains in the hands of the Prosecutor and is subject to only 
limited judicial review.227  
18.4.3. Prosecutorial Discretion and the “Interests of Justice” 
18.4.3.1. The OTP and Article 53(1)(c) 
Article 53(1)(c) contains the main site of discretion that invokes our pre-
viously outlined argument for including consequentialist considerations in 
the ethical obligations of the OTP during the preliminary examination 
                                                                                                                        
359–60, see supra note 219; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the ICC Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 188, see 
supra note 210; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, No. ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, para. 50, re-
ferring to sentencing RPE, Rule 145(1)(c) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4972c0/). For a 
discussion, see Ambos, 2016, pp. 284 ff., see supra note 2. The OTP points out that it 
“may apply a stricter test when assessing gravity for the purposes of case selection than 
that which is legally required for the admissibility test under article 17”, see ICC-OTP, 
2016, para. 36 see supra note 160. With regard to the gravity test, in its recent policy paper 
on case selection, the OTP deviated from its November 2013 policy paper by adding a ref-
erence to crimes committed “by means of, or that result in […] the destruction of the envi-
ronment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land” 
(ibid., para. 41). See thereto Bernaz, 2017, p. 528, see supra note 160. 
225  RegOTP, Regulation 34(2), see supra note 195; ICC-OTP, 2016, para. 45–46, see supra 
note 160. 
226  Cf., for example, ICC-OTP, 2003, p. 1 (“feasibility of conducting an effective investigation 
in a particular territory”), see supra note 160; ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Be-
fore the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2003, p. 2 (availability of the necessary co-
operation) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f53870/). 
227  Only pursuant to legal regulation, especially Article 53(3) ICC Statute. It is however ques-
tionable to interpret Article 53(1)(a) and (b) as providing for “exacting legal requirements” 
(ICC, Situation on the Vessels of Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the request of 
the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investiga-
tion, 16 July 2015, ICC-01/13-34, para. 14 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/)); on 
the criticism regarding the trigger and scope of the judicial review, see Guariglia and 
Rogier, 2015, pp. 362–63, see supra note 219. 
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phase.228 There is no other clause in the ICC Statute allowing so explicitly 
for policy considerations.229 The concept of the “interests of justice” with-
in the meaning of Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) is nowhere defined in the 
ICC’s legal framework. The OTP understands the concept as “a potential 
countervailing consideration that might produce a reason not to proceed” 
even where jurisdiction and admissibility are satisfied.230 Thus, “interests 
of justice” is a negative requirement that may exclude an investigation (or 
prosecution), even if the positive requirements of Article 53(1) and (2) are 
                                                   
228  Our argument is only for the expanded influence of consequentialist considerations. About 
the so-called “consequentialist approach” as a way to address preliminary examinations 
(vis-à-vis the “gateway approach”) see Stahn, 2017, pp. 7 ff., see supra note 1. For the 
consequentialist approach, “there is a certain virtue in the conduct of a preliminary exami-
nation as such, irrespective of whether or not it leads to investigation at the ICC” (p. 7 with 
further references). According to the narrower “ICC-centric” gateway approach, “prelimi-
nary examinations are investigation-centred”, which means that “they mainly serve as a 
means to deciding whether or not to open an ICC investigation and are essentially a filter 
that determines the pathway towards investigations” (p. 6). 
229 Cf. Ali Arsanjani, “The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws”, in 
ASIL, Proceedings of the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, ASIL, Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 67 (“broad range of possibilities”); Richard 
J. Goldstone and Nicole Fritz, “In the Interests of Justice and Independent Referral: The 
ICC Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2000, 
vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 662–63; Matthew R. Brubacher, “Prosecutorial Discretion within the In-
ternational Criminal Court”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2004, vol. 2, no. 
1, pp. 80 ff. (p. 81: “broader interests of the international community”); Talita de Souza 
Dias, “‘Interests of justice’: Defining the scope of Prosecutorial discretion in Article 
53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 731-751; Maria Varaki, “Revisiting the 
‘Interests of Justice’ Policy Paper”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 
15, no. 3, pp. 455-470; Paul Seils and Marieke Wierda, The International Criminal Court 
and Conflict Mediation, Occasional Paper, International Center for Transitional Justice, 
New York, 2005, p. 12; Frank Meyer, “Complementing Complementarity”, in Internation-
al Criminal Law Review, 2006, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 580. Christ Gallavin, “Article 53 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC: In the Interests of Justice?”, in King’s College Law Journal, 
2003, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 195, 197, draws a comparison to the ‘public interest’ criterion in 
English and Welsh law arguing that while the Prosecutor must be independent she must at 
the same time be aware of the political realities; on this parallel, see also Brubacher, 2004, 
p. 80, see supra note 217. On the public interest criterion in English and Welsh law in gen-
eral see Antony Duff, “Discretion and Accountability in a Democratic Criminal Law”, in 
Máximo Langer and David Alan Sklansky (eds.), Prosecutors and Democracy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 9, 24-32. 
230 ICC-OTP, 2007, pp. 2–3 (emphasis in the original), see supra note 155. 
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met. It will only be utilised “in exceptional circumstances” as a kind of 
last resort.231 
18.4.3.2. Whose Justice? 
The notion of ‘justice’ involves a broader assessment that just a single 
situation or case232 and is not limited to what we might think of as typical 
criminal justice considerations,233 but rather it includes alternative forms 
of justice, and entails an overall assessment of the situation.234 As we not-
ed previously in Section 18.2.2., the particular features of what constitutes 
justice vary, and while we do not aim to construct a theory of justice in 
this chapter, we adopt the view that it always has something to do with 
fairness. Again, this can involve the protection of substantive rights, or the 
protection of procedural rights through strict adherence to rules, or ensur-
ing that all potential defendants are treated the same before the law. Be-
cause they will sometimes be in conflict, we see justice as a balancing of 
various fairness considerations. 
                                                   
231 Ibid., p. 3. See also Rohrer, Legalitäts- oder Opportunitätsprinzip beim Internationalen 
Strafgerichtshof, Heymann, Köln, 2010, pp. 253–54, 313. 
232 Jessica Gavron, “Amnesties in the Light of Developments in International Law and the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court”, in International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 2002, vol. 51, no. 1, p. 110. 
233 Namely, considerations which concern the proper administration of justice, for example, 
the admission of additional evidence on the basis of “interests of justice”, cf. ICTY, Prose-
cutor v Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16-A, paras. 52–54, 61–69 (on former Rule 115(B) RPE 
ICTY); for more examples, see Stegmiller, 2011, p. 367, see supra note 2; also ICC-OTP, 
2007, p. 8 (to be understood more broadly “than criminal justice in a narrow sense”), see 
supra note 155. 
234 Ambos, 2016, p. 387, see supra note 2. See also Goldstone and Fritz, 2000, p. 662, see 
supra note 229; Darryl Robinson, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth 
Commissions and the International Criminal Court”, in European Journal of International 
Law, 2003, vol. 14, no. 3, p. 488; Meyer, 2006, p. 579, see supra note 229; Kenneth A. 
Rodman, “Is Peace in the Interest of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion 
at the International Criminal Court”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2009, vol. 22, 
no. 1, pp. 101 ff., 108 ff.; Stegmiller, 2011, pp. 358, 367–68, 378–79, see supra note 2; 
Rohrer, 2010, pp. 314 ff., see supra note 231. On judicial intervention in ongoing atrocities 
and the assumption that justice can be pursued neutrally during conflicts, see Leslie Vin-
jamuri, “The ICC and the Politics of Peace and Justice”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and 
Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 
20–25; on the interests of justice in conjunction with the principle of positive complemen-
tarity, see Justine Tillier, “The ICC Prosecutor and Positive Complementarity: Strengthen-
ing the Rule of Law?”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2013, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 
542–45; Stahn, 2017, p. 9, see supra note 1. 
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To analyse whether or not an investigation (or a possible corre-
sponding prosecution) serves the “interests of justice”, we have two 
threshold questions to answer. The first is what counts as justice, and 
whether and which alternative justice mechanisms count as justice. Do-
mestic criminal justice can be thought of as strictly procedural in nature, 
in that justice has been served if the domestic criminal procedures have 
been followed. Or we might think of domestic criminal justice as serving 
a more social purpose, albeit still local, in allowing a community to take 
ownership over crimes of mass atrocity and use transitional justice mech-
anisms to repair and reconcile. Some authors consider “interests of jus-
tice” as the most explicit gateway of the ICC Statute for the recognition of 
alternative processes of national reconciliation, including the granting of 
amnesties or other exemption measures for the sake of achieving peace.235 
Whether or not it should be primary, the domestic situation should be an 
important consideration in assessing the “interests of justice”. Even with 
ius puniendi firmly established, it will be quite difficult to justify punish-
ing defendants if the ICC acts completely counter to the interests of the 
domestic criminal justice systems. 
Global criminal justice, on the other hand, might look more like an 
objective practice of holding individuals accountable for crimes of mass 
atrocity. This is one way of thinking about universal jurisdiction, where a 
crime is subject to prosecution in any jurisdiction in the world, because it 
                                                   
235 John Dugard, “Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?”, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 1999, vol. 12, no. 4, p. 1014; John Dugard, “Possible 
Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions”, in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 1, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 702; Goldstone and Fritz, 2000, pp. 656, 662, see supra note 229; 
Robinson, 2003, p. 486, see supra note 234; Héctor Olásolo, “The Prosecutor of the ICC 
before the Initiation of Investigations: A Quasi-judicial or a Political body?”, in Interna-
tional Criminal Law Review, 2003, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 111 (referring to a TRC); Brubacher, 
2004, pp. 81–82, referring to post-conflict reconciliation processes, see supra note 229; 
Seils and Wierda, 2005, p. 12 (“most direct significance to mediators”), see supra note 229; 
Meyer, 2006, p. 579, see supra note 229; Rodman, 2009, pp. 101 ff., 108 ff., considering 
the goal of peace at the core of his broad, consequentialist approach, see supra note 234; 
Marta Valiñas, “Interpreting Complementarity and Interests of Justice in the Presence of 
Restorative: Based Alternative Forms of Justice”, in Carsten Stahn and Larissa J. van den 
Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague, 2010, pp. 277–78; Stegmiller, 2011, pp. 358, 367–68, 378–79, see supra note 2; 
less emphatic, Scharf, “The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court”, in Cornell International Law Journal, 1999, vol. 32, no. 3, p. 524. 
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is a crime against the people in every jurisdiction in the world, and ius 
puniendi and ius poenale create the normative authorization for universal 
prosecutions. A commitment to universal jurisdiction reflects a cosmo-
politan view of justice, which contains three important moral elements. 
First, “the ultimate units of concern are human beings or persons – rather 
than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, 
nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in 
virtue of their individual members or citizens”.236 Second, “the status of 
ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally – 
not merely to some subset”.237 Finally, “persons are ultimate units of con-
cern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or 
suchlike”.238 Some argue that the object and purpose of the ICC Statute 
(the fight against impunity) and the use of “interests of justice” in other 
provisions of the ICC and other Statutes 239  indicate that the non-
investigation/prosecution cannot be based on transitional justice consider-
ations.240 While we would disagree with the idea that transitional justice 
                                                   
236  Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”, in Ethics, 1992, vol. 103, no. 1,  
p. 48. Italics in original. See also Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cos-
mopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Polity, Cambridge, 2002, p. 169; Immanuel Kant, 
“Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Right, § 43–§ 62”, in Pauline Kleingeld (ed.) and 
David L. Colclasure (trans.), Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, 
Peace, and History, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006, p. 139, 6:343–44; Derek 
Heater, World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and Its Opponents, Continuum, London, 
2002, pp. 13–14; Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 4; Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciproci-
ty, and the State”, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2007, vol. 35, no. 1, p. 3; Gillian Brock, 
Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 12; 
Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner (eds.), Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from 
International Law and Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 
131–32; David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, Polity, 2010, p. 15.  
237  Pogge, 1992, p. 48, see supra note 236; see also Pogge, 2002, p. 169, see supra note 236; 
Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 3, supra note 236; Brock, 2009, p. 12, see supra note 236; Held, 
2010, pp. 15–16, see supra note 236. 
238  Pogge, 1992, p. 48, see supra note 236; see also Pogge, 2002, p. 169, see supra note 236; 
Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 3, supra note 236; Brock, 2009, p. 12, see supra note 236; Held, 
2010, pp. 15–16, see supra note 236. 
239 See Human Rights Watch, Interests of Justice, 2005, p. 6 referring to Articles 55(2)(c), 61, 
65, 67, ICC Statute, and (in fn. 17) to Statutes of earlier international criminal tribunals 
where the notion was always understood in the sense of a fair administration of justice. 
240 See ibid., pp. 4 ff. stating that “the prosecutor may not fail to initiate an investigation or 
decide not to proceed with the investigation because of national efforts, such as truth 
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considerations should never play a role, it also seems clear that the de-
mands of cosmopolitan justice should be a factor in an assessment of jus-
tice. The concept of universality is central for the ICC.  
The second, related question is who counts as a victim for purposes 
of the justice analysis. Immediate victims of mass atrocity are clearly in-
cluded in this group. It may be that the OTP is only allowed to consider 
these immediate victims with respect to Article 53 and the interests of 
justice. But if we think of mass atrocity as a crime against humanity as a 
whole, the group of victims grows much larger. Universal (or nearly uni-
versal) jurisdiction could require us to factor all of humanity into an as-
sessment of what would be in the interests of justice. Again, we might 
find that the interests of local and global ‘victims’ do not align.241  
We argue that deontological obligations do not permit the OTP to 
pursue one form of justice to the serious detriment of the other form of 
justice. Since these different understandings of justice may conflict with 
one another, it may be impossible for the Prosecutor to make decisions 
that will maximize the justice interests of all the relevant constituencies. It 
remains within the purview of the Prosecutor to strike the right balance 
and decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the formal initiation of an 
investigation or prosecution 242  would jeopardize justice interests. 243  In 
                                                                                                                        
commissions, national amnesties, or traditional reconciliation methods, or because of con-
cerns regarding an ongoing peace process” (at pp. 4–5). 
241 For a recent account of the discussion of how the ICC has failed victims, see Gaelle 
Carayon and Jonathan O’Donohue, “The International Criminal Court’s Strategies in Rela-
tion to Victims”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 
567-591. 
242 ICC Statute, Articles 53(1) and (2), see supra note 104. 
243 See, for example, Carsten Stahn, “Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of 
Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 698, arguing that abstinence from 
(immediate) prosecution may be allowed if otherwise reconciliation would be seriously put 
a risk; or Helmut Gropengießer and Jörg Meißner, “Amnesties and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2005, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 
296, arguing that it is “possible to suspend the punishment even of serious offences in fa-
vour of higher-priority-interests” (similarly Karlijn van der Voort and Marten Zwanenburg, 
“From ‘Raison d’État’ to ‘Ètat de Droit International’: Amnesties and the French imple-
mentation of the Rome Statute”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2001, vol. 1, no. 3, 
pp. 329–30) or, at p. 297 that the Prosecutor makes “his own decision on prognosis and 
balance” (emphasis in the original). For considerations governing the timing of indict-
ments, see ICTJ, UN Guidelines Meeting, 2005, pp. 3 ff. 
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light of the fact that the ICC claims to have the goals of ending impunity 
for individual criminals and protecting the global community from the 
harms of mass atrocities, it seems that neither of these aims or constituen-
cies can be ignored altogether. 
18.4.3.3. Political Considerations and Article 53(1)(c) 
The possibility of adverse State reactions to the investigation or prosecu-
tion of its officials must not subject the Prosecutor or the Court as a whole 
to intimidation by powerful States. Otherwise, the Court would rightly 
face criticism that it only prosecutes weak States, and thus undermine its 
legitimacy. International prosecutors have always been subject to pressure 
to achieve results, as was even admitted by the Trial Chamber in the 
Lubanga Judgment, which referred to the “degree of international and 
local pressure, once it was known that officials from the Court had arrived 
in the country”.244 The completion strategies at the ad hoc tribunals had a 
similar effect, as noted in Judge David Hunt’s dissenting opinion to an 
admissibility decision of the ICTY in the Milošević case, in which he 
complained about a “consequential destruction of the rights of the ac-
cused”, the “desire to assist the prosecution to bring the Completion Strat-
egy to a speedy conclusion”, and that it was “improper to take Completion 
Strategy into account […] at the expense of those rights”; in sum: “Com-
pletion Strategy has been given priority over the rights of the accused”.245 
                                                   
244  ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v Lubanga, Trial-
Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, para. 142 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/677866/); on the “natural tendency 
of the prosecutors to sympathize with victims of crimes at the expense of ICC defendants”, 
see Markovic, 2011–12, p. 209, see supra note 163. See generally Ambos, 2012, p. 127, 
see supra note 194. 
245  ICTY, Prosecutor v Milošević, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility 
of Evidence-in-Chief in the Form of a Written Statement, 21 October 2003, IT-02-54-
AR73.4, para. 20–22 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/41554b/). See also ICTR, Prosecutor 
v Nyiramasuhuko, Decision in the Matter of Proceedings Under Rule 15bis(D), Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge David Hunt, 24 September 2003, ICTR-97-21-T, para. 17 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c56e1a/) (the completion strategy in Resolution 1503 should not be in-
terpreted as an encouragement by the Security Council to the ad hoc Tribunals to “conduct 
its trials so that they would be other than fair trials”). About this dissent Fidelma Donlon, 
“The Judicial Role in the Definition and Implementation of the Completion Strategies of 
the International Criminal Tribunals”, in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial 
Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 
p. 360. 
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In a similar vein, Kevin J. Heller opined that completion strategies have 
often “(1) promoted impunity, (2) undermined OTP independence, (3) 
damaged the OTP’s legitimacy, and (4) complicated post-closure pro-
jects”.246 In fact, the consequentialist tendencies go back to Nuremberg, 
where the prosecutor found himself in a structurally and procedurally 
superior position vis-à-vis the defence,247 and some scholars and observers 
complained that inconsistent rulings favoured the prosecution.248 Fair trial 
guarantees are considered to have been rather weak.249 The separation of 
powers principle was diluted,250 and a violation of the legality principle – 
the retroactivity element, to be concrete – has always been a matter of 
some dispute, not only with regard to the Nuremberg trials, but also the 
international criminal trials that followed.251  
The ICC certainly depends on State co-operation, yet it must still 
ensure that it makes decisions about which situations and cases to pursue 
from a critical distance, especially with respect to the States in which the 
criminal situations take place. It would delegitimise the Court if the ICC 
had a practice of making political concession to States in terms of the 
                                                   
246  Kevin J. Heller, “Completion”, in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), 
International Prosecutors, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 900. But see Lovisa 
Bådagård and Mark Klamberg, “The Gatekeeper of the ICC – Prosecutorial Strategies for 
Selecting Situations and Cases at the International Criminal Court”, in Georgetown Jour-
nal of International Law, 2017, vol. 48, pp. 639-733 (arguing that the OTP should be more, 
not less focused on the goals of the Court in selection decisions). 
247  Hans Laternser, “Looking Back at the Nuremberg Trials with Special Consideration of the 
Processes Against Military Leaders”, in Guénaël Mettraux (ed.), Perspectives on the Nu-
remberg Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 480. 
248  See Bernard V.A. Röling, The Tokyo Judgment, APA-University Press, Amsterdam, 1977, 
pp. 633–34; Telford Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, Back 
Bay Books, Boston, 1992, p. 321. 
249  See, generally, Patricia M. Wald, “Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Lega-
cy”, in Cardozo Law Review, 2005–06, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 1596–97; Ron Levi, John Hagan 
and Sara Dezalay, “International Courts in Atypical Political Environments: The Interplay 
of Prosecutorial Strategy, Evidence, and Court Authority in International Criminal Law”, 
in Law and Contemporary Problems, 2016, vol. 79, no. 1, p. 297. 
250  Christoph Safferling and Philipp Graebke, “Strafverteidigung im Nürnberger 
Hauptkriegsverbrecherprozess: Strategien und Wirkung”, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 2011, vol. 123, no. 1, p. 67. 
251  H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morale”, in Harvard Law Review, 
1958, vol. 71, no. 4, p. 619; Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, “Defending the Criminal 
Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions”, in 
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2008, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 65 ff. 
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investigation and prosecution of the States’ officials.252 Rather, the “inter-
ests of justice” clause can only be invoked if the reason(s) that cause the 
Prosecutor to abstain from investigation and prosecution can really be 
traced back or are linked to justice interests, that is, if the abstention really 
serves the interests of justice.253 It is here that we can see how deontologi-
cal constraints on the OTP remain crucial for ensuring that the OTP seeks 
justice. The OTP must never treat potential defendants, or regions, or 
States, as mere means to serve a political end, whether it is personal or 
institutional. But these deontological constraints leave space for prosecu-
torial discretion and freedom of action, and it is here that we will see how 
consequentialist considerations may in fact be necessary to fill an ethical 
gap.  
The “interests of justice” at the preliminary examination phase are 
not focused on whether or not a particular individual can receive a fair 
trial at the ICC. Justice at this phase is considering a constituency of vic-
tims, whether local or global, and not just a particular defendant. Because 
of the scope of this inquiry, we acknowledge that prosecutorial discretion 
with respect to analysing the “interests of justice” will involve political 
considerations. As noted above, political decisions based on bias or 
blackmail will never be appropriate. But as Frédéric Mégret has argued, 
while international criminal justice has tried to distance itself from any 
“blatantly political decision”, the project of international criminal justice 
“cannot come about without some political power”.254 The factors in Arti-
cle 53 make it clear that the Prosecutor has to take a legally substantiated 
decision on a case by case basis and cannot just invoke general policy 
considerations in their own right; otherwise, she could indeed “risk being 
mired in making political judgements that would ultimately undermine his 
[her] work” (or more exactly: her authority) and be subjected “to enor-
mous political pressures and attempted manipulations by governments 
                                                   
252  Ambos, 2016, p. 388, see supra note 2. 
253  Contrary to Human Rights Watch, Interests of Justice, 2005, pp. 19–20, the victims’ justice 
interests cannot be limited to the interests of a criminal prosecution excluding a limine 
their possible interests in peace, traditional reconciliation etc. It is equally unconvincing to 
adduce as an additional factor in favour of criminal prosecution the victims’ interest in the 
memory since this can normally be better preserved by a TRC. 
254  Frédéric Mégret, “The Anxieties of International Criminal Justice”, in Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 2016, vol. 29, no. 1, p. 201.  
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and rebel groups”.255 The Prosecutor must always ‘judicialize the politics’ 
without being a political actor herself.256 So we agree with Mégret that 
these political considerations are inevitable, and we further argue that 
these political considerations constitute consequentialist ethical obliga-
tions on the part of the OTP. 
One important aspect of these political considerations that the OTP 
should be obligated to consider is the continued existence and functioning 
of the ICC as a legitimate international institution. This is especially so 
since the existence of a political community – here: the ‘humanity’ – to 
authorise international criminal adjudication has frequently been reject-
ed.257 If humanity fails to constitute a political community to legitimize an 
international criminal tribunal, “legitimacy must rest on the fairness [of 
this tribunal’s] procedures”.258 Some have recently advanced a strategic 
view of the “interests of justice” concept, arguing that it should be used 
against the opening of an investigation – despite the existence of a reason-
able basis within the meaning of Article 53(1)(a) – if such an investigation 
were detrimental to the Court’s ‘viability’.259 This strategic approach goes 
too far, in our view, because we do not see the “interests of justice” as 
way for the Court to avoid its obligations to seek global and domestic 
justice. However, there may be instances in which Article 53(1)(c) is nec-
essary to avoid the dissolution of the Court altogether. It may be reasona-
ble, for instance, to take into account whether or not a region perceives 
the ICC as a fair institution before initiating another investigation into a 
situation from that region, especially if the region suggests that it may pull 
out of the ICC Statute altogether if it believes the ICC to be unfair and 
                                                   
255  Human Rights Watch, Interests of Justice, 2005, p. 14. 
256  Stegmiller, 2011, p. 379, see supra note 2; see, in a similar vein, Brubacher, 2004, p. 95, 
arguing that prosecutorial “discretion must exclude partisan politics, but not the more 
statesmanlike politics of persuading state compliance”, see supra note 229. 
257  David Luban, “A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity”, in Yale Journal of International 
Law, 2004, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 124–41. 
258  Antony Duff, “Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law”, in Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 591. 
259  Cale Davis, “Political Considerations in Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Crim-
inal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2015, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 172, 174, 188–
89. 
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biased.260 In this situation, a strict deontological/retributive constraint on 
the OTP would require the investigation of the situation without consider-
ing the overall impact on the ICC or the region. Whether or not the ICC 
should continue with the investigation in this hypothetical situation is not 
immediately obvious without more information. What is obvious is that 
the OTP should have an ethical obligation to take its own continued exist-
ence into account when assessing the “interests of justice”.  
18.4.3.4. Deontological and Consequentialist Obligations under 
Article 53(1)(c) 
Accordingly, we argue that there are some situations in which the OTP 
should be required to use consequentialist considerations to consider the 
moral weight of their discretionary decisions under Article 53(1)(c). We 
find that the continued existence of the ICC, or the maintenance of some 
particular global order, cannot be the only aims of the OTP unless the 
OTP ignores all of its deontological obligations related to treating all peo-
ple as ends, never as mere means. Prosecutions cannot come about for 
purely consequentialist reasons, and we recognize that since we can’t pre-
dict the future, the best we can hope for in our invocation of consequen-
tialist considerations is that prosecutors will make decisions based on 
what is expected to be the best outcome.261 Yet we would argue that the 
OTP is obligated to consider the continued existence of the ICC alongside 
these deontological constraints, because the deontological constraints are 
insufficient to account for the global politics that affect the ICC and its 
legitimacy, both perceived and actual. The ICC might never be popular, 
and we should not use the ICC’s popularity as a metric for its successful-
ness, but the ICC’s perception in the world is important because it relies 
                                                   
260  Jonathan Hafetz argues that the ICC should focus more on distributive considerations in 
order to ensure legitimacy. See Jonathan Hafetz, “Fairness, Legitimacy, and Selection De-
cisions in International Criminal Law”, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2017, 
vol. 50, pp. 1133-1172. 
261  In less cautious language Anderson, 2016, p. 192, see supra note 61: “[T]he Jack of pre-
dictability in a system in which the resources of the Prosecutor are so small in relation to 
the whole world that intervention looks like a lightning strike turns belief in the system in-
to something no longer about legitimacy, or even about rational deterrence. lt looks like 
just plain bad luck. A system for going after the world’s worst crimes and worst interna-
tional criminals that has a feeling of simple misfortune to the participants will not fulfil 
very adequately either legitimacy or rational deterrence”. 
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on the co-operation of States in order to function.262 If the OTP relies sole-
ly on deontological constraints to ensure that trials are fair, but the sub-
stantive focus of investigations remains largely focused on the African 
continent, the ICC may not be able to sustain the kind of support it has 
enjoyed from many African countries thus far,263 if only due to the percep-
tion of unfairness rather than actual unfairness. 
A flat-footed consequentialist or utilitarian theory might suggest 
that we should forgo procedural fairness considerations and corresponding 
deontological constraints in favour of purely substantive aims, seeking to 
prosecute only those individuals with overwhelming evidence against 
them, or attempting to ensure convictions even where the evidence is 
lacking. Such a simplistic consequentialist theory might even seek to jus-
tify the use of the OTP’s prosecutorial discretion under Article 53(1)(c) in 
service of creating or sustaining a particular global order. This sort of the-
ory could allow the OTP to refrain from investigating situations in any 
African countries, until the perception of the ICC has changed throughout 
the African continent. We do not endorse such a use of consequentialist 
                                                   
262  Larry May and Shannon Fyfe, International Criminal Tribunals: A Normative Defense, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 188. 
263  See, for example, Charles Chernor Jalloh, “The African Union, the Security Council, and 
the International Criminal Court”, in Charles Chernor Jalloh and Illias Bantekas (eds.), The 
International Criminal Court and Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 185-
188. For a general discussion of the (now decreasing) support of (some) African states see 
Mandiaye Niang, “Africa and the Legitimacy of the in Question”, in International Crimi-
nal Law Review, 2017, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 615-624; Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, “Africa 
and the International Criminal Court: Then and Now”, in Gerhard Werle, et al. (eds.), Afri-
ca and the International Criminal Court, Asser, Springer, The Hague, 2014, pp. 13 ff.; 
Sanji Mmasenono Monageng and Alexander Heinze, “The Rome Statute and Universal 
Human Rights”, in Evelyn A. Ankumah (ed.), The International Criminal Court and Africa, 
Intersentia, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, 2016, pp. 63 ff.; Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, 
“The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis”, in In-
ternational Affairs, 2016, vol. 92, no. 6, pp. 1319-1342; Sarah Leyli Rödiger, Leonie Steinl 
and Valérie V. Suhr, “Das Völkerstrafrecht in Krisenzeiten”, in Kritische Justiz, 2018, vol. 
51, no. 1, 7 ff.; Jide Nzelibe, “The Breakdown of International Treaties”, in Notre Dame 
Law Review, vol. 93, no. 3, pp. 1219 ff. About South Africa’s and especially the African 
National Congress’ (ANC) support and commitment international humanitarian and human 
rights law is well-documented, see Gerhard Kemp, “South Africa’s (Possible) Withdrawal 
from the ICC and the Future of the Criminalization and Prosecution of Crimes Against 
Humanity, War Crimes and Genocide Under Domestic Law: A Submission Informed by 
Historical, Normative and Policy Considerations”, in Washington University Global Stud-
ies Law Review, vol. 16, no. 3, p. 428. 
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considerations by the OTP. Rather, we argue that the OTP is obligated to 
consider the political implications of investigations during the preliminary 
examination phase as part of a more complex, institutional consequential-
ist theory. This sort of theory would not assess the consequences of each 
individual investigation or prosecution carried out by the OTP and the 
ICC. Maintaining the institution of the ICC becomes primary if we think 
of the world in which the ICC exists and functions as the scenario that is 
likely to create the best outcomes. Thus, this type of consequentialist 
analysis aims at ensuring the continued existence of the institution, rather 
than at attempting to predict the consequences of pursuing any one situa-
tion in particular. On this view, procedural justice remains the central type 
of fairness consideration, and deontological and consequentialist ethical 
considerations can (and must) co-exist in the OTP as they seek the same 
goals. 
18.4.4. Accountability Mechanisms and Judicial Review 
We focus in this sub-section on the internal accountability mechanisms 
and the ways they apply specifically to prosecutorial discretion during the 
preliminary examination phase, before outlining the external accountabil-
ity mechanism of judicial review of the OTP.  
Recall from Section 18.3.3.2.1. that the Prosecutor’s ability to im-
pose disciplinary measures on her staff applies at any phase. So the Prose-
cutor can use this power to prevent her staff from disrupting trial proceed-
ings, or to chastise them for failing to act in an appropriately professional 
manner. Ethical failures at the level of prosecutorial discretion may be 
much more serious than conduct warranting a dismissal or a complaint or 
a mere slap on the wrist. Given the seriousness of these decisions, it 
seems unlikely that a lower-level staffer at the OTP would be in a position 
to influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under Article 53(1)(c). 
But it is certainly possible that a lower-level individual at the OTP could 
have failed to meet an ethical obligation in terms of information gathering 
or disclosure, and this could have played an important role in influencing 
the Prosecutor’s assessment of the political considerations surrounding a 
situation. Thus, the Prosecutor and the OTP benefit from the Prosecutor’s 
ability to threaten or utilize disciplinary procedures to establish a certain 
kind of respectful professional environment, but also to prevent large or 
small-scale misconduct. 
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The OTP’s institutional independence, and the prosecutorial discre-
tion that exists with respect to Article 53, is subject to limited judicial 
review,264 drawing from the supervisory powers of the Chambers.265 This 
judicial review serves as the corresponding legal accountability mecha-
nism for the ethical obligations on the part of the OTP in exercising pros-
ecutorial discretion. It does not create a new ethical obligation on the part 
of the OTP. In the case of a proprio motu investigation,266 the Prosecutor 
must seek permission from the PTC if she wants to continue with the in-
vestigation.267 The OTP may only commence the formal investigation if 
the PTC is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to conduct such an 
investigation.268 Otherwise, the OTP may submit a new request based on 
                                                   
264  Morten Bergsmo, Frederik Harhoff and ZHU Dan, “Article 42”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai 
Ambos (eds.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 3rd edi-
tion, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2016, mn. 8–9; Côté, 2012, p. 328, see supra note 114; Heinze, 
2014, pp. 251–52, see supra note 17; see also ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecution’s Reply on the Applications for Participation 
01/04-1/dp to 01/04-6/dp, 15 August 2005, ICC-01/04-84, para. 32, see supra note 118; 
ICTR, Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on Urgent Oral Motion 
for a Stay of the Indictment, or in the Alternative a Reference to the Security Council, 26 
March 2004, ICTR-2000-56-I, paras. 22–25 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f8de3d/); 
SCSL, Prosecutor v Sesay et al., Trial Chamber, Decision on Sesay Motion Seeking Dis-
closure of the Relationship between Governmental Agencies of the United States of Amer-
ica and the Office of the Prosecutor, 2 May 2005, SCSL-04-15-T, para. 22 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/fde087/); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, “Prosecutorial Discretion before 
National Courts and International Tribunals”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
2005, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 136, 138; Peter C. Keen, “Tempered Adversariality: The Judicial 
Role and Trial Theory in the International Criminal”, in Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 2004, vol. 17, no. 4, p. 797; Hakan Friman, “Procedures of International Criminal In-
vestigations and Prosecutions”, in Robert Cryer et al. (eds.), Introduction into Internation-
al Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2014, p. 430; Thalmann, 2012, p. 473, see supra note 126; Vladimir Tochilovsky, The Law 
and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals and Courts: Procedure and 
Human Rights Aspects, 2nd edition, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2014, p. 470; Kuczyńska, 
2015, pp. 40–42, see supra note 41; from a comparative perspective, Kai Ambos, “The 
Role of the Prosecutor”, in Stephen Livingstone (ed.), Towards a Procedural Regime for 
the International Criminal Court, London, 2002, pp. 16–21, 63. 
265  From a comparative perspective, see Kai Ambos, “The Status, Role and Accountability of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Overview on the Basis 
of 33 National Reports”, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Jus-
tice, 2000, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 116. 
266  ICC Statute, Article 15(1), see supra note 104. 
267  Cf. ibid., Article 15(3). 
268  Ibid., Article 15(4). See also Ambos, 2016, p. 340, see supra note 2 
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new facts or evidence,269 or it must drop the investigation. In the case of 
State or Security Council referrals,270 the PTC can formally review the 
OTP decision “to initiate an investigation”,271 after the preliminary exam-
ination is concluded. The PTC is entitled to review OTP non-investigation 
or non-prosecution decisions under Article 53(1) and (2) pursuant to Arti-
cle 53(3) of the ICC Statute. However, there generally is no possibility of 
judicial review in cases of prosecutorial inaction. Thus, a decision not to 
initiate an investigation under Article 15 cannot be reviewed.272 After all, 
the decision to investigate or prosecute belongs to the realm of the Prose-
cutor, being the dominis litis over this part of the proceedings, and thus 
cannot be substituted by a judicial organ.273 
Now that we have argued for our normative understanding of how 
prosecutorial discretion should be influenced by consequentialist ethical 
considerations during the preliminary examination phase, and identified 
the related OTP obligations and accountability mechanisms, Section 18.5. 
will outline policy recommendations that support our normative claims. 
18.5. Specific Recommendations for OTP Ethics in the Preliminary 
Examination Phase 
In this penultimate section, we argue that the OTP must be accountable to 
more specific ethical standards applicable to the preliminary examination 
phase in order to ensure the legitimacy and fairness of the Court, both in 
terms of perception and actual practice. We address both direct ethical 
duties and internal accountability mechanisms.  
18.5.1. Suggested Ethical Obligations 
18.5.1.1. Revisions to the OTP’s Policy Guidelines 
Our first recommendation is that the OTP should generate a more concrete 
set of policy guidelines to defend and explain the normative foundations 
of prosecutorial ethics, especially with respect to prosecutorial discre-
                                                   
269  ICC Statute, Article 15(5), see supra note 104. 
270  Cf. ibid., Article 13(a) and (b). 
271  Ibid., Article 53(1). 
272  Cf. Stahn, 2009, p. 255, see supra note 162.  
273  See, in a similar vein, Stahn, 2009, p. 255, supra note 162; Friman, Brady, Costi, Guariglia 
and Stuckenberg, 2013, p. 390 (Chamber “not empowered to substitute a negative decision 
with its own prosecution”), see supra note 222. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 64 
tion.274 We do not think that relying on a common-sense understanding of 
morality is sufficient to ensure that individuals from a wide range of 
backgrounds pursue the same ethical aims. Rather, we suggest that the 
OTP should clearly identify when, which, and how deontological and 
consequentialist considerations should play a role in its selection and pri-
oritization strategy, especially considering the mandate and purpose of the 
ICC. The OTP should be obligated to make selection decisions in accord-
ance with the following theoretical underpinnings related to punishment. 
18.5.1.1.1. Retribution 
Retribution and deterrence275 are of limited relevance at the international 
level.276 It is therefore acceptable, that high selectivity undermines the 
                                                   
274  In a similar vein, see Nicholas Cowdery, “The Exercise of the Powers of the Porsecutor”, 
in Bergsmo, Rackwitz and SONG (eds.), 2017, pp. 421–22, see supra note 111. But see 
Bruce A. Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect”, in Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 461-484 (arguing that holding prosecutors more accountable may 
require developing alternatives to formal discipline or restructuring the process by which 
ethics rules for prosecutors are created and enforced). 
275  Roberto Bellelli, “The Establishment of the System of International Criminal Justice”, in 
Roberto Bellelli (ed.), International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome 
Statute to Its Review, Ashgate, Farnham, 2010, pp. 5, 13; Bradley E. Berg, “The 1994 I.L.C. 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: A Principled Appraisal of Jurisdictional 
Structure”, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 1996, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 
254 ff. For ICTR jurisprudence, see, for example, ICTR, Prosecutor v. Serushago, Trial 
Chamber, Sentence, 5 February 1999, ICTR-98-39-S, para. 20 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/e2dddb/); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 
1999, ICTR-96-3-T, para. 455 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0dbbb/). For ICTY juris-
prudence, see, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Trial Chamber, Sentencing 
Judgment, 29 November 1996, IT-96-22-T, para. 65 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
eb5c9d/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 24 March 2000, IT-
95-14/1-A, para. 185 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/176f05/). Cautioning against the ap-
plication of quantitative methods to determine the preventive effect of international crimi-
nal trials Anderson, 2016, p. 189, see supra note 61; Tomer Broude, “The Court Should 
Avoid all Considerations of Deterrence and Instead Focus on Creating a Credible and Le-
gitimate Normative Environment in Which Serious Crimes are Not Tolerated”, in Richard 
H. Steinberg (ed.), Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, Brill 
Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2016, p. 194 (“[S]pecific and general deterrence are empirically 
intangible – in the international criminal realm they can neither be proved nor disproved in 
a methodologically meaningful manner, beyond conjecture. Deterrence, therefore, cannot, 
and should not, serve as an appreciable objective to be achieved by the Court”). See, how-
ever, David Scheffer, “Maximizing Opportunities to Deter Further Atrocity Crimes”, in 
ibid., p. 220: “Recent empirical research demonstrates the deterrence value of international 
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Court’s capacity to achieve retributive justice.277  As Mark Drumbl re-
marks: “The retributive function is hobbled by the fact that only some 
extreme evil gets punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for 
political reasons anathema to Kantian deontology”.278 Thus, retribution 
cannot justify the selection of some suspects over others.279 Ranking po-
tential suspects in terms of their relative desert is impractical.280 Deonto-
logical retributivists have provided theoretical tools to measure desert.281 
For instance, ‘harm-ratings’ which examine the consequences of a crime 
under consideration of certain assumed social situations and evaluate the 
“consequences in the light of certain assumed basic values”;282 or by the 
                                                                                                                        
and domestic prosecutions of human rights violators, including perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes”). 
276  Ambos, 2013, p. 68, see supra note 77; Leslie P. Francis and John G. Francis, “Internation-
al Criminal Courts, the Rule of Law, and the Prevention of Harm: Building Justice in 
Times of Injustice”, in Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (eds.), International Criminal Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010; Deirdre Golash, “The Justification of Pun-
ishment in the International Context”, in Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (eds.), Interna-
tional Criminal Law and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 
201 ff.; Berg, 1996, p. 254, see supra note 275.  
277  This criticism has been voiced in Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International 
Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 151–54, 156–57 (citing Letter 
“Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers 17.8.1946”, in Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Brief-
wechsel 1926-1969, R. Piper GmbH, Munich, 1985, p. 4 (translated to English in Lotte 
Köhler & Hans Saner (eds., trans.), Correspondence 1926-1969, Harcourt, 1992). See also 
Margaret M. deGuzman, “Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International 
Criminal Court”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, 2012, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 302. 
278  Drumbl, 2007, p. 151, see supra note 277. 
279  deGuzman, 2012, p. 303, see supra note 277; Michael T. Cahill, “Retributive Justice in the 
Real World”, in Washington University Law Review, 2007, vol. 85, no. 4, p. 870. 
280  deGuzman, 2012, p. 303, see supra note 277; Cahill, 2007, p. 852, see supra note 279. 
281  These theoretical tools may even comprise utilitarian approaches, as the so-called retribu-
tarianism does, see Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg and Netanel Dagan, “Retributarianism: A 
New Individualization of Punishment”, in Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2018, Advance 
Article, p. 1 (“These retributarian approaches are characterized by the individualization of 
retributivism. On one hand, retributarianism shares with classic retributivism the rhetoric 
of justice, a focus on the moral evaluation of the severity of the offense, and the primary 
importance ascribed to maintaining proportionality. On the other hand, it shares with utili-
tarianism the possibility of taking into account, in addition to the severity of the offense, 
the offender’s personal circumstances, with a future-oriented perspective that also consid-
ers developments subsequent to the commission of the offense”). 
282  Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Anal-
ysis”, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1991, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 6–7. 
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impairment of personal interests such as ‘welfare interests’, 283  which 
comes close to the (rather consequentialist) German Rechtsgutslehre284 
and might – in our view – not be a deontological tool at all. Whether these 
tools can be applied in practice, however, especially in context of the ICC, 
seems doubtful.  
Efficiency has been at the core of reform efforts within and outside 
of the ICC.285 It is clear from these efforts that the necessary reforms can 
be more easily and quickly achieved by changes in practice (via practice 
manuals like the Chambers Practice Manual) than by – usually more 
cumbersome – normative reforms (via amendments of the RPE or even 
                                                   
283  Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, pp. 41 ff. 
284  See in more detail Kai Ambos, “The Overall Function of International Criminal Law: 
Striking the Right Balance Between the Rechtsgut and the Harm Principles”, in Criminal 
Law and Philosophy, 2015, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 301–29; Kai Ambos, “Rechtsgutsprinzip und 
harm principle: theoretische Ausgangspunkte zur Bestimmung der Funktion des Völker-
strafrechts”, in Mark A. Zöller (ed.), Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft in internationaler 
Dimension: Festschrift für Jürgen Wolter zum 70 Geburtstag am 7 September 2013, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2013, pp. 1285–310. 
285  See, on the one hand, ICC, Chambers Practice Manual, May 2017 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/f0ee26/). About the creation of the Manual, see, for example, Hirad Abtahi and 
Shehzad Charania, “Expediting the ICC Criminal Process: Striking the Right Balance be-
tween the ICC and States Parties”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2018, Advance 
Article, pp. 35 ff.; the various Reports of the Study Group on Governance (2011–15), es-
pecially the most recent Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learnt in ICC-ASP, Re-
port Study Group on Governance, 2015, Annex II, 29 ff. and, last but not least, ICC, Sec-
ond Court’s report on the development of performance indicators for the ICC, 11 Novem-
ber 2016, p. 12–13 (formulating as an autonomous second goal ‘[T]he ICC’s leadership 
and management are effective’); for a comprehensive overview of this Court-led initiative 
since its inception see Philipp Ambach, “A Look towards the Future: The ICC and ‘Les-
sons Learnt’”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and Practice of the International Criminal 
Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 1284 ff.; Philipp Ambach, “The ‘Les-
sons Learnt’ Process at the ICC: a Suitable Vehicle for Procedural Agreements?”, in 
Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2016, vol. 11, no. 12, pp. 857 ff.; Birju 
Kotecha, “The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits of Performance Indicators”, 
in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 543-565. On the oth-
er hand, see Guénaël Mettraux, Shireen A. Fisher, Dermot Groome, Alex Whiting Gabriel-
le McIntyre, Jérome de Hemptinne, and Göran Sluiter, Expert Initiative on Promoting Ef-
fectiveness at the International Criminal Court, 2 December 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/3dae90/) and the summary by Jürg Lindenmann, “Stärkung der Effizienz der Ver-
fahren vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof”, in Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2015, vol. 10, no. 10, p. 529. 
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the ICC Statute).286 The ensuing management needs to not only concern 
the judges but also the Prosecutor who bears the main responsibility for 
the conduct of the preliminary and investigation stage.287 Given the Pros-
ecutor’s broad discretion at this procedural stage, with virtually no judi-
cial supervision288 and great freedom to select situations and cases,289 a 
coherent and transparent prosecution strategy with the respective policies 
is required as a counterbalance.290 
18.5.1.1.2. Deterrence 
Deterrence is also unable to provide the theoretical basis for concrete se-
lection criteria291 – even though deterrence emanates from utilitarian mor-
al philosophy. However, read together with other utilitarian goals of the 
ICC, such as strengthening the protections of international humanitarian 
law; creating a historical record of atrocities; providing satisfaction to the 
victims of crimes committed by an offender; and to promoting a process 
of reconciliation,292 it might still be a better option for grounding punish-
                                                   
286  Cf.  ibid. (calling for “changes of practice”, and only subsidiary for normative changes); 
see also Ambach, 2016, p. 862 (referring to “practice adjustments short of the ‘article 51 
threshold’”, that is, “internally” without an amendment of the RPE) and pp. 847–-64 (on 
the amendments of the RPE via Article 51(2)(a) and (3), especially highlighting the 
smoother avenue for the judges pursuant to Article 51(3)), see supra note 285. 
287  For a critical discussion of the management structures of the OTP, see Mettraux, Fisher, 
Groome, Whiting McIntyre, de Hemptinne and Sluiter, 2014, p. 51 (paras. 4 ff.) (recom-
mending, among other things, a streamlining of the prosecutorial investigations, pp. 65–66 
para. 55), see supra note 285. 
288  Cf. Ambos, 2016, pp. 381 ff., see supra note 2. From a policy perspective against judicial 
oversight during investigation, see Mettraux, Fisher, Groome, Whiting McIntyre, de 
Hemptinne and Sluiter, 2014, p. 8, para. 8, p. 11, para. 36, see supra note 285. 
289  Cf. Ambos, 2016, pp. 376 ff., see supra note 2; Ambos, 2016, pp. 33 ff., see supra note 
182. With a special focus on fairness see also May and Fyfe, 2017, pp. 177 ff., see supra 
note 262. 
290  See now – long expected – ICC-OTP, 2016 (establishing general principles, repeating the 
legal criteria and – most importantly – proposing case selection [gravity of the crime, de-
gree of responsibility of the accused and representativity of charges, para. 34 ff.] and prior-
itisation criteria [cf. especially para. 50–51]), see supra note 160. 
291  In this vein also deGuzman, 2012, pp. 306 ff., see supra note 277; Anderson, 2016, pp. 189 
ff, see supra note 61. For a nuanced account of deterrence see Broude, 2016, pp. 194 ff., 
see supra note 275. 
292  Heinze, 2014, pp. 216 ff., see supra note 17; John D. Jackson and Sarah J. Summers, The 
Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, 
pp. 111–12 (using the term ‘purpose’); Jens D. Ohlin, “Goals of International Criminal Jus-
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ment, since it includes the Court’s mandate. After all, a prosecutorial 
strategy must always be measured against the legitimacy and effective-
ness of the ICC; the effectiveness of an institution – in turn – depends on 
the execution of its mandate.293 This mandate serves as the purpose or the 
goals of an institution. These goals cannot be assigned or determined a 
placere. They are established by the mandate provider or stakeholder,294 
especially in a rule-based international order.295 In case of the ad hoc tri-
bunals, the mandate provider is the UN Security Council.296 Since the UN 
is bound by human rights norms based on its Charter, so are those tribu-
nals and their prosecutors.297 This, of course, also has an impact on the 
prosecutors’ understanding of the tribunals’ goals and purposes when se-
lecting suspects. Thus, human rights law-related goals, such as satisfac-
                                                                                                                        
tice and International Criminal Procedure”, in Göran Sluiter et al. (eds.), International 
Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 55, 
58–60; Jenia I. Turner, “Plea Bargaining”, in Linda Carter and Fausto Pocar (eds.), Inter-
national Criminal Procedure: The Interface of Civil Law and Common Law Legal Systems, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013, pp. 34, 51; Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 89; Nerida Chazal, The International 
Criminal Court and Global Social Control: International Criminal Justice in Late Moder-
nity, Routledge, London, 2016, p. 2 (albeit claiming that providing satisfaction and repara-
tion to victims is of secondary importance, which might not reflect the Statute’s telos). See 
also – albeit with regard to the ICTY – Minna Schrag, “Substantive and Organisational Is-
sues”, in Bergsmo, Rackwitz and SONG (eds.), 2017, pp. 392 ff., supra note 111. For ar-
guments for restorative justice or healing, See, for example, Mark J. Osiel, “Ever Again: 
Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre”, in University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view, 1995, vol. 144, no. 2, pp. 471–78, 512. 
293  Yuval Shany, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Ap-
proach”, in American Journal of International Law, 2012, vol. 106, no. 2, p. 237. 
294  Ibid., p. 240. 
295  Ohlin, 2013, p. 61, see supra note 292. 
296  Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/827(1993), 25 May 1993; Secu-
rity Council Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/RES/955(1944), 8 November 1994; Iain 
Bonomy, “The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial”, in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2007, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 353. 
297  Masha Fedorova and Göran Sluiter, “Human Rights as Minimum Standards in Internation-
al Criminal Proceedings”, in Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, 2009, vol. 
3, no. 1, p. 21; Krit Zeegers, International Criminal Tribunals and Human Rights Law, 
Springer, The Hague, 2016, p. 57; Lorenzo Gradoni, “International Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals: Bound by Human Rights Norms … or Tied Down?”, in Leiden Journal of In-
ternational Law, 2006, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 849. 
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tion and restitution,298 have arguably a more prominent position within the 
system of the ad hoc tribunals than at the ICC due to the different man-
date providers.299 In other words, ‘core goals’ of the ICTY/ICTR and the 
ICC do not necessarily have to coincide. At the ICC, the States Parties 
determine the mandate of the Court, and although international treaties or 
other instruments creating international courts will always be the result of 
a diplomatic compromise in which the framing of a text is a part of the 
bargaining process, this mandate is first and foremost consequentialist. 
18.5.1.1.3. Expressivism and Communication 
We are well aware that selection and prioritization criteria written in the 
ink of consequentialism risk widening the power of the Prosecutor to the 
detriment of fairness and justice. Both the expressivist and communicative 
purpose of punishment,300 in particular and in its several variants, cannot 
                                                   
298  Krešimir Kamber, Prosecuting Human Rights Offences, Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2017, pp. 
186–87. 
299  Stahn, 2017, p. 9 with further references, see supra note 1, who views the “consequential-
ist approach” (in more detail supra note 228) of the OTP to preliminary examinations as 
carrying the potential of turning the ICC “into a human rights monitoring body or even 
cast[ing] irreversible shadows of incrimination on individuals prior to investigations”. 
300  We understand expressivism as the expression of condemnation and outrage of the interna-
tional community, where the international community in its entirety is considered one of 
the victims, see also Kai Ambos, “Review Essay: Liberal Criminal Theory”, in Criminal 
Law Forum, 2017, vol. 28, pp. 589, 601 with further references. Even though expressivism 
can be traced back to Hegel’s theory of punishment (for Hegel punishment is the “cancel-
lation [Aufheben] of crime”, which “is retribution in so far as the latter, by its concept, is 
an infringement of an infringement [of right] and in so far as crime, by its existence 
[Dasein], has a determinate qualitative and quantitative magnitude, so that its negation, as 
existent, also has a determinate magnitude”, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood (ed.), H.B. Nisbet (trans.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1821/1991, § 101, emphases in the original; see Antje Du Bois-Pedain, 
“Hegel and the Justification of Real-world Penal Sanctions”, in Canadian Journal of Law 
& Jurisprudence, 2016, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 37, 42; see also the analysis of Thom Brooks, 
Hegel’s Political Thought, 2nd edn, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2013, p. 172), 
Feinberg is usually named as its proponents, especially by authors from the common law 
system (for more references see May and Fyfe, 2017, pp. 61 ff., see supra note 262). What 
is commonly overlooked is that Feinberg speaks of “expression” rather than “communica-
tion” of punishment: “[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes 
of resentment and indignation. […] Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance 
largely missing from other kinds of penalties”, Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1974, p. 98, emphasis in the original. 
There are several attempts to distinguish expressivist and communicative theories of pun-
ishment, evolving around the existence of a recipient (for our purposes, this admittedly 
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be transferred beyond the domestic realm, where the recognition of valid 
criminal laws can be empirically proven, to an area where these criminal 
laws do not exist. Here, international criminal law is not only “educating 
society about its past” through the truth-telling function of international 
criminal trials;301 it also very bluntly aims to create an awareness of the 
existence of a norm, instead of strengthening this norm’s perception. This, 
however, arguably bestows upon criminal law the function of creating 
morality, which is neo-colonialism par excellence.302 Especially the OTP’s 
policy of “positive complementarity”303 – “a concept aimed at encourag-
                                                                                                                        
rough and almost simplistic identification of a common criterion needs to suffice): Expres-
sivist theories too are based on communication but that communication does not require a 
recipient and is audience-independent while communicative theories are based on an 
communicative act that is aimed at a certain recipient and is audience-dependent (see, for 
example, Andy Engen, “Communication, Expression, and the Justification of Punishment”, 
in Athens Journal of Humanities and Arts, 2014, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 299, 304 ff.; Bill Wringe, 
“Rethinking expressive theories of punishment: why denunciation is a better bet than 
communication or pure expression”, in Philosophical Studies, 2017, vol. 174, no. 3, pp. 
681-708). Communicative punishment theories therefore recognise the social communica-
tion between offender, victim and society through punishment (Ambos, ibid., p. 601 with 
further references). This stems from the idea that a communication with (instead of about) 
the offender is both possible and necessary (ibid., p. 602). Beyond that, through punish-
ment society not only communicates with the offender, but also “with itself” (Klaus Gün-
ther, “Criminal Law, Crime and Punishment as Communication”, in Andrew P. Simester et 
al. (eds.), Liberal Criminal Theory, Hart, Oxford, 2014, p. 131). In the words of Anthony 
Duff: “In claiming authority over the citizens, it [that is, criminal law] claims that there are 
good reasons, grounded in the community’s values for them to eschew such wrong […]. It 
speaks to the citizens as members of the normative community.” (Antony Duff, Punish-
ment, Communication and Community, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 80). 
301  Mina Rauschenbach, “Individuals Accused of International Crimes as Delegitimized 
Agents of Truth”, in International Criminal Justice Review, 2018, Advance Article, p. 3 
with further references. 
302  Cornelius Prittwitz, “Die Rolle des Strafrechts im Menschenrechtsregime”, in Arno 
Pilgram et al. (eds.), Einheitliches Recht für die Vielfalt der Kulturen? Strafrecht und 
Kriminologie in Zeiten transkultureller Gesellschaften und transnationalen Rechts, LIT, 
Wien, 2012, pp. 23, 31. 
303  Ambos, 2016, p. 327 with further references, see supra note 2; Cedric Ryngaert, “Com-
plementarity in Universality Cases: Legal-Systemic and Legal Policy Considerations”, in 
Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for 
Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2010, pp. 165, 172 
ff. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/7-bergsmo); Olympia Bekou, “The ICC and Capacity 
Building at the National Level”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Law and Practice of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 1245, 1252 ff.; William 
W. Burke-White, “Maximizing the ICC’s Crime Prevention Impact Through Positive 
Complementarity and Hard-Nosed Diplomacy”, in Richard H. Steinberg (ed.), Contempo-
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ing domestic criminal justice systems to conduct their own criminal pro-
ceedings” – has been subjected to such a criticism.304 Yet we see this con-
sequentialist dimension of prosecutorial discretion as Larry May under-
stands it, invoking an ‘international harm principle’, or a moral argument 
for thinking that group-based rather than individualized harms are the 
proper subject of international prosecutions.305 May focuses on humani-
ty’s interest rather than individual interests, claiming: “One interest of 
humanity is that its members, as members, not be harmed. This is similar 
to the claim that a club has an interest that its members, as members, not 
be harmed. For when the club’s members are harmed in this way, the 
harms adversely affect the reputation of the club, and even the ability of 
the club to remain in existence”.306 This mirrors an objective understand-
ing of legal goods, as promoted by Feinberg with his understanding of 
harm (see above). Thus, according to May, “justified international prose-
cutions require either that the harm must be widespread in that there is a 
violation of individuality of a certain sort epitomized by group-based 
harmful treatment that ignores the unique features of the individual victim, 
or the harm must be systematic in that it is perpetrated in pursuance of a 
plan by an agent of a State or with active involvement from a State or 
State-like entity”.307 These purposes of punishment (and their respective 
limitations) should be more clearly reflected in the OTP policies. 
18.5.1.2. Concretization of the OTP’s General Ethic Rules 
(Especially its Code of Conduct) 
Second, we follow Morten Bergsmo in our argument for more precise 
obligations on the part of the OTP with respect to their conduct, pursuant 
                                                                                                                        
rary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2016, 
pp. 203 ff. 
304  Stahn, 2017, p. 9 with further references, see supra note 1. 
305  Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 81. In support of and applying May’s harm principle (especially with-
in the context of the IMT), see Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath, “A Defense of In-
ternational Criminal Law”, in Ethics, 2004, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 40 ff. But see Reeves, 2018, 
p. 1060, see supra note 50, who denies that we should treat the harm of crimes against 
humanity as a “precondition of legitimate prosecution” and instead claims that universal 
jurisdiction should not require special standing. Again, we disagree with his conflation of 
questions about universal jurisdiction with those of ius puniendi. 
306  May, 2005, p. 82, see supra note 305. 
307  Ibid., p. 90. 
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to the OTP Code. In 2003, Morten Bergsmo, Senior Legal Advisor at the 
ICC-OTP Legal Advisory Section at the time, led a team which drafted a 
Prosecutorial Code of Conduct (‘Draft Code’), which appeared on the 
ICC’s website.308 In comparison to the then-existing Professional Conduct 
for Prosecution Counsel at the ad hoc tribunals, Bergsmo’s draft was 
much more specific.309 The draft is not available at the ICC’s website an-
ymore, but was kindly provided to the authors by Bergsmo himself and 
has recently been reprinted.310 The Draft Code begins by identifying a 
moral obligation that is not legally enforceable, yet it is one that may go a 
long way toward cultivating an impressive sort of professional environ-
ment at the OTP. Regulation 5.1 of Chapter 2 of the Draft Code explains 
that the Prosecutor “promulgates this Code of conduct to inculcate and 
uphold the standard of excellence expected from all members of the Of-
fice”.311 Similarly, Regulation 6.2 of Chapter 2 proposes that members of 
the OTP “shall establish and promote a unified international legal culture 
within the Office, rooted in the principles and purposes of the Statute, 
without bias for the rules and methods of any one national system or legal 
tradition”.312 A written expectation of excellence and a certain profession-
al culture could serve to generate pride and determination on the part of 
the OTP staff in their approach to other ethical obligations. A more explic-
it demand for the deontological obligations of self- and other-respect 
could only improve the culture of the OTP. Regulations 7 through 12 also 
provide for more precise parameters of the sort of character and conduct 
that should be expected of someone at the OTP, with respect to standards 
of independence,313 honourable and professional conduct,314 faithful con-
                                                   
308  Theresa Roosevelt, “Ethics for the Ethical: A Code of Conduct for the International Crimi-
nal Court Office of the Prosecutor”, in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 2011, vol. 24, 
no. 3, p. 844. 
309  Ibid., p. 846. 
310  Salim A. Nakhjavani, “The Origins and Development of the Code of Conduct”, in 
Bergsmo, Rackwitz and SONG (eds.), 2017, Annex 1, pp. 964 ff., see supra note 111. 
311  Draft Code, Chapter 2, Regulation 5.1. 
312  Ibid., Regulation 6.2. About this “legal culture” in more detail, see Christopher Staker, 
“Observations on Legal Culture, Legal Policy and the Management of Information”, in 
Bergsmo, Rackwitz and SONG (eds.), 2017, pp. 637–38. 
313  Draft Code, Chapter 2, Regulation 7. 
314  Ibid., Regulation 8. 
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duct, 315  impartial conduct, 316  contentious conduct, 317  and confidentiali-
ty.318 Again, there should be more than a reliance on commonsense moral-
ity in establishing constructive ethical obligations for the OTP.  
In terms of more specific issues relating to prosecutorial discretion, 
Regulation 6.3 of Chapter 2 of the Draft Code obligates all members of 
the OTP to: “in all their dealings with and relations to the Court and in all 
matters arising in the performance of their duties or the exercise of their 
powers, (a) maintain the independence of the Office and refrain from 
seeking or acting on instructions from any external source; (b) conduct 
themselves honourably, professionally, faithfully, impartially and consci-
entiously; […] (d) endeavour to establish the truth in preliminary exami-
nations, investigations and prosecutions, in accordance with Article 54 of 
the Statute and Regulation 13; (e) promote the effective [and expeditious] 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court”. Regulation 6.3(e) in particular obligates the OTP to work fairly, 
but also effectively, which is important for maintaining the ICC as an in-
ternational criminal justice institution. If the OTP cannot function effec-
tively, the wheels of the ICC will grind to a halt. 
A possible objection by the OTP to the focus on substantive truth-
finding is that it is overly utopian. The OTP Code in fact counters the 
draft in its footnote to the corresponding provision: “This standard of 
truth-seeking is excerpted from the statement of purpose supporting the 
duty of the Prosecutor to investigate all relevant facts and evidence, that is, 
‘In order to establish the truth…’ (Article 54(1)(a)). As the search for truth 
cannot be an obligation of result, the term ‘strive’ is used to convey an 
obligation of means of central importance for individual choices of con-
duct”.319 Yet we would argue that the language should not be modified to 
reflect a less stringent obligation.  
Regulation 13 provides for useful, specific standards of ‘truth-
seeking’, among other things: first, “to provide the factual and evidentiary 
basis for an accurate assessment of whether there may be criminal respon-
                                                   
315  Ibid., Regulation 9. 
316  Ibid., Regulation 10. 
317  Ibid., Regulation 11. 
318  Ibid., Regulation 12. 
319  Reprinted in Nakhjavani, 2017, Annex 1, p. 840, see supra note 310. 
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sibility under the Statute”; second, the “investigation of both incriminat-
ing and exonerating circumstances as a matter of equal priority and with 
equal diligence”; and third, “prompt reporting of concerns which, if sub-
stantiated, would tend to render a previous conviction made by the Court 
unsafe, bring the administration of justice into disrepute or constitute a 
miscarriage of justice; and full conformity to the applicable rules on dis-
closure of new evidence”.320 The second and third standards are especially 
compelling. The second standard does not only highlight the (policy-
implementing) feature of investigating both incriminating and exonerating 
evidence, but also stresses the importance of the word “equally” in a foot-
note: “The Statute requires that incriminating and exonerating circum-
stances be investigated ‘equally’. This standard interprets ‘equally’ as 
equality in priority, diligence and resource-allocation, and thus relevant to 
several professions and levels of seniority within the Office”.321  
The investigation of exonerating evidence, as an element of truth 
finding that a prosecution team may find particularly challenging to de-
mand of itself, is further specified in Regulation 46 of the Draft Code: 
“During evidence collection, all care shall be taken to identify exonerating 
evidence […] If any material points to further potentially exonerating 
material, this potential shall be recorded. If the lead is not pursued further, 
the reasons for this decision shall be recorded on the Evidence Registra-
tion Form”.322 It is useful that there is no discretion available here, where 
the obligation is strict and straightforward. 
Our final recommendation for adoption from the Draft Code is 
Regulation 14, which establishes the “standard of effective investigation 
and prosecution”.323 This regulation uses the modifier “reasoned” to limit 
what counts as an acceptable “evaluation of facts, evidence, and law, par-
ticularly in preparing and conducting the tests of reasonable basis, prima 
facie admissibility, interests of justice and reconsideration, considering 
applicable factors and criteria and taking into account the interests pro-
tected in the Statute in each case”.324 It is necessary that the OTP not be in 
                                                   
320  Draft Code, Chapter 2, Regulation 13. 
321  Reprinted in Nakhjavani, 2017, Annex 1, p. 840, see supra note 310. 
322  Draft Code, Chapter 2, Regulation 46. 
323  Ibid., Regulation 14. 
324  Ibid., Regulation 14(b). 
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a position to shy away from clear expectations for upstanding conduct in 
associated with the preliminary examination phase, and one way to do that 
is to be more precise about the standard of evaluation that is acceptable. 
This standard means reasons must be available for any exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion, and this seems more than reasonable given the stakes 
of ICC investigations. 
18.5.2. Suggested Internal Accountability Mechanisms 
In line with our argument throughout this chapter that the Prosecutor 
should act in accordance with deontological constraints and also in light 
of consequentialist considerations, we find that the existing internal ac-
countability mechanisms give her suitable discretion in determining how 
to hold her staff accountable for failed ethical obligations. There is little 
that can be done internally to ensure that the Prosecutor herself is held 
legally accountable for her purely ethical obligations, other than the pas-
sage and revision of the OTP, which constitutes the basis for several inter-
nal accountability mechanisms. We thus rely on the suggestions revisions 
to the OTP Code listed in Section 18.5.1. above, and would insist that 
external bodies who play a role in selecting the Prosecutor are obligated to 
ensure that the Prosecutor is of the highest moral calibre.  
18.6. Conclusion 
We have argued that the foundations of prosecutorial discretion, particu-
larly in the OTP at the ICC, cannot be mere platitudes about doing one’s 
job with honour and avoiding serious misconduct in carrying out one’s 
duty. We have analysed the normative foundations of prosecutorial ethics 
in international criminal law and argued for the necessity of relying on 
consequentialist considerations during the preliminary examination phase 
at the ICC, as carefully constrained by deontological obligations. In par-
ticular, we have argued that in Article 53, the concept of the “interests of 
justice” should include both global and local concerns and victims, which 
will sometimes require the OTP to balance conflicting interests and make 
decisions that promote the ‘expectably best’ outcome for all interested 
parties.  
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 77 
19 
______ 
19. Politics, Power Dynamics, and the Limits of 
Existing Self-Regulation and Oversight in 
ICC Preliminary Examinations 
Asaf Lubin* 
Should the normative framework that governs the International Criminal 
Court’s (‘ICC’) oversight concerning preliminary examinations undergo a 
reform? The following chapter answers this question in the affirmative, 
making the claim that both self-regulation by the Office of the Prosecutor 
(‘OTP’) and quality control by the Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) currently 
suffer from significant deficiencies, thus failing to reach the optimum 
point on the scale between absolute prosecutorial discretion and absolute 
control. The chapter demonstrates some of these inadequacies using the 
example of the preliminary examination concerning the situation in Pales-
tine. The chapter first maps out the legal structures and mechanisms that 
regulate the preliminary examination stage. The chapter then explores a 
number of key areas in which the OTP has considerable independence, 
and concerning which sufficient quality control is critical to ensuring the 
legitimacy of the preliminary examination process, and of the Court itself. 
This review includes an analysis of the Court’s potential for politicization, 
the problems faced by the OTP when attempting to articulate generalized 
prioritization policies and exit strategies, the regulation of evidentiary 
standards at the preliminary examination stage, and the role of transparen-
cy in the preliminary examination process. The chapter concludes with 
four suggestions for potential reform of the existing control mechanisms 
over prosecutorial discretion in preliminary examinations: (1) re-phasing 
                                                   
*  Asaf Lubin is J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School (2018 expected); Resident Fellow at 
Yale’s Information Society Project; Visiting Scholar at Hebrew University Cyber Security 
Research Center; and Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Privacy 
International. He would like to thank Morten Bergsmo, Carsten Stahn, as well as the team 
at the Centre for International Law Research and Policy and Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, for all of their invaluable support in the drafting and publication of this piece. 
He wishes to also thank Shannon Kisch for her continued guidance and assistance. 
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of the preliminary examination phase and the introduction of a Gantt-
based review process and a sliding scale of transparency requirements; (2) 
redefinition of the relationship between the OTP and PTC at the prelimi-
nary examination stage; (3) redrafting the existing OTP policy papers on 
Preliminary Examinations and Interests of Justice, as well as adopting a 
new policy paper on Evidence, Evidentiary Standards, and Source Analy-
sis; and (4) introducing a ‘Committee of Prosecutors’ as a new external 
control mechanism. 
19.1. Introduction 
In her famous speech at Sanders Theater, before the gathered masses at-
tending the 1993 Harvard Law School Class Day Program, then recently 
confirmed Attorney General Janet Reno presented a stirring account of the 
role and mandate of criminal prosecutors. “We cannot forget the need to 
use the law as a shield, but we must remember other forces of the law”, 
she told the cheering crowd of young law students, stressing the point that 
“the prosecutor who thinks that they have done their job when they get a 
conviction and see somebody sentenced […] have another think coming”. 
In her speech, Reno was underlying the need, indeed the ultimate duty of 
prosecutors, “to look beyond the narrow aspects of the courtroom”.1 This 
obligation is perhaps magnified in the international sphere, where political 
pressures2 and economic costs,3 as well as mandate constraints and juris-
                                                   
1 Text of speech given by Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, Harvard Law School 
Class Day Program, 9 June 1993. 
2 See, for example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Philosophy and Policy of International Crim-
inal Justice”, in Lal Chand Vonrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on In-
ternational Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2003, p. 107 (“political manipulation will derive from realpolitik, which will use interna-
tional criminal justice as a tool to achieve its goals”); see also Felix Olick, “Ocampo re-
marks spark fury over ‘politics’ around Kenyan ICC cases", in Standard Digital, 9 Febru-
ary 2014 (citing criticism by lawyers over what they perceived to be an infiltration of “in-
ternational politics” into the Court, following a statement made by former prosecutor 
Ocampo that diplomats had attempted to exert pressure on him as he launched his investi-
gation into Kenya: “There were some diplomats asking me to do something more to pre-
vent Mr. Kenyatta or Mr. Ruto to run in the elections. I said, it’s not my job. Judges in 
Kenya should do that. And if they authorise them to run, people will vote. And if people 
vote for them, we have nothing to say”); David Bosco analysed the Court’s dependence 
and interdependence, noting that:  
on paper at least, the International Criminal Court is a striking advance for the legalist 
worldview against the traditional concept of sovereignty […] the ICC is designed to be 
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dictional limitations,4 prove a constant hindrance to formal criminal pros-
ecution.  
The preliminary examination stage, briefly introduced in the Rome 
Statute, has the potential to be a procedural vessel by which the Prosecu-
tor may indeed look “beyond the narrow aspects of the courtroom”.5 The 
                                                                                                                        
largely free from political control. The court’s prosecutor and its judges are asked to 
work on the basis of the court’s governing statute, a set of carefully defined crimes, 
and the court’s rules of evidence and procedure […] Yet the Rome Statute also made 
clear that the court would be entirely dependent on state resources to succeed. Negotia-
tors gave the court no enforcement tools of its own. Investigations on national soil re-
quire official permission and access. To apprehend suspects, the court leans on state 
police and military forces. Financially, the court relies on annual dues from members 
[…] If the court needs support of states in general, those major powers that enjoy glob-
al reach and influence are particularly important. These states have the economic, dip-
lomatic, intelligence, and military resources needed to help turn the court’s writ into 
reality either directly or via pressure on those whose cooperation is essential in particu-
lar cases. 
See David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power 
Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 3–4. 
3 See, for example, William W. Burke-White, “Regionalization of International Criminal 
Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration”, in Texas International Law Journal, 2003, 
vol. 38, p. 738 (“The monetary costs of international criminal law enforcement have been 
and will continue to be a significant hindrance to the effective operation of international 
tribunals”); Pierre-Richard Prosper, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, 
Statement before the House International Relations Committee on the U.N. Tribunals for 
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the ICC, 28 February 2002 (“the process [of inter-
national criminal justice as seen through the work of the Tribunals], at times, has been 
costly, has lacked efficiency, has been too slow”); Patricia M. Wald, “To Establish Incredi-
ble Events by Credible Evidence: The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War 
Crimes Tribunal Proceedings”, in Harvard International Law Journal, 2001, vol. 42, p. 
536 (Wald, a former US judge at the ICTY, noted that the “United Nations is understanda-
bly anxious to bring to closure the ICTY and the tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which to-
gether consume almost ten percent of the total UN budget”). 
4 See, generally, Awa Njoworia Valerie Adamu, The Jurisdictional Limitations of the Statute 
of the ICC: The International Criminal Court, Jurisdiction and the Crimes Under the Ju-
risdiction of the Court, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, 2012. 
5 This echoes what Professor Mirjan Damaška coined as the ‘didactic function’ of the ICC, 
and the role of international criminal law actors as ‘moral teachers’. As Damaška explains, 
international criminal courts should “look beyond the effect of their decisions on potential 
criminals. Instead, they should aim their denunciatory judgments at strengthening a sense 
of accountability for international crime by exposure and stigmatization of these extreme 
forms of inhumanity. This exposure is apt to contribute to the recognition of basic humani-
ty. To the extent that international criminal courts are successful in this endeavor, humani-
tarian norms would increasingly be respected – the low probability of their violations be-
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preliminary examination stage, as Carsten Stahn writes, could thus be 
understood not purely in a technical sense, as a ‘filter’ for determining 
when to launch an investigation, but rather taking into account its broader 
virtues underpinned “in its alert function and its communicative power 
towards the creation of a broader ‘international system of justice’”.6 This 
approach is further reflected in the declared goals of the preliminary ex-
amination stage. As the OTP clarified in its 2013 Policy Paper on Prelimi-
nary Examinations, “in the course of its preliminary examination activities, 
the Office will seek to contribute to the two overarching goals of the 
Rome Statute: the ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine national 
proceedings, and the prevention of crimes”.7 These goals are clearly more 
far-reaching than the expeditious indictment of a carefully drawn up list 
of alleged perpetrators.8 
                                                                                                                        
ing visited with criminal punishment notwithstanding”. Mirjan R. Damaška, “What is the 
Point of International Criminal Justice?”, in Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2008, vol. 83, no. 
1, p. 329, p. 345.  
6 Carsten Stahn, “Damned if you do, damned if you don’t: Challenges and Critiques of ICC 
Preliminary Examinations” (on file with the author). See also Grotius Centre for Interna-
tional Legal Studies, “Preliminary Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit: Reviewing 
Policies and Practices” (hereinafter ‘Grotius Centre Report’), para. 5: 
[T]he OTP may have more leverage over States during preliminary examinations than 
during investigation, due [to] the scope of choice/discretion involved and the unpre-
dictability of the outcome. OTP action might have most effects on actors on the ground 
at this stage, since unlike in the context of arrest warrants, the Office was not yet 
‘locked in’. It was argued that in situations where the context is right, preliminary ex-
aminations could be used to facilitate choices in relation to peace and justice. Prelimi-
nary examinations could be used to facilitate a number of goals: prevention of atrocity 
crimes, shape the agenda of peace negotiations, or serve as catalyst for complementari-
ty and/or transitional justice. Preliminary examinations could also have a certain deter-
rent effect due to their element of surprise, their ‘watchdog function’ (that is, the fact 
of ‘being watched’), and the structural relationship between the OTP and the state con-
cerned (that is, monitoring, putting pressure, providing reward for behaviour). These 
factors make preliminary examinations a powerful instrument […]. 
7 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 93 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
8 At the same time, however, it is important to clarify that the ICC will not open a prelimi-
nary examination “merely with the purpose of prevention or ‘positive complementarity‘”, 
and in that regard the need for the information relating to the situation must substantiate 
some form of initial basis for a potential investigation. See Grotius Centre Report, see su-
pra note 6, para. 8. 
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It should thus come as no surprise that for the ICC Prosecutor, 
Fatou Bensouda, preliminary examinations have proved to be “one of the 
most remarkable efficiency tools” the OTP has at its disposal.9 But the 
efficiency of the preliminary examination stage hinges on balanced, im-
partial utilization by the Prosecutor that is conducive to both political sta-
bility and the legitimacy of the Court.10 This is a matter of concern to 
some since, during a preliminary examination, significant latitude is in the 
hands of the Prosecutor, who already enjoys “extremely wide” discretion 
“when compared to national courts and even ad hoc tribunals”.11 This 
                                                   
9 Fatou Bensouda, “Reflections from the International Criminal Prosecutor”, in Case West-
ern Reserve Journal of International Law, 2012, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 509. Phakiso Mo-
chochoko, the Director of the Jurisdiction, Complementary and Cooperation division had 
hinted the same: “The Office of the Prosecutor can make a substantial contribution, in pro-
actively collecting information and monitoring situations under preliminary examination”. 
See Phakiso Mochochoko, “Open Debate of the United Nations Security Council on Peace 
and Justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal Court: Address 
on behalf of the Prosecutor”, 17 October 2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a7d99b/). 
10 As noted by Damaška, “as the interdisciplinary literature on norm acceptance through 
persuasion suggests, there exists a necessary condition for [international criminal courts] 
success in performing [the] socio-pedagogical role [that is their ‘didactic function’]: they 
should be perceived by their constituencies as a legitimate authority. Lacking coercive 
power, their legitimacy hangs almost entirely on the quality of their decisions and their 
procedures”. See Damaška, see supra note 5, p. 345. 
11 Antonio Coco, “Article 13(c)”, in Mark Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the 
International Criminal Court, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, fn. 183 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e2b/). One reflection of this concern can be found in 
the January 2017 resolution by the African Union, which welcomed notifications by Bu-
rundi, South Africa, and The Gambia of withdrawal from the ICC and further adopted a 
withdrawal strategy for the Union. The Resolution also included calls for reforming the 
ICC, given the dissatisfaction of the AU with the Court and what they perceive as an ineq-
uitable international criminal justice system. For further reading see Emmanuel Igunza, 
“African Union backs mass withdrawal from ICC”, in BBC News, 1 February 2017. See 
also Russian Federation, “Decree on the Intention not to become a Party to the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court”, 16 November 2016 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/02c22f-1/): 
Unfortunately the Court failed to meet the expectations to become a truly independent, 
authoritative international tribunal. The work of the Court is characterized in a princi-
pled way as ineffective and one-sided in different fora, including the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Security Council. It is worth noting that during the 14 years 
of the Court’s work it passed only four sentences having spent over a billion dollars. In 
this regard the demarche of the African Union which has decided to develop measures 
on a coordinated withdrawal of African States from the Rome Statute is understandable. 
Some of these States are already conducting such procedures. 
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project on “Quality Control in Preliminary Examination” thus asks con-
tributors the following research question: in light of the above considera-
tions, how can we ensure greater awareness and improvement of quality 
in the work of the OTP at the preliminary examination stage? 
To answer this question, I begin by adopting a definition of ‘quality 
control’ that is similar to that introduced by Morten Bergsmo in the 2013 
CILRAP-project on ‘Quality Control in Fact-Finding’, tweaked to ac-
commodate the unique features of preliminary examinations. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, a quality control approach “invites consideration of 
how the quality of every functional aspect” of a preliminary examination 
can be improved including “work processes to identify, locate, obtain, 
verify, analyse, corroborate, summarise, synthesise, structure, organise, 
present, and disseminate” law and facts as they relate to each specific 
situation under prosecutorial review, and to the decision as to whether or 
not to open an investigation.12 In line with this definition, the chapter 
looks at only one institutional component that may serve to ensure greater 
quality awareness and ultimate improvement: effective control mecha-
nisms over prosecutorial discretion in the review of situations in the pre-
investigation phase. 
The topic of controlling prosecutorial discretion, both in the domes-
tic and the international planes, has been the subject of significant schol-
arship.13 Judge Gerard E. Lynch summarized this literature by suggesting 
                                                   
12 Morten Bergsmo, “Foreword by the Editor”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Control in 
Fact-Finding, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Florence, 2013, p. viii (http://www.
toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo). 
13 For domestic analysis see, for example, Stephanos Bibas, “Prosecutorial Regulation Versus 
Prosecutorial Accountability”, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2007, vol. 157, 
no. 4, p. 1002 (noting that “[m]uch management literature bemoans excessive corporate 
hierarchies and praises the recent trend toward flattening and slimming layers of bureau-
cracy […] General Electric, for example, became leaner and more flexible by slimming 
down from twenty-nine to six levels […] In contrast, prosecutors’ offices have nowhere 
near six levels of review. Many prosecutors’ offices are at the other extreme of the spec-
trum, with virtually no effective oversight in most cases. Rather than being regulated to 
death, even line prosecutors express frustration with the lack of coordination. Because the 
problem is the opposite one, the solution is as well”); John H. Langbein, “Controlling 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany”, in University of Chicago Law Review, 1974, vol. 41, 
no. 3, p. 439; Sara Sun Beale, “Prosecutorial Discretion in Three Systems: Balancing Con-
flicting Goals and Providing Mechanisms for Control”, in Michele Caianiello and Jacquel-
ine S. Hodgson (eds.), Discretionary Criminal Justice in a Comparative Context, Carolina 
Academic Press, Durham, 2015, p. 52 (looking at prosecutorial discretion in the U.S., 
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that while critics of broad discretion wish to see clear self-executing rules 
that would “prevent officials from applying subjective and potentially 
biased standards”, defenders of discretion claim that such a view would be 
“intolerable if pressed to extremes”. Discretion, they argue, is “part of the 
function of the criminal law, that must in turn be moderated by sensible 
officials who understand that not every case that falls within the literal 
terms of the law is meant to be punished”. Yet, even were we to accept 
some measure of prosecutorial discretion as inevitable, it would not fol-
low that “the discretion should be exercised without public accountability, 
or that some form of review of the resulting decisions should not be per-
mitted”.14 
This chapter seeks to examine what model of prosecutorial control 
was adopted by the drafters of the Rome Statute in the context of prelimi-
nary examinations, and where this model has proved ineffective in the 
work of the ICC to date. The chapter proceeds in the following order. Sec-
tion 19.2. briefly summarizes the normative framework that governs the 
preliminary examination stage, with a particular focus on prosecutorial 
independence.  
Section 19.3. maps out the existing control mechanisms over OTP 
activities at the preliminary examination stage, looking at both internal 
oversight in the form of self-regulation, or ‘office common law’, and ex-
ternal oversight in the form of mandatory review by the PTC. Particular 
emphasis will be given to development of oversight mechanisms as part 
of the Court’s evolution and on particular cases during which this over-
sight was put to the test. 
                                                                                                                        
Germany, and France the author concludes “all three national systems have structural 
mechanisms designed to provide a degree of democratic accountability. The issue in both 
is how to balance the need for accountability with the commitment to prosecutorial neu-
trality and independence, especially in cases involving the investigation of politically 
prominent suspects who are members – or opponents – of the current government”); 
CHEN Siyuan, “The Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore: Past, Present, and 
Future”, in International Review of Law, 2013, vol. 5, p. 1. For analysis of prosecutorial 
discretion in the ICC, see DONG Jingho, “Prosecutorial Discretion at the International 
Criminal Court: A Comparative Study”, in Journal of Politics and Law, 2009, vol. 2, no. 2, 
p. 109; Allison Marston Danner, “Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prose-
cutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court”, in American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 2003, vol. 97, p. 510. 
14 Gerard E. Lynch, “Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion”, in Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice, 2002. 
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Section 19.4. will discuss the difficulties with which the currently 
existing oversight framework is faced, using the Palestinian preliminary 
examination as a case study. The section will focus on three key issues 
related to preliminary examinations that are exemplified in the Palestinian 
case: (1) the potential for the politicization of the Court; (2) the problems 
faced by the OTP when attempting to articulate generalized prioritization 
policies and exit strategies; and (3) the regulation of evidentiary standards 
at the preliminary examination stage.  
Finally, as mentioned at first, Section 19.5. will suggest four areas 
for potential reform, including (1) re-phasing of preliminary examinations 
and the introduction of a Gantt-based review process and a sliding scale of 
transparency requirements; (2) redefinition of the relationship between the 
OTP and PTC at the preliminary examination stage; (3) redrafting existing 
OTP policy papers on Preliminary Examinations and Interests of Justice 
and the adoption of a new Policy Paper on Evidence, Evidentiary Stand-
ards, and Source Analysis; and (4) introducing a ‘Committee of Prosecu-
tors’ as a new external control mechanism. 
19.2. Normative Framework 
19.2.1. Legislative Structures 
It is obvious that the drafters of the Rome Statute “did not anticipate the 
significance that is now attached to Preliminary Examinations”.15 If any-
thing, the drafters assumed that preliminary examinations would be a far 
weaker process with a much shorter leash, since the general obligation to 
co-operate under Part 9 of the Statute only applies to investigations and 
cases.16 As a result, the Rome Statute stipulates only general and largely 
                                                   
15 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Stat-
ute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Second Edition, 2016, p. 46. See also, Stahn, see su-
pra note 6, p. 3 (“When the Rome Statute was drafted, hardly anyone contemplated how 
important preliminary examinations would become in the operation of the ICC”). 
16 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), Article 86 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). Surprisingly, the preliminary examination stage 
is now considered by some to have provided the OTP more power than any other stage. 
See Grotius Center Report, see supra note 6, para. 5: 
Several participants argued that PEs have a certain intrinsic value that goes beyond in-
vestigations. The point was made that the OTP may have more leverage over States 
during PEs than during investigation, due the scope of choice/discretion involved and 
the unpredictability of the outcome. OTP action might have most effects on actors on 
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vague factors that must be considered during the preliminary examination 
phase as detailed in Article 53(1): 
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made 
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or 
she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed 
under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investi-
gation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: 
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court has been or is being committed. 
(b) The case is or would be admissible under Article 17; 
and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the in-
terests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial rea-
sons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. 
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable 
basis to proceed and his or her determination is based solely 
on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-
Trial Chamber.17 
The term ‘preliminary examination’ itself is introduced in the Rome 
Statute only indirectly. Article 15(6) refers to the procedural obligations of 
the Prosecutor when exercising her proprio motu powers to review a po-
tential situation.18 The Prosecutor is called to “analyse the seriousness of 
the information received” and “seek additional information from States, 
                                                                                                                        
the ground at this stage, since unlike in the context of arrest warrants, the Office was 
not yet ‘locked in’. It was argued that in situations where the context is right, PEs 
could be used to facilitate choices in relation to peace and justice. 
17 Rome Statute, ibid., Article 53(1). 
18 Ibid., Article 15(6) (“If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and  
2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable 
basis for an investigation, he or she shall information those who provided the information. 
This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information submitted to 
him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence”). Article 42(1) 
of the Statute, in laying out the mandate of the OTP, also makes an implied mention of pre-
liminary examinations, noting that: “The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently 
as a separate organ of the Court. It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any sub-
stantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them 
and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court”.  
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organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropri-
ate”.19 On the basis of this information, gathered over the course of this 
stage, coined by the Statute as a preliminary examination, the Prosecutor 
is instructed to decide whether there is “reasonable basis for an investiga-
tion”.20 Although this is not expressly stated, it is inferred from Article 53 
that the preliminary examination stage is required not only in proprio 
motu decisions, but in fact in all scenarios, including those where the re-
view is triggered by the United Nations Security Council or by a referral 
from a State Party.21 Furthermore, the practice of the OTP has been to 
open a preliminary examination, “as a matter of policy”, in all situations 
where a declaration pursuant to Article 12(3) is made by a non-State Par-
ty.22 
                                                   
19 Ibid., Article 15(2). Note that the creation of this pre-investigation stage is unique to the 
ICC, compared with the ad hoc tribunals which had specific jurisdiction over a single situ-
ation. As further explained by Ambos and Stegmiller, the  
preliminary examination stage is an important and necessary innovation compared to 
the pre-trial procedure of former International Criminal Tribunals (the International 
Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon). Contrary to these Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals that 
all possessed jurisdiction over a specific situation, limited in temporal and territorial 
terms, the ICC does not have such jurisdictional limitations. Instead, the ICC must pre-
investigate and select its own situations. Even in the case of prima facie pre-defined 
situations, by way of a SC or State referral. 
Kai Ambos and Ignaz Stegmiller, “Prosecuting international crimes at the International 
Criminal Court: is there a coherent and comprehensive prosecution strategy?”, in Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 2012, vol. 58, no. 4, p. 421.  
20 Ibid., Article 15(1), (2), (6). 
21 Schabas, see supra note 15, p. 829 (“This is implied by Article 53 because it is necessarily 
the basis for the decision of the Prosecutor about whether or not to proceed with an inves-
tigation. The consequences of this scheme is that an investigation under Article 53 cannot 
begin until the Prosecutor has carried out a preliminary examination.”). ICC OTP, Report 
on Preliminary Examination Activities, 14 November 2016, para. 10 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/f30a53/) (“As required by the Statute, the Office’s preliminary examination 
activities are conducted in the same manner irrespective of whether the Office receives a 
referral from a State Party or the Security Council or acts on the basis of information on 
crimes obtained pursuant to article 15”). 
22 Ibid., pp. 358–359 (“as a matter of policy the Prosecutor responds to Article 12(3) declara-
tion by conducting a ‘preliminary examination’ in accordance with Article 15, treating the 
declaration in the same way as it treats a referral by a State Party or by the Security Coun-
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Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence establishes that in 
determining whether there is “reasonable basis to proceed with an investi-
gation” the Prosecutor shall consider the three factors set out in Article 
53(1)(a) to (c).23 Based on this rule, the OTP has adopted a four-phased 
‘filtering process’ which is flexible enough, according to the Office, to 
allow for engagement in a “holistic approach” throughout the preliminary 
examination stage.24  
Phase 1 consists of a ‘pre-preliminary examination’, which encom-
passes the analysis of communications to conclude whether the infor-
mation available is serious enough to warrant the launching of a prelimi-
nary examination, and whether such examination would not be frivolous. 
Of all phases, there is the least amount of public information available 
about the general procedures and structures adopted by the OTP at this 
phase, as well as statistics regarding the number and nature of Phase 1 
processes launched or closed.25  
                                                                                                                        
cil. However, unlike a referral the Article 12(3) declaration does not entitle a non-party 
State that has made the declaration to contest a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed”). 
23 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, as amended on 22 
May 2013, ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, Rule 48 (2000). 
24 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 21, para. 15 (by “holistic approach” 
the OTP intends that while each phase focuses on a distinct statutory factor, the analysis it-
self is not formalistically rigid). See also Schabas, see supra note 15, p. 400 (“The first 
phase consists of a general analysis of the seriousness of information provided to the Court. 
Situations that are outside the jurisdiction can be quickly weeded out. No doubt there are 
many frivolous submissions, filed by cranks or by well-meaning but ill-informed activists, 
perhaps searching for a bit of publicity rather than out of any serious hope that prosecu-
tions could result. Phase two, which is really the formal beginning of the examination, 
deals with the precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction set out in Article 12 of the Stat-
ute and whether a reasonable basis exists to think that the alleged crimes are within the 
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Already attention is given to whether or not potential 
cases may exist. The third phase concerns the admissibility of potential cases, applying the 
two main criteria of complementarity and gravity. Finally, phase four examines whether 
the ‘interest of justice’ may nevertheless tip the balance against prosecution. An internal 
report that analyses the relevant factor s and concludes with a recommendation is then 
submitted to the Prosecutor, who decides whether there is a reasonable basis for an investi-
gation”). 
25 It is in this context that Amitis Khojsteh, “The Pre-Preliminary Examination Stage: Theory 
and Practice of the OTP’s Phase 1 Activities”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds), 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPub-
lisher, Brussels, 2018, chap. 8 offers some unique insight into this under-researched and 
under-discussed phase. 
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Phase 2, the formal initiation of a preliminary examination, corre-
lates with Article 53(1)(a) and involves an examination of the precondi-
tions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, including territorial or 
personal, temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Phase 3 correlates with Article 53(1)(b) and focuses on the admissi-
bility of potential cases in terms of complementarity and gravity.  
Finally, Phase 4 correlates with Article 53(1)(c) and involves the 
consideration of the interests of justice prior to the formulation of a final 
recommendation to the Prosecutor on whether a reasonable basis to initi-
ate an investigation exists.26 
As of the date of writing, the OTP is reviewing 8 ongoing prelimi-
nary examinations. Three (Gabon, Palestine, and Ukraine) are at Phase 2, 
four (Colombia, Guinea, Iraq/UK, and Nigeria) are at Phase 3, and one, 
concerning Afghanistan, is pending authorization from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber III to initiate an investigation.27 This growing list of situations 
includes some of the most politically fraught and highly publicized con-
                                                   
26 Originally the OTP delineated only three phases of the Preliminary Examination process. 
See OTP, “Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor”: 
Referrals and Communications (September 2003)” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
f53870/):  
The first phase of analysis is an initial review to identify those communications that 
manifestly do not provide any basis for further action. Following this determination, 
acknowledgements will be sent, either providing reasons for the decision not to pro-
ceed or else advising that further analysis will be undertaken. Once the initial backlog 
of communications is cleared, the Office will endeavour to ensure that this first phase 
is completed and acknowledgements are sent within one month of receipt of any com-
munication sent in a working language of the Court. The second phase of analysis is a 
more detailed legal and factual analysis of significant communications, carried out by 
JCCD, with support from the Investigation Division, under supervision of the Execu-
tive Committee and the Prosecutor. The most serious situations will proceed to the 
third phase, advanced analysis and planning. During this phase, the Office may devel-
op an investigation plan, in which case a joint team will be created, led by the Investi-
gation Division and including members of the Investigation Division, Prosecution Di-
vision and JCCD. In this third phase, a decision may be taken to initiate an investiga-
tion under Article 53 or to seek Pre-Trial Chamber authorization under Article 15(3).  
27 ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 4 December 2017 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/e50459/). The number of situations under phase 1 review is not dis-
closed by the OTP. On 29 November 2017, the Prosecutor notified the PTC of her “final 
decision” regarding the preliminary examination pertaining to registered vessels of Como-
ros, Greece and Cambodia, ending an examination which began with a referral dating 14 
May 2013 from the Government of the Union of Comoros.  
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flicts and hotspots around the world, and thus stands in stark contradiction 
to the limited number of predominantly African cases currently on the 
ICC docket. While some of these situations relate to alleged crimes that 
are relatively recent (for example, those committed in Gabon since May 
2016), others concern crimes allegedly committed years ago (for example, 
the preliminary examination into the situation in Afghanistan which has 
been ongoing since 2007, and which concerns alleged crimes committed 
since 2003). 
Some critics have raised the concern that “[t]he OTP’s lengthy 
open-ended analysis of several situations”, coupled with “the absence of 
reporting over long periods”, have “strained the credibility of its prelimi-
nary examinations” and have made its few public statements appear 
“more like posturing”. 28  For example, concerning the aforementioned 
preliminary examination in Afghanistan, in its November 2016 update on 
preliminary examinations, the OTP made the much-anticipated statement 
that “a final determination” with respect to the situation, which has been 
ongoing for a decade, will be made “in the very near future”.29 It took an 
additional year for the Office to conclude the examination and request 
authorization from the Court to initiate an investigation into alleged war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed as part of or with a nexus 
to the armed conflict in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003.30 
                                                   
28 Human Rights Watch, ICC: Course Correction: Recommendations to the Prosecutor for a 
More Effective Approach to “Situations under Analysis”, 16 June 2011 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/43aefb/). 
29 OTP, “Annex to the “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, 
issues her annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2016)” (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/834809/). 
30 OTP, “Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to 
article 15”, 20 November 2017” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db23eb/). For an analysis 
of the potential reasons for the delay see David Bosco, “Will the ICC Launch a Full Inves-
tigation in Afghanistan?”, in Lawfare, 8 May 2017. Same criticisms can be raised with re-
gard to the Preliminary Examination on Colombia, which has been open for more than ten 
years, and some NGOs are criticizing as “unacceptable”. See Stéphanie Maupas, “ICC 
Prosecutor at a Turning Point”, in JusticeInfo, 7 March 2017; see also Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, “The ICC’s Afghanistan Investigation: The Missing Option”, in Lawfare, 24 
April 2017.  
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19.2.2. Prosecutorial Independence and External Review 
Interestingly enough, the drafters of the Rome Statute were never con-
cerned with prosecutorial thumb-twiddling of the kind described above; 
they were far more worried about prosecutorial foot-stomping. This con-
cern may be noted in the debates that led to the introduction of prosecuto-
rial powers proprio motu under Article 15 of the Statute. The image of an 
all-mighty global prosecutor with proprio motu powers, a “lone ranger 
running wild”,31 concerned the US delegation (and many other delega-
tions), as expressed in an official statement circulated towards the end of 
the Rome Statute negotiations in 1998: 
The United States strongly supports an effective ICC Prose-
cutor who will be able to exercise independent judgment and 
who will be perceived as impartial and fair. […] The United 
States is strongly of the view that the principles of prosecuto-
rial independence and effectiveness are not only fully con-
sistent with, but ultimately will be best served by, the struc-
ture proposed by the ICC under which the Prosecutor’s au-
thority to embark on an investigation is triggered by a refer-
ral by a State or the Security Council. It is our firm view that 
the proposal for a proprio motu prosecutor – one tasked with 
responding to any and all indications that a crime within the 
potential jurisdiction of the Court may have been commit-
ted – not only offers little by way of advancing the mandate 
of the Court and the principles of prosecutorial independence 
and effectiveness, but also will make much more difficult the 
Prosecutor’s central task of thoroughly and fairly investigat-
ing the most egregious crimes.32 
                                                   
31 Danner, see supra note 13, p. 513 (“Opponents argued that the Prosecutor could become 
either a “lone ranger running wild” around the world targeting highly sensitive political 
situations or a weak figure who would be subject to manipulation by states, NGOs, and 
other groups who would seek to use the power of the ICC as a bargaining chip in political 
negotiations”). 
32 Statement of the United States Delegation Expressing Concern Regarding the Proposal for 
a Proprio Motu Proecutor (22 June 1998), reprinted in Rod Grams (ed.), Is a U.N. Interna-
tional Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Operations of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate (23 July 
1998), pp. 147–150. The International Law Commission further promoted this position. 
The ILC was of the view that, absent support from a State Party or the UNSC, prosecution 
of crimes under the Statute should not be undertaken. The ILC assumed the Prosecutor 
would be vulnerable to political pressure, and that therefore the support of State parties or 
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Supporters of proprio motu powers, on the other hand, were equally 
concerned with the independence and effectiveness of the OTP, arguing 
that by limiting the Prosecutor’s investigatory capabilities “to situations 
identified by overtly political institutions like States and the Security 
Council”, the drafters would “decrease the independence and credibility 
of the Court as a whole”.33 The final wording of Article 15 was therefore a 
compromise, “one of the most delicate provisions of the Statute” and the 
product of “extensive debates and divisions of views throughout the draft-
ing process and until the end of the Rome Conference”.34 The proposal 
was put forward by German and Argentina. While it granted the Prosecu-
tor proprio motu powers, it simultaneously put checks on those powers. 
As was further explained by Judge Fernandez in his separate opinion on 
the Côte d’Ivoire situation: “there was growing recognition that there 
were some real risks of abuse of power and that some checks and balances 
were needed, both in order to prevent arbitrary decisions taken in a soli-
tary fashion by the Prosecutor, and to help insulate the Prosecutor from 
external pressure”.35  
                                                                                                                        
the UNSC would prevent “frivolous, groundless, or politically motivated campaigns”. 
Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court in Report of the International Law Com-
mission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2), re-
printed in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session, 1997, p. 46. 
33 Danner, see supra note 13, p. 514. 
34 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the re-
public of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09, paras. 17–18. See also Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to the same judgment, para. 12 (Article 15 was “one of the most 
fervently negotiated provisions of the Rome Statute”). In favour of the proprio motu pow-
ers were Thailand, Lesotho, Jordan, Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Morocco, Australia, 
New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Italy, South Africa, Tanzania, Brazil, Denmark, Madagascar, Germany, Sweden, Slo-
venia, Canada, Chile, Bahrain, Andorra, Greece, Senegal, Azerbaijan, Republic of Korea, 
Switzerland, Togo, Sierra Leon, Portugal, Burkina Paso, Peru, Uruguay, Namibia and Po-
land. Opposing the powers were the US, Nigeria, Iran, Kenya, Yemen, Iraq, Indonesia, In-
dia, Israel, Libya, Cuba, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russian Federation, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. For further reading, see Schabas, 
see supra note 15, p. 396. 
35 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi’s Separate and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 3 
October 2011, ICC-02/11, para. 8. See also, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, see supra 
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Stepping outside Article 15 and looking at the power to launch pre-
liminary examinations more broadly, two primary checks and balances are 
included in the Statute. The first check concerns the obligation to provide 
reasoning in cases of dismissal as a matter of general fairness. If the Pros-
ecutor seeks not to initiate an investigation, under Rule 105 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence she is required to “promptly inform in writ-
ing” the State(s) that referred the situation to the Prosecutor under Article 
14 or the Security Council in respect of situations covered by Article 
13(b). This obligation to notify applies, under Article 15(6), in respect of 
“those who provided information” for a proprio motu preliminary exami-
nation. Such notifications must include the reasons for the dismis-
sal/decision not to investigate, while taking into account any potential 
danger to the safety, well-being, or privacy of victims or witnesses.36  
A second check on the preliminary examination activities of the 
OTP was introduced in Articles 15 and 53, in the form of judicial review 
by the PTC. This judicial review is limited to certain specific scenarios: (a) 
when the Prosecutor decides to proceed proprio motu with an investiga-
tion it must seek the authorization of the PTC;37 (b) in situations of Secu-
rity Council or State Party referrals, the referring parties are entitled to 
request judicial review by the PTC of the Prosecutor’s decision (in rela-
tion to determinations not to open an investigation on the basis of jurisdic-
tion or admissibility);38 and (c) in the case of a decision by the Prosecutor 
not to open an investigation, based solely on the conclusion that an inves-
tigation would not serve the interests of justice, the PTC may review the 
decision on its own initiative, and the decision shall be effective only if 
confirmed by it.39  
                                                                                                                        
note 34, para. 18 (where it noted that the drafters sought a “balanced approach that ren-
dered the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation acceptable to 
those who feared it” by introducing the PTC as a check so to alleviate the “risk of politiciz-
ing the Court and thereby undermining its credibility”). 
36 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, see supra note 23, at Rule 105; Rome Statute, see 
supra note 16, Article 15(6). Note, that no obligation to provide such notification is re-
quired in the case of Article 12(3) declarations. 
37 Rome Statute, ibid., Article 15(3)-(4). 
38 Ibid., Article 53(3)(a). 
39 Ibid., Article 53(3)(b). 
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It is in this context that Articles 15 and 53 are “closely associated” 
and lay out the full scope of prosecutorial discretion by mapping the Pros-
ecutor’s independent role in the selection of situations for prosecution.40 
The PTC, however, may not become engaged following a decision to 
close an examination launched proprio motu (including those launched on 
the basis of Article 12(3) declarations), or in cases where the UNSC or 
referring States do not seek to challenge the decision of the OTP to close 
an investigation (or where such investigations are eventually launched).41 
This significantly reduces the potential scope of judicial review over pre-
liminary examination decisions.42 
Some have contemplated whether the Assembly of State Parties 
(‘ASP’) offers some additional form of control over the Prosecutor. The 
ASP does elect the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor, and in theory has 
the power of removing them by a majority vote.43 Such removal can only 
occur if serious misconduct or a serious breach of duties has occurred.44 
Additionally, a few scholars have pondered whether the ASP may use its 
                                                   
40 Schabas, see supra note 15, p. 394 (noting further that the Prosecutor is “beyond any doubt 
the most important individual at the Court. She may also be one of the most powerful, per-
haps indeed the most powerful, official in any international organization, including the 
United Nations”). 
41 The Prosecutor is also subject to judicial review in a case where it seeks to take the testi-
mony or a statement, examine, collect or test evidence of a witness which may not be 
available subsequently for the purposes of a trial (cases of “unique investigative opportuni-
ties”). See Rome Statute, see supra note 16, article 56. 
42 The PTC may theoretically examine a decision by the Prosecutor not to open a Preliminary 
Examination under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court; however, the PTC 
has interpreted that power narrowly. See Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regula-
tions of the Court (ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14), Decision on the ‘Request for review of the 
Prosecutor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a Preliminary Examination concerning 
alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 
25 April 2014’, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 12 September 2014 (the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected 
the request by President Mohamed Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt to 
review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to open a Preliminary Examination, limiting the 
scope of their review). 
43 Judges may only be removed by a two-thirds vote, making the Prosecutor slightly more 
accountable to the ASP than the judges. 
44 Rome Statute, see supra note 16, Article 46. This control is made possible through the 
work of the independent oversight mechanism established in 2009 under the Office of In-
ternal Audit. For further reading see Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, “Estab-
lishment of an Independent Oversight Mechanism”, ICC-ASP/8/Res.1, adopted by consen-
sus at the 7th Plenary Meeting, 26 November 2009. 
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significant control over budgetary decisions to micromanage prosecutorial 
decision-making at the pre-trial stage.45 
Overall, the regulatory framework under the Statute at the prelimi-
nary examination stage grants significant discretion to the Prosecutor, 
establishes minimal guidelines on specific aspects of preliminary exami-
nation proceedings, and offers, at least on paper, only limited institutional 
checks on the work of the OTP throughout this crucial phase. On a glori-
fied altar of prosecutorial independence and impartiality, the drafters thus 
willingly sacrificed significant portions of institutional and mandatory 
control. This observation recalls a sentiment expressed in the seminal 
work of Kenneth Culp Davis on “Discretionary Justice”: 
If all decisions involving justice to individual parties were 
lined up on a scale with those governed by precise rules at 
the extreme left, those involving unfettered discretion at the 
extreme right, and those based on various mixtures of rules, 
principles, standards, and discretion in the middle, where on 
the scale might be the most serious and most frequent injus-
tice? […] I think the greatest and most frequent injustice oc-
curs at the discretion end of the scale, where rules and prin-
ciples provide little or no guidance, where emotions of de-
ciding officers may affect what they do, where political or 
other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the im-
perfections of human nature are often reflected in the choices 
made. I think that in our system of government, where law 
ends tyranny need not begin. Where law ends discretion be-
gins, and the exercise of discretion may mean either benefi-
cence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasona-
bleness or arbitrariness.46 
In his book, Davis makes two important assertions. First, for every 
agency decision there is “an optimum point on the scale between rule-of-
law at one end and total discretion at the other end”, and second, that once 
this optimum level is achieved discretionary power is “confined, struc-
tured, and checked” so as to ensure “the greatest amount of discretionary 
                                                   
45 Danner, see supra note 13, p. 524. 
46 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, Baton Rouge, 1969, p. V.  
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justice and the least amount of discretionary injustice”.47 In the following 
section, we will examine what actions both the Prosecutor and the PTC 
have taken since the ICC opened its doors in order to reach this optimum 
level. We will examine both internal and external control mechanisms and 
how they have evolved over time. 
19.3. Existing Oversight Mechanisms 
In the years since the Court’s establishment, a number of mechanisms 
have been put in place in an attempt to improve the transparency and pre-
dictability of the preliminary examination stage and thereby optimize 
quality controls over the assessment process of the OTP. These mecha-
nisms have evolved, in great part, due to the institutional evolution of the 
OTP,48 the surge in Article 15 communications coming before the Court 
for examination,49 and the natural transformations resulting from changes 
in the identity of the prosecutors and prosecutorial staff. Of these mecha-
nisms, the most fundamental is self-regulation by the OTP. This practice 
involves the self-imposition of a series of internal guidelines and policies, 
mandatory checkpoints, reporting obligations, and transparency standards 
to be applied equally across situations.  
                                                   
47 Frank J. Remington, “Review: Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry”, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law Review, vol. 36, 1969, p. 884, p. 889. 
48 Jens Meierhenrich, “The Evolution of the Office of the Prosecutor at the International 
Criminal Court: Insights from Institutional Theory”, in Martha Minow et al. (eds.), The 
First Global Prosecutor: Promise and Constraints, University of Michigan Press, Ann Ar-
bor, 2015, pp. 100–102 (noting that “between 2002 and 2012, the OTP underwent a num-
ber of far-reaching institutional transformations, all of which had profound effect on the 
everyday life of international prosecution at the ICC”, mapping four developments as “crit-
ical junctures” in the institutional development of the OTP during that period: (1) the in-
vention of the JCCD, (2) the introduction of joint teams, (3) the creation of ExCom, and (4) 
the drafting of an Operational Manual). 
49 As of the 2016 reporting period, and since it opened its doors in July 2012, the OTP has 
received a total of 12,022 Article 15 communications. That said, on average the OTP re-
ceives 520 communications a year, more than 70% of which are deemed manifestly ill-
founded, and only a handful warrant further analysis (44 in 2014; 42 in 2015; and 28 in 
2016). For further reading see 2016 preliminary examination report, see supra note 21, pa-
ra. 18; OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 12 November 2015, para. 18 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac0ed2/); idem, Report on Preliminary Examination Ac-
tivities, 2 December 2014, para. 18, (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3594b3/). See Ambos 
and Stegmiller, supra note 19, p. 422 (noting that “only when the number of communica-
tions on potential situations increased, a policy with regard to preliminary examinations 
became a matter of urgency”). 
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In addition to self-regulation, as we have already discussed, the 
PTC affords a complementary layer of external oversight over the work of 
the Prosecutor at a number of limited, but nonetheless crucial, junctures 
throughout specific preliminary examination review processes. The juris-
prudence of the Chamber, in a few key decisions, offers further clarity as 
to the regulatory framework that governs the Prosecutor’s assessment of 
situations. Further, such rulings play a role in conveying to the OTP the 
Court’s level of comfort regarding certain prosecutorial decisions actions, 
and policies. Self-regulation and judicial review, which together are cur-
rently the only substantive control mechanisms at the preliminary exami-
nation stage, will be analysed in this section to determine their effective-
ness in ensuring quality control over prosecutorial discretion. 
19.3.1. Self-Regulation (‘Office Common Law’) 
Under Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Prosecutor is 
required to put in place “regulations to govern the operation of the Of-
fice”.50 In line with this requirement, at a very early stage (June 2003), the 
OTP issued a comprehensive draft of regulations that included an in-depth 
discussion on the values, principles, and structures that should govern the 
preliminary examination stage.51 On 5 September 2003, the Prosecutor 
adopted ad interim an abridged version of the draft regulations.52 Howev-
                                                   
50 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, Rule 9. 
51 OTP, Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (annotated) (3 June 2003), Part 2: 
The Management of Preliminary Examination, Article 53(1) Evaluation, and Start of In-
vestigation, pp. 14–20 (amongst other things the draft sets three values and principles that 
must be met at the Preliminary Examination stage: “(a) ensure the efficient and timely im-
plementation of preliminary examinations and evaluations; (b) establish a transparent and 
rational decision making process during preliminary examinations and evaluations that 
guarantees accurate, reasonable and consistent results; (c) enable the Chief Prosecutor to 
base his decision of whether to start an investigation on a reliable basis, both factually and 
legally”. The draft additionally establishes a log of Article 15 preliminary examinations 
and Article 53 evaluations, and the designation of Article 15 communications and prelimi-
nary examinations by the Deputy Prosecutor (Investigations) to teams within the OTP. The 
Draft also included a process whereby reports are to be handed to the Deputy Prosecutors, 
and the way in which decisions on whether a reasonable basis to proceed with an investi-
gation are to be made. Finally, the Draft introduced the concept of a “draft investigative 
plan” which, together with a recommendation, should form the basis of an application by 
the OTP to the PTC for opening an investigation proprio motu).  
52 For a complete history of the development of the draft regulations, see Carlos Vasconcelos, 
“Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor”, in Morten Bergsmo et al. (eds.), His-
torical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPub-
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er, it took more than six years for a limited version of those guidelines – 
excluding most, if not all, of the substantive policies relating to prelimi-
nary examinations – to be formally adopted.53  
The importance of prosecutors developing internal policies has been 
reflected, for example, in the 1990 UN “Guidelines on the Role of Prose-
cutors”. While this document is aimed at domestic public prosecutors, it 
nonetheless offers “standards and principles which are generally recog-
nized internationally as necessary for the proper and independent prosecu-
tion of offenses”.54 Article 17 of the UN Guidelines, titled “Discretionary 
Powers”, confirms that:  
In countries where prosecutors are vested with discretionary 
functions, the law or published rules or regulations shall pro-
vide guidelines to enhance fairness and consistency of ap-
proach in taking decisions in the prosecution process, includ-
ing institution or waiver of prosecution.55  
                                                                                                                        
lisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 801-824 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-
song). 
53 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 23 April 2009, Section 3: 
Preliminary Examination and Evaluation of Information (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
a97226/) (these regulations adopt most of the language of Articles 15 and 53 as they are, 
offering little additional information as to OTP policies at the Preliminary Examination 
stage. That said, Regulation 29 clarifies that the OTP should “produce an internal report 
analyzing the seriousness of the information, considering the factors set out in Article 
53(1), and offering a recommendation on whether there is reasonable basis in opening an 
investigation”). 
54 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Guidelines on the Role of Pros-
ecutors”, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba (September 1990), Article 1.3(d) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/15b063/).  
55 Ibid., at Article 17. See further, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and Interna-
tional Association of Prosecutors, “The Status and role of Prosecutors: A Guide (2014)”, p. 
17 (noting that “there are tangible benefits in having established policies and guidelines in 
prosecution services for all to follow in the performance of their duties. Many prosecution 
services worldwide have established guidelines for many aspects of a prosecutor’s practice, 
some of them being annotated with recent case law, thus providing a legal backdrop for the 
policy and allowing prosecutors to take direction from the law. The guidelines (often also 
known as “policy manuals”, “desk books” or “codes”) provide both prosecutors and man-
agers with a quick reference to common questions that arise during the daily practice of 
their profession and allow for quick reference and consistent responses to those queries 
within the prosecution service and outside it. Making reference to a manual can provide 
not only direction to the individual prosecutor but also protection from accusations of arbi-
trary conduct if a decision to pursue or not pursue a certain course of action is challenged 
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It is indeed a common feature across legal jurisdictions that most 
prosecutorial discretionary decisions “follow a sort of office common law, 
that is, habits and patterns of disposition that treat like cases alike”.56 Es-
tablishing mandatory structures, procedural hoops, and internal frame-
works is a necessary step, since it serves as a compass in the organic evo-
lution of prosecutorial habits, and ensures greater predictability and objec-
tivity in the overall work of the OTP. Looking at both the June 2003 Draft 
Regulations and the September 2003 paper on “Some Policy Issues before 
the Office of the Prosecutor” with its accompanying annex on referrals 
and communications,57 it is clear that the Court’s first prosecutor, Louis 
Moreno-Ocampo, was receptive to the calls for the Prosecutor to adopt a 
“public articulation of prosecutorial guidelines that will shape and con-
strain his discretionary decisions”.58 
However, and intriguingly, despite the fact that Ocampo welcomed 
the development of internal regulations and policies on preliminary exam-
inations, he insisted that the work products of those processes remain con-
fidential. For example, the Draft Regulations established both logging 
procedures of preliminary examinations by the Deputy Prosecutor for 
Investigations, and reporting procedures by OTP-designated preliminary 
examination teams. Under Ocampo’s guidelines, both the logs and the 
progress reports – including the final ‘draft investigative plan’ incorporat-
ing the recommendation as to whether to open an investigation – were to 
be treated as confidential internal materials not subject to disclosure.59 At 
                                                                                                                        
at a future date. Reference to how the guidelines guided their decisions can provide an ar-
ticulable, legally sound response to any challenges that may arise and further promotes 
transparency in the decision-making process”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f782ce/). 
56 Bibas, see supra note 13, p. 373. 
57 See supra note 26. 
58 Danner, see supra note 13, p. 511. 
59 Draft Regulations, see supra note 51, Part 2, Regulation 3 (“the Deputy Prosecutor (Inves-
tigations) shall keep a Log of all Article 15 preliminary examinations conducted (Prelimi-
nary Examinations Log). The Log shall be considered an internal document prepared by 
the Office of the Prosecutor in connection with the investigation or presentation of a case 
as specified by rule 81(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and not be subject to 
disclosure”); Regulation 8 (“The Deputy Prosecutor (Investigations) shall keep a Log of all 
Article 53(1) evaluations conducted. The Log shall be considered an internal document 
prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor in connection with the investigation or presenta-
tion of a case as specified by rule 81(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and not be 
subject to disclosure.”); and Regulation 6 (“The report prepared by the Preliminary Exam-
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most, the Guidelines established that teams engaged in preliminary exam-
ination analysis could provide the Prosecutor with “a recommendation” as 
to how to “explain and communicate” a decision not to open an investiga-
tion “to the general public”.60 So in essence, early-term Ocampo laid the 
foundations for prosecutorial decision-making at the ICC, by introducing 
the ‘black box’, as Stephanos Bibas defined it,61 and providing the general 
public with a glimpse of the box’s contours. It was left for Ocampo at the 
end of his tenure, and more pressingly for his successor Bensouda, to 
open this black box, inviting the public to look inside.62 This is of course a 
welcome development, as Bibas explains: 
Opening the black box can help to make prosecutors’ deci-
sions more legitimate in the eyes of the public as well as fer-
ret out suspicious patterns that might reflect bias or sloth. 
Opening the black box would also invite more public input, 
helping to refine patterns of discretion to better track the 
public’s shared sense of justice. The shared sense of justice is 
contextual, so this process of refining discretion can make 
justice more reasoned and reasonable than any set of rules 
alone could.63 
The ‘opening of the black box’ and the increase in transparency re-
garding the preliminary examination process did not happen spontaneous-
ly – it was a slow, gradual process whereby the policies of the OTP ma-
                                                                                                                        
ination Team and the draft investigation plan shall be considered internal documents pre-
pared by the Office of the Prosecutor in connection with the investigation or presentation 
of a case as specified by rule 81(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and not be 
subject to disclosure”).  
60 Ibid. at Part 2, Rule 11.2.  
61 Bibas, see supra note 13, at 373 (“even though outsiders see only a black box with no 
evident law, insiders recognise norms and customs that yield predictable results”). 
62 One example of this could be the publicity of preliminary examinations. As Seils write: 
“during the first two years of operations, the OTP indicated that it would not make public 
which situations were under preliminary examination. This practice was reversed in 2007”. 
Paul F. Seils, “Making Complementarity Work: Maximizing the Limited Role of the Pros-
ecutor”, in Stahn et al. (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: 
From Theory to Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. 
63 Ibid. See also Staphanos Bibas, “Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure”, 
New York University Law Review, vol. 81, no. 3, 2006, p. 911, pp. 947–948 (“for criminal 
punishment to communicate consistently and effectively, criminal procedure must be 
transparent. Other-wise, current and prospective criminals, victims, and the public do not 
see justice done or hear the law’s message”). 
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tured, its statements to the public increased, and its inclination towards 
greater elaboration of the reasoning behind its decisions became more 
profound and inherent. This is what has led William Schabas to conclude 
that the OTP has exemplified “an impressive and unprecedented degree of 
transparency, at least by comparison with the equivalent bodies in the ad 
hoc tribunals”.64 Current examples of transparency at the preliminary ex-
amination stage abound and include the OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, annual reports on the status of ongoing preliminary exami-
nations, detailed analysis of decisions to terminate preliminary examina-
tions, reporting to the UNSC and the ASP, and additional statements and 
engagements (both in official and non-official capacities) by high-level 
OTP personnel.65 Each of these examples deserves individual considera-
tion.  
19.3.1.1. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 
As we have already seen, since its inception, the OTP has been engaged in 
a process with the goal of developing and advancing its internal policies 
and guidelines on how to conduct preliminary examinations. Some of 
these policies, like the June 2006 “Criteria for Selection of Situations and 
Cases” draft policy paper, were even circulated for comments among ex-
ternal experts and NGOs.66 Nonetheless, until November 2013, the OTP 
operated without a public, official and finalized document detailing the 
                                                   
64 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 5th edition, 2017, p. 372.  
65 It is important to note that other policy papers by the OTP may reference preliminary 
examinations. For example, the November 2016 Policy on Children devoted a section to 
preliminary examinations. Nonetheless, the Prosecutor seems to merely re-echo positions 
raised in the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, rather than establishing new poli-
cies or changing course on existing guidelines. See OTP, Policy on Children, November 
2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c2652b/). 
66 See Human Rights Watch, “The Selection of Situations and Cases for Trial before the 
International Criminal Court: HRW Policy Paper”, 26 October 2006 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/753e9b/); Ambos and Stegmiller, see supra note 19, p. 422 (“In October 
2010 the OTP published a Draft Policy Paper on preliminary examinations which was 
widely circulated and invited critical commentary. This Preliminary Examinations Paper is 
largely based on an earlier (internal) draft paper on situation and case selection of 2006, 
which was also circulated, albeit not that widely, for comments among (external) experts.”). 
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legal interpretations employed by the OTP over the course of its prelimi-
nary examination determinations.67 
The release of the final policy paper in 2013 reflected a strong in-
terest by Prosecutor Bensouda in the enhancement of the legitimacy of the 
Court by formulating “standardized, clear, transparent, and predictable 
working methods”.68 This helped distinguish between Bensouda and her 
predecessor, under the direction of whom the OTP faced extensive criti-
cism “for failing to be sufficiently transparent in its decision-making pro-
cesses”. 69  The preliminary examination Policy Paper set forth further 
transparency-increasing policies, including: OTP yearly reports on prelim-
inary examinations, early interaction with stakeholders, information on 
high-level visits, and the publication of situation-specific reports (both in 
cases where a decision to open an investigation or close a situation is 
made, and for ongoing preliminary examinations, providing the public 
with an interim analysis of specific topics, such as jurisdiction or admissi-
bility).70  
On the other hand, the Policy Paper raises certain concerns. One el-
ement of the Policy Paper worth noting is its distinction between ‘general 
principles’ and ‘policy objectives’. The former includes independence, 
impartiality, and objectivity, which serve as three ‘overarching principles’ 
that guide the preliminary examination stage. Missing from that list is the 
principle of transparency, which is only introduced at the end of the Paper 
as a ‘policy objective’. The OTP thus connects transparency with the other 
stated ‘policy objectives’ of positive complementarity and prevention of 
                                                   
67 This document saw an early draft edition being circulated in October 2010, with the con-
tinuous delays being explained by the need for a robust consultative process with ‘part-
ners’. See Thomas Obel Hansen, “The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: Ending 
Impunity through ‘Positive Complementarity’?”, p. 3 (on file with the author). As Hansen 
details there, criticism has been raised about the slow pace at which these policy briefs 
have been produced. 
68 Fatou Bensouda, “Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor”, in Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 45, 2012, p. 506. 
69 Ibid., p. 1. 
70 See also OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 6 July 2015, para. 54 (“to promote a better un-
derstanding of the process, correct possible misperceptions and increase predictability, the 
Office will continue to provide information on its preliminary examination activities 
through, amongst others, the publication of a yearly overview report and related press re-
lease, the issuance of situation-specific reports or statements, and where appropriate, un-
dertaking field activities”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ae957/). 
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crimes. In essence, what the OTP is acknowledging is that it is not being 
transparent for the sake of transparency, but rather that it will utilize dis-
closures when it deems necessary, as a tool to advance other policy objec-
tives.71 Transparency, in the eyes of the OTP, is a means, not an end. 
Moreover, the OTP uses the following terminology when describing 
its policy objectives. On positive complementarity, the OTP writes: 
The nature of the Office’s efforts towards encouraging genu-
ine national proceedings will be dependent on the prevailing 
circumstances. The Office will engage with national jurisdic-
tions provided that it does not risk tainting any possible fu-
ture admissibility proceedings. Nonetheless, the Office can 
report on its monitoring activities, send in-country missions, 
request information on proceedings, hold consultations with 
national authorities as well as with intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations, participate in awareness-
raising activities on the ICC, exchange lessons learned and 
best practices to support domestic investigative and prosecu-
torial strategies, and assist relevant stakeholders to identify 
pending impunity gaps and the scope for possible remedial 
measures.72 
On the topic of crime prevention, the OTP notes: 
The Office will seek to perform an early warning function. 
For this purpose, it will systematically and proactively col-
lect open source information on alleged crimes that appear to 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
This will allow the Office to react promptly to upsurges 
of violence by reinforcing early interaction with States, in-
ternational organisations and non-governmental organisa-
tions in order to verify information on alleged crimes, to en-
courage genuine national proceedings and to prevent reoc-
currence of crimes.  
The Office may also issue public, preventive statements 
in order to deter the escalation of violence and the further 
                                                   
71 Thus, for example, the OTP “generally makes all preliminary examinations public, except 
for those that are in Phase I. A situation in Phase 1 may be made public when there is con-
siderable interest, or if the Office receives many inquiries”, see Stahn, see supra note 6, p. 
13. 
72 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 7, para. 102. 
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commission of crimes, to put perpetrators on notice, and to 
promote national proceedings […].73 
In essence, the Policy Paper reaffirms the view that the preliminary 
examination stage, from the perspective of the OTP, is not centred on the 
prompt conclusion of the examination as to whether a full investigation 
should be opened. The OTP has grown to realize that it is in fact most 
effective when it positions situations in the preliminary examination’s 
figurative parking lot.74 Once placed there, the OTP is free to actively 
monitor ongoing political developments, relying on the “shadow of the 
Court”,75 and the threat of an investigation. The fact that it is not yet 
committed to specific cases against individual perpetrators further allows 
the OTP to exert its influence equally on all parties to a situation. Coupled 
with the fact that “there are no timelines provided in the Statute for bring-
ing a preliminary examination to a close”,76 the OTP is empowered to 
engage in this leverage strategy, which Stahn coins the ‘consequentialist 
approach’, for extensive periods.77 At the preliminary examination stage, 
                                                   
73 Ibid., paras. 104–06. 
74 Kersten used a culinary analogy to describe the phenomenon, noting that of the Court’s 
“long-lasting examinations like Afghanistan and Colombia, it has often been said that they 
are left on the ‘low-heat’ of preliminary examination status as a means for the Court to be 
able to say it is interested and active in those situations and not because it actually is”. See 
Mark Kersten, “How Long Can the ICC Keep Palestine and Israel in Purgatory?”, in Jus-
tice in Conflict, 29 February 2016. 
75 See, for example, “We Should at All Costs Prevent the ICC from Being Politicised”, 
Vereinte Nationen, German Review of the United Nations, vol. 62, no. 1, 2014 (where 
Prosecutor Bensouda explains: “over time, as the ICC encourages national systems to de-
velop their national jurisdiction and their capacity to try these crimes, people will recog-
nise that the fewer cases we have, the more successful the Court is. “Success” for the ICC 
should not be gauged by the number of cases we have. Success will be gauged by the de-
terrent effect of the shadow of the Court in preventing crimes; and by the increase in ca-
pacity and ability of national jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute their own crimes. 
Then the ICC’s role will have been fulfilled”); see also, James Verini, “The Prosecutor and 
the President”, 22 June 2016, in The New York Times (Ocampo takes a similar position to 
that of Bensouda, as the author describes – Ocampo believed in the pre-emptive power of 
prosecution – “the shadow of the court”, as he liked to call it. In his inaugural address at 
The Hague, Moreno-Ocampo said the Court’s success would be measured not by how 
many cases it tried but by how few). 
76 Ibid., para. 14. 
77 Stahn, see supra note 6, pp. 5–6 
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the OTP becomes in essence a hybrid human rights monitoring body and a 
fact-finding mission with a forceful whip.78  
However, as Human Rights Watch has criticized: “using prelimi-
nary examinations to influence national authorities or potential violators is 
no easy task and requires a careful balancing act. While the fact that a 
situation may come before the ICC initially provides an incentive for au-
thorities to stop crimes or to start their own investigations, that leverage is 
likely to wane with the passage of time”.79 Some scholars go even further, 
claiming that there is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that 
the consequentialist approach is at all effective in achieving the Court’s 
agenda.80 Stahn summarizes: 
One of the most forceful critiques of the consequentialist ap-
proach is the uncertainty regarding the desired effects. The 
use of preliminary examination as leverage for ‘positive 
complementarity’ may trigger unintended political effects: a 
risk of derailing peace negotiations, rising victim expecta-
tions, or ‘mimicking’ of ICC processes at the national level. 
Existing experiences show that ICC engagement has pro-
moted complementarity in countries with a strong rule of law 
culture. It has been less effective in fragile environments. 
One lesson is that the side effects must be analysed better. 
The ICC should not open a preliminary examination merely 
for the purpose of promoting rationales, such as complemen-
                                                   
78 Ibid., p. 13 (“The OTP has developed the practice of developing annual reports. They are 
in some respects comparable to country monitoring under human rights mechanisms”), but 
cf. p. 2 (“ICC preliminary examinations differ partly from human rights documentation by 
NGOs and fact-finding bodies. They are part of the justice process and address violations 
specifically through the lens of individual criminal responsibility”). 
79 Human Rights Watch, “ICC: Course Correction”, see supra note 28. 
80 Seils, see supra note 55, p. 998 (as he writes, there is no evidence that publicizing prelimi-
nary examinations has “made a difference” in the context of increasing positive comple-
mentarity); Geoff Dancy and Florencia Montal, “Unintended Positive Complementarity: 
Why International Criminal Court Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights 
Prosecutions”, American Journal of International Law, forthcoming, 2017, pp. 13, 17 
(“We contend that the launch of a formal ICC investigation of a particular country is asso-
ciated with a spike in domestic prosecutions for all human rights violations, and further, 
that this effect is larger than the impact of the target state’s ratification of the Rome Statute 
or the Prosecutor’s decision to begin a preliminary examination. […] Preliminary examina-
tions do not carry costs as high for states, since the Court in this phase is mainly limited to 
an information collection and assessment role”). 
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tarity or deterrence. In certain contexts, the rationales of pre-
vention may require respect for peace processes. Using pre-
liminary examination as a catalyst for other rationales re-
quires a deeper commitment to in-depth situational analysis 
over time.81 
19.3.1.2. Public Reporting on Preliminary Examinations 
Beginning 13 December 2011,82 the OTP has annually released reports to 
the public, summarizing the activities conducted during the reported year 
for each of the preliminary examinations under review.83 Interestingly, the 
length of the reports has been increasing (25 pages in 2011, 63 in 2014, 73 
in 2017). The increase in length is not anecdotal, nor is it a mere reflection 
of the rise in the number of preliminary examinations over the course of 
those years. It is evidence of the current Prosecutor’s motivation to effec-
tively disseminate information concerning its monitoring operations and 
assessments to the general public. It is also a reflection of the significant 
investment of OTP resources into this reporting. Despite the addition of 
content and information, in the six years since the first report the format 
has remained largely the same. These reports consist of an introduction to 
preliminary examination activities, and a review of each of the situations 
before the OTP, including examinations that were concluded during the 
relevant year, organized by phase. 
The reports of the OTP serve as a pressure relief valve, providing 
critics with proof that the OTP remains active. This is done by voluntarily 
providing information regarding both the factual and legal narratives as 
they emerge from the assessment, while keeping the situations parked at 
the preliminary examination stage. Reviewing the reports shows that the 
OTP adopts an expansive definition of‘situation’ at this stage, allowing it 
to expand its monitoring to cover all alleged crimes potentially surround-
                                                   
81 Stahn, see supra note 6, p. 13. 
82 Incidentally, this was the day after the election of Fatou Bensouda as Prosecutor. 
83 Throughout almost all of Ocampo’s tenure as Prosecutor there was no significant reporting 
on ongoing preliminary examinations, let alone an annual report. In 2006, a single report 
was published on the activities which were performed during the first three years in opera-
tion of the OTP. Preliminary examinations were discussed only briefly in this report, chief-
ly concerning the importance of gravity when making decisions on case selection (see OTP, 
Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003 - June 2006) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c7a850/)). 
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ing a particular conflict or tension hotspot.84 Moreover, knowing that all 
concerned parties carefully read these reports, statements made in their 
framework allow the Prosecutor to signal to States its views on certain 
political developments, in the hopes of guiding their behaviour. 85  The 
affected States, let alone potential defendants, have very little recourse at 
this stage to challenge factual or legal characterizations made by the Pros-
ecutor as part of her monitoring. These examples thus indicate that, at the 
preliminary examination phase, “the balance between prosecutorial dis-
cretion and the rights of the defense leans the most toward discretion”.86 
19.3.1.3. Termination of Preliminary Examinations Reports 
Another means by which the OTP has increased transparency relates to 
notification and publication of the reasoning surrounding the termination 
of preliminary examinations. The first decision to terminate an ongoing 
preliminary examination came in 2006 and concerned alleged crimes 
against humanity by the Government of Venezuela, targeting political 
opponents. The decision issued by the OTP, headed by then Prosecutor 
Ocampo, consisted of a short five-page letter, signed by Ocampo and 
mailed to those who submitted the communication to the Court under Ar-
                                                   
84 Consider, for example, the expansion of the preliminary examination regarding the Situa-
tion in Afghanistan to cover CIA operations in Poland, Romania and Lithuania. See 2016 
Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 21, para. 199 (“In addition, a limited 
number of alleged crimes associated with the Afghan armed conflict are alleged to have 
been committed on the territories of Poland, Lithuania and Romania, which are parties to 
the Statute. This is because individuals captured in the context of the armed conflict in Af-
ghanistan, such as presumed members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, were allegedly trans-
ferred to detention centres located in those countries.”). 
85 Consider, for example, the comments of the OTP regarding the recent political appoint-
ments and election results in Guinea as part of the 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, 
ibid., paras. 272, 276 (“in this context, the reappointment of Me Cheick Sako in the posi-
tion of Minister of Justice signals the continued support of the authorities for the investiga-
tion carried out by the Guinean panel of judges […] the Office notes that the appointment 
in March 2016 of General Mathurin Bangoura, former member of the CNDD indicted in 
2015, as Governor of Conakry was perceived by victims and civil society organisations as 
a troubling signal in the context of Guinean authorities’ stated intention to bring to justice 
the persons allegedly involved in the 28 September case”). 
86 Carsten Stahn and Dov Jacobs, “The Interaction between Human Rights Fact-Finding and 
International Criminal Proceedings”, in Phillip Alston et al. (eds.), The Transformation of 
Human Rights Fact-Finding, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. 
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ticle 15.87 The letter notes that the OTP conducted a “crime analysis”, 
which included “preparation of tables of allegations and pattern analysis” 
as well as “legal research and analysis of the main doctrinal issues”.88 The 
letter was eventually published online, but no public statement or press 
release was ever produced to accompany it.  
This decision is a stark contrast to the one published by the OTP, 
led by the present Prosecutor, when the preliminary examination into 
Honduras was terminated. In that case, the Prosecutor made a general 
public statement on 28 October 2015,89 which was immediately followed 
by a three-day country visit “to announce and explain in detail the conclu-
sions reached by the OTP to Honduran authorities and civil society organ-
isations”.90 The OTP produced a 49-page analysis of the legal issues sur-
rounding its decision, focusing on subject-matter jurisdiction.91 Addition-
ally, a two-page Questions and Answers document was published in both 
English and Spanish to facilitate broader dissemination.92 Finally, the de-
cision was included in the November 2015 preliminary examination re-
port of the OTP.93 A similar approach was taken by the Prosecutor in the 
termination decision regarding the situation in the Republic of Korea.94 In 
                                                   
87 OTP, “Response to Communications Received Concerning Venezuela”, 9 February 2006 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c90d25/). The Court took the same approach in its re-
sponse in Iraq which was issued the same day and consisted of a ten-page letter. OTP, “Re-
sponse to Communications Received Concerning Iraq”, 9 February 2006 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/5b8996/). 
88 Ibid., p. 2. 
89 Office of the Prosecutor, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination into the situation in 
Honduras”, 28 October 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1d09c8/). 
90 See 2015 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 49, para. 287. 
91 OTP, Situation in Honduras: Article 5 Report, October 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/54755a/). 
92 OTP, “On the decision of the ICC Prosecutor to close the preliminary examination in 
Honduras” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0035a/). 
93 See 2015 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 49, paras. 268–289. 
94 On 23 June 2014 the Prosecutor made a public statement that the two maritime incidents in 
the Yellow Sea of 2010 did not satisfy the requirements for an initiation of an investigation 
(OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, 
on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the situation in the Republic of Ko-
rea”, 23 June 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8d0a96/)). That statement was immedi-
ately followed by a 24-page report summarizing the complete legal analysis of the subject-
matter jurisdiction, on the basis of which its termination decision was made (OTP, Situa-
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other words, the OTP has reinterpreted its obligations under Article 15(6) 
and Rule 105 and committed itself to far broader obligations of notifica-
tion, transparency, and reasoning. 
The very act of giving a public reason for the conclusions of a pre-
liminary examination creates a powerful mechanism of control.95 Provid-
ing a robust legal analysis and argumentation forces the Prosecutor not 
only to justify its interpretation and logic through the Statute’s terminolo-
gy, but more importantly it sets a principle and a precedent to be relied on 
in the future (both internally within the OTP, and externally by critics). 
These are all positive developments. However, there is a fly in the oint-
ment. Recognizing the power of the Prosecutor to produce this detailed 
legal analysis, which is not subject to adversarial scrutiny or judicial re-
view, risks the development of ‘prosecutorial adjudication’ at the ICC. 
The term, first coined by Lynch, involves a situation whereby the Prose-
cutor becomes a “central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the 
judge as arbiter of most legal issues […])”.96 In the context of internation-
al crimes, the Prosecutor additionally becomes the final authority in estab-
lishing the pseudo-legal, pseudo-political narrative surrounding the situa-
tion under review. This is especially important in cases where the prelimi-
nary examination was not launched on the basis of a State referral, and 
even more so in situations involving non-members of the Rome Statute. In 
those instances, the relevant countries might be relieved to learn that an 
investigation will not ensue, but at the same time they are offered no 
means to challenge any characterizations made by the Prosecutor,97 which 
                                                                                                                        
tion in Republic of Korea: Article 5 Report, June 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
ef1f7f/)). The decision was also reported in 2014 Preliminary Examination Report, see su-
pra note 49, paras. 218–245. 
95 David Moshaman, “Reasoning as Self-Constrained Thinking”, Human Development, vol. 
38, no. 1, 1995, p. 53 (“reasoning is best construed as a form of thinking in which the 
thinker purposely constrains processing of information in an effort to realise the epistemic 
advantages of making justifiable inferences”). 
96 Gerard E. Lynch, “Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?”, 
in Stanford Law Review, vol. 55, no. 4, 2003, pp. 1403–04. 
97 Note further that in accordance with the policies of the OTP “before making a determina-
tion on whether to initiate an investigation, the Office will also seek to ensure that the 
States and other parties concerned have had the opportunity to provide the information 
they consider appropriate” (2016 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 21, para. 
12). However, a similar policy is not stated for decisions to close preliminary examinations, 
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they might not accept, and which, considering the Court’s standing, will 
ultimately be instrumental in framing the political memory and legal reali-
ty concerning these situations in future discussion.  
19.3.1.4. Press Releases and Reporting to the UNSC and the ASP 
The Prosecutor and other high-ranking officials at the OTP and the Court 
additionally brief the UNSC (regarding situations referred to it under 
UNSC resolutions)98 and the ASP.99 These public statements may place 
additional constraints upon the work of the OTP by forcing it to answer to 
other institutions. At the same time, however, it gives an opportunity for 
the Prosecutor to continue the game of political signalling by openly 
speaking about ongoing preliminary examinations. One recent example is 
the May 2017 statement by the Prosecutor made during a routine briefing 
to the UNSC on the situation in Libya: “I take this opportunity before the 
council to declare that my office is carefully examining the feasibility of 
opening an investigation into migrant-related crimes in Libya should the 
court’s jurisdictional requirements be met”. 100  This statement further 
demonstrates how the OTP uses its innate discretion during the prelimi-
nary examination stage to expand the reach of situations it reviews to cov-
er as much international activity as possible (including the most hotly 
contested contemporary human rights abuses, regardless of their immedi-
ate connection to the situation under review), thus enabling it to monitor 
and influence them from within, and thereby win political capital. 
                                                                                                                        
and even if it did, there is surely no requirement to reflect the States’ and other parties’ po-
sitions in the final termination report.  
98 See, for example, OTP, Twelfth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court to the United Nations Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011) (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/461c14/); OTP, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor to the UNSC on the Sit-
uation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)”, 9 November 2016 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/f093e8/). 
99 See, for example, OTP, “Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Address at the First Plenary, Fifteenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties”, 
16 November 2016 (noting that “beyond increasing the quality of our preliminary exami-
nations, investigations and prosecutions, one of the main goals of my tenure as Prosecutor 
is to strengthen trust and respect for the Office by ensuring further transparency and pre-
dictability in our operations”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4f0ecf/). 
100 OTP, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor to the UNSC on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970 (2011)”, 8 May 2017, para. 29 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a943f7/). 
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It is further a common feature in the Office’s work for the Prosecu-
tor to issue press releases at times of deteriorating security situations, re-
minding all parties to the conflict that the OTP is watching.101 Some of 
these press releases are issued as part of a field mission, an area of activity 
not originally provided for under Article 15, but one nonetheless under-
taken by both Prosecutors. 102  The OTP additionally engages in other 
forms of outward communication including academic writing, interviews, 
and lectures.103 
19.3.2. Judicial Review by the PTC 
The drafters’ conceptualization of the relationship between the OTP and 
the PTC did not materialize. As we have seen, the system of checks and 
balances which they created follows the notion of an over-zealous Prose-
cutor eager to launch investigations, constrained by an active PTC pro-
                                                   
101 See, for example, OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, following growing tensions reported in Guinea”, 14 October 2015 
(“As part of its ongoing preliminary examination, my Office has been closely following 
developments in the situation in Guinea, including as they relate to the risk of possible vio-
lence leading to crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 
[…] I would like to reiterate my call for calm and restraint to all political actors, and their 
supporters. I wish to reiterate that anyone who commits, orders, incites, encourages or con-
tributes in any other way to the commission of atrocity crimes falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC is liable to prosecution either in Guinea or at the Court in The Hague”) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/10190c/); OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding the worsening security situation in 
Burundi”, 6 November 2015 (“I recall that any person in Burundi who incites or engages 
in acts of mass violence including by ordering, requesting, encouraging or contributing in 
any other manner to the commission of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) is liable to prosecution before this Court. Should 
any conduct in Burundi – whether by the Security Forces, militias or any armed group – 
amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, no-one should doubt my re-
solve to fulfill my mandate so that the perpetrators do not go unpunished”) (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/65d51f/). 
102 See, for example, OTP, “Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, on her Office’s mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 16 
to 20 October 2016” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c374e0/). 
103 See, for example, Bensouda, see supra note 9; Fatou Bensouda, “The Office of the Prose-
cutor of the International Criminal Court: Successes, Challenges and the Promise of Inter-
national Criminal Justice”, UN Audiovisual Library of International Law (available on its 
web site); Mark Kersten, “A Test of Our Resilience – An Interview with the ICC Deputy 
Prosecutor”, in Justice in Conflict, 10 August 2016. 
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tecting the Court’s legitimacy through fighting against politicization.104 
The reality is reversed. The Prosecutor is in no rush to conclude prelimi-
nary examinations and proceed to investigations, and the PTC is criticized 
by its own judges as being in danger of becoming “a mere rubber-
stamping instance”,105 likely to “automatically [agree] with what the Pros-
ecutor presents”. 106  The PTC has adopted, for example, an approach 
                                                   
104 See supra note 32. See also Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute, see supra note 34, para. 32 (noting that the goal of PTC re-
view is “to prevent the Court from proceeding with unwarranted, frivolous, or politically 
motivated investigations that could have a negative effect on its credibility”). Situation in 
Georgia, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Authorization of 
an Investigation, 27 January 2016, ICC-01/05, Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, 
para. 9 (noting that “[a]ccording to my recollection, when the idea of providing the Prose-
cutor with such power in the absence of a State’s complaint was first tabled by one mem-
ber of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) in the course of preparing the 1994 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (the “1994 ILC Draft”), there was a clear 
resistance by the ILC working group members, as they thought that the international com-
munity was not ready to provide a free hand to a world Prosecutor”). 
105 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, see supra note 34, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, para. 19. 
106 Situation in Georgia Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Authorization of an Investi-
gation, Separate Opinion of Judge Kovács, see supra note 104, paras. 6, 11: 
I consider that “judicial control”, be it at the article 15 stage or a subsequent stage of 
the proceedings, is not an empty term. Judicial control entails more than automatically 
agreeing with what the Prosecutor presents. It calls for “an independent judicial in-
quiry” of the material presented as well as the findings of the Prosecutor that there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with the opening of an investigation. This process requires 
a full and proper examination of the supporting material relied upon by the Prosecutor 
for the purpose of satisfying the elements of article 15(4) in conjunction with article 
53(1)(a)-(c) of the Statute, as well as the victims’ representations, which are referred to 
in article 15(3) of the Statute. To say otherwise means that the Pre-Trial Chamber will 
not be exercising what the Majority describes as “judicial control”. Nor will the Pre-
Trial Chamber be acting in a manner which can prevent the abuse of power on the part 
of the Prosecutor. […] The degree of seriousness of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s examina-
tion should not depend on the stage of the proceedings as the Majority Decision sug-
gests. Being at the early stages of the proceedings does not justify a marginal assess-
ment. It just means that the assessment should be carried out against a low procedural 
standard (“reasonable basis to proceed”) and a low evidentiary standard (“reasonable 
basis to believe”) on the basis of the request, the available material and the victims’ 
representations. Still such an assessment should be carried out thoroughly and the deci-
sion should demonstrate the thoroughness of the assessment conducted by the Cham-
ber. 
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whereby its examination of Article 15 requests is “strictly limited”.107 As a 
result, all three of the Prosecutor’s applications to launch investigations 
under Article 15 to date have been authorized by the PTC.108 Similarly, 
the scope of judicial review has been the subject of contestation, even 
between the Pre-Trial Chambers.109 Schabas has attempted to explain, in 
part, the Chamber’s difficulty when attempting to conduct a robust judi-
cial review at the preliminary examination stage (looking at the inherent 
disadvantage of the PTC at the preliminary examination stage, as it lacks 
adversarial debate): 
[T]he judicial approval of the Prosecutor’s application has 
been relatively perfunctory […] Nothing of [the Court’s] in-
quiry suggests a genuine effort to come to terms with issues 
of ‘politicization’ or concerns about prosecutorial abuse. It 
would be difficult for them to do so given that the hearings 
take place ex parte, that is, without an opposing party. The 
Prosecutor can hardly be expected to provide the Court with 
evidence of abusive or improper intent.110 
Moreover, the OTP adopted the policy of informing relevant State(s) 
prior to seeking authorization from the PTC to launch an investigation in 
proprio motu situations (with the hope that the relevant State(s) would 
take steps to simply refer the situation directly).111 Essentially, despite the 
                                                   
107 Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Authorization of an Investi-
gation, ibid., para. 3. 
108 Schabas, see supra note 64, p. 161 (“All three of the applications made by the Prosecutor 
have been granted by the Pre-Trial Chambers although in each decision judges have 
penned individual opinions indicating that there is no consensus within the Court about the 
function of the judicial review provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 15”). 
109 See the positions of a group of international experts convened on 29 September 2015 by 
the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies and the Centre for International Law Re-
search and Policy. Their concluding report notes: “It remains contested to what extent Arti-
cle 53 review powers apply to proprio motu action under Article 15, what qualifies as a 
‘decision’ of the Prosecutor ‘not to proceed’, triggering powers of judicial review under 
Article 53 (1) and (2), and to what extent such a decision must be formalised. Differences 
also exist between how Pre-Trial Chambers have interpreted the scope of judicial review in 
relation to Article 15 at the end of the preliminary examination, that is, regarding authori-
zation to investigate ongoing and continuing crimes, or only crimes committed until the 
date of the filing of the request for authorization”. Grotius Center Report, see supra note 6, 
para. 21. 
110 Schabas, see supra note 64, pp. 162–63. 
111 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 7, paras. 94–99. 
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Chamber’s leniency in authorizing investigations, the OTP prefers to op-
erate with as little judicial scrutiny as possible and will not shy away from 
utilizing loopholes in the Statute to do so. 
Peculiarly, the PTC has been an active check to the powers of the 
OTP concerning one type of decision, when responding to attempts by the 
Prosecutor to delay or close ongoing preliminary examinations. When 
given a chance to criticize the Prosecutor for either stalling or terminating 
a preliminary examination, the PTC has been quick to do so.112 In this 
regard, it is useful to analyse both the 2006 Central African Republic 
(‘CAR’) decision, and the 2014 decision concerning the situation on cer-
tain registered vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia. 
19.3.2.1. Central African Republic 
The Chamber’s involvement in the situation in the CAR offers good in-
sight into both the dynamics between the PTC and the OTP at the prelimi-
nary examination stage, and their divergent interpretations of the temporal 
scope of prosecutorial discretion. On 27 September 2006, almost two 
years after making its initial referral to the OTP under Article 14, the 
Government of the CAR requested the Chamber’s intervention. This Re-
                                                   
112 In fact, this strand of activism by the PTC has been reflected at the investigation stage as 
well. The first decision ever made by the PTC was a February 2005 decision to convene a 
“Status Conference” relating to the ongoing investigation into the situation in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. The Chamber, which was frustrated by the slow nature of the 
investigation of the OTP, relied on a broad interpretation of a general provision contained 
in Article 57(3)(c) of the Statute to increase its control over the Prosecutor. This in turn led 
to a minor controversy in which the Prosecutor publicly rejected the purported authority of 
the Chamber to convene a status conference, claiming that “the system enshrined in the 
Statute is one where the investigation is not performed or shared with a judicial body, but 
rather entrusted to the prosecution […] at the same time, the system also includes a closed 
number of provisions empowering the Pre-Trial Chamber to engage in specific instances of 
judicial supervision over the Prosecution’s investigative activities. The prosecution submits 
that this delicate balance between both organs must be preserved at all times in order to 
honour the Statute, and to enable the Court to function in a fair and efficient manner” (Sit-
uation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04), Prosecutor’s Position on 
Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 17 February 2005 Decision to Convene a Status Conference, 8 
March 2005, para. 3). The Pre-Trial Chamber by a ruling dismissed the Prosecutor’s objec-
tions and the Statute Conference took place. For further reading see Michela Miraglia, 
“The First Decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber: International Criminal Procedure Un-
der Construction”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 4, no. 1, 2006, pp. 188–
95. 
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quest was based on the Prosecutor’s alleged “failure to decide, within a 
reasonable time” whether or not to initiate an investigation.113  
The PTC, in its decision, reaffirmed the right of a referring State to 
be informed by the Prosecutor of developments concerning a preliminary 
examination, and the right of the PTC to request that the Prosecutor make 
such information available.114 The PTC further made reference to a series 
of terms used by both the Statute and the Rules constraining the temporal 
scope of prosecutorial discretion (“reasonable time”, “without delay”, 
“promptly”, and “in an expeditious manner”). While the PTC did not in-
terpret any of these terms directly, it did recall that “the preliminary exam-
inations of the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Northern Uganda were completed within two to six months”.115 On the 
basis of this, the PTC requested that the Prosecutor issue a report no later 
than 15 December 2006, containing information as to the current status of 
the preliminary examination, including “an estimate of when the prelimi-
nary examination of the CAR situation will be concluded”.116 
The Prosecutor’s response was decisive. Although it did provide the 
PTC and the CAR with a report detailing its activities, it clarified that it 
was doing so without accepting “the existence of a legal obligation to 
submit this type of information […] nor adopting any precedent that it 
may follow in future cases”.117 As we have already discussed, that report 
did in fact lay the groundwork for the eventual voluntary adoption of this 
method of reporting in all preliminary examination situations beginning in 
2011.118  
From the Prosecutor’s perspective, it was crucial to ensure that the 
equilibrium in the PTC-OTP relationship not be skewed. Therefore, the 
                                                   
113 Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision Requesting In-
formation on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central Af-
rican Republic, 30 November 2006, ICC-01/05, p. 3. 
114 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 
115 Ibid., p. 4. 
116 Ibid., p. 5. 
117 Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecution’s Report Pur-
suant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting Information on 
the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, 
15 December 2006, ICC-01/05, para. 11. 
118 See supra Section 19.3.1.2.  
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Prosecutor stated that the Chamber’s supervisory role was limited to “a 
review of a decision under Article 53(1) and (2) by the Prosecutor not to 
proceed with an investigation”.119 If the OTP delays this decision, the 
Prosecutor stressed, “there is no exercise of prosecutorial discretion sus-
ceptible to judicial review by the Chamber”.120 Similarly, the Prosecutor 
refused to commit to any specific deadlines, noting that: 
[T]he OTP, while committed to reaching decisions under Ar-
ticle 53 (1) as expeditiously as possible, submits that no pro-
vision in the Statute or the Rules establishes a definitive time 
period for the purposes of the completion of the preliminary 
examination. The OTP submits that this was a deliberate leg-
islative decision that provides the required flexibility to ad-
just the parameters of the assessment or analysis phase to the 
specific features of each particular situation. That choice, 
and the discretion that it provides, should remain undis-
turbed.121 
The matter was left there, with no resolution of the objection’s core 
issue: whether ‘inaction’ in the form of a delay in OTP decision-making 
during the preliminary examination phase (be it intentional or uninten-
tional) constitutes an exercise of prosecutorial discretion subject to judi-
cial review.122  
19.3.2.2. Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia 
On 6 November 2014, the OTP announced that, based on the information 
available to it, there was no reasonable basis to proceed with an investiga-
tion of the situation on certain registered vessels of Comoros, Greece, and 
Cambodia.123 The situation, which concerned the May 2010 interception 
of a flotilla that left Turkey with the goal of breaking the maritime block-
                                                   
119 Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial 
Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision, see supra note 117, para. 1. 
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid., para. 10. 
122 It is worth nothing that since the voluntary adoption of greater reporting and transparency 
during preliminary examinations, we have not seen any further criticism by the PTC of the 
OTP for delaying, even in the context of prolonged preliminary examinations such the one 
related to the situation in Afghanistan. 
123 OTP, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) 
Report, 6 November 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/43e636/). 
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ade on the Gaza strip, was referred to the OTP by the Government of the 
Union of Comoros on 14 May 2013.124 Based on a detailed report issued 
by the Prosecutor, dealing with jurisdictional and admissibility issues, the 
OTP concluded that any potential cases likely to arise from an investiga-
tion into the situation would not be of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court, and therefore would be inadmissible pursuant to Arti-
cles 17(1)(d) and 53(1)(b).125 
On 29 January 2015, the Representatives of the Union of Comoros 
filed an application for review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed, 
pursuant to Article 53(3)(a) of the Statute. The application raised two 
complaints. The first concerned an alleged failure by the Prosecutor to 
take into account other facts (a complaint the PTC later dismissed). The 
second concerned alleged analytical errors in the Prosecutor’s assessment 
of gravity under Article 17(1). The PTC issued its decision on 16 July 
2015, calling on the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to open an 
investigation.126 It was the first review of its kind. The PTC identified 
                                                   
124 This is a unique preliminary examination in the sense that in concerns a single incident, 
and not a full situation. After the Hamas terrorist organization seized control of the Gaza 
Strip in June 2007, the Government adopted various measures, including a 3 January 2009 
naval blockade on the Gaza Strip. In the days preceding May 31, 2010, a flotilla of six ves-
sels advanced towards the coastline of Israel, with approximately 700 persons on board. 
The largest of the ships in the flotilla, the Mavi Marmara, was the location of the incident 
that is the sole subject of the preliminary examination. On May 31, 2010, in the early hours 
of the morning, IDF forces boarded the Mavi Marmara and took control of the vessel. Dur-
ing the boarding and taking control of the ship, the IDF forces encountered violent re-
sistance. When the conflict ended, it was found that nine of the ship’s passengers had been 
shot dead, and fifty-five passengers and nine IDF soldiers had been wounded. The Prelim-
inary Examination was the subject of extensive investigation concluding in two national 
reports (produced by both Turkey and Israel) and two international reports (produced by a 
fact-finding mission of the United Nations Human Rights Council and a panel of inquiry 
appointed by the UN Secretary-General). For further reading, see Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/f2de32/). 
125 Ibid., para. 150. The OTP focuses its conclusion on the limited nature of these potential 
cases (“considering the scale, impact and manner of the alleged crimes, the Office is of the 
view that the flotilla incident does not fall within the intended and envisioned scope of the 
Court’s mandate… in the context of the current referral, it is clear that the potential case(s) 
that could be pursued as a result of an investigation into this situation is limited to an event 
encompassing a limited number of victims of the alleged ICC crimes, with limited coun-
tervailing qualitative considerations” (ibid., paras. 142–44). 
126 Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic, 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Request of the Union 
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errors in every aspect of the gravity analysis of the OTP, including in its 
consideration of potential perpetrators, the scale of the crimes, the nature 
of the crimes, the manner of their commission, and their impact.127 This 
decision by the PTC is a troubling one, in terms of both its legal merits 
and its policy implications.  
Within the limits of this chapter, I will not touch on the substantive 
legal arguments, which have been the subject of extensive criticism. It has 
been argued that the Judges applied a “bizarre” test for “potential perpe-
trators” (one which ignores the relative importance of the potential perpe-
trators), and moreover conflated situational gravity with case gravity in 
their analysis of the scale of the crimes.128 Moreover, the majority deci-
sion called on the Prosecutor to take into consideration “the attention” that 
the Mavi Marmara incident had attracted (including “fact-finding efforts” 
                                                                                                                        
of the Comoros to Review the Prosecutor’s Decision not to Initiate an Investigation, 16 Ju-
ly 2015, ICC-01/13, p. 26 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/).  
127 Ibid. paras. 20–48. 
128 For a complete review see Kevin Jon Heller, “The Pre-Trial Chamber’s Dangerous Como-
ros Review Decision”, in Opinio Juris 17 July 2015 (noting in particular that “The PTC’s 
approach to “potential perpetrator” gravity would thus seems to be based on a basic mis-
understanding of the difference between situational and case gravity”. Focusing on the ar-
gument raised by the Court that the scale of the crimes is similar to that in the case against 
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Abdallah Banda, Heller writes “here the PTC explicitly com-
pares the gravity of the Comoros situation to the gravity of one case within a situation. The 
number of victims in the Comoros situation is indeed comparable to the number of victims 
in the JEM attack on the UN peacekeepers in Darfur. But the Abu Garda and Abdallah 
Banda case was one of many cases within the Darfur situation; when we compare the 
number of victims in the Comoros situation to the Darfur situation as a whole, it is clear 
that the PTC has no basis whatsoever to insist that the “scale” factor counsels in favour of 
finding the Comoros situation grave enough to formally investigate. The comparison is 
then between 10 civilian deaths and hundreds of thousands); see also Dov Jacobs, “ICC 
Judges ask the Prosecutor to reconsider decision not to investigate Israeli Gaza Flotilla 
conduct”, in Spreading the Jam, 20 July 2015 (noting that Chamber’s interpretation of the 
“potential perpetrators” test is at odds with the case law of Pre-Trial Chamber II in the 
Kenya situation); Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops and Tom Zwart, “The Flotilla Case before 
the ICC: The Need to Do Justice While Keeping Heaven Intact”, in International Criminal 
Law Review, vol. 5, no. 6, 2015. But cf. Marco Longobardo, “Everything Is Relative, Even 
Gravity: Remarks on the Assessment of Gravity in ICC Preliminary Examinations, and the 
Mavi Marmara Affair”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 14, no. 4, 2016 
(suggesting that the “OTP should have properly considered that the admissibility threshold 
at the stage of preliminary examinations is less stringent than the one embodied in Article 
53(2)”). 
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launched by the United Nations).129 The Chamber’s request has the poten-
tial of greatly politicizing the Court, and in any event involves the re-
introduction of ‘social alarm’ as a gravity test (a test which was already 
rejected by the Appeals Chamber in 2006).130  
Far more troubling than the debates on the merits is the Chamber’s 
overall conceptualization of its standard for review of OTP decisions and 
the scope of the Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 53, to which most of 
the following analysis is devoted. The majority decision put forward the 
presumption that Article 53(1)(a)–(b) involve no discretionary power, 
merely requiring the “application of exacting legal requirements”.131 By 
doing so, they sought to shift power back to them by allowing the PTC to 
micromanage precisely this legal application, without being branded as 
interfering with or infringing on prosecutorial independence. The PTC in 
essence sought to place itself as a second-tier prosecutor. However, the 
Chamber’s approach may only encourage the OTP to offer less reasoning, 
as such detailed reporting is not required under the Statute or the Rules. If 
the OTP provides no robust legal analysis of its decisions, there is nothing 
to micromanage, and that will be a detrimental blow to transparency and 
predictability. 
Moreover, the majority decision attempted to further narrow the 
scope of prosecutorial discretion by establishing an extremely low bar for 
launching investigations. As they wrote in their decision:  
If the information available to the Prosecutor at the pre-
investigative stage allows for reasonable inferences that at 
least one crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed and that the case would be admissible, the Prose-
                                                   
129 Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic, 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros, see 
supra note 126, para. 51. 
130 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Appeals Chamber Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”, 13 July 2006, ICC-01/04 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/083c1a/). See also Dov Jacobs, supra note 128. 
131 Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic, 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros, see 
supra note 126, para. 14. 
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cutor shall open an investigation, as only by investigating 
could doubts be overcome.132 
Adopting this model of interpretation of the preliminary examina-
tion stage completely overturns the role of the OTP as it has evolved over 
the years since the Court’s establishment. This approach forces the Prose-
cutor to adopt the position of a legal technician, not a consequentialist, 
and it urges the OTP to launch more investigations in less time, as (in the 
Chamber’s view) those could assist in ‘overcoming any doubts’ about the 
circumstances.133 Judge Péter Kovács’ partly dissenting opinion is telling, 
as it reflects exactly the dangers of adopting the majority’s approach in the 
dynamic relationship between the OTP and the PTC. He writes: 
I do not believe that the Pre-Trial Chamber is called upon to 
sit as a court of appeals with respect to the Prosecutor’s deci-
sions. Rather the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role is merely to make 
sure that the Prosecutor has not abused her discretion in ar-
riving at her decision not to initiate an investigation on the 
basis of the criteria set out in article 53(1) of the Statute. This 
view calls for a more deferential approach when reviewing 
the Prosecutor’s decision on the basis of the criteria set out in 
article 53(1), and is implied in the text of article 53. It pro-
vides the Prosecutor with some margin of discretion in de-
ciding not to initiate an investigation into a particular situa-
tion. This interpretation is more in line with the main idea 
underlying article 53 namely, to draw a balance between the 
Prosecutor’s discretion/independence and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s supervisory role in the sense of being limited to 
only requesting the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision if 
necessary. To argue that the power of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
exceeds this point is daring. The Majority does not go in this 
direction. Instead, it preferred to conduct a stringent review, 
                                                   
132 Ibid., para. 13. 
133 A similar concern was raised by a group of international experts: “Some concerns were 
expressed in relation to the consequences of the Comoros decision. It was argued that the 
decision might have negative side effects on preliminary examinations, since it curtails 
prosecutorial discretion and might indirectly force the OTP to open investigations in many 
situations. This might deprive the space for analysis under preliminary examinations, and 
might ultimately make the OTP more reluctant to open preliminary examinations, since it 
would inevitably be expected to follow up by an investigation” (see Grotius Center Report, 
see supra note 6, para. 22).  
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which clearly interferes with the Prosecutor’s margin of dis-
cretion.134 
In an attempt to reassert her prosecutorial discretion, Prosecutor 
Bensouda applied for an appeal under Article 82(1)(a), claiming the 
Chamber’s decision was a decision on admissibility. By a 3 to 2 vote, the 
majority dismissed the Prosecutor’s appeal, determining that the decision 
did not in fact concern admissibility (correctly, as it was a review of a pre-
trial decision not to open an investigation). The Appeals Court did note 
that whereas “the Prosecutor is obliged to reconsider her decision not to 
investigate”, she nonetheless “retains ultimate discretion over how to pro-
ceed”.135 The Prosecutor, thus, reaffirmed her prosecutorial power vis-à-
vis the PTC regarding the decision of whether to open an investigation.136 
On 29 November 2017 the Prosecutor notified PTC I of her “final deci-
sion”, under Rule 108(3), and after carrying out a “thorough review of all 
submissions made and all the information available, including information 
newly made available in 2015-2017”.137 The Prosecutor concluded that 
there was no reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and made 
sure to clarify that, as far as her Office is concerned, this “closes the pre-
liminary examination”, subject only to the “Prosecutor’s ongoing and 
residual discretion under article 53(4) of the Statute”.138 
                                                   
134 Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic, 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros, 
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, ICC-01/13-34-Anx-Corr, paras. 7–8, see 
supra note 126. 
135 Schabas had argued similarly, noting that “[i]n the Gaza Flotilla situation, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber ‘requested’ the Prosecutor ‘to reconsider’ the decision, according to the terms of 
Article 53(3)(a). The language seems mild and less than mandatory. Can anything further 
be done if the Prosecutor ‘reconsiders’ and decides to maintain her decision? It seems that 
as long as the Prosecutor bases her decision on the grounds of jurisdiction or admissibility, 
this is where the matter ends”. See Schabas, see supra note 64, p. 241. 
136 Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, Appeals Chamber, 6 November 2016, ICC-
01/13, para. 59. For further reading see Giulia Pecorella, “The Comoros situation, the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor: the Rome Statute’s system of checks and balances is in 
good health”, in International Law Blog, 30 November 2015.  
137 2017 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 27, para. 320. 
138 Ibid., at para. 344. 
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19.4. The Palestinian Preliminary Examination and 
the Limits of Existing Oversight Mechanisms 
What is evident from the analysis up this point is that both self-regulation 
by the OTP and judicial review by the PTC are underperforming in their 
role of maximization of quality control over prosecutorial discretion at the 
preliminary examination stage. The PTC has adopted a narrow interpreta-
tion of prosecutorial discretion, in accordance with which it is pushing the 
OTP to avoid consequentialism at all costs. The PTC is thus encouraging 
or attempting to strong-arm the Prosecutor into focusing its limited prose-
cutorial resources on launching investigations. The OTP, on the other 
hand, has adopted a set of regulations that, while introducing a certain 
degree of transparency and adherence to procedure, nonetheless enhances 
prosecutorial discretion at the preliminary examination stage. These 
guidelines further incentivize ‘parking’ more situations for more extensive 
periods of time. The OTP is thus at a risk of becoming too involved in the 
political monitoring game and overcautious in proceeding with investiga-
tions or, when appropriate, concluding preliminary examinations. 
Davis’ ‘optimum point’ has not been reached, and this lack of bal-
ance results in the occasional power struggle between the OTP and the 
PTC, in addition to insufficient checks on the Prosecutor’s evolving con-
sequentialist role at the preliminary examination stage. These limitations 
of the existing control mechanisms are the subject of this section, and will 
be exemplified relying on the case study of the preliminary examination 
in Palestine. In particular, the section will focus on three primary concerns 
resulting from this lack of adequate oversight: (1) the potential politiciza-
tion of the Court; (2) issues relating to prioritization policies and exit 
strategies; and (3) insufficient regulation of evidentiary standards at the 
preliminary examination stage. 
19.4.1. The Preliminary Examination on Palestine: Background 
On 1 January 2015, the Palestinians lodged an Article 12(3) declaration 
with the Registrar of the ICC,139 stating their wish to accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed “in the occupied Palestinian 
                                                   
139 Mahmoud Abbas, “Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court”, 31 December 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/60aff8/). 
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territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014”.140 The next day, 
the Palestinians deposited their instrument of accession to the Court with 
the United Nations Secretary-General (which entered into force for Pales-
tine on 1 April 2015).141 On 7 January 2015, the Registrar of the ICC in-
formed President Abbas of his acceptance of the Article 12(3) declaration, 
which was then transmitted to the Prosecutor.  
This was not the Palestinians’ first attempt to grant jurisdiction to 
the Court, the first declaration being lodged in 2009. Back then, Prosecu-
tor Ocampo ultimately rejected the declaration in April 2012, based on the 
inability of the OTP to determine Palestinian statehood for the purposes of 
the Statute. The Prosecutor stated that it was “for the relevant bodies at 
the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal 
determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State for the purpose of 
acceding to the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of juris-
diction by the Court under article 12(1)”.142 This statement was problem-
atic in and of itself, ultimately broadening the interpretation of ‘statehood’ 
beyond its usual parameters, by essentially empowering the United Na-
tions General Assembly (‘UNGA’) and the ASP to make determinations 
that would be binding on an international judicial body. 
In 22 November 2012, the UNGA adopted resolution 67/19, up-
grading Palestine’s status from ‘observer entity’ to ‘non-member observer 
State’. In 2014, Prosecutor Bensouda published an article in The Guardi-
                                                   
140 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 21, para. 111. 
141 United Nations Secretary General, “State of Palestine Accession to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court”, 6 January 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f7411b/) 
(note that the UNSG accepted the accession of the Palestinians in his technical and admin-
istrative capacity as depository of the Rome Statute. As a later note by the UNSG clarifies 
“[i]n conformity with the relevant international rules and his practice as a depositary, the 
Secretary-General has ascertained that the instruments received were in due and proper 
form before accepting them for deposit, and has informed all States concerned accordingly 
through the circulation of depositary notifications This is an administrative function per-
formed by the Secretariat as part of the Secretary-General’s responsibilities as depositary 
for these treaties. It is important to emphasize that it is for States to make their own deter-
mination with respect to any legal issues raised by instruments circulated by the Secretary-
General”. United Nations Secretary-General, “Note to Correspondents – Accession of Pal-
estine to Multilateral Treaties”, 7 January 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/864b39/). 
142 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, Novem-
ber 2012, para. 201 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0b1cfc/). 
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an, titled “The truth about the ICC and Gaza”.143 While the situation in 
Palestine was no longer the subject of a preliminary examination, the 
Prosecutor still thought it useful to note that her Office had “examined the 
legal implications of this development and concluded that while this 
change did not retroactively validate the previously invalid 2009 declara-
tion, Palestine could now join the Rome statute”. She further suggested 
that “is a matter of public record that Palestinian leaders are in the process 
of consulting internally on whether to [lodge a new Article 12(3) declara-
tion]; the decision is theirs alone and as ICC prosecutor, I cannot make it 
for them”.144 There is a question of whether or not this type of political 
signalling and public winking is appropriate for an ICC Prosecutor.  
Following the above-mentioned lodging of the declaration and ac-
cession to the Statute at the beginning of 2015, the OTP issued a state-
ment on 16 January 2015, confirming that it found the adoption of UNGA 
resolution 67/19 “determinative of Palestine’s ability to accede to the 
Statute pursuant to article 125, and equally, its ability to lodge an article 
12(3) declaration”.145  
A preliminary examination was immediately launched. Based on its 
policy, the OTP is examining alleged crimes committed by both the IDF 
and members of Palestinian armed groups as part of the conflict that 
erupted over the course of the summer of 2014 (Operation Protective 
Edge), along with specific alleged crimes in the West Bank and East Jeru-
salem (namely alleged settlement activities, ill-treatment and escalation of 
violence).146 The preliminary examination is currently at the jurisdiction 
phase (Phase 2), and the OTP is reviewing open source materials and re-
ports from individuals, groups, States, IGOs and NGOs. The Office spe-
cifically mentions “monthly reports” from the Government of Palestine 
regarding alleged ongoing crimes and other developments. The OTP is 
                                                   
143  Fatou Bensouda, “[T]he truth about the ICC and Gaza”, in Guardian, 29 August 2014. 
144  Ibid. 
145 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine”, 16 January 2015 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dcbe5/). 
146 2017 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 27, paras. 58–66. 
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also developing and running a number of databases, and conducting field 
missions.147 
The Palestinian case study is intriguing because, as the Prosecutor 
herself notes, “[t]he alleged crimes that have been the subject of analysis 
to date involve complicated factual and legal assessments, such as in rela-
tion to conduct of hostilities issues, thereby necessitating careful analysis 
in reference to the relevant law applicable and information available”.148 
But it is not only that the legal questions lead to significant complica-
tions;149 the facts surrounding the dispute are also unique. As noted by the 
former Legal Advisor of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alan Baker: 
This unique and sui generis situation, including the history 
and circumstances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict regard-
ing the territories, as well as the series of agreements and 
memoranda that have been signed between the Palestinian 
leadership and the Government of Israel, have produced a 
special independent regime – a lex specialis – that governs 
all aspects of the relationship between them, including the 
respective status of each party vis-à-vis the territory.150 
The combination of legal issues, which lack sufficient clarity in in-
ternational criminal law jurisprudence especially insofar as they relate to a 
prolonged situation of belligerent occupation, and the one-of-a-kind na-
ture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, poses a series of concerns regarding 
quality control of this preliminary examination. It goes to heart of the 
question of how the Court will square issues relating to territorial or per-
sonal jurisdiction without making political determinations that should be 
decided in bilateral negotiations between the parties. Note, in this regard, 
that in both the 2015 and 2016 annual preliminary examination reports, 
the Prosecutor maps out a series of alleged crimes “without prejudice to 
any future determinations by the Office regarding the exercise of territori-
                                                   
147 Ibid., paras. 72–77; see also 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 21, paras. 
135–44. 
148 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, ibid., para. 139. 
149 Note in this regard, as an example, the fact that the 2016 Preliminary Examination Report 
(see supra note 21, paras. 130–132) does not explain how the settlements come within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. See also Stahn, supra note 6, p. 14. 
150 Alan Baker, “International humanitarian law, ICRC and Israel’s status in the Territories”, 
in International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 94, no. 888, Winter 2012, p. 1515. 
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al or personal jurisdiction by the Court”.151 In other words, the Prosecutor 
is entering this political minefield without a methodology for determining 
thorny jurisdictional questions as well as interpretive matters as they re-
late to the novel legal issues at hand. The Palestinian preliminary exami-
nation thus offers a useful case study to examine the limitations of extant 
oversight, insofar as it may become an instance of ‘prosecutorial adjudica-
tion’ where the OTP would apply subjective values in its analysis.  
19.4.2. Politicization of the Court 
The decision of the Prosecutor to launch a preliminary examination con-
cerning the situation in Palestine encompassed a number of adjudicative 
decisions. First, as noted by Schabas, “that the Prosecutor considers a 
declaration by a non-party State pursuant to Article 12(3) as an automatic 
trigger for a preliminary examination is an innovation, something not pro-
vided for in the Rome Statute or anywhere else in the legal instruments 
applicable to the Court”.152 Moreover, the decision to recognize Palestine 
as a State for the purposes of an Article 12(3) referral was in itself a high-
ly contentious decision criticized by a number of scholars. 153  Indeed, 
                                                   
151 See, for example, 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 21, para. 119. 
152 Schabas, see supra note 21, p. 400. 
153 CHAN James, “Judicial Oversight over Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute”, FICHL Policy 
Brief Series No. 11 (2013), Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2013 (http://www.
toaep.org/pbs-pdf/11-chan), pp. 3–4 (“The Palestinian Declaration also sends a message to 
quasi-States that a declaration can be used to their advantage […] the OTP has allowed the 
ICC to be used as a forum for questions of statehood. Submissions to the OTP have argued 
that accepting the Palestine Declaration would create precedent for other non-State entities 
such as Kosovo or Taiwan to assert political independence”); Zachary Saltzman, “Much 
Ado About Nothing: Non-Member State Status, Palestine and the International Criminal 
Court”, St. John’s Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol. 3, no. 2, 2013, p. 207 
(“The General Assembly resolution upgrading Palestine to a non-member state status thus 
has little effect on ICC jurisdiction pursuant to 12(3). The criteria for statehood were either 
met or not met prior to the General Assembly’s vote. The vote did little to change the exist-
ing calculus prior to the vote”); XIAO Jingren and ZHANG Xin, “A Realist Perspective on 
China and the International Criminal Court”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 13 (2013), 
Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2013 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/13-xiao-
zhang) (“Practice regrettably shows that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has allowed the 
Court to be used as a forum for the consideration of political questions of statehood 
through its discretionary preliminary examination powers. This is a most serious matter 
from the perspective of China which impacts on the legitimacy of the Court. The protract-
ed and monarchical manner in which the former ICC Prosecutor indulged in his prelimi-
nary examination of the Palestinian Article 12(3) declaration for more than three years sets 
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States do not declare their independence in The Hague, nor are they 
formed by the Court. The traditional criteria for the recognition of state-
hood under international law, codified in the Montevideo Convention and 
rooted in effective control, offer the most widely accepted prescription to 
be applied at the outset of making any determination regarding state-
hood.154 These rules should not, of course, be applied rigidly – they re-
quire a case-by-case analysis, as noted by James Crawford:  
It has been argued that international law does contain worka-
ble rules for determining whether a given entity is or is not a 
State. Of course, these rules are not, so to speak, self-
executing: as with rules in other areas of international law, 
their application by international lawyers, or by States and 
other international persons, requires the exercise of judgment 
in each case.155 
What is of concern is, therefore, the procedure whereby the deter-
mination of Palestinian statehood was made in January 2015. Leaving 
open the question of whether Palestine is a State in the traditional sense, 
one should ask: who applied the rules and who exercised judgment in 
recognizing Palestinian statehood at the ICC? The Prosecutor merely ac-
cepted as determinative a UNGA resolution which was nothing more than 
a symbolic vote upgrading Palestine’s representation at the United Na-
tions to “somewhere in between the other observers, on the one hand, and 
member states on the other”.156 Did the delegates voting at the General 
Assembly realize that they were voting on Palestinian accession to the 
                                                                                                                        
a landmark precedent for how the Office might disregard legitimate state interests during 
the examination of such declarations as well as complaints. There is little, if anything, af-
fected governments can do during such preliminary examination, except to wait for what 
may be a very long time, even when the complaint is politically motivated. The present au-
thors fail to comprehend how the ICC Prosecutor could spend more than three years exam-
ining the Palestinian declaration.”). 
154 See, for example, J.D. van der Vyver, “Statehood in International Law”, in Emory Interna-
tional Law Review, vol. 9, 1991, p. 12 (explaining that the declaratory theory, consisting of 
the Montevideo Convention requirements, is widely accepted). 
155 James Crawford, “The Criteria for Statehood in International Law”, in British Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 48, no. 1, 1977, p. 181.  
156 Permanent Observer Mission of The State of Palestine to the United Nations, “Status of 
Palestine” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/15678f/).  
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Rome Statute, and if they were told would they have voted differently?157 
In any event, is it prudent to abrogate this pertinent decision to a single 
political action by one political arm of the United Nations? 
This is of critical importance, because this kind of recognition by 
the Prosecutor has a norm-setting function. Decisions by the ICC, as an 
international Court, carry a different status from those of the International 
Olive Council, for example.158 As noted by Yaël Ronnen: 
                                                   
157 Reviewing the explanation of votes made by those States who either voted in favour of or 
abstained from UN General Assembly resolution 67/19 is quite telling and contradicts that 
conclusion. See, for example, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Af-
fairs, William Hague (abstained), who remarked: “We continue to believe that the pro-
spects for a swift return to negotiations on a two state solution – the only way to create a 
Palestinian state on the ground – would be greater today if President Abbas had been able 
to give the assurances we suggested, and without which we were unable to vote in favor of 
the resolution. In particular, we called on President Abbas to set out a willingness to return 
to negotiations without preconditions, and to signal that the Palestinians would not imme-
diately seek action in the International Criminal Court, which would be likely to make a 
return to negotiations impossible” (emphasis added) (Jill Reilly, “U.N agrees to recognise 
Palestine but UK abstains from vote after Hague issues peace deal demands”, in Daily 
Mail, 30 November 2012); Japan’s Ambassador to the United Nations General Assembly, 
Jun Yamazaki (voted in favour): “It is not acceptable to use this resolution to act in a way 
that might negatively affect or hinder direct negotiations with Israel. We ask for prudence 
with respect to conduct such as accession to international organizations, action which 
might negatively affect the prospect for the resumption of negotiations” (emphasis added) 
(Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, “Statement by H.E. Jun Yamazaki, At 
the Debate of the United Nations General Assembly on Agenda Item 36: “The Situation in 
the middle East” and Agenda Item 37: “The Question of Palestine”, 30 November 2012 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1e116d/)); Romania’s Ambassador to the United Nations 
General Assembly Simona Mirela Miculescu (abstained): “Romania does not favor unilat-
eral initiatives, regardless of which side they come from, as they may have adverse effects 
for the resumption of the peace process negotiations. The adopted resolution is not facili-
tating the recognition of Palestine as a state nor its accession to international organisa-
tions and treaties” (emphasis added) (Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Na-
tions, “Romania’s participation at the General Assembly Session on the resolution “The 
Status of Palestine in the United Nations", 29 November 2012 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/89c434/)); Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kingdom of Belgium, Didier Reynders (voted in favour): “For Belgium, the resolution 
adopted today by the General Assembly does not yet constitute recognition of Palestine as 
a state in the full sense of the word” (emphasis added) (Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Af-
fairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, “Declaration by Minister Reynders 
following the awarding to Palestine of the status of observer/non-member state”, 30 No-
vember 2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f911f1/)). 
158 Isabel Putinja, “Palestine Becomes Olive Council’s Newest Member”, in Olive Oil Times, 
20 April 2017. 
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a determination by a legal body such as the ICC (the prose-
cutor and, at a later stage, the Court) that a state of Palestine 
exists (either generally or for the purpose of Article 12(3)) 
would carry significant weight. […] Thus, if the Prosecutor, 
or later the Pre-Trial Chamber, determines that the Palestini-
an declaration fulfills the requirements of Article 12(3), they 
would be assuming an almost unprecedented competence, 
which incurs onto the political sphere which is the traditional 
prerogative of states.159 
This argument will be further borne out to the extent that the Prose-
cutor proceeds with the preliminary examination, basing its decision on a 
determination of territorial and personal jurisdiction which will go beyond 
recognizing a Palestinian State, and which will de facto delineate its bor-
ders.160 Although Bensouda emphasizes that any determination will be 
strictly limited for the purposes of the preliminary examination, the Pros-
ecutor in essence has placed her Office at the centre of any future negotia-
tion between the parties. The determinations of the OTP are likely to be 
raised in the future by the Palestinians, by Israel, and by other interested 
parties, for the purposes of making territorial claims or objections. A re-
cent statement by former Prosecutor Ocampo confirms this point. At a 
visit to Al-Quds University in May 2017, Ocampo acknowledged that the 
status of Palestine as a State has been indisputably solidified legally and 
politically as a result of the launching of the Palestinian preliminary ex-
amination. He further noted that the Palestinian preliminary examination 
“was not the goal but only one of the many political and diplomatic means 
the Palestinian side is wisely utilizing to achieve its legitimate aim of end-
ing the occupation”.161  
As Allison Danner wrote, the ICC Prosecutor sits “at a critical junc-
ture in the structure of the Court, where the pressures of law and politics 
                                                   
159 Yaël Ronen, “ICC Jurisdiction over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip: Article 12(3) of the 
ICC Statute and Non-state Entities”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 8, 
no. 1, 2010, p. 22. 
160 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Stat-
ute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 290 (noting that the “actual limits of the ter-
ritory of Palestine are also a matter of dispute”). 
161 Palestine News Network, “االستيطان جريمة حرب ستؤدي إلى ادانة اسرائيل :اوكامبو” (“Ocampo: 
Settlement of War Crimes will lead to Condemnation of Israel”, in Palestine News Net-
work, 30 May 2017 (translated from the original Arabic). 
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converge. The cases adjudicated by the ICC are infused with political 
implications and require sensitive decision making”.162 To avoid as much 
politicization of the Court as possible, Alex Whiting, former Prosecution 
Coordinator and Investigation Coordinator at the OTP, recommended that 
Prosecutors adopt a chess-master’s mentality.163 Given that the positions 
of the international community, the situation States, and the primary ac-
tors (including the victims and the accused) are all frequently in a state of 
flux, OTP investigations are inherently dynamic. As a result, at “any given 
time, the prosecutor has to consider and weigh all of the different varia-
bles when deciding where to investigate, what resources to dedicate, how 
fast to go, when there is enough evidence, and when to move to the next 
phase”.164  
The creation of facts on the ground by the OTP, and categorical de-
terminations by the Prosecutor which will be very difficult to reverse, 
stand directly opposed to this necessary dynamism.165 Further complica-
tions arise from the preliminary examination on Palestine, since it requires 
                                                   
162 Danner, see supra note 13, p. 510. 
163 Alex Whiting, “Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court”, in 
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 76, nos. 3–4, 2013, p. 185 (“To employ a cliché, 
planning and conducting an investigation at the ICC is like playing three-dimensional, or 
even four- or five-dimensional, chess”). 
164 Ibid. A similar approach is suggested by Jacob Foster. See generally, Jacob N. Foster, “A 
Situational Approach to Prosecutorial Strategy at the ICC”, in Georgetown Journal of In-
ternational Law, vol. 47, 2016. 
165 Valérie Arnould, “The Limits of International Criminal Justice: Lessons from the Ongwen 
Case”, 27 January 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b4fc01/) (“intervention in ongoing 
conflict exposes the Court to excessive politicisation, as it inexorably gets sucked into po-
litical wrangling and opens itself up to political manipulation by states. In the Ugandan 
case, President Museveni mobilised international justice to legitimise his government’s 
military response to the conflict, divert attention away from the army’s own human rights 
practices, and to depoliticise the northern conflict. Experiences in Sudan, Kenya and Pales-
tine in turn show how the Court may be used as a bargaining chip in political power plays, 
either between states or domestic elites. This becomes particularly problematic if interna-
tional justice is used as a substitute to the pursuit of a political or military solution. While it 
is impossible for the Court to completely act outside of politics, there is a need to reflect 
more on circumstances where too much politics may end up immobilising the Court and 
serving the interest of neither justice nor peace. The hard truth which thus needs to be con-
fronted is that rather than ending conflict, international justice is at growing risk of becom-
ing an additional terrain on which wars are fought out. While it would be unrealistic to 
simply state that the Court should therefore never intervene in ongoing conflicts, at the 
minimum a more critical reflection of the conditions under which this happens is needed.”). 
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the Prosecutor to apply what was in essence created to be a jus post bel-
lum criminal justice mechanism to a lingering, protracted, and drawn out 
jus in bello situation. No other conflict currently under preliminary exam-
ination, even other ongoing, volatile situations (for example, Ukraine), 
has this kind of historically magnified nature, reflected in a state of occu-
pation now entering its fiftieth year. By opening the preliminary examina-
tion, the OTP bull has placed itself within the china shop that is the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Every legal interpretation, statement, or declaration 
must be vetted and thoroughly scrutinized, as each one is likely to make 
an immediate and lasting political impact. 
19.4.3. Prioritization Policies and Exit Strategies 
Setting aside the issue of semantics,166 one key dilemma concerning the 
inner workings of the OTP involves how to prioritize between situations, 
and later cases, and also if, when and how to disengage from ongoing 
preliminary examinations.167 Many of these questions are left to the dis-
                                                   
166 Grotius Centre Report, see supra note 6, para. 30 (“It was pointed that some of the existing 
semantics are open to question. Experience across institutions suggests that disengage-
ment/’exit’ is not simply a moment in time, but a complex process in itself. In line of this, 
it might be more appropriate to speak of ‘completion’, rather than ‘exit’”).  
167 At present the OTP “has no exit strategy in place for any of the situations in which it oper-
ates” (see Rebecca J. Hamilton, “The ICC’s Exit Problem”, in New York University Jour-
nal of International Law and Policy, 2014, vol. 47, p. 5). The Office of the Prosecutor had 
promised that as part of a Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation it will include 
a clearer working definition and structure for “exit strategies”, see Strategic Plan 2016-
2018, see supra note 70, para. 36 (“the Office will define its policy on how it proposes to 
end its involvement in a situation under investigation, the so-called: “exit strategy” for sit-
uations”). The Policy Paper adopted in 15 September 2016 does not even mention the term, 
let alone provide any meaningful analysis (see Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on 
Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
182205/)). For the purposes of this chapter, I adopt a definition of ‘exit strategy’ similar to 
that of Richard Caplan, it is “a plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing” from a 
situation, “ideally having attained the goals that inspired international involvement origi-
nally. If the goals have been attained, an exit strategy may envision follow-on measures to 
consolidate the gains […] However, if the goals have not been attained and, it is concluded, 
cannot be attained, then a different set of considerations will govern the formulation of an 
exit strategy. For instance, if there have been partial gains, are these worth preserving and, 
if so, how can that be achieved? If there are reputational costs associated with exit, such as 
perceived loss of credibility, how can these best be contained? If exit will leave others to 
pick up the pieces, how is the process to be managed without leaving the others high and 
dry? As these considerations suggest, exit is not merely a technical matter, to be accom-
plished (ideally) when requirements for sustainability have been achieved. It is also a polit-
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cretion of the Prosecutor, given that there are no temporal limitations on 
preliminary examinations168 (aside from a general obligation to complete 
them within a ‘reasonable time’ regardless of complexity),169 and that the 
OTP Policy Paper only instructs in vague terms that preliminary examina-
tions may be terminated depending on “the availability of information, the 
nature, scale and frequency of the crimes, and the existence of national 
responses in respect of alleged crimes”.170 
It is important to recall that the ICC has capacity limitations. The 
ICC is unlikely to act as a first, second, or even third responder to the 
commission of widespread atrocities, and the most important thing the 
OTP can do to enhance its positive image is to educate the public on the 
subject of its inevitable constraints. As clarified by Bibas and Burke-
White: 
A system that idealistically promises justice to everyone will 
disappoint most of them. It must focus on the most inten-
tional and flagrant crimes that caused the gravest harm to the 
most victims and sowed the most widespread grief and bit-
terness. Coherent screening policies can pick a handful of 
strong cases involving the worst crimes, to maximize public 
satisfaction and historic resolution. They can screen out all 
but the most serious international crimes and all but the 
highest-level persons responsible, such as political or mili-
tary leaders.171  
                                                                                                                        
ical matter, whose pace may be determined by a host of domestic and international factors 
that may have little to do with the achievement of sustainable outcomes” (see Richard 
Caplan, “Exit Strategies and State Building”, in Richard Caplan (ed.), Exit Strategies and 
State Building, 2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 5–6). Devising an exit strategy 
at the beginning of the Preliminary Examination stage will entail reviewing all of the 
above factors to develop both the goals and the risks involved in the particular situation 
under review. 
168 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 7, para. 89. 
169 See supra Section 19.3.2.1. in this chapter. 
170 It is intriguing to note that the original regulations of the OTP envisioned a one-month 
maximum deadline for the first Phase, see supra note 26. 
171 Stephanos Bibas and William W. Burke-White, “International Idealism Meets Domestic-
Criminal-Procedure Realism”, Duke Law Journal, vol. 59, no. 4., 2010, pp. 681–682. Cf. 
Grotius Centre Report, see supra note 6, para. 33 (“Doubts were expressed whether inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals should focus strictly on ‘big fish’, while leaving 
‘small fish’ to domestic courts”). 
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This approach echoes the consequentialist model and has implica-
tions for gravity and complementarity considerations by the OTP. At the 
same time, the OTP must recognize that there are limits to the duration of 
even prolonged preliminary examinations as well as to their number,172 
not the least of which is its own budgetary constraints.173 While proposals 
to set rigid time limits174 may be counterproductive to the goals of posi-
tive complementarity and tailored prosecutorial strategies,175 there could 
                                                   
172 Vincent Dalpé, “The ICC-OTP’s Approach to Preliminary Examinations: Complementarity 
in Action or Complete Inaction” (on file with the author) (“one must keep in mind that the 
ICC barely has the necessary resources to prosecute a handful of individuals every year. 
The ICC is not a development agency and by no means has the necessary resources to or-
chestrate the monumental rule of law project that positive complementarity would require. 
A clear line needs to be drawn between the court’s mission to promote rule of law and that 
of adjudicating crimes of international concern”). 
173 Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2016 of the International 
Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/14/10 2 September 2015, para. 135 (“This budget increase does 
not allow the Office to immediately respond to all the demands placed upon it […] Situa-
tions that are under preliminary examination, and for which investigations could be opened, 
are being postponed as a result of insufficient resources”). 
174 Grotius Centre Report, ibid., para. 16 (“Some support was expressed in favour of fixed 
timelines and greater judicial review of prosecutorial action […] preliminary examinations 
should be concluded within one year, with the possibility for the Prosecutor to request the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to extend the time limit, if necessary”). Kersten, see supra note 74 
(“This issue of how long preliminary examinations should last was raised last year at a 
conference organized by the inestimable Carsten Stahn and his team at Leiden University. 
There, a number of participants raised the possibility of adopting reasonable timelines. The 
most convincing version of this argument, at least in my view, essentially prescribed a 
general time limitation on how long prosecutors would have to conduct a preliminary ex-
amination. Here, somewhere between three to five years would be considered fair, alt-
hough some suggested a one-year time period (I think this is far too little). After the initial 
period of time passed, the Office of the Prosecutor would have three options: 1) close the 
preliminary examination; 2) proceed to an official investigation; or 3) apply to judges for 
an extension of the preliminary examination for an additional period of time, perhaps 
somewhere between 2–3 years. During such applications – which, if the record of prelimi-
nary examinations to date is any indication, would regularly be filed – those states under 
scrutiny as well as victims’ representatives would be permitted to file their own declara-
tions as to whether to proceed to an official investigation”). 
175 Grotius Centre Report, ibid., para. 18 (“other participants remained skeptical towards the 
idea of specifying time limits for prosecutorial action. Questions were raised about the fea-
sibility of time limits in ‘hard’ cases. Would the Prosecutor have to proceed with an inves-
tigation even if she does not have enough information or should the Preliminary Examina-
tion be closed? How should the OTP and Chambers address situations where it is not clear 
whether an investigation should be initiated? Concerns were expressed that the complexity 
and fluidity of the situations make it difficult to impose timelines. Difficulties would arise 
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be other means to regulate generalized temporal considerations at the pre-
liminary examination stage.176 The Court must devote more resources to 
developing tailored engagement strategies with affected States at an early 
stage of preliminary examinations, and to continuously updating those 
strategies. Moreover, the Court needs to ensure that extending preliminary 
examination periods does not serve to politically misuse preliminary ex-
aminations in domestic PR campaigns.177 This directly ties into the issue 
of prioritization, and in light of the increase in referrals to the Court, and 
the Chamber’s pushback in the case of the Registered Vessels of Comoros, 
Greece, and Cambodia, it has become critical for the Court to have clear, 
public and defensible prioritization policies. 
One area of particular importance, in this context, concerns peace 
negotiations and their impact on “interests of justice” interpretations and 
broader exit strategies.178 For these purposes, ‘victims’ are defined under 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as “natural persons who have suf-
fered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdic-
                                                                                                                        
in particular in situations of continuing or recurring violence (for example, Nigeria and 
Honduras), or when peace negotiations are ongoing or agreements have been reached and 
the OTP has to give the state time to proceed with its own investigations and prosecu-
tions”). 
176 Ibid., paras. 16–17 (the group of experts considered other ways including granting the 
territorial or personal jurisdiction state (or even the victims) the possibility of asking the 
PTC to request that the OTP make a decision (similar to the CAR situation). Alternatively, 
it might be possible to allow the OTP to request PTC rulings on jurisdiction or admissibil-
ity at the Preliminary Examination stage, or to establish reasonable timeframes for each 
phase of a Preliminary Examination assessment). 
177 James, see supra note 153, pp. 2–3 (noting that the “publicity generated” through activities 
done at the Preliminary Examination stage “could be politically advantageous” for one of 
the parties).  
178 As explained above, as part of the preliminary examination process, the Prosecutor consid-
ers whether, taking into account the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims, there 
are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the in-
terests of justice. Rome Statute, see supra note 18, Article 53(1)(c). 
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tion of the Court”.179 Any decision not to open an investigation on the 
basis of “interests of justice” is subject to mandatory judicial review.180 
In its 2007 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, the OTP adopted 
a narrow understanding of “interests of justice” incorporating a “presump-
tion in favour of investigations or prosecution” and a standard of “excep-
tionality” (a course of last resort).181 Concerning peace processes specifi-
cally, the OTP refers to the recognized role of the UNSC in maintaining 
peace and security and its power to delay investigations and prosecutions 
by means of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (thus 
stressing that the “broader matter of international peace and security is not 
the responsibility of the Prosecutor”).182 Concerning the conflict in Ugan-
da, the Juba peace talks were launched two years after the OTP concluded 
its preliminary examination and opened an investigation. As a result, the 
negotiations were not considered as part of the Ugandan preliminary ex-
amination. On the other hand, both in the context of Colombia and in the 
context of the Palestine, negotiations may play a role in the Prosecutor’s 
analysis. 
The position that interests of peace are distinguishable from inter-
ests of justice and fall outside the mandate of the OTP is discouraging. In 
a world where the UNSC is paralysed due to conflicting agendas among 
permanent members with veto power, to abrogate all responsibilities to 
that institution seems unreasonable. The Court must engage in determin-
ing whether pursuing criminal justice during a preliminary examination 
would serve stability. The fact that the PTC is required to review such 
determinations further justifies the OTP in considering interests of justice 
rather than ignoring them. The Policy Paper is so limiting that it seems 
very unlikely that the Prosecutor will ever find an investigation should not 
be launched under Article 53(1)(c). As Schabas has noted: 
                                                   
179 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, see supra note 23, Rule 85. This definition of victim-
hood is slightly vague, as the means whereby interests of different groups of victims could 
be discerned and compared are unclear. Consider the following: will an Israeli settler in the 
West Bank be considered a victim? Would her interests be ranked differently or the same 
as the interests of a Palestinian? 
180 Rome Statute, see supra note 18, Article 53(3)(b). 
181 OTP, Policy Paper on Interests of Justice, September 2007, pp. 3–4. 
182 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 
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It is often said that without justice there can be no peace, but 
the opposite is also a valid proposition: without peace there 
can be no justice. It is probably unwise to reduce the debate 
to absolute propositions, whereby one objective, be it justice 
or peace, trumps the other. Advocates of uncompromising 
justice build their argument on the rights of victims, whose 
claim is secured by contemporary human rights norms. But 
while individual victims are perfectly entitled to see their 
perpetrators brought to book, like many rights, this must 
sometimes acknowledge competing interests, including the 
right to peace. The real issue is whether the Prosecutor, in 
making determinations under article 53, engages with the 
peace and justice dialectic or instead positions himself as an 
advocate for justice, leaving others to defend the interests of 
peace. The Prosecutor’s policy paper takes the latter ap-
proach, although a good case can be made for a more holistic 
perspective. Perhaps future Prosecutors of the Court will at-
tempt to balance the interests of justice and peace in the se-
lection of cases, invoking the ‘interests of justice’ where de-
ferral of prosecution may be useful in promoting an end to 
conflict.183 
The public statements of the OTP in the wake of the signing of a 
peace accord between Colombia and the FARC-EP were also disconcert-
ing. On 1 September 2016, the Prosecutor welcomed the “historic 
achievement”, noting specifically the Special Jurisdiction for Peace which 
was supposed to be established and take into consideration the victims 
“legitimate aspirations for justice”.184  Following the narrow victory of 
‘no’ voters in the October 2016 referendum, all direct references to the 
Rome Statute were removed from the revised deal. As some have con-
tended, “reaching a peace accord and ending 52 years of armed conflict 
between the State and the FARC-EP would not have been possible at all 
without a transitional justice system that prioritizes the needs of Colombi-
ans for peace and reconciliation higher than the Rome Statute and the 
                                                   
183 Schabas, see supra note 21, p. 839. 
184 OTP, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion of the peace nego-
tiations between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia – People’s Army”, 1 September 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c64dd0/). 
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increasingly controversial ICC”.185 The Prosecutor ignored these consid-
erations and published a column in the weekly Semana, in which she clar-
ified that the OTP would intervene and prosecute cases if Colombia’s 
transitional justice system “fails to effectively prosecute military and 
guerrilla commanders over war crimes or crimes against humanity”.186 
This precedent is worrisome in the context of the preliminary exam-
ination on Palestine. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has known high and 
low tides of bilateral negotiations, often supported by the United States as 
an intermediary. Unlike a final and comprehensive status agreement 
achieved through bilateral compromise, bringing the Chairman of the Ye-
sha Council or a high-ranking Hamas official to The Hague is unlikely to 
end the occupation, dismantle a single settlement, or reduce violence in 
the region; in fact, the reverse is true, it will likely only raise antagonism. 
The Prosecutor’s unwillingness to acknowledge the role her Office might 
play in derailing such negotiations, and her refusal to recognize that her 
mandate actually requires her to take these considerations under review,187 
is troubling, as this refusal could, in and of itself, lead to significant polit-
ical implications.  
19.4.4. Evidentiary Standards at the Preliminary Examination Stage 
The information available at the preliminary examination stage is neither 
expected to be “comprehensive” nor “conclusive”, compared to evidence 
gathered during an investigation.188 According to Regulation 24 of the 
                                                   
185 Christof Lehmann, “ICC Chief Prosecutor Bensouda Threatens With Intervention in Co-
lombia”, in MSNBC, 27 January 2017. 
186 Ibid. 
187 In this context it might be useful to note that the expression “interests of justice” was 
proposed by the United Kingdom in an amendment to what was then Article 26 of the draft 
statute. In an accompanying discussion paper, the UK delegation clarified that “the refer-
ence to the “interests of justice” is intended to reflect a wide discretion on the part of the 
prosecutor to decide not to investigate comparable to that in (some) domestic systems, eg 
[…] there were good reasons to concluded that a prosecution would be counter-
productive”: see UK Discussion Paper, “International Criminal Court: Complementarity”, 
29 March 1996, para. 30 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/45b7f5/). Based on this Schabas 
concludes that “had there been an amendment to article 53(1)(c) to the effect that ‘the in-
terests of justice shall not be confused with the interests of peace’, it would surely not have 
met with consensus”, Schabas, see supra note 21, p. 836. 
188 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, see supra note 34, 
para. 27; 2016 Preliminary Examination Report, see supra note 21, para. 11. 
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Regulations of the OTP, the Office is required to develop and apply “a 
consistent and objective method for the evaluation of sources, information 
and evidence”, taking into consideration their credibility and reliability 
while ensuring bias control by inspecting multiple sources.189 The Prose-
cutor has full discretion in conducting preliminary examinations and is 
provided with a broad range of investigatory powers, short of the formal 
mechanisms utilized by the Office at the investigation stage (including in 
particular Part 9 co-operation),190 to conduct her examination: 
According to Article 15(2), the tools available to the Prose-
cutor at this stage include: received information; additional 
information from States, organs of the UN, intergovernmen-
tal or non-governmental organizations or other reliable 
sources and ‘written or oral testimony’ received at the seat of 
the Court (whereby the ordinary procedures for questioning 
shall apply and the procedure for preservation of evidence 
for trial may apply pursuant to Rule 47). Although apparent-
ly limited in scope, the sources described under this rule are 
potentially rich in terms of the information they may in prac-
tice be able to provide. Moreover, there is arguably no reason 
to restrictively interpret the type of non-governmental or 
governmental organization that may and should be ap-
proached by the ICC Prosecutor under this provision. Flexi-
bility and creativity should be employed in this regard, de-
pending on the type of information sought.191 
Thomas Hansen, relying on OTP Reports, mapped out the “wide 
range” of activities conducted within this phase. Amongst those he 
                                                   
189 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, see supra note 42, Regulation 24. 
190 For an analysis of different interpretations as to whether Part 9 Cooperation should apply 
to preliminary examinations, see OTP, Informal Expert Paper: Fact-finding and investiga-
tive functions of the office of the Prosecutor, including international co-operation, 2003, 
paras. 22–29 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ba368d/). 
191 Ibid., para. 21. Although the above description refers specifically to the conditions con-
cerning the receipt of information by the Prosecutor acting proprio motu, in reality these 
conditions are not really any different from those when she acts pursuant to a State Party or 
Security Council referral. “The Prosecutor must always ‘analyse the seriousness’ of infor-
mation provided, even when it comes from a State Party or the Security Council, as the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence make quite clear. Moreover, she may always seek addi-
tional information from various ‘reliable sources’ and receive written or oral testimony at 
the seat of the Court” (Schabas, see supra note 21, p. 402). 
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notes:192 (1) creating databases relating to incidents and crimes under ex-
amination; (2) conducting various forms of legal analysis, including in the 
context of determining the existence of an armed conflict; (3) analysing 
decisions by national courts, as well as non-criminal domestic processes; 
(4) verifying information provided in communications, including from 
other States, and assessing the senders’ reliability, using open source in-
formation such as international organizations and NGO human rights re-
ports and statements; (5) reviewing legislative developments that may 
have an impact on the conduct of national proceedings; (6) analysing pro-
visions in peace agreements; (7) shedding further light and filling infor-
mational gaps relying on the jurisprudence of regional courts; (8) conduct-
ing meetings at both the seat of the Court and in examination countries 
with various stakeholders (governmental, civil society, victims); and (9) 
conducting missions to situation countries to undertake outreach and edu-
cation activities.193 
The OTP 2016-2018 Strategic Plan on Prosecutorial Strategy notes 
further that “[t]he high pace of technological evolution changes the 
sources of information, and the way evidence is obtained and presented in 
court”.194 As a result, the Strategic Goal 4 of the OTP involves adapting 
the Office’s investigative capabilities and network to “the technological 
environment” and has included hiring cyber investigators and digital fo-
rensic analysts as well as training and capacity building.195 
The preliminary examination process is opaque inasmuch as the 
OTP does not have a clearly defined, publicly available policy on eviden-
                                                   
192 Hansen, see supra note 67, pp. 11–12. 
193 More generally regarding the OTPs methods at the Preliminary Examination phase, see 
OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 7, paras. 31–32 (“As in-
formation evaluated at the preliminary examination stage is largely obtained from external 
sources, rather than through the Office’s own evidence-gathering powers (which are only 
available at the investigation stage), the Office pays particular attention to the assessment 
of the reliability of the source and the credibility of the information. The Office uses stand-
ard formats for analytical reports, standard methods of source evaluation, and consistent 
rules of measurement and attribution in its crime analysis. It checks internal and external 
coherence, and considers information from diverse and independent sources as a means of 
bias control”).  
194 Strategic Plan 2016-2018, see supra note 70, para. 3. 
195 Ibid., paras. 23, 59. 
19. Politics, Power Dynamics, and the Limits of  
Existing Self-Regulation and Oversight in ICC Preliminary Examinations 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 139 
tiary standards and the analysis of sources at that stage.196 It is submitted 
that the Prosecutor should provide additional information (and actual past 
examples) of how it corroborates and verifies information, as well as how 
much weight is given to different source types. This is predominantly 
because of the extensive weight given to open-source materials – includ-
ing materials by UN fact-finding missions and monitoring bodies, as well 
as human rights NGOs. It is also taking into consideration situations 
whereby the affected States might not co-operate with the Prosecutor dur-
ing the preliminary examination analysis. This problem was exemplified 
in the 2014 Report concerning the Situation on Registered Vessels of 
Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia. The OTP relied on four different re-
ports197 and seemingly gave all four identical weight. However, Israel has 
reason to be concerned about legal and factual determinations based on 
insufficient evidence. As Judge Thomas Buergenthal wrote in his dissent-
ing opinion in the 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ supported its find-
ings: 
with evidence that relates to the suffering the wall has caused 
along some parts of its route. But in reaching this conclusion 
the Court fails to address any facts or evidence specifically 
rebutting Israel’s claim of military exigencies or require-
                                                   
196 For example, in the context of activities conducted in 2017 as part of the Preliminary 
Examination into Palestine the Office clarifies that it has:  
reviewed and assessed a large body of information from various types of sources, in-
cluding publicly available information as well as information and materials provided to 
the Office by relevant individuals, local and international NGOs, international organi-
zations and States. Consistent with standard practice, the Office has subjected such in-
formation to rigorous source evaluation, including in terms of the reliability of the 
sources and credibility of the information received. In this regard the Office has con-
tinued to take steps to verify and corroborate a number of relevant factual issues, in-
cluding, for example, by requesting additional information from relevant actors (2017 
Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 27, at para. 74). 
The Office does not provide any information about the “various types of sources” it col-
lected, the nature of its “standard practice” of “rigorous source evaluation”, or the ways by 
which it verifies sources to determine reliability and credibility. 
197  Namely, (1) the report from the fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights 
Council, (2) the report of the four-member panel of inquiry established by the UN Secre-
tary-General and chaired by Geoffrey Palmer, (3) the report by the national commission of 
inquiry established by the Turkish Government, and (4) the report of the investigate com-
mission established by the Israeli Government and headed by former Israeli Supreme 
Court Justice Jacob Turkel. 
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ments of national security. It is true that in dealing with this 
subject the Court asserts that it draws on the factual summar-
ies provided by the United Nations Secretary-General as well 
as some other United Nations reports. It is equally true, how-
ever, that the Court barely addresses the summaries of Isra-
el’s position on this subject that are attached to the Secretary-
General’s report and which contradict or cast doubt on the 
material the Court claims to rely on. Instead, all we have 
from the Court is a description of the harm the wall is caus-
ing and a discussion of various provisions of international 
humanitarian law and human rights instruments followed by 
the conclusion that the law has been violated. Lacking is an 
examination of the facts that might show why the alleged de-
fences of military exigencies, national security or public or-
der are not applicable to the wall as a whole or to the indi-
vidual segments of its route. The Court says that it “is not 
convinced” but it fails to demonstrate why it is not con-
vinced, and that is why these conclusions are not convinc-
ing.198 
Greater contemplation as to the means by which the Prosecutor 
analyses, verifies, and disseminates information is absolutely critical, es-
pecially considering that the OTP acts as a quasi fact-finding mission and 
human rights monitoring body, at the preliminary examination stage, one 
that is occasionally known for taking the strategy of “naming and sham-
ing”.199 
                                                   
198 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion), International Court of Justice, 9 July 2004, Separate Declaration by 
Judge Buergenthal, pp. 243–244. 
199 James Verini, see supra note 75 (“Moreno-Ocampo seemed to see the ICC not as a forensic 
body so much as a “naming and shaming” organization, like Human Rights Watch or Am-
nesty International. And while it was true that the court’s small budget limited the size of 
his investigations, he was, some say, already more interested in prominence than evidence. 
A former court attorney told me: “He would see the leader of a state and say: ‘There must 
be evidence out there. Go get it for me.’”). More generally regarding criticism of the OTP 
as a monitoring body, see Grotius Centre Report, see supra note 5, para. 27 (“questions 
were raised regarding the role of the ICC in terms of monitoring: whether it should moni-
tor domestic trial proceedings until a final judgment is rendered or simply make sure that 
proceedings are genuine at a given time, with the possibility of reopening the situation if 
circumstances change. Several participants shared reservations about the idea of long-term 
monitoring. They highlighted that the scope of Pes is quite different than trial monitoring 
and raised concerns with regard to resource limitations and the potential prolongation of 
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Moreover, to the extent that the Court intends to increase its usage 
of digital evidence, including through the reliance on the collection, stor-
age, (algorithmic) analysis, verification, and promulgation of intercepted 
communications, bulk data sets, or computerized digital depositories, to 
name but a few examples, clearer policies must be put in place to ensure 
both the accuracy of the conclusions and the privacy of individuals.200 The 
United Nations Global Pulse, an initiative by the United Nations Secre-
tary-General, focuses on the means by which UN agencies and authorities 
harness big data safely and responsibly in pursuit of a public good. The 
Global Pulse’s Data Privacy Advisory Group adopted a set of “Privacy 
and Data Protection Principles” in July 2016, which themselves were an 
evolution of UNGA resolution 45/95 of 15 December 1989 establishing 
“Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files”.201 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has recently adopt-
ed a robust policy on the protection of personal data of persons of concern 
to the agency. Among the standards to be adhered to are basic principles 
of personal data processing.202 The policy also includes guidelines cover-
ing data processing by implementing partners and the transfer of data to 
                                                                                                                        
Pes. It was suggested that closure, with potential re-opening, might be a more suitable 
methodology. This power, however, has thus far not been exercised or tested”). 
200 Note in this regard that the Rome Statute only addresses the protection of the “dignity and 
privacy of victims and witnesses” (see Rome Statute, see supra note 18, at Articles 68(1) 
and 57(3)(c)). However, such investigative techniques could interfere with the rights to 
privacy of the accused as well as the rights to privacy of uninvolved third parties (what is 
commonly known as ‘collateral data’), and their right to privacy does not seem to receive 
statutory protection under the Statute. 
201 For further reading, see United Nations Global Pulse, “Privacy and Data Protection Princi-
ples” (available on its web site) (the guidelines cover individual privacy protections, data 
security, lawful collection, right and purpose of use, risk and harm assessment and mitiga-
tion, data sensitivity, data minimization, data quality and accountability, data retention, and 
collaboration with others on data-related matters). UNGA Resolution 45/95 (the precursor 
to the Privacy and Data Protection Principles) not only adopted the guidelines for the regu-
lation of computerized personal data files across the United Nations, but also called on “all 
governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations to respect those 
guidelines in carrying out the activities within their field of competence”. This would seem 
to include the ICC. 
202  Namely legitimate and fair processing, purpose specification, necessity and proportionality, 
accuracy, respect for data subjects’ rights (including rights to access, correct and delete da-
ta, and to object to processing), confidentiality, security, the practice of conducting data 
protection impact assessments, and rules on retention, accountability and supervision. 
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third parties.203 At the very least, the OTP needs to have a similar policy 
developed which will provide more comprehensive information and as-
surances as to how its investigative policies, as they relate to new tech-
nologies and greater volumes of electronic data, are in compliance with 
those basic standards.204 
Further, the question of the evidentiary standard to be met is equally 
as open-ended and discretionary as the decision on investigative tools and 
methods. The Prosecutor must show that there is “a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation”.205 That will of course depend on whether 
the OTP finds in Phase 2 that there is “reasonable basis to believe” that 
the criteria under Article 53(1)(a)–(c) are met. The two threshold criteria 
(“to believe” and “to proceed”) “mutually relate” and the “underlying 
purpose of this check is to control for frivolous or politically motivated 
charges”.206 This requirement applies equally to all three trigger mecha-
nisms moving a situation from a preliminary examination to an investiga-
tion. While the bar is essentially low, “the question how low the threshold 
                                                   
203 For further reading, see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Policy on the 
Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR, May 2015 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/6b6aef/). 
204 Certain limited aspects of this novel legal problem were raised in the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, in the context of a challenge by the Defense Counsel of call sequence tablets 
(CSTs) that the Prosecution sought to bring into evidence. The Prosecution created the 
CSTs using the call data records (‘CDRs’) pertaining to the metadata of every mobile 
phone call and text message in Lebanon between 2003 and 2010. The CDRs were trans-
ferred from Lebanese telecommunications providers to the United Nations International 
Independent Investigation Commission (‘UNIIIC’) and the Tribunal’s Prosecution. Both 
the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber agreed that the Prosecutor could legally re-
quest and obtain the CDRs without judicial authorization because such authorization was 
not required under their respective governing legal instruments. The Appeals Chamber fur-
ther held that while there is a compelling case as to the CDRs protection by international 
standards on the right to privacy, the transfer of the CDRs in the absence of judicial control 
in this particular case did not violate the right to privacy because the transfer was provided 
for by (domestic) law, was necessary and proportionate. For further reading see The Prose-
cutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash et al. (STL-11-01/T/AC/AR126.9, Special Tribunal for Leba-
non, The Appeals Chamber, Decision on Appeal by Counsel for Mr. Oneissi Against the 
Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Legality of the Transfers of Call Data Records). 
205 See Rome Statute, see supra note 18, at Articles 15(3)-(4) and 53(1). 
206 Mark Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, Torkel 
Opsahl Academic Epublisher, Brussels, 2017, p. 188 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
aa0e2b/). 
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actually is remains unsettled in present ICC jurisprudence”.207 Once again, 
some greater elucidation regarding the interpretations of the necessary 
evidentiary standard by the Prosecutor could significantly improve quality 
control of the Office’s work. 
19.5. Areas for Potential Reform 
In this section, I aim to propose a number of potential reforms relating to 
the internal operations of the OTP, the relationship between the OTP and 
the PTC, and external oversight over the Office’s work during the prelim-
inary examination stage, each of which, I believe, could have a positive 
impact in helping to ensure greater quality control throughout all phases 
of the preliminary examination process. While some of the proposed re-
forms would require, by their nature, the unlikely accord of a wide range 
of actors in and around the Court (the Prosecutor, the Judges, and the 
States Parties), others are subtler or more moderate and would therefore 
be easier to implement. Together, or individually, these proposals should 
serve as the beginning of a conversation, and are by no means its conclu-
sion.  
19.5.1. Re-phasing of the Preliminary Examination Phase 
One possible reform that the OTP should consider is restructuring its 
phasing of the preliminary examination stage. As Stahn wrote, “the 
phased-based approach involves a certain tension between a sequenced 
and a parallel consideration of selection criteria. The idea to break prelim-
inary examination down into phases seems to suggest that the analysis is 
sequenced. It implies that one phase comes after the next. According to 
this logic, analysis may get stuck at one phase, like jurisdiction, for years, 
without considering information related to other phases. Given these con-
                                                   
207 Ibid., pp. 188–89. For further analysis of the application of the “reasonable basis to be-
lieve” standard, questioning whether the ICC Prosecutor may have adopted a “too high a 
threshold for making this determination and hence proceeding to the next phase of the pre-
liminary examination”, see Thomas Obel Hansen, “Policy Choices, Dilemmas and Risks in 
the ICC’s Iraq-UK Preliminary Examination”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 83 (2017), 
Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2017, pp. 2-3 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/
83-obel-hansen/). 
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cerns, it might make sense to adopt a more holistic methodology towards 
the respective situation”.208 
Potential re-phasing could be based on various stages at the prelim-
inary examination that are already sequenced (that is, collection of mate-
rials, extraction of information and arrangements in databases, mandated 
consultation processes, routine internal and external progress reports and 
reviews, meetings with stakeholders and missions to situation countries). 
This re-phasing would involve breaking the preliminary examination into 
each of its sub-components and replicating the natural sequencing. Step-
ping outside of strictly delimited conception of preliminary examination 
phases that merely mimic the statutory provisions of Article 53 will allow 
the Prosecutor to open the ‘black box’ of the preliminary examination 
review process once more, this time inviting the public to look even deep-
er inside.  
The more the preliminary examination stage could be broken down 
to its vital or basic elements, the easier it would be to produce a visual 
‘Gantt chart’ of prosecutorial work to be used internally to enhance re-
sults-driven action and quantifiable achievements by the OTP, and provide 
greater transparency to the ASP in budgeting decisions. Gantt charts are a 
common practice in business, providing a graphical depiction of a project 
schedule, from start to finish, that maps flexible beginning and end dates 
of all elements of a particular project (including resources, milestones, 
tasks, and dependencies). This could allow for the further formalization of 
“internal benchmarks and channels of communication”209 as well as for 
holding individuals accountable within the OTP. As part of this reform, it 
is worth considering the introduction of a formal ‘exit strategy develop-
ment’ phase, preferably early on in the preliminary examination, which 
could even be subject to a mandatory dialogue with ASP delegates.210 In 
                                                   
208 Stahn, see supra note 6, p. 12. As discussed above, the Prosecutor already purports to 
adopt a “holistic approach” regarding the preliminary examination stage, see supra note 24. 
The Prosecutor claims that the analysis during the preliminary examination stage is not rig-
id and does not follow the statutory stages inflexibly. That said, very little is known about 
what the OTP actually means by this. Restructuring the preliminary examination stage 
would make it possible to put meat on the skeleton of the Office’s self-proclaimed holistic 
methodology.  
209 Ibid. 
210 It is important to stress that the comments received from ASP members, under such a 
potential mandatory consultation, must not be binding on the Prosecutor. In developing an 
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any event, as previously mentioned, Gantt charts are not to be adhered to 
religiously. Start and end dates may move or change to ensure flexibility. 
The original Gantt chart will merely provide a model for preliminary ex-
aminations (that could further elucidate what the Prosecutor considers as 
‘reasonable time’ for each of the examination’s phases), but will be rou-
tinely updated in accordance with the dynamics of any given examination. 
As such, this proposal does not purport to set strict time frames for pre-
liminary examinations, nor does it find such an endeavour useful. 
19.5.2. Redefining the Relationship between the OTP and the PTC 
As demonstrated, the PTC needs to more substantively acknowledge the 
significant margin of discretion of the OTP at the preliminary examination 
stage, especially in connection with its consequentialist policies. At the 
same time, it would be useful to consider whether greater judicial review 
of OTP decisions might be a welcome step. The addition of more proce-
dural structure to the preliminary examination stage, through re-phasing 
as discussed above, could allow for a PTC review that is far more tech-
nical and tailored to analysis of actual abuse of powers or improper intent 
(addressing Schabas’ valid concerns about the effectiveness of judicial 
review).211 In fact, insofar as the review is limited to those procedural 
elements (as opposed to micromanagement of subject-matter determina-
tions, as happened in the Comoros decision), it might even be possible to 
mandate a PTC review of every decision to launch an investigation (and 
not only those launched proprio motu – ending what is an arbitrary dis-
tinction between Article 14 and Article 15 judicial review). There is also 
justification for allowing the Prosecutor, when she deems necessary, to 
apply to the Court for an advisory opinion on matters related to the pre-
liminary examination stage – a mechanism currently unavailable to her.212 
                                                                                                                        
early conceptualization of ‘exit strategies’ (see discussion on the definition of the term at 
supra note 167) at the preliminary examination stage, the OTP should be advised by as 
many actors as possible in order to map out the key goals and the broader objectives to be 
achieved in ‘consequentially’ engaging a particular situation; but the final decision rests 
with the Prosecutor. 
211 See supra note 110. 
212 Stahn, see supra note 6, pp. 14–15 (noting that judicial review in the process of deliberat-
ing the question of Palestinian statehood could have been useful, but that “Regulation 46 
was not meant to provide a judicial forum for such disputes” – further concluding that this 
situation is “unsatisfactory”. According to Stahn there is need to provide a channel through 
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Any proposed increase in the role of the PTC at the preliminary ex-
amination stage must be considered with great caution. The intention here 
is not to turn the preliminary examination stage into a quasi-trial and cer-
tainly not to establish legal judgments (which might ultimately be per-
ceived as binding on the Court) at an early stage. This is because, at the 
pre-investigation stage, any engagement with the Court is by default con-
ducted on an ex parte basis, with no one representing the affected States 
or presenting broader counter-arguments to the position of the OTP.213 
19.5.3. Redrafting Existing OTP Policy Papers and the Adoption of 
New Policies 
Another significant area of reform could be the amendment by the OTP of 
some of its policies and the adoption of new policy papers, correcting 
some of the existing flaws in the Court’s prosecutorial system, discussed 
and analysed throughout this chapter. In this regard, the Prosecutor should 
clarify that transparency is not merely a ‘policy objective’ but indeed a 
‘general principle’ that guides every preliminary examination. It is true 
that not everything must be disclosed, and that the question of transparen-
cy itself should be subject to discretion. Certain elements in the prelimi-
nary examination process might indeed be better served if carried out with 
some degree of secrecy (consider, for example, sensitive consultations 
with victims’ groups or with the affected States). The question, therefore, 
is not whether transparency should be uniformly and rigidly applied, but 
                                                                                                                        
which judicial guidance can be sought prior to, or during, preliminary examinations. I 
would further suggest that such guidance not be binding on the Prosecutor, but should 
nonetheless hold significant weight). At the moment, the only external legal advice availa-
ble to the Prosecutor comes in the form of thematic experts the OTP may consult with on a 
routine or ad hoc basis (for example, roundtable consultations, academic engagements, and 
workshops). 
213 Some might say that any attempt to involve the PTC will inevitably lead to conclusions 
that will have far-reaching legal and political consequences not unlike those of the OTP 
today, and in that case even greater caution is required. One can potentially conceive of 
means that could introduce structured adversarial PTC proceedings at the preliminary ex-
amination stage (beyond what exists today, which is the ability of States to request to sub-
mit amicus briefs). For example, the establishment of a “red team” within the OTP (that 
would be required to submit an alternative account to that of the Prosecutor to the PTC) or 
a special advocate in the Court that might engage with interested States and could raise 
their concerns during PTC proceedings. For now, the proposal does not go that far; it mere-
ly suggests greater PTC involvement, limited however solely to a technical, rather than 
substantive, review of procedure. 
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rather whether transparency should be treated as a general principle to be 
followed, to the extent possible, with some degree of consistency. Trans-
parency should thus be aspired to, and not seen solely through utilitarian 
lenses as a means to achieve ever-changing objectives. 
If my Gantt chart-based approach is adopted, the question then aris-
es as to whether these charts are shared with the public, a question that 
goes to the heart of the tension between transparency and efficacy. I 
would recommend that a generic Gantt chart be disclosed, in order to edu-
cate the public about the various sub-stages of the preliminary examina-
tion process and to elucidate the time frames envisioned by the Office for 
each sub-stage as a matter of best practice in an ideal scenario. The dis-
closure of elements of specific Gantt charts from specific preliminary 
examinations, on the other hand, should be part of a sliding scale ap-
proach to transparency. So, while initially the balance would be tilted 
against such disclosures, the longer the preliminary examination was on-
going without a determination, the more reasons there would be to in-
crease transparency by providing greater information about specific chal-
lenges and time frames.  
Further, the OTP should reconsider its Policy Paper on the Interests 
of Justice, due in part to the political deadlock at the UNSC, which pre-
vents it from offering an effective check on the work of the OTP as it re-
lates to decisions that could hinder stability and the broader maintenance 
of peace and security. This is of specific importance in the context of de-
cisions relating to peace negotiations and agreements. The drafters of the 
Rome Statute included this parameter within the Prosecutor’s discretion-
ary powers (which reflected the notion that the Court does not operate in 
vacuum), and it is wrong of a Prosecutor to abrogate this responsibility. 
Similarly, the OTP should elaborate on its policies regarding the formula-
tion of disengagement plans from situations (‘exit strategies’).214 
Finally, the Prosecutor should adopt a new Policy Paper on eviden-
tiary standards and policies related to sources of information, including at 
the preliminary examination stage. The Prosecutor should use that paper 
to set out in detail the process whereby it examines open-source materials 
and what legal weight her Office gives them, including by reference to 
actual examples from past preliminary examinations which have already 
                                                   
214 See supra note 167. 
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been closed. The Prosecutor should further introduce standards concern-
ing the collection, access to, analysis, and dissemination of digital com-
munications and digital forensic evidence, predominantly as they relate to 
data protection and privacy regulation.  
19.5.4. External Review Processes 
Finally, there is some basis to the contention that the OTP could be 
checked by other external oversight mechanisms beyond the PTC.215 In 
this context, Senior Legal Advisor to the Pre-Trial Division of the ICC, 
Gilbert Bitti, has suggested the radical idea of “a structural reform of the 
office of the prosecutor”, replacing the Prosecutor with a three-member 
‘Committee of Prosecutors’ (‘College de Procureurs’). Bitti claimed that 
this would “ensure greater credibility of the institution’s choices” by en-
hancing the stability of penal policies within the Office.216 While such a 
                                                   
215 Some commentators have suggested that external review processes should even extend 
beyond the OTP and cover the entire Court. See Morten Bergsmo et. al., “A Prosecutor 
Falls, Time for the Court to Rise”, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 86 (2017), Torkel Op-
sahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2017 p. 4 (http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/86-four-
directors/) (“Ov-ersight of the ICC cannot be left to States Parties alone […] Immunizing 
the Court through the good intentions of officials and civil society actors may inadvertent-
ly numb the normal sense of vigilance within the organization, on which its self-
preservation depends. An unarticulated sense within the Court that it will not be held ac-
countable, that Governments will conceal problematic information from the public, should 
not be allowed to take hold”). 
216 Gilbert Bitti, “Article 53. Ouverture d’une enquête”, in Javier Fernandez and Xavier Pa-
creau (eds.), Commentaire du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale, Pedone, 
Paris, 2012, vol. II, p. 1173, at p. 1227 (“On peut également envisager, pour assurer une 
meilleure transparence, et done une plus grande crédibilité des choix de l’institution, une 
réforme structurelle du Bureau du Procureur. La première chose à afaire serait de remplac-
er le Procureur par un collège de procureurs, à savoir trois procureurs elus pour 9 ans, non 
rééligible, et dont le renouvellement se ferait par tiers tous les trois ans. On aboutirait ainsi 
sans doute aune plus grande stabilité de la politique pénale et donc à une meilleure coher-
ence des choix de politique pénale”). Bitti then proceeds by suggesting that the OTP would 
be split into two, with the Committee of Prosecutors working alongside a “Commission of 
Inquiry and Analysis” (Commission D’enquête et D’analyse). The latter will be composed 
of qualified investigators and analysts under the direction of a senior investigator and a 
senior analyst that would be of the same rank as the Prosecutors in the Committee. Within 
six months from a referral or Article 15 communication, the Commission would be re-
quired to submit its final report to the Committee of Prosecutors. The Committee would 
then have six months to make a determination regarding the launch of an investigation, 
subject to review by the PTC. 
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dramatic reform may be unnecessary, Bitti’s creative idea is certainly one 
that is worth more than a passing thought. 
One could envision a less drastic version of Bitti’s proposal through 
the establishment of an external ‘Committee of Prosecutors’ that would 
serve the purpose of guiding the OTP in its exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Such a Committee might include former Prosecutors from the 
ICC and other international courts and tribunals, along with a regional 
representation by high-ranking State prosecutors. This Committee could 
issue reports, guidance, and support at the request of the Prosecutor or, in 
cases of prolonged preliminary examinations, at their own volition. Such 
decisions would not replace the Prosecutor’s overall discretion or final say, 
but could further support it by offering more detailed reasoning and great-
er objectivity to the determinations – thus enhancing the overall legitima-
cy of the Court.217 
19.6. Conclusion 
Celebrating its fifteenth anniversary, the ICC is at a crossroads. The polit-
ical reality that embraced the Court with the signing of the Rome Statute 
in 1998 is not the same political reality in which the Court must manoeu-
vre today. The Prosecutor faces opposition from African States, increased 
nationalism in the United States under the current administration, and 
populist rhetoric across Europe, financial crises that force the Court’s 
primary donors to cut their budget, and grotesque war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in war zones like Syria with no available means to seek 
ICC redress. 
It is in this context that the Prosecutor’s power to engage in prelim-
inary examinations is both a promise and a curse. The OTP should contin-
ue to push for crime prevention and positive complementarity, looking 
“beyond the narrow aspects of the court room”, while using the means 
available to it through Article 53(1) examinations. At the same time, how-
ever, the Prosecutor should be fully cognizant of the limits of its own 
power to effect change, and should ensure that good faith is not confused 
                                                   
217 The controversy that arose in 2010 following the establishment of the Independent Over-
sight Mechanism and the debates over its monitoring functions over the OTP, makes me 
believe this recommendation is likely to endure similar resistance. See, generally, Bertham 
Kloss, The Exercise of Prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court: To-
wards a more Principled Approach, Herbert Utz Verlag, Munich, 2016, pp. 74–77. 
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with impotent idealism. A number of politically contentious preliminary 
examinations are threatening to further degrade public perception of the 
Court. In trying to achieve Davis’ ‘optimum point’, mechanisms at the 
preliminary examination stage should be re-conceptualized, first and 
foremost by the OTP. This chapter has attempted to analyse the limitations 
of existing mechanisms, and to offer potential reforms which may aid the 
advancement of quality awareness and improvement throughout the pre-
liminary examination process. 
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20. Disarming the Trap: 
Evaluating Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Preliminary Examinations beyond 
the False Dichotomy of Politics and Law 
Jens Iverson* 
This chapter interrogates the assumption that the choices faced by the 
Office of the Prosecutor in preliminary examinations can be adequately 
summarized as a conflict between law and politics. It argues in favour of a 
more open discussion of the trade-offs inherent in pursuing international 
criminal justice, particularly on a limited budget. International criminal 
law practitioners and scholars are too often stuck in a rhetorical trap that 
ill-serves the goals of making and explaining collective value choices and 
critiques. Time and resources are wasted in a discursive framework pair-
ing unsubstantiated allegations of politicization with unsatisfying invoca-
tions of professionally simply following where the law and the evidence 
lead. Not only does this sterile back-and-forth fail to explain the actual 
actions and motivations of decision makers, but it neuters the didactic 
potential of international criminal law mechanisms, even (or perhaps es-
pecially) in the preliminary examination stage. 
20.1. Introduction 
The spectre of politicization is never far from the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, and the scope of prosecutorial discretion in preliminary exami-
nations is wide. At the preliminary examination stage, there is ordinarily 
no check to the Prosecutor’s discretion from any judge, defence counsel, 
or victims’ representative. The Office of the Prosecutor must be, in large 
                                                   
*  Jens Iverson is Assistant Professor of Law, Leiden University. This chapter builds on 
previous online writings of the author, particularly “Spreading the jam”. Many thanks to 
Professors Carsten Stahn, Ascanio Piomelli, and Naomi Roht-Arriaza for inspiration, and 
Dr. Joe Powderly, Dr. Dov Jacobs, and Cale Davis for their thoughtful comments. Errors 
are the author’s own. 
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part, guided by its own principles at this early stage. The Office of the 
Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations declares that 
“[t]he preliminary examination process is conducted on the basis of the 
facts and information available, and in the context of the overarching 
principles of independence, impartiality and objectivity”.1 Similarly, in 
the Policy Paper on Case Selection it proclaimed that “[t]he Office shall 
conduct its case selection and prioritisation on the basis of the overarching 
principles of independence, impartiality and objectivity”.2  All of these 
principles are efforts in part to prevent politicization, real or perceived. 
Independent, objective, impartial analysis is as an essential founda-
tion for criminal justice. Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as fairness’ underscores 
that the principles of justice should be best chosen through a ‘veil of igno-
rance’ in which people do not know of their own partial interests, but in-
stead approach choices pertaining to justice as objectively as possible.3 
Partiality is thus viewed, from a Rawlsian perspective, as an impediment 
to achieving justice, and politics conceived as a form of partiality an unal-
loyed negative. This sets up the dichotomy of partial politics on the one 
hand and objective application of the law to a given set of facts on the 
other hand. This dichotomy is usually assumed without examination, and 
guides the debate over the choices of actors within international criminal 
law. Anything not framed as law is assumed to be politics, and politics are 
to be avoided. 
This chapter disputes the assumption that the choices faced by the 
Office of the Prosecutor in preliminary examinations can be adequately 
summarized as a conflict between law and politics. This conflict may exist, 
but reducing the spectrum of choices of the Office of the Prosecutor to 
this conflict is a thin and inadequate framework to understand those 
choices. This chapter argues in favour of a more open discussion of the 
trade-offs inherent in pursuing international criminal justice, particularly 
with a limited budget. International criminal law practitioners and schol-
ars are too often stuck in a rhetorical trap that ill-serves the goals of mak-
ing and explaining collective value choices and critiques. Time and re-
                                                   
1 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, p.  
7, para. 25 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
2 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 
2016, p. 7, para. 16 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205/). 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1971. 
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sources are wasted in a discursive framework pairing unsubstantiated al-
legations of politicization with unsatisfying invocations of professionally 
“simply following where the law and the evidence lead”.4 Not only does 
this sterile back-and-forth fail to explain the actions and motivations of 
decision makers, but it neuters the didactic potential of international crim-
inal law mechanisms, even in the preliminary examination stage. 
The chapter does not follow the pattern employed by some critical 
theorists in which apparently apolitical, objective analyses are decon-
structed and revealed as mere subjective expressions of power. If that 
technique is ‘critical’ the argument made by this chapter is for a Pragmatic 
‘anti-critical’ approach. This Pragmatic5  approach is more than simple 
apology. It maintains that the Office of the Prosecutor’s choices are not 
determined entirely by law or politics, but at least in part is an expression 
of value prioritization best understood on its own terms.  
This argument finds particular purchase in the context of prelimi-
nary examination stage. The didactic function of preliminary examination 
is underappreciated, except to the degree it is included in the overall dis-
cussion of ‘positive complementarity’.6 If freed from the trap of avoiding 
public discussion of prioritization made for fear of being slandered as 
‘politicized’ comparatively transparent explanations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s choices can play an important role in driving public discus-
sion of what values undergird international criminal law.  
Isaiah Berlin asserted “collisions of values are of the essence of 
what they are and what we are”.7 The Office of the Prosecutor, its sup-
porters, and critics, should directly confront the collisions of values inher-
                                                   
4 For an example of discourse on politics and international law, see, for example, Martti 
Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law”, in European Journal of International 
Law, 1990, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 4. 
5 On the value of Pragmatism and human rights, see, for example, Richard Rorty, “Human 
rights, rationality, and sentimentality”, in Rathore, Aakash Singh, and Alex Cistelecan 
(eds.), Wronging Rights?: Philosophical Challenges for Human Rights, Routledge, 1993, 
pp. 1–34. For a skeptical approach to Pragmatism and jurisprudence see, for example, 
Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, Harvard University Press, 1993. 
6 On the neglected importance of the didactic function, see, for example, Mirjan Damaška, 
“What is the point of international criminal justice”, in Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2008, 
vol. 83, no. 1, p. 329. 
7 Isaiah Berlin, “The pursuit of the ideal”, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in 
the history of ideas, Princeton University Press, 2013. 
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ent in the use of prosecutorial discretion. Openly discussing the possibility 
that, with a limited budget, addressing crimes in Palestine may mean that 
crimes in Afghanistan may go largely un-investigated by the Office of the 
Prosecutor, or that crimes of sexual violence may have to be prioritized 
above other crimes, and doing so with minimal unfounded allegations of 
politicization, will not only promote the values behind each of these op-
tions. It will also enrich our understanding of each option, help the Office 
of the Prosecutor to come to better decisions, and may ultimately result in 
greater support and financial backing for the project of international crim-
inal law in general.  
The chapter begins in Section 20.2. with a brief discussion of the 
context of preliminary examinations at the International Criminal Court, 
and proceeds in Section 20.3. to interrogate what ‘quality’ means in terms 
of ‘quality control’ in preliminary examinations. Section 20.4. emphasizes 
Mirjan Damaška’s prioritization of the didactic effect of international 
criminal courts and ties it to the idea of quality in preliminary examination. 
The chapter continues in Section 20.5. with a discussion of Amartya Sen’s 
distinction between optimal and maximal choices, where a maximal alter-
native need not be ‘best’.8 The idea of didactics from an experimentalist 
or Pragmatic point of view is explored in Section 20.6. Section 20.7. 
brings together the idea of a choice by the Office of the Prosecutor being 
maximal from a Pragmatic perspective. The limits to approaching choices 
in preliminary examination through a purely didactic lens are discussed in 
Section 20.8, followed by concluding reflections. 
This work relies in part on the contributions of scholars (Mirjan 
Damaška, Amartya Sen, and John Dewey) who are widely familiar as 
intellectuals. Applying their work to the challenges of International Crim-
inal Law, particularly the practical demands of quality control in prelimi-
nary examinations, may require a bit more explanation than building on 
the work of scholars whose contributions are focused exclusively or pri-
marily on international criminal law. Hopefully, any patience required in 
following their potential contribution to understanding the demands of 
quality control will be rewarded by the utility of bringing fresh approach-
es to the problems faced by practitioners. Damaška, Sen, and Dewey all 
                                                   
8 Amartya Sen, “Reason and Justice: The Optimal and the Maximal”, in Philosophy, 2017, 
vol. 92, no. 1, pp. 5–19. 
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hail from different disciplines, but share a common emphasis on the im-
portance of paying attention to local generation of law and meaning. 
Damaška is a consummate comparativist, bringing a unique perspective to 
his scholarship on international criminal law. Sen’s work is replete with a 
discussion of social choice and justice. Dewey is a foundational Pragma-
tist whose work revolutionized early twentieth century philosophy with 
respect to re-founding liberal democratic values on the basis of experi-
mentation and locally-constructed meaning. In addition, there is a rich 
scholarship emphasizing international criminal law’s expressive function.9 
Before exploring selected contributions of these scholars, the basic argu-
ment of the chapter will be amplified. In the following sections, the trap 
of falling into a discourse that eliminates any useful public discussion of 
the choices that may be available will be examined, and an argument will 
be made for particular emphasis on the didactic function of international 
criminal justice.  
20.2. Defining the Trap:  
The Context of Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations 
The Office of the Prosecutor is of course not wrong to insist on “inde-
pendence, impartiality and objectivity” as guiding principles for prelimi-
nary examinations,10 case selection,11 and its practice generally. Its main 
                                                   
9 See, for example, Mark A. Drumbl, “The expressive value of prosecuting and punishing 
terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and international criminal law”, in George 
Washington Law Review, 2006, vol. 75, nos. 5–6, p. 1165; Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, 
“Justice without Politics-Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court”, in 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2006, vol. 39, no. 3, p. 583 
(arguing that the choices of the Office of the Prosecutor are inherently political); Robert D. 
Sloane, “The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National 
Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law”, in Stanford Journal of In-
ternational Law, 2007, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 39; William Schabas, “Victor’s Justice: Selecting 
“situations” at the International Criminal Court”, in John Marshall Law Review, 2009, vol. 
43, no. 3, p. 535; Rod Rastan, “Comment on Victor’s Justice & the Viability of Ex Ante 
Standards”, in John Marshall Law Review, 2009, vol. 43, no. 3, p. 569; Margaret M. 
deGuzman, “Choosing to prosecute: Expressive selection at the International Criminal 
Court”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, 2012, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 265; Darryl 
Robinson, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win”, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 323. 
10 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, p. 7, para. 25, 
see supra note 1. 
11 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 2016, p. 7, 
para. 16, see supra note 2. 
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approach to engaging with local actors at the preliminary examination 
stage appears to be through the concept of “positive complementarity”.12 
The hope is that: “A Court based on the principle of complementarity 
ensures the international rule of law by creating an interdependent, mutu-
ally reinforcing system of justice”.13 Positive complementarity in practice 
appears to be “encouraging genuine national proceedings”,14 noting that: 
[T]he Office can report on its monitoring activities, send in-
country missions, request information on proceedings, hold 
consultations with national authorities as well as with inter-
governmental and non-governmental organisations, partici-
pate in awareness-raising activities on the ICC, exchange 
lessons learned and best practices to support domestic inves-
tigative and prosecutorial strategies, and assist relevant 
stakeholders to identify pending impunity gaps and the scope 
for possible remedial measures.15 
There is little guidance from the Office of the Prosecutor as to 
whether its engagement with local actors helps determine a ranked priori-
ty of the gravity of potentially criminal conduct. Gravity is primarily 
treated as a threshold determination for admissibility pursuant to Article 
17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. 16  Regulation 29(2) provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors for the Office of the Prosecutor to consider when 
assessing the gravity of alleged crimes: “In order to assess the gravity of 
the crimes allegedly committed in the situation the Office shall consider 
various factors including their scale, nature, manner of commission, and 
impact”. The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations amplifies the 
meaning of these factors: 
62. The scale of the crimes may be assessed in light of, inter 
alia, the number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of 
the damage caused by the crimes, in particular the bodily or 
psychological harm caused to the victims and their families, 
or their geographical or temporal spread (high intensity of 
                                                   
12 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, p. 23, paras. 
100 ff., see supra note 1. 
13 Ibid., p. 23, para. 100. 
14 Ibid., p. 24, para. 102. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 
July 2002 (‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
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the crimes over a brief period or low intensity of crimes over 
an extended period). 
63. The nature of the crimes refers to the specific elements of 
each offence such as killings, rapes and other crimes involv-
ing sexual or gender violence and crimes committed against 
children, persecution, or the imposition of conditions of life 
on a group calculated to bring about its destruction. 
64. The manner of commission of the crimes may be as-
sessed in light of, inter alia, the means employed to execute 
the crime, the degree of participation and intent of the perpe-
trator (if discernible at this stage), the extent to which the 
crimes were systematic or result from a plan or organised 
policy or otherwise resulted from the abuse of power or offi-
cial capacity, and elements of particular cruelty, including 
the vulnerability of the victims, any motives involving dis-
crimination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a 
means of destroying groups. 
65. The impact of crimes may be assessed in light of, inter 
alia, the sufferings endured by the victims and their in-
creased vulnerability; the terror subsequently instilled, or the 
social, economic and environmental damage inflicted on the 
affected communities.17 
This is an admirable start. The jurisprudence cited in the Policy Pa-
per on Preliminary Examinations warning against excessively formulistic 
grounds for the assessment of gravity is indeed persuasive.18 Nonetheless, 
these general principles provide little check on the Office’s determination 
of the gravity of possible crimes (at least at this early stage), nor much 
guidance as to how or whether a determination of relative gravity will 
inform the allocation of resources. Criticisms such as Human Rights 
                                                   
17 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, pp. 15–16, 
paras. 62–65, see supra note 1. 
18 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”, under seal 13 July 2006; 
reclassified as public 23 September 2008, ICC-01/04-169, paras. 69–79 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8c20eb/). 
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Watch’s report ICC: Course Correction19 alleging inconsistency in ap-
proach across various situations will likely persist. Such criticism will 
also be largely unanswerable because the introduction of so many sub-
criteria in an overall balancing test provides little transparency or ground 
for any kind of objective metric.  
Beyond the policy papers cited above, observers of international 
criminal law may detect a more general cautious pattern in statements and 
responses from the Office of the Prosecutor. For example, when the par-
ticular charges chosen by the Office in the first trial are questioned, they 
will emphasize that they follow evidence’s lead. When members of only 
one side of a conflict are charged, the Office of the Prosecutor will argue 
that to charge leaders from both sides, when that is not where the evidence 
leads, would be a political choice – and they must avoid politics. When 
the question arises of whether there is a tension between prosecution and 
peace, the Office of the Prosecutor representatives will typically point to 
the United Nations Security Council’s power to pause investigation and 
prosecution, indicating that political choices should be made by the Secu-
rity Council. When it is pointed out that every situation country is in Afri-
ca, the response is much the same as to the question about refusing to 
“balance” prosecutions on both sides of a conflict – the Prosecution will 
not “balance” their work by opening an investigation elsewhere if that is 
not where the evidence leads. The Office of the Prosecutor will not be 
politicized. It will follow the law. 
This approach is understandable, but it is part of what is being de-
scribed here as a trap that needs to be disarmed. What is needed is a con-
versation where those interested in the Office of the Prosecutor’s deci-
sions can discuss them without falling into an artificial dichotomy where 
everything is either political or legal, with no room for additional criteria 
to be considered. 
The unique horrors of forcing children to kill, the particular struc-
tural threat of election violence, the specific values threatened by forced 
marriage – choosing to prioritize addressing one of these at the expense of 
another must unfortunately be done by the decision makers at the Office 
                                                   
19 Human Rights Watch, ICC: Course Correction: Recommendations to the Prosecutor for a 
More Effective Approach to “Situations under Analysis”, 16 June 2011 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/43aefb/). 
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of the Prosecutor, and yet cannot be fully evaluated either through a legal 
or political framework. Even combined, the legal and political frame-
works merely provide a needlessly binary worldview. This dichotomy 
places the Office of the Prosecutor in a position of unnecessary opacity 
with respect to explaining their choices. They cannot discuss non-legal 
values easily without being subject to the critique of politicization. So, 
functionally, they are quiet. 
The Office of the Prosecutor and its critics are caught in a rhetorical 
trap. No one realistically expects that the Office behaves as a creature of 
pure logic, able to rationalize all choices into the single logical choice 
made evident by the evidence. Thus, when a choice is made, it is easy to 
paint that choice not based on the application of the law to the facts, what 
might be described as a professional choice or a legal choice, but rather a 
political choice. If it cannot be wholly made clear by law, then the politi-
cal explanation is the only remaining option. 
It should be evident to any observer that the Office of the Prosecu-
tor has to make choices. It is neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Any 
choice it makes is liable to be attacked as a political choice, by academics, 
activists, and defence counsel (Chambers largely limits itself to pointing 
out errors of law and professionalism). The Office of the Prosecutor does 
its best to make clear that they have not been politicized, but it cannot 
convincingly explain its actions merely with a wave at the law, or the evi-
dence, and an invocation of gravity, without anything further. 
It is perhaps helpful to think more about what we mean by such 
terms as ‘political’, ‘legal’ and ‘prosecutorial discretion’. One can, of 
course define political and legal in the negative, where political is the 
non-legal and the legal is the non-political. This is implied by the pattern 
of responses from the Office of the Prosecutor, and often from the state-
ments of their detractors.  
What positive definitions can be offered? Positively defining ‘law’ 
is perhaps easier in the context of evaluating the actions of the Office of 
the Prosecutor with reference to the legal texts that created and govern it, 
including: the Rome Statute,20 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and 
Regulations of the Court. Positively defining ‘politics’ is of course diffi-
cult, with many wanting to define it broadly, but it might be helpful in this 
                                                   
20 ICC Statute, see supra note 16. 
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context to tie it to the term ‘politicization’, with a focus on power rela-
tions between humans and groups of humans, particularly with respect to 
governmental power. The issue of politics as power relations is particular-
ly heated in the context of armed conflict, and indeed haunts international 
criminal law. When Justice Robert Jackson famously described the Inter-
national Military Tribunal as “one of the most significant tributes that 
Power has ever paid to Reason”, it spoke not only to pride in the law, but 
the concern over victor’s justice as a particular politicization of law that 
lies at the nexus of international criminal law and international humanitar-
ian law.  
The tension between the two frameworks of law and politics is a re-
al one, and virtually any choice by the Office of the Prosecutor can useful-
ly be analysed both in terms of its relation to specific legal texts and its 
effects in power relations. But the analysis need not, and should not, stop 
there. All this chapter suggests is a richer discussion. A discussion that 
acknowledges the legal limitations of the Office of the Prosecutor, the 
effects of power relations, but that also recognizes that the Prosecutor’s 
decisions may express human values that are neither wholly legal nor 
political.  
Charging an accused for recruitment of child soldiers but not for 
gender or sexual based violence despite evidence of both, can be thought 
of not only as a legal or political choice, but also as a performance choice. 
The Office of the Prosecutor can be praised for delivering a message with 
special emphasis (given the simple charge and as it happens, conviction) 
that recruitment of child soldiers is wrong and may have repercussions for 
the perpetrator. The Office of the Prosecutor can be criticized by implicit-
ly sending a message that gender and sexual based violence is not im-
portant enough to charge even when it would not necessarily involve ad-
ditional accused or evidence. Either of these statements has legal and po-
litical ramifications, but they need not be, at their core, legal or political. 
Regardless of one’s opinion on the choice, the conversation is enriched by 
consciously avoiding unnecessary simplification into a political-legal di-
chotomy.  
Similarly, should the Prosecutor decide she will not proceed on an 
investigation based on the authority granted by UN Security Council re-
ferral specifically because the UN Security Council failed to provide the 
necessary funding for such an investigation, that decision would be an 
example of prosecutorial discretion not wholly determined or explainable 
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by law or politics. Such a decision would have political and legal effects, 
but is not fundamentally political or legal in nature. More fundamentally, 
such an exercise of discretion goes to a clash of values that can exist be-
tween, for example, pursuing accountability for specific alleged crimes 
and building a sustainable and responsible relationship between institu-
tions. 
20.3. What is Quality in Quality Control? 
There are a range of best practices that pertain to quality control in pre-
liminary examinations that are beyond the scope of this chapter: avoiding 
unforced errors in terms of, for example, acquiring, preserving, and ana-
lysing inculpatory and exculpatory evidence while respecting the rights of 
the accused and the interests of the victims. This section will instead focus 
on the goals of international criminal justice as a useful guide to the 
meaning of quality in quality control. Even without evidentiary errors, for 
example, if the choices made do not ultimately serve to achieve the goals 
of international criminal justice, the ‘quality’ of the choices made must be 
questionable. 
Mirjan Damaška’s provocatively titled What is the point of interna-
tional criminal justice discusses the overabundance of goals international 
criminal courts have set for themselves as a curable weakness of those 
courts.21  He notes that such goals include retribution for wrongdoing, 
general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, producing a historical 
record, giving voice to the victims of international crime, propagate hu-
man rights values, achieve peace and security objectives, and protecting 
the rights of the accused.22 These goals are not only too ambitious, but 
also too diverse. Adopting a myriad of different Herculean goals threatens 
to pull these courts in too many directions at once, making completion of 
even just one of their goals difficult.23 Damaška goes beyond the peace 
versus justice chestnut to include the tension between individualization of 
proven criminal responsibility and creating an accurate history, or the 
rights of the accused and the desire to satisfy crime victims (framed as a 
tension between procedural and substantive justice). 24  He particularly 
                                                   
21 Damaška, 2008, p. 330, see supra note 6. 
22 Ibid., p. 331. 
23 Ibid., pp. 331–32. 
24 Ibid., pp. 332–34. 
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notes the case of Barayagwiza, in which an initial decision to release an 
accused due to a violation of his rights to a speedy trial was reversed ap-
parently due to the Rwandan government’s decision to suspect co-
operation with the Tribunal.25 Most interesting is Damaška’s analysis of 
the tension between the didactic26 goals of international criminal justice 
and the (asserted) desire of victims to see the direct perpetrators of crimes 
committed against them convicted.27 Damaška suggests that the greatest 
didactic impact can be achieved primarily from dramatic prosecutions of 
high-level superiors.28  
Damaška suggests that the goals of international criminal courts 
should have direct impacts on their work. For example, Damaška provides 
rationales as to why an emphasis on didactic effect (in contrast with gen-
eral deterrence) should lead the Office of the Prosecutor (in any interna-
tional criminal tribunal) to hesitate before relying heavily on joint crimi-
nal enterprise or anything that resembles it, or to depend upon superior 
responsibility unless necessary. Damaška seems to indicate that ‘quality’ 
is not avoiding error, or applying the law as mechanistically as possible to 
facts, but rather, active analysis as to the goals of the institution and al-
lowing those goals to influence policy and practice. 
20.4. Quality in Preliminary Examination as Potential Didactic Effect 
After noting the superabundance of goals of international criminal courts 
and the tensions between them, Damaška turns to a theme that can be 
connected to Sen’s analysis described below, the absence of a ranking 
order among the goals.29 He makes a compelling case for the primary 
importance of the didactic function.30 He specifically ranks didactic ef-
fects above deterrence, noting the very limited capacity of international 
criminal courts to provide a credible threat for most perpetrators, whereas 
                                                   
25 ICTR, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for 
Review or Reconsideration), 31 March 2000, ICTR-97-19-AR72, paras. 34, 74 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/1c0fe7/). 
26 Damaška uses the term “pedagogical”. 
27 Damaška, 2008, pp. 334–35, see supra note 6. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., pp. 339–40. 
30 Ibid., pp. 343 ff. 
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the didactic effect does not rely on such a threat.31 Such a didactic effect, 
lacking coercive power, rests almost entirely on the quality of the deci-
sions and procedures – legitimacy and integrity are critical for such an 
effect.32 
Damaška also notes that the didactic effect of a choice within inter-
national criminal justice can vary depending on local experience, customs, 
sensibilities and loyalties. The same conviction may produce one effect in 
one community and another in a different community, or in the interna-
tional community as a whole. 33  Ideally, international criminal justice 
would command ‘thick acceptance’ by being tailored to local sensibilities, 
but this would necessarily entail fragmentation of international criminal 
law, leading to incoherence and a lack of integrity.34 How can this tension 
be resolved? Damaška suggests the following: 
International prosecutors-who have great leeway in choosing 
whom to prosecute, when, and on what charges-should care-
fully weigh local factors in discharging their responsibilities. 
Dismissive or condescending attitudes toward local culture 
or laws and insensitivity to state identity (especially if fragile) 
should be anathema. And international judges, while follow-
ing the uniform legal regime, should make it their habit al-
ways to explain, in their decisions, the reasons or special 
needs that induce international criminal law to deviate from 
whatever local norms or practices are deemed fair and ap-
propriate.35 
This has particular application within the context of preliminary ex-
aminations. When comparing the various aspects of gravity of multiple 
possible crimes,36 and with an eye towards thick acceptance and didactic 
effect of the choices made, the Office of the Prosecutor would be well 
advised to take into account not only gravity, but also the comparative 
gravity of the crimes as felt by the affected communities. Ideally this 
would occur with all relevant organs of the Court supplementing this 
                                                   
31 Ibid., p. 345. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 335. 
34 Ibid., p. 349. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See supra Section 20.2. 
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evaluation with respectful explanations of any differences between its 
practice and the legal norms of said communities. This may be useful 
when the mode of liability has no local equivalent, and where the appear-
ance of selective prosecution of local leaders may be seen as an expres-
sion of power and partiality.37  
A focus on didactic effect suggests a particular approach the Office 
of the Prosecutor should take with respect to investigations: to concentrate 
on establishing whether particular individuals committed specific wrongs, 
and shy away from attempting to providing a broad narrative history of 
peoples and groups leading up to the alleged crimes.38 That said, focusing 
on selected semi-representative episodes of atrocity may have a more 
profound impact than relying on a strict evaluation of gravity if that im-
plies the same didactic notes will be struck repeatedly.39 The didactic ef-
fect of the prosecutions pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, for ex-
ample, was likely enhanced by the thematic nature of those prosecu-
tions.40 
20.5. Contrasting ‘Optimal’ and ‘Maximal’ Choices 
Early in Reason and Justice: The Optimal and the Maximal, Sen provides 
an example of optimal decision-making that can be usefully repurposed 
for the question of choices facing the Office of the Prosecutor during pre-
liminary examination.41 The example is worth quoting in full, as it cannot 
be much reduced without a loss of explanatory power. 
Let me begin with an example. Consider a person, Ashraf, 
with a strong anti-terrorism commitment in contemporary 
West Asia who is considering the possibility of two terrible 
events, both of which a terrorist group has threatened to car-
ry out. One threatened event – let us call it x – is the total 
destruction of the historic city of Nineveh (with, however, 
no one being killed), and the other – called y – involves the 
killing of a thousand people at a different spot (without any 
                                                   
37 See Damaška, 2008, pp. 350 ff., see supra note 6. 
38 See ibid., p. 360. 
39 See ibid. 
40 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council 
Law No. 10, vol. XV, Procedure, Practice and Administration, October 1946–April 1949, 
pp. 23–28 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ffda62/). 
41 Sen, 2017, see supra note 8. 
20. Disarming the Trap 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 165 
destruction of Nineveh). Both are hugely bad things to hap-
pen, and Ashraf is considering what can be done to stop 
them. If it turns out that he and his fellow anti-terrorists can 
prevent one of the two ghastly events, but not both, then his 
decision would have to be about choosing between x and y.  
The point is not only that it is a difficult choice, nor 
that the considerations involved in the two alternatives are 
quite different: one is the prevention of the murder of a large 
number of people (a thousand in this example) and the other 
the preservation of a great historical sight which can be 
thought to be valuable in itself, but would also be hugely 
valued by a great many generations to come. The point ra-
ther is that we may have good reasons to give decisional 
priority in one direction, or alternatively in the other – a plu-
rality of answers that need not be eliminated by what Rawls 
calls a ‘reflective equilibrium’. It may be quite acceptable, 
and yet not obligatory, that by the force of reasoning Ashraf 
will decide in favour of one of the alternatives, rejecting the 
other (for example, choosing to sacrifice a thousand human 
lives, for preventing the destruction of Nineveh).42 
Here, relying on Nikolas Bourbaki,43 an ‘optimal’ choice or result is 
one that is the ‘best’, whereas a ‘maximal’ choice or result is one that is 
“no less satisfactory than any other conclusion (an alternative that cannot 
be bettered)”.44 Using this formal definition, all optimal choices are max-
imal, but not all maximal choices have the unique quality of being optimal. 
While this may seem like an esoteric distinction useful in mathematics but 
not for legal professionals, Sen asserts this distinction is “absolutely cen-
tral to the nature of substantive ethical arguments, including the assess-
ment of the respective claims of alternative theories of justice”.45 To the 
degree Sen’s argument is correct, and to the degree the Office of the Pros-
ecutor must address competing claims to justice, consideration of this 
distinction may prove useful. 
                                                   
42 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 
43 Nicolas Bourbaki, Elements de Mathématique, Hermann, 1939; translated to English in 
Springer-Verlag, 1939. 
44 Sen, 2017, p. 7, see supra note 8. 
45 Ibid., p. 7. 
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The Office of the Prosecutor often faces an array of choices not un-
like Ashraf. In the preliminary examination of any given situation, multi-
ple events like x (the destruction of cultural property) and y (the murder 
of many people) may have already occurred, and with a limited set of 
resources, not every event can be fully investigated. Indeed, as the Office 
of the Prosecutor may in some cases provide early warning, the Office of 
the Prosecutor may be placed in an even more similar situation to Ashraf 
than the investigation of past crimes.46 Further, difficult choices such as 
these occur on every scale, from which situations should be prioritized, to 
which events or course of potentially criminal conduct should merit par-
ticular investigation, to which particular crimes should be emphasized, to 
aspects of an individual charge. How can the Office of the Prosecutor 
make the best choice at every level? 
Sen’s contribution is to indicate that there may not be a best (‘opti-
mal’) choice, but rather a set of ‘maximal’ choices (as well as objectively 
non-maximal and (necessarily) non-optimal choices). Ashraf, in Sen’s 
example, can come to the end of his impartial and reasoned assessment 
without ranking x above y or vice versa. If he could rank one above the 
other, he could respond with an optimal choice. If he prevents x but not y, 
even if he cannot objectively and impartially rank x and y, his choice may 
be considered maximal, because preventing x is “no less satisfactory than 
any other conclusion”, including preventing y. Put another way, prevent-
ing y (the alternative maximal choice) does not represent a better choice 
because x and y are an unranked pair with respect to each other. 
For some readers, graphic representations of these quantitative con-
cepts may be of assistance. Before jumping to ‘x’ and ‘y’ from Sen’s ex-
ample, an easier example will be provided. 
                                                   
46 “18. The Office will also seek to react promptly to upsurges of violence by reinforcing 
early interaction with States, international organisations and non-governmental organisa-
tions in order to verify information on alleged crimes, to encourage genuine national pro-
ceedings, and to prevent the recurrence of crimes”. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper 
on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, p. 4, para. 18, see supra note 1. 
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x = Destruction of Nineveh a = Destruction of replicas from
Nineveh




Here, ‘x’, the destruction of Nineveh, clearly has a greater ‘gravity’ 
than the destruction of replicas from Nineveh. Even if the replicas are 
artfully crafted, and even without a clear, rigorous, objective definition 
and means of evaluation of the definition of ‘gravity’ with respect to the 
destruction of cultural heritage, an unambiguous ranking is possible, plac-
ing preventing x above preventing a. Preventing x is thus both the maxi-
mal and optimal choice between the two. Gravity is put in quotes not to 
denigrate the concept of gravity as used in international criminal law, but 
as a gentle reminder that it operates in part as an analogy with real, meas-
urable, physical gravity (in the sense of an attractive force between mass), 
and that like all analogies, it has limits (in this case, precise quantifica-
tion). Not only may ‘a’ not necessarily pass the gravity threshold for ad-
missibility pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute,47 even if it 
did (perhaps as part of an additional course of conduct) it might not merit 
the same level of analysis and attention.  
                                                   
47 ICC Statute, see supra note 16. 
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Here, choosing to prevent either x or y may be maximal, but neither 
is optimal without some sort of ‘total gravity index’ that can somehow 
equate the gravity of a (measurable) unit of to something arguably incom-
parable, such as the loss of life. This is similar to the situation in a stand-
ard economics textbook, where a range of goods can be produced along a 
simple production – possibility frontier – any choice along that frontier 
will be maximal (usually goods like bread and butter are used), while 
none will be optimal without some clear index between the two maxi-
mands – in this example the goods being produced. In terms of the choic-
es faced by the Office of the Prosecutor, it will rarely be two simple 
choices, but rather a range of possible crimes to investigate. 
The following figure is an extremely simplified example of an array 
of six events with various levels of destruction of cultural property or loss 
of life. 
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Here, again, investigating any particular event, if only one could be 
picked, could be said to be maximal. Without some agreed upon way to 
compare units of one type of gravity with another, choosing the optimal 
event to prioritize above all others on the basis of ‘gravity’ alone is 
impossible. Any event along the ‘frontier’ could be considered a maximal 
choice. Prioritizing any event below the frontier would be considered non-
maximal (and non-optimal). Any quality control rubric measuring the 
choices of the Office of the Prosecutor has to consider the real constraints 
of the Office, in which not every investigatory lead can be pursued. The 
complications of real investigations may make such comparisons appear 
foolish, but at the risk of trying the patience of the reader, one last figure 
will be ventured to illustrate the basic concept. 
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Ultimately, the choices of the Office of the Prosecutor must respond 
to more than the gravity of the crimes within their jurisdiction, including 
such factors as the availability and reliability of evidence, co-operation of 
States, the interests of the victims, and the rights of the accused. Nonethe-
less, the basic point holds; there may be multiple choices that are maximal, 
without any one of them being clearly optimal. Were this visualization to 
be carried out further, even with respect to the gravity alone, many addi-
tional variables representing the various values involved would have to be 
represented. Given the inherent difficulty with assessment of evidence at 
the stage of preliminary examination, as well as the arbitrary nature of 
comparing arguably incomparable qualities, some indication of uncertain-
ty akin to error bars would need to be introduced.48 But that would be 
taking the exercise too far; the point here is not to introduce or encourage 
some sort of ‘total gravity index’ that would allow an optimal choice to be 
determined, but rather to illustrate the problem that in any actual prelimi-
nary examination the best that can be hoped for is that the choices made 
are not clearly inferior to alternative options, given the knowledge availa-
ble at the time. 
                                                   
48 Sen discusses this in terms of “unbridgeable gaps in in information” and “tentative incom-
pleteness”. Sen, 2017, p. 12, see supra note 8. 
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At this point the reader may contrast the Office of the Prosecutor’s 
list of sub-criteria with respect to gravity and Sen’s simple thought exper-
iment, and feel that neither provides a great deal of guidance as to quality 
or limits to the Office’s discretion. Combining Damaška’s insights as to 
the local specificity of the didactic function and Sen’s framework allow-
ing a range of acceptable approaches to the same facts is of some help. 
Sen’s framework should allow the Office of the Prosecutor and its critics 
to relax and admit a variety of acceptable (approaching maximal) choices, 
while Damaška’s insights can provide some guidance as to how the Office 
of the Prosecutor can approach the question of how and whether to pro-
ceed with a degree of local nuance and a clearer prioritization of goals 
(emphasizing the didactic function). Damaška’s warnings regarding pat-
ronizing tone or approach are particularly valuable here  –  while the pri-
mary long-range goal of international criminal courts may be didactic (to 
consolidate and reinforce fundamental values underpinning international 
criminal law so as to enhance voluntary compliance and enforcement), the 
individuals receiving the most education at the preliminary examination 
stage are the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor, not the individuals in 
affected communities.  
The staff of Office of the Prosecutor has the opportunity during pre-
liminary examination not only to receive and analyse communications and 
learn about evidence and allegations to which they may apply the law and 
plan further investigations, but also to learn in a more nuanced way what 
the impact of crime is, which is inextricably bound up in how it is defined 
and experienced on an individual and community basis. The Office of the 
Prosecutor notes “The impact of crimes may be assessed in light of, inter 
alia, the sufferings endured by the victims and their increased vulnerabil-
ity; the terror subsequently instilled, or the social, economic and environ-
mental damage inflicted on the affected communities”.49 The role of af-
fected communities in evaluating the gravity of various crimes for them-
selves is not made clear by this list of sub-criteria. Prioritizing the didactic 
function provides a particular opening to interact with affected communi-
ties and individuals in a manner that allows them to contribute to the dis-
cussion as to priorities of the Office of the Prosecutor without necessarily 
feeling that any variance from the public line of proceeding mechanisti-
                                                   
49 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, p. 16, para. 65, 
see supra note 1. 
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cally “on the basis of the facts and information available, and in the con-
text of the overarching principles of independence, impartiality and objec-
tivity” will subject the Office to unfounded allegations of politicization. 
20.6. Pragmatism and Didactics 
The Office of the Prosecutor is, of course, not the only actor with respect 
to the didactic effect of a preliminary investigation and any subsequent 
proceedings at the International Criminal Court. Local civil society, local 
government, and other local actors may all play a role, and other organs of 
the Court play a role at any later stage. To examine their role, particularly 
with respect to didactics, it may be helpful to look towards foundational 
theorists of education.  
One rediscovered theorist who may be helpful with respect to the 
philosophy of education is John Dewey, a leading (some would say the 
leading)50 US public intellectual of the 1920s through the early 1940s.51 
Dewey is generally considered a Pragmatist, although he preferred the 
term ‘Experimentalism’ to ‘Pragmatism’ because his emphasis was on the 
evaluation of practices by their consequences.52  Dewey’s contributions 
were rich and varied, providing important insight to the theory of partici-
patory democracy and legitimacy of government amongst other matters.53  
From the outset, Dewey emphasized the importance of local legiti-
macy. He asserted that “Humanity cannot be content with a good which is 
procured from without, however high and otherwise complete that 
good”.54 Dewey’s Experimentalist/Pragmatist approach to legitimacy and 
to education emphasizes the necessity of widespread participation in polit-
ical life. He suggested that values are not formed from on high and pushed 
                                                   
50 Ascanio Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering”, in Clinical Law 
Review, 2005, vol. 12, p. 541, at p. 565. Note that the author served as research assistant 
for Ascanio Piomelli. My thanks to him for his support. 
51 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and vision: Continuity and innovation in Western political 
thought, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 503 (comparing Dewey favorably with John 
Rawls and John Stewart Mill). 
52 Piomelli, 2005, p. 566, see supra note 50. 
53 Ibid., p. 549. 
54 John Dewey, “The Ethics of Democracy” (1888), in The Early Works of John Dewey, 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2008, vol. 1, p. 228, reprinted in John Dewey, in Debra 
Morris and Ian Shapiro (eds.), The Political Writings, Hackett Publishing, 1993, p. 49, at p. 
61; also as cited in Piomelli, 2005, p. 541, see supra note 50. 
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down, but rather that there existed a “necessity for the participation of 
every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the 
living of men together”,55 and further: 
The very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle form 
of suppression. It gives individuals no opportunity to reflect 
and decide upon what is good for them. Others who are sup-
posed to be wiser and who in any case have more power de-
cide the question for them and also decide the methods and 
means by which subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of 
what is good for them. This form of coercion and suppres-
sion is more subtle and more effective than is overt intimida-
tion and restraint.56 
Imagining Sen’s Ashraf deciding between addressing event x or 
event y, one might suggest that Ashraf would be best served not by fol-
lowing some a priori abstract determination of how these types of issues 
should be balanced, but rather guided by the values of affected communi-
ties. While cultural property may be in part a universal heritage, it is also 
part of specific heritage. Ashraf facing a similar choice on the surface 
level could and should come to a different determination depending on 
what he could ascertain about the affected communities. One does not 
need to adopt a particular philosophical outlook such as Pragmatism to 
emphasize the importance of allowing local individuals (particularly vic-
tims), civil society and representative government a role in defining ‘qual-
ity’. ‘Quality control’ is in a sense always in the hands of the Prosecutor 
and in the testing of her decisions in subsequent proceedings, but the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor would be well-served by listening to and learning 
from affected communities, and by incorporating local perspectives into 
decision-making. This cannot be done adequately through the passive 
receipt of communications or communicating only to government officials 
at the apex of local authority and influence. To the degree possible, per-
spectives from those most directly affected by criminal conduct, often 
made available only through civil society, should be sought out and re-
sponded to. 
                                                   
55 John Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey: 1925-1953: 1932: Ethics, Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2008, vol. 7, p. 217. 
56 Ibid., p. 218. 
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Civil society and the Office of the Prosecutor must inevitably re-
main separate and independent actors, including during preliminary exam-
ination. The question is how, not whether, they will relate to each other. 
The main mode may be one in which the Office of the Prosecutor receives 
communications, which may include both potential evidence and legal 
characterization of that evidence, from civil society. What Ascanio 
Piomelli and others have called “collaborative lawyering” 57  may be 
looked upon nervously by those who fear anything that may be character-
ized as ‘political’ (indeed this type of lawyering is also known as “politi-
cal lawyering”58), but by any name, local lawyers working in collabora-
tion with individuals and communities affected by crimes within the juris-
diction of the Court should be encouraged by all involved to make their 
case publicly as a welcome part of the discussion as to what ‘quality’ 
means in a particular context. 
20.7. A Pragmatic Approach to the Didactic Effect of Choices Made 
in Preliminary Examinations 
Dewey and his more famous colleague and intellectual predecessor Wil-
liam James emphasized truth-testing59 and idealized a scientific approach 
to contested social questions.60 The decision in Lubanga not to prioritize 
sexual violence and to prioritize the conscripting and using child soldiers 
has been widely criticized.61 One critical question that might be posed is 
how attitudes and concepts towards sexual violence and child soldiers has 
changed in communities that have paid particular attention to the Lubanga 
trial. Empirically determining the effect of choices on goals such as deter-
                                                   
57 Piomelli, 2005, p. 541, see supra note 50. 
58 Ibid., p. 545. 
59 See, for example, James T. Kloppenberg, “James’s Pragmatism and American Culture: 
1907-2007”, in John J. Stuhr (ed.), 100 Years of Pragmatism: William James’s Revolution-
ary Philosophy, Indiana University Press, 2009, p. 7. 
60 Piomelli, 2005, p. 569, see supra note 50. 
61 See, for example, Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, “The Importance of Effective 
Investigation of Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes at the International Criminal 
Court”, in American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 2009, vol. 17, 
no. 2, p. 337; Dustin A Lewis, “Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence Against Men in 
Conflict Settings under International Law”, in Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2009, 
vol. 27, no. 1, p. 1; Anne-Marie de Brouwer, “Reparation to Victims of Sexual Violence: 
Possibilities at the International Criminal Court and at the Trust Fund for Victims and 
Their Families”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2007, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 207–37. 
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rence is notoriously difficult, as imagining the counterfactual scenario 
without investigation and prosecution tends towards speculation as to 
what might be in the mind of individual potential perpetrators. Empirical-
ly determining the didactic effect of choices made by the Office of the 
Prosecutor may be comparatively easier, as one could use qualitative in-
terview research or quantitative survey research to determine baseline and 
post-trial attitudes and concepts regarding relevant criminal conduct.  
Disappointment and other reactions from investigation and trial 
outcomes should matter. Just to take one example, one set of hypotheses 
that might be put forward is that the Lubanga investigation and charging 
decisions created local disappointment from affected individuals and pos-
sibly even local minimization of the importance of the issue of sexual 
violence – an unwanted didactic effect. But for these reactions to matter 
institutionally, they must be measured, considered, and incorporated into 
the Office of the Prosecutor’s understanding of how it will make choices 
and evaluate those choices going forward. 
Incorporating social science tools to measure affected communities 
and individuals as part of quality control may not be a comfortable or 
familiar process for the Office of the Prosecution. It may, in fact be a re-
sponsibility that may be a better fit for the Registry (as such or in the op-
eration of Trust Fund for Victims), an outside party, or a collaborative 
effort. The institutional fact of making such measurements will likely 
change the way decision makers evaluate their decisions. Making such 
measurements may also serve to provide a signal that may itself be helpful. 
A commitment to making the results of such social science research may 
available would also further the degree of transparency and accountability 
for the Office of the Prosecutor and the Court in general. 
20.8. Limitations to Using Criminal Proceedings as a Means to a 
Didactic End 
This chapter has suggested that the Office of the Prosecutor embrace 
Damaška’s recommendation that the didactic goal of international crimi-
nal justice be prioritized over, for example, deterrence, or incapacitation, 
due in part to the inherent limitations of scalability of the International 
Criminal Court’s capacity and the inherent ends-based evaluation of the 
importance of the didactic function. That said, there are limitations to the 
pursuit of this goal, both ethically and inherently. 
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Ethically, the retributive justification for criminal punishment is 
limited by the imperative not to use individuals as merely a means to an 
end, but rather to act in accordance with the inherent dignity and rights of 
each affected individual. There is no need to engage in a lengthy discourse 
on Kantian ethics at this point, but rather just to emphasize a few aspects 
of the Rome Statute.62 Not only must the “application and interpretation 
of law pursuant to this article […] be consistent with internationally rec-
ognized human rights” (pursuant to Article 21(3)), protect the rights of the 
accused throughout (particularly: Articles 20, 22, 23, 63, 66, 67, and 85), 
as well as the rights and interests of the victims and witnesses (particular-
ly Articles 57(3), 64(2), 64(6), 65(4), 68, 70, 75, and 79), but the Office of 
the Prosecutor must, pursuant to Article 54(1)(a): “investigate incriminat-
ing and exonerating circumstances equally”.  
Investigating exonerating circumstances is potentially one of the 
more difficult areas of quality control for the Office of the Prosecutor. The 
Article 54(1)(a) obligation, combined with the Article 67(2) disclosure 
obligation,63 create an area of potential conflict between the goals de-
scribed by Damaška. Exonerating circumstances not only make it difficult 
to get a conviction (or lengthy sentence), but may arguably make certain, 
simplistic didactic efforts more difficult. If the evidence may create rea-
sonable doubt with regards to any element of any count, the Office of the 
Prosecutor may have difficulty switching between its largely adversarial 
role during the pre-trial, trial, and appeals stages and the more inquisitori-
al, investigative judge-like role apparently envisaged by the command to 
investigate exonerating circumstances equally with incriminating circum-
stances.  
This can be resolved in part by emphasizing that the didactic func-
tion envisaged by Damaška and others is broader and more fundamental 
than the desire that no crime remain unpunished (ne crimina remaneant 
impunita).64 The primary didactic function from Damaška’s perspective is 
                                                   
62 ICC Statute, see supra note 16. 
63 “In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as 
soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or con-
trol which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to 
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evi-
dence.” 
64 Damaška, 2008, p. 356, see supra note 6. 
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to “propagate human rights values”.65 It is precisely by doing what is dif-
ficult, to scrupulously respect the rights of the accused especially when it 
makes the conviction of an accused more challenging, that this lesson is at 
its most potent. It is inherently self-defeating for the Office of the Prose-
cutor to abuse human rights in order to propagate human rights values. To 
put it more positively, placing the didactic function more squarely at the 
heart of the Office of the Prosecutor’s goals when the ‘lessons’ include 
modelling the rule of law and the rights of the accused is likely to improve 
quality control in the difficult area of the production and disclosure of 
potentially exculpatory evidence. The more that the Office of the Prosecu-
tor can internalize the idea that gathering, producing and providing such 
evidence can also be framed as a ‘win’ in the way a conviction is often 
seen as a victory, the more the Office of the Prosecutor is likely to check 
itself when its discretion is very broad. In the context of preliminary ex-
amination, the Office of the Prosecutor does not have the same investiga-
tive and disclosure obligations as in later stages, but the basic approach is 
likely to inform the workings of Prosecution staff – the full and rigorous 
evaluation of alternative theories and interpretation of communications 
that do not support proceeding to trial.  
More fundamentally, Damaška’s warning about the limited capacity 
of international criminal courts applies even when the prioritized goal is 
comparatively scalable. Mark Drumbl has written particularly well about 
the potential and the limits of the expressive value of international crimi-
nal justice.66 Because the Office of the Prosecutor must make choices, that 
selectivity inherently undercuts certain values that one might wish it could 
express, in terms of the equality before the law, universal application of 
the law, the equal dignity of all people, the universal nature of human 
rights of all people including victims of crimes not fully investigated by 
the Office of the Prosecutor. But these limitations should serve more as a 
call to arms, to address and expand the capacity of international criminal 
                                                   
65 Ibid., p. 331. 
66 See, for example, Mark A. Drumbl, “Collective Violence and Individual Punishment”, in 
Northwestern University Law Review, 2005, vol. 99, no. 2, p. 593; Mark A. Drumbl, “The 
Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conven-
tions, and International Criminal Law”, in George Washington Law Review, 2006, vol. 75, 
no. 5–6, p. 1165; Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007, pp. 173–76. 
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justice, than a signal to stop the discussion about the choices being made 
by limiting the discussion to a sterile circular discourse as to whether the 
Prosecutor’s choices are optimal or ‘political’. 
20.9. Conclusions 
In order for the discussion to be more productive, for the Office of the 
Prosecutor to use its discretion in the best possible manner, and for inter-
national criminal law to best address the terrible issues necessarily in its 
portfolio, we must have a richer, franker discussion over what to do with 
limited resources. Discussing directly the implication that addressing 
crimes in Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya may mean that crimes in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo may go un-investigated by the Office 
of the Prosecutor, and doing so without unfounded allegations of politici-
zation, may not only promote the values behind each of the options, en-
rich our understanding of them, and help us come to better decisions, they 
may ultimately result in greater support and financial backing for the pro-
ject of international criminal law in general.  
Then again, it may not. Discussing these trade-offs may not, for ex-
ample, motivate States to properly fund the International Criminal Court – 
maybe nothing will. There will certainly be disagreement and lack of con-
sensus. There is no single value to maximize, no single criterion to satisfy 
in every case. But that is where the conversation should begin, not end. 
As mentioned at the outset, Isaiah Berlin stated in his 1988 address 
The Pursuit of the Ideal, “collisions of values are of the essence of what 
they are and what we are”.67 He was addressing such grand issues as the 
different choices made by cultures over history. This chapter is discussing 
the choices of the Office of the Prosecutor, particularly in the context of 
preliminary examinations. But the principle holds true. We should directly 
confront the collisions of values inherent in the use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. We may not discover anything as grand as who we are, but it is 
still a better option than reflexively falling back into further fruitless 
rounds of allegations of politicization on one side and defensive invoca-
tions of the law and the evidence on the other. By addressing the collision 
of values beyond law and politics, we will get closer to the heart of what 
we, as international criminal lawyers, think we are doing. 
                                                   
67 Berlin, 2013, see supra note 7. 
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This chapter is, at heart, a plea for a more open discussion of the 
trade-offs inherent in pursuing international criminal justice, particularly 
with a limited budget. Too much time is wasted in unsubstantiated allega-
tions of politicization and unsatisfying invocations of simply following 
the evidence. The Office of the Prosecutor and its critics are stuck in a 
rhetorical trap that ill serves the goals of making and explaining their val-
ue choices and critiques. To disarm this trap, international criminal law 
scholars are well served to review general, friendly criticism from schol-
ars such as Damaška, and broaden such criticism to include the insights of 
leading ethical philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries on 
the interconnected issues of education, legitimacy, and social choice. The 
goal should not be to eradicate or minimize politics where it exists, but 
not to let complaints about politics occupy and silence the entire field of 
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21. Make the ICC Relevant: 
Aiding, Abetting, and Accessorizing as 
Aggravating Factors in Preliminary Examination  
Christopher B. Mahony* 
21.1. Introduction 
To date, preliminary examinations by the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’) have focused on the culpability of local actors. There is scarce 
evidence on any deterrent effect of international criminal justice. This 
chapter considers the absence of empirical basis for the ICC’s objective of 
deterring atrocity by considering whom the Court targets for prosecution, 
and whom it implicates in its preliminary examinations. It places this con-
sideration in the context of the increased prevalence of intra-State conflict 
with external actors supporting various parties. The chapter argues that 
conduct enabling conflict and jus in bello crimes should constitute a key 
aggravating criterion for opening a formal investigation, particularly after 
the activation of the crime of aggression. It further argues that in making 
reports on preliminary examination, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
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(‘OTP’) is also duty-bound to report on credible evidence of conduct that 
constitutes aiding, abetting or otherwise acting as an accessory (‘accesso-
rizing’) to international criminal conduct. 
The chapter will consider if the OTP adequately considers the role 
of external aiders, abettors and accessories in key situations under prelim-
inary examination. Is this conduct, which is criminalized by the Rome 
Statute, attracting sufficient attention from the OTP and domestic criminal 
justice actors? 
The chapter will start by considering literature on the effect of in-
ternational criminal justice on the inclination of actors to use force and 
commit core international crimes. It will then consider the nature of vio-
lent conflict and the role of external actors, highlighting the emblematic 
case of Syria. 
Then, it will turn to the process and criteria for making a determina-
tion regarding a preliminary examination. In describing the process, it will 
discuss where aiding, abetting and accessorizing fit, and should fit, in this 
process. After that, it will consider the jurisprudence on the technical ele-
ments on the modes of liability of aiding, abetting and accessorizing. It 
will then consider the ICC’s preliminary examination of Afghanistan. 
Finally, it will assess the ICC-OTP’s conduct in this respect, how it has 
evolved, its efficacy, and where it could go for the greatest impact to those 
at risk of core international crimes. 
It is argued that an effective prosecutorial strategy that advances the 
interests of justice, peace, and security must not abstain from pursuing the 
external actors that fuel conflict. Focusing on aiding, abetting and acces-
sorizing is a strategy that marries jus in bello with jus ad bellum. This 
chapter will identify how the prevalence of international humanitarian law 
violations in conflict means that prosecuting the conduct of  aiding, abet-
ting and accessorizing allows a prosecutor to effectively prosecute the 
crime of aggression. This is so where the aggressive behaviour is apparent 
in external actors’ support of “armed bands, groups, irregulars or merce-
naries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State”.1 In 
relation to the crime of aggression, this applies only to external State sup-
port for non-State actors on another territory. However, this chapter will 
                                                   
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 8bis(2)(g) (‘ICC 
Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
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also consider the peace and security implications of targeting all external 
actors aiding, abetting and accessorizing to government actors as well as 
other domestic actors. 
Lastly, the chapter will survey some of the situations under investi-
gation and those under preliminary examination before the OTP. The situ-
ations, it is argued, indicate that those engaged in aiding, abetting and 
accessorizing are not attracting the attention they deserve. Given the pub-
lic policy positioning of some aiding, abetting and accessorizing conduct, 
it is further argued that the omission brings into question the authenticity 
of preliminary examination objectives stated by the OTP, including en-
hanced efficiency and independence. 
21.1.1. Considering the ICC’s Deterrent Effect 
At the heart of this chapter is the idea that violent conflict is often accom-
panied by international humanitarian law violations. The first judgement 
at Nuremburg stated: 
To initiate a war of aggression is not only an international 
crime; it is the supreme international crime, differing only 
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the ac-
cumulated evil of the whole.2 
Today, battle deaths remain high. However, as the United Nations and 
World Bank have noted in their flagship study on conflict prevention, 
                                                   
2 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), The United States of America, The French 
Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, v. Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Rib-
bentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, 
Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 
und Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, 
Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von 
Neurath, and Hans Fritzsche, individually and as members of any of the following groups 
namely: Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Na-
tionalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die 
Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as 
the ‘SS ‘) and including Der Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the ‘SD ‘); Die Ge-
heime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the ‘GESTAPO ‘); Die 
Sturmabteilungen der N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the ‘SA ‘) and the General Staff 
and High Command of the German Armed Forces, Judgment, 1 October 1946, in The Trial 
of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sit-
ting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (22 August 1946 to 1 October 1946), 25 (421), para. 
426 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/45f18e/). 
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violence increasingly targets urban areas and public spaces. Civilians, 
therefore, are becoming more and more vulnerable, despite (if not because 
of) technological advancement.3 Between 2010 and 2016, the number of 
civilian deaths in violent conflicts had doubled just as the ICC expanded 
its situations and indictments.4 
Reviews of the ICC’s impact have at times sought cause for incre-
mental optimism. Jo and Simmons find that neither ICC ratification nor 
domestication of the Rome Statute appears to reduce rebel killing of civil-
ians.5 They also find, at a low level of significance, that rebel groups ap-
pear to respond to ICC actions.6 They find that ratification of the ICC may 
be associated with increased violence among rebel groups.7 They find that 
relative strength and government behaviour are the most consistent pre-
dictors of rebel intentional killing.8 They note a stronger effect attributable 
to the ICC on governments than rebels, including “weak yet notable im-
provements” on domestic reforms in Uganda, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire.9 
They also observe that the Court has had little effect in situations such as 
Sudan and Libya,10 which also appears to be the case in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. A simplistic obser-
vation identifies that in four of the seven countries where suspects have 
been indicted, violent conflict has recurred.  
Jo and Simmons’ language suggests a level of confirmation bias in 
their research. They state that: 
prosecutorial deterrence theory implies that investigations, 
indictments and especially successful prosecutions should 
trigger a reassessment of the likelihood of punishment and a 
boost to deterrence – a result consistent with Kim and Sik-
                                                   
3 United Nations and World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing 
Violent Conflict, Washington, D.C., 2018, p. xix (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7bb4c2-1/
). 
4 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “UCDP Data for down-
load” (available on the University’s web site). 
5 Jo Hyeran and Beth A. Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?—
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kink’s study of national human rights trials in transition 
countries.11 
Jo and Simmons cite the work of Kim and Sikkink, which tests for 
the association of prosecutions with repression instead of conflict recur-
rence.12 Further, the theory has long been debunked by what Simon calls 
the counter-intuitive behaviour of social systems.13 After correcting a mis-
take in the data, Jo and Simmons observed that: 
ratification of the ICC [Statute] may be associated with in-
creased violence among rebel groups, which differs from our 
initial conclusion of “no effect” and is contrary to theoretical 
expectations of prosecutorial deterrence.14 
Sikkink suggests that domestic prosecutions are associated with 
human rights improvements.15 Olsen, Payne and Reiter find that a combi-
nation of amnesties and prosecutions are associated with improvements in 
human rights and democracy.16 However, they do not consider recurrence 
or non-recurrence of conflict. The link of domestic processes to the ICC 
occurs via the principle of complementarity, where the ICC cedes primacy 
of jurisdiction to States unless those States are unable or unwilling genu-
inely to prosecute crimes themselves. Jo and Simmons claim that ICC 
complementarity increases the quality of domestic criminal processes, and 
that better criminal trial processes are likely to have a more positive effect 
on conflict non-recurrence.17 They identify the situations in Uganda, Ken-
ya and Côte d’Ivoire, where domestic processes were established to pros-
ecute crimes. They concede the weakness of those processes, but the criti-
cal element is that, in each case, the process is deferential to power. Ra-
                                                   
11 Ibid. 
12 Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries”, in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 4, 
pp. 939–63. 
13 Herbert Alexander Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Eco-
nomic Reason, MIT press, 1997, vol. 3. 
14 Jo and Simmons, 2017, see supra note 5. 
15 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics (The Norton Series in World Politics), W.W. Norton & Company, 2011. 
16 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: 
Comparting Processes, Weighing Efficacy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washing-
ton, D.C., 2010. 
17 Jo and Simmons, 2017, see supra note 5. 
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ther than enhance the rule of law and the confrontation of impunity, the 
cited cases embed it by building into the international system expedient 
domestic processes that reflect power. Those cited processes pursue only 
government adversaries or low-hanging fruits. At the same time, the pro-
cesses provide legitimacy to the governments of States subject to ICC 
investigation based upon the States’ ostensible co-operation with the 
ICC.18 
The joint United Nations–World Bank Pathways for Peace study 
took the first step towards identifying the relationship between domestic 
prosecutions of international crimes and conflict (non-)recurrence. The 
UN-commissioned background study found that the rate of conflict recur-
rence decreases by approximately 70% when trials are pursued in respect 
of mid- and low-level actors while prosecution of high-ranking individu-
als is associated with a 65% increase in the rate of conflict recurrence.19 
Like common international criminal justice approaches, the high-
ranking individuals that are prosecuted in domestic courts are all persons 
within situations. However, the countries experiencing violent conflict are 
rarely themselves the manufacturers of weapons. International criminal 
justice tends to attribute responsibility very narrowly and without regard 
to the evidence about the true nature of violent conflict. The following 
section highlights the nature of conflict and queries whether international 
criminal justice targets the right people.  
21.2. Globalization, Liberalism and Proxy-War’s Enablement 
Grievances relating to exclusion of social groups from political power, 
access to land and resources, access to justice and security, and access to 
services, are not novel.  
                                                   
18 Christopher B. Mahony, “If You’re Not at the Table, You’re on the Menu: Complementari-
ty and Self-Interest in Domestic Processes for Core International Crimes”, in Morten 
Bergsmo and SONG Tianying (eds.), Military Self-Interest in Accountability for Core In-
ternational Crimes, 2nd edition, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018, pp. 
229–60 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/25-bergsmo-song-second). 
19 Leigh Payne, Andrew G. Reiter, Christopher B. Mahony and Laura Bernal-Bermudez, 
“Conflict Prevention and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence”, Background paper for United 
Nations-World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Pre-
venting Violent Conflict, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2017. 
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Two historical ‘functions’ affecting the increased phenomena of lo-
cal conflict’s ‘transnationalization’ can be observed. The first is the break-
ing down of State sovereignty via the economic liberalism that accompa-
nies globalization. The second is that the United Nations Security Council, 
the critical infrastructure for managing armed conflict, is focused upon 
managing conflict between States – particularly conflict between its five 
permanent members.20 It is not designed to prevent domestic violent con-
flict. The decline in inter-State conflict indicates the emergence of adher-
ence to certain norms and law. Since the post-World War II establishment 
of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council’s five veto-
wielding permanent members have also constituted the world’s largest 
military powers and arms manufacturers.21 They have peacefully managed 
and mitigated the risk of direct violent conflict between themselves. Yet, 
particularly since the end of the Cold War, they have (albeit to variant 
degrees) unanimously come to embrace economic liberalism as a founda-
tion for inter-State commerce. 
21.2.1. Conflict’s Multi-dimensional Causes 
After the last great inter-State armed conflict – World War II – anti-
colonial and post-colonial violent conflicts and Cold War proxy-wars 
came to affect  a number of African and Asian States.22 At the end of the 
Cold War, new proxy-contestations emerged in the Third World, particu-
larly in Africa, where the United Kingdom, the United States and France 
contested spheres of influence via proxies. 23  A comparative surge in 
                                                   
20 Simon Chesterman, “The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law”, 7 May 2008, NYU 
School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-57; Annex to the letter dated 18 April 
2008 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, Doc. A/63/69-S/2008/270, 7 May 2008. 
21 Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and International Security”, in Survival, vol. 35, no. 2, 
pp. 3–30; Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World: 
The UN’s Roles in International Relations, 2nd edition, Clarendon Press, 1994. 
22 See, for example, Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism 
in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought, Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2007; Shashi Tharoor, An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India, Aleph 
Book Company, 2016. 
23 See John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War 
to Iraq, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; Bruce Russett, “The Democratic Peace”, in Conflicts 
and New Departures in World Society, Routledge, 2017, pp. 21–43; Adda Bruemmer Bo-
zeman, Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities, Princeton University Press, 2015. 
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peacekeeping and prevention, among other factors, helped reduce conflict 
in a post-Cold War global order until the mid-2000s.24 Intra-State conflicts 
proliferated, commonly driven by resource scarcity, demographic pres-
sures, and group-specific grievances surrounding exclusion from access to 
political power, land and resources, justice and security, and services.25 At 
the same time, a window of opportunity opened to focus the international 
system on its capacity to manage and mitigate intra-State conflicts in the 
same way the system has managed the risk of direct conflict between P5 
actors. However, in 2005,the number of persons killed in violent conflict 
reached a low point, signalling a different turn as the scope and fatalities 
of conflict began to increase – a trajectory that accelerated in 2010 (see 
Figure 3 below). 
The level of global contextual risk is currently increasing because 
of the emergence of ‘stressors’, which are cumulative for two reasons: (1) 
increasing complexity due to greater interconnectedness of people, and (2) 
faster rates of economic, social and technological change. With regard to 
violent conflicts, multi-dimensional risks could simultaneously affect ge-
ographic, infrastructural, societal, political and economic dimensions. 
Some of the most prominent areas of risk that interface with risks and 
effects of violent conflicts include climate change, natural disaster, epi-
demics, economic shocks, demographic expansion, and so on. 
Financial liberalization and transnationalization of capital embed 
inequality of access to capital and consequently, to economic, educational 
and other sources of economic mobility. It also enables transnational sup-
port for armed groups engaged in violent conflict. For example, in the 
second half of 2010, before the Arab Spring, key staple food prices had 
risen by over 25%, acting as a shock multiplier to the drought that Syria 
encountered.26 Economic historians cite increasing deregulation of capital 
markets as increasing the frequency and severity of boom and bust eco-
                                                   
24 World Bank, 2018, p. 11, see supra note 3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Elena I. Ianchovichina, Josef L. Loening and Christina A. Wood, “How Vulnerable are 
Arab Countries to Global Food Price Shocks?”, in The Journal of Development Studies, 
vol. 50, no. 9, pp. 1302–19; George Joffé, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and 
Prospects”, in The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 507–32. 
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nomic cycles.27 Increasingly regular and severe global economic adjust-
ments themselves drive up commodity prices, fuelling speculation, dis-
proportionately affecting marginalized communities, and elevating griev-
ances relating to social groups about their exclusion from power, re-
sources, justice, security and services.28 
21.2.2. Syria: A Permissive Global System’s Emblematic Proxy-War 
The conflict in Syria has by far the highest number of conflict-related 
deaths (see Figure 1). It is worth considering, therefore, the impact of the 
transnational phenomena described in the previous section on the situation 
in Syria. 
 
Figure 1: Number of Conflict-Related Deaths Worldwide, by Country, 2016 
                                                   
27 Hyman P. Minsky and Henry Kaufman, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 2008, vol. 1. 
28 For example, fiscal space in Saudi Arabia allowed the government to rapidly deploy USD 
130bn in social spending at the outset of protests in that country. See F. Gregory Gause III, 
“Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability", 
in Foreign Affairs, 2011, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 81–90; Neil MacFarguhar, “In Saudi Arabia, 
Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now”, in New York Times, 8 June 2011. 
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Between 2005 and 2010, the Fertile Crescent29 witnessed the worst 
drought in recorded history, which intensified during the winter of 2006-
2007. 
Syria’s drought and its economic and social implications are un-
common themes among influential explanations of Syria’s conflict. The 
conflict’s onset occurred in the context of the Arab Spring protests, influ-
enced by the demonstration effect of organized protests and local condi-
tions, including “microfoundations and emotions”.30 
It has been indicated that the drought cannot be explained by natural 
causes, instead, it is consistent with models of anthropogenic climate 
change. The drought affected, with particular intensity, Syria’s territory. 
Agriculture collapsed in the north-eastern region of Syria – the breadbas-
ket of the country that produces two-thirds of the country’s cereal output. 
Food prices went through the roof, more than doubling between 2007 and 
2008. However, violent conflict did not occur in 2006 or 2007. The popu-
lation in the northeast provinces of Syria witnessed a dramatic increase in 
nutrition-related diseases in children due to their inability to afford food 
as a result of a combination of high prices and deprivation of income and 
livelihood. School enrolment also dropped by 80%. An aggravating factor 
accompanying these socio-economic conditions was migration of dis-
placed persons. As many as 1.5 million people were internally displaced 
in Syria, moving, along with many Iraqi refugees, to the periphery of ur-
ban areas.  
                                                   
29 Civilization emerged for the first time in the ‘Fertile Crescent’ more than 10 millennia  
ago. Crops and animals were domesticated, institutions were created, agriculture and tech-
nology flourished. The interactions between humans and ecosystems that enabled civiliza-
tion to emerge have sustained populations in the region since then. 
30 Wendy Pearlman, “Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings”, in Per-
spectives on Politics, 2013, vol.11, no. 2, pp. 387–409. 
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Figure 2: Syrian Conflict Timeline 
By 2010, 20% of Syria’s urban population was composed of inter-
nally displaced persons and Iraqi refugees, mostly on the urban periphery. 
The displaced population had no legal settlement options, and was faced 
with overcrowding, lack of basic services, rampant unemployment, and 
rising crime.31 These peripheral urban areas became the cradle of the civil 
unrest that began to intensify in March 2011, which was inspired by the 
examples of Tunisia and Egypt but also supported by an influx of arms 
and foreign nationals supported by regional and global governments.32 As 
the conflict unfolded, it became clear that Saudi Arabia, co-ordinating 
with the United States, began importing arms and people into Syria to 
fight the Syrian government. Similarly, the Russian and Iranian govern-
ments provided significant support to the Syrian government to repel the 
rebels. The direct engagement of one superpower in a conflict appeared, 
in the eyes of another, to be a decision between either inevitably engaging 
with that superpower or accepting that non-direct engagement would con-
stitute concession of the military imperative to that superpower. Goldberg, 
                                                   
31 Colin P. Kelleya, Shahrzad Mohtadib, Mark A. Canec, Richard Seagerc and Yochanan 
Kushnirc, “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian 
drought”, in Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences, 2015, vol. 112, no. 11, pp. 
3241–46. 
32 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Saudis offer Russia secret oil deal if it drops Syria”, in The 
Telegraph, 27 August 2013; Mark Mazzetti, Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, “Military 
Success in Syria Gives Putin Upper Hand in U.S. Proxy War”, in New York Times, 6 Au-
gust 2016. 
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who had an interview with the then US President, Barak Obama, de-
scribed it as follows: 
“When you have a professional army,” he once told me, “that 
is well armed and sponsored by two large states” – Iran and 
Russia – “who have huge stakes in this, and they are fighting 
against a farmer, a carpenter, an engineer who started out as 
protesters and suddenly now see themselves in the midst of a 
civil conflict …” He paused. “The notion that we could 
have – in a clean way that didn’t commit U.S. military forc-
es – changed the equation on the ground there was never 
true.”33 
He further described Obama’s view on the regional contestation be-
tween Iran and Saudi Arabia that feeds many violent conflicts in the Mid-
dle East: 
At one point I observed to him that he is less likely than pre-
vious presidents to axiomatically side with Saudi Arabia in 
its dispute with its arch-rival, Iran. He didn’t disagree. 
Iran, since 1979, has been an enemy of the United 
States, and has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, is a 
genuine threat to Israel and many of our allies, and engages 
in all kinds of destructive behavior,” the president said. “And 
my view has never been that we should throw our traditional 
allies” – the Saudis – “overboard in favor of Iran. 
But he went on to say that the Saudis need to “share” 
the Middle East with their Iranian foes. “The competition be-
tween the Saudis and the Iranians – which has helped to feed 
proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen – requires 
us to say to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they 
need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and 
institute some sort of cold peace,” he said. “An approach that 
said to our friends ‘You are right, Iran is the source of all 
problems, and we will support you in dealing with Iran’ 
would essentially mean that as these sectarian conflicts con-
tinue to rage and our Gulf partners, our traditional friends, do 
not have the ability to put out the flames on their own or de-
cisively win on their own, and would mean that we have to 
start coming in and using our military power to settle scores. 
                                                   
33 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, in The Atlantic, April 2016. 
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And that would be in the interest neither of the United States 
nor of the Middle East. 
The United Nations Security Council encourages permanent mem-
bers to settle disputes between themselves without coming into direct 
military conflict. However, there is no such mechanism to deter proxy-war. 
21.2.3. How the Global System and Its Leadership Ignore 
Contemporary Conflicts 
The joint United Nations and World Bank flagship study on conflict pre-
vention does not consider prevention issues that appear at the forefront of 
the mind of the former US President. Obama failed to consider how the 
risk of violent conflict may be lowered by development of norms and 
rules that stigmatize, dissuade, deter or even prevent external actors from 
inserting weapons, armed actors, and other material support of armed 
groups into situations of instability.  
Conflicts with increasing non-State armed groups also reduces for-
mal State involvement, rendering traditional dispute resolution less ap-
propriate. The plurality of armed groups and their diverse nature (from 
rebels, militias and violent extremist groups to traffickers and other orga-
nized criminal groups) adjust the political economy of conflict. The func-
tion of international criminal justice has failed to respond appropriately. 
As the international criminal justice system is preoccupied with 
more expedient indictees located within domestic military and political 
structures, both internationalized conflicts where external actors are en-
gaged and the number of non-State groups have increased dramatically 
(see Figures 3–4). 
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Figure 3: Number of Internationalized Violent Conflicts, 1946-201634 
 
Figure 4: Number of Non-State Groups Active in Violent Conflict Worldwide, 
1989-201635 
                                                   
34 World Bank, 2018, p. 18, see supra note 3. 
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The UN–World Bank Pathways for Peace report acknowledges the 
existence of the increased incidence of internationalized conflict and the 
role of the United Nations Security Council in resolving disputes between 
States. Obama acknowledged the engagement of external actors, including 
himself in his capacity as US President. However, he failed to consider 
the efficacy of global peace and security for this type of behaviour, or the 
efficacy of potential collective responses by nations. 
The following section considers the role of the modes of liability of 
aiding, abetting and accessorizing, where they might sit in the preliminary 
examination process, and where the legal threshold lies for aiding, abet-
ting and accessorizing international crimes.  
21.3. Prosecuting Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing as a Response 
to Proxy-War 
The OTP enjoys an opportunity to play a role in dissuading actors, or at 
least momentarily disrupting, delaying, or adjusting the incentives and 
disincentives of actors from waging war. It can do so by adopting an ap-
proach that focuses on the conduct of external enabling actors. 
Confronting the self-interest of States that seek to permit war by 
proxy, something which is prohibited under international law, could con-
stitute a much more substantive contribution to the prevention of violent 
conflict than dealing with the crimes that occur only after conflict has 
started. This approach considers the interaction of the crime of aggression 
of supporting a party to a conflict in another State (where an external ac-
tor is supporting a non-State actor) along with the conduct of the party 
being supported (given the commonality of international crimes commit-
ted by non-State actors).  
External actors play a prominent role in causing the onset, escala-
tion and persistence of violent conflict with which core international 
crimes are associated. For the prevention of violent conflicts, employing 
available means to prosecute those actors is equally important as prosecut-
ing local direct perpetrators and persons with command responsibility. 
                                                                                                                        
35 Ibid., p. 16. 
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21.3.1. Gravity in Preliminary Examination and the Aiding, 
Abetting and Accessorizing of Crimes  
As noted elsewhere in these volumes, the OTP receives and analyses re-
ferrals and communications to determine whether there is a reasonable 
basis to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for crimes under the 
Statute before the Court. The factors and procedures applied by the Office 
to carry out a preliminary examination are outlined in its 2010 Draft Poli-
cy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.36  
In determining whether a reasonable basis to proceed with an inves-
tigation exists or not, the Prosecutor considers jurisdiction, admissibility 
and interests of justice.37 Presuming a situation moves to Phase 3, admis-
sibility under Article 1738 requires consideration of the role of aiding, 
abetting and accessorizing. Firstly, in considering complementarity,39 it 
should determine whether a domestic process has jurisdiction over the 
modes of liability of aiding, abetting and accessorizing, and whether in-
vestigations are credibly pursuing such persons. Secondly, it should con-
sider aiding, abetting and accessorizing to third parties as a significant 
aggravating factor in determining gravity40  regarding the most serious 
crimes and those bearing greatest responsibility for them.41  
Finally, the OTP should, where there are positive determinations on 
both jurisdiction and admissibility,42 consider the role of aiding, abetting 
                                                   
36 ICC OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 4 October 2010, p. 1 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/bd172c/). 
37 Ibid. 
38 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(b), see supra note 1. 
39 Ibid., Article 17(1)(a)–(c). The Court is intended to complement national criminal justice 
systems, hence in general a case will be inadmissible if it has been or is being investigated 
or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction. However, a case may be admissible if the inves-
tigating or prosecuting state is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation 
or prosecution.  
40 Ibid., Article 17(1)(d). 
41 ICC OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2010, para. 51, see supra note 
36. 
42 ICC OTP, Report on activities performed during the first three years (June 2003 – June 
2006), 12 September 2006, p. 2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c7a850/). 
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and accessorizing in identifying the “countervailing consideration”43 of 
the interests of justice.  
In relation to gravity, there is a specific guiding consideration for 
determining if the gravity threshold is met in respect of war crimes.44 Ar-
ticle 8(1) states that these crimes exist when they are “committed as part 
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes”.45 This means that the role of external actors would suggest a 
degree of planning. Therefore, a perpetrating group or actor would be 
more likely to have a plan or a policy. 
The prosecutor enjoys a great deal of discretion in interpreting 
“gravity”, which is not defined in the Rome Statute. This opens the door 
to employing the modes of liability of aiding, abetting and accessorizing 
as an interpretive mechanism of aggravation.46 In determining whether to 
open an investigation, the OTP’s intention is to establish a basic standard 
that is not overly restrictive.47 At the stage of initiating an investigation, 
there is not yet a ‘case’. Preliminary examination, therefore, should con-
sider situations generally, with awareness of likely cases. Given the role 
of external actors in materially (and often lethally) supporting perpetrators, 
a part of this general consideration includes consideration of aiding, abet-
ting and accessorizing. It may also better inform the Prosecutor as to the 
perpetrator’s extent of responsibility during case selection.48  
                                                   
43 ICC OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2010, para. 10, see supra note 
36. 
44 ICC OTP, “OTP Response to Communications received concerning Iraq”, 9 February 2006, 
p. 8 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5b8996/). 
45 ICC Statute, Article 8(1), see supra note 1. 
46 See William A. Schabas, “Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International 
Criminal Court”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2008, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 731, 
at pp.736–41. For a wider discussion of gravity, including information on the origins of the 
gravity threshold and an analysis of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s approach to Article 17, see War 
Crimes Research Office, The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal Court, 
American University Washington College of Law, 2008. 
47 ICC OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2010, at para. 68, see supra 
note 36. 
48 Fabricio Guariglia, “The Selection of Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice 
of the International Criminal Court, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2009, pp. 
209–17, at p. 213. 
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The OTP provides a number of criteria for determining gravity that 
are relevant to the role of persons that aid and abet or act as accessories to 
international crimes.49 The role of external actors goes in particular to the 
‘nature’ of crimes, particularly high-level killings, the manner of commis-
sion of crimes (in terms of participation), and abuse of power (where ex-
ternal actors experience comparatively little consequence). Similarly, ex-
ternal aiding, abetting and accessorizing has a long-term ‘impact’ because 
conflicts involving external actors last longer, thus increasing the possibil-
ity of cross-border conflicts. 
If the OTP makes a positive determination on admissibility, the 
OTP will weigh the gravity and victims’ interests to determine the “inter-
ests of justice”.50 This includes consideration of the interests of the vic-
tims, the conflict parties’ views, victims’ interest in seeing justice done, 
and witnesses’ physical and psychological well-being, as well as the dig-
nity and privacy of victims and witnesses.51 In making such a determina-
tion, in particular of the victims’ interest, the role of external actors is 
significant. 
In weighing the above considerations, the OTP should provide, in 
its reports on preliminary examinations, an outline of credibly alleged 
external actors with potential criminal liability. It should also lay out how 
the credibly alleged conduct relates to the aforementioned preliminary 
examination considerations. 
                                                   
49 ICC OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2010, at para. 70, see supra 
note 36. For more information regarding the origins of these criteria, see Paul Seils, “The 
Selection and Prioritization of Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core In-
ternational Crimes Cases, 2nd edition, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2010 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/4-bergsmo-second). 
50 ICC Statute, Articles 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c), see supra note 1. Article 53(1)(c) provides: 
“Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are none-
theless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice”. Article 53(2)(c) additionally requires consideration of the particular circumstances 
of the accused. 
51 ICC OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, at p. 5 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/bb02e5/). 
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21.4. The Legal Threshold of Aiding, Abetting and Accessorizing 
The mode of liability of aiding and abetting in international criminal law 
was first established at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’). Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute ascribes criminal 
responsibility where an actor “aided and abetted in the planning, prepara-
tion or execution of a crime”.52 The mode of liability was not present in 
the Charters of the Nuremburg or Tokyo tribunals.53 It has taken on nor-
mative acceptance in international criminal law and has been included in 
the Statutes of all the post-Cold War international criminal courts and 
tribunals. The existence of this mode of liability has facilitated successful 
prosecution of political leaders and external commercial or State actors 
because it is not necessary to show command responsibility over perpetra-
tors.54 In effect, the mode of aiding, abetting and accessorizing also crimi-
nalized the conduct of waging war by proxy (where proxy forces commit 
crimes).55  
The ICTY in Perišić preferred a mens rea element that demands 
that the aider or abettor specifically intend for support to be used for the 
specific acts that occurred (known as ‘specific direction’).56 However, it 
was rejected by later jurisprudence at the ICTY and at the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.57  
                                                   
52 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 
1993, amended 17 May 2002, Article 7(1) (‘ICTY Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/b4f63b/). 
53 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/64ffdd/); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, adopted 19 
January 1946, amended 26 April 1946 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a3c41c/). 
54 Andrew Clapham, “Extending international criminal law beyond the individual to corpora-
tions and armed opposition groups”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2008, 
vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 899–926. 
55 Ibid. 
56 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Perišić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 28 February 2013, IT-04-81-A, 
para. 44 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f006ba/). 
57 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 23 January 2014, IT-05-
87-A, paras. 1648–49 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/81ac8c/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popo-
vić et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 30 January 2015, IT-05-88-A, para. 1758 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/4c28fb/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber, Judgment, 9 December 2015, IT-03-69-A, paras. 104–07 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/198c16/). 
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21.4.1. Aiding and Abetting under the Rome Statute 
Article 25(3)(c) of the Statute58 provides for criminal liability if a person: 
For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a 
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its 
attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission […] 
The Pre-Trial Chamber has noted that a “substantial” contribution 
to the crime may be contemplated.59 The Rome Statute, unlike the juris-
prudence of the ad hoc tribunals, does not require the aider and abettor to 
share the perpetrator’s intent to commit the crime. 
However, the threshold remains unclear, as the language “or other-
wise assists” is novel to the ICC. It suggests that the provision of  means 
for the commission of a crime may simply constitute an example of assis-
tance, and perhaps a lower threshold than the “substantial” contribution 
threshold. 
Future ICC defendants may argue that Article 25(3)(c) expressly 
adopts a ‘specific direction’ standard because assistance must be given 
“for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such crime”.60 They 
may argue that the Article 25(3)(c) language of “otherwise provides” adds 
a mental element that must be proved in addition to intention and 
knowledge under Article 30.61 This view is held by multiple observers, 
                                                   
58 ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(c), see supra note 1; Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’), 
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 26 September 2013, SCSL-03-
01-A, para. 207 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3e7be5/). 
59 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, ICC-
01/04-01/10-465-Red, para. 279 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/63028f/); ICC, Situation 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial 
Chamber I, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, para. 997 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/677866/). 
60 Defendants may argue that “the Court was established to try the most serious crimes of 
international concern”, which demand high thresholds: Sarah Finnin, Elements of Accesso-
rial Modes of Liability: Article 25(3)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 203. See also ICC Statute, Preamble, 
Articles 1 and 5(1), see supra note 1. 
61 Albin Eser, “Individual Criminal Responsibility”, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2002, p. 767, at pp. 798–801; Finnin, 2012, p. 180, see supra note 60; K.J.M. Smith, 
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who argue that the inclusion of the “for the purpose” language would be 
otherwise meaningless. 
However, David Scheffer and Caroline Kaeb argue that the word 
“purpose” indicates only the de minimis and neutral mens rea element of 
acting in a manner that has the consequence of facilitating the commission 
of crimes.62 Their view is that the language “for the purpose of” reflects a 
lack of drafting consensus regarding mens rea. It is worth noting, in this 
relation, that Scheffer was present at the drafting. They conclude that the 
mens rea element of aiding and abetting is informed by Article 25(3)(d)(ii) 
requiring “knowledge” of the “near certainty” of a crime “in the ordinary 
course of events” because drafting consensus existed in that provision.63 
They argue that if the drafters intended that an accessory must share a 
perpetrator’s intent, aiding and abetting would have been a co-perpetrator 
mode of liability under Article 25(3)(a).64 Their argument may be sup-
ported by tracing the drafting of Article 25(3)(c) to the US Model Penal 
Code, which does not require specific direction.65 Further, their argument 
is normatively supported by the Rome Statute’s own intent to “put an end 
to impunity” via interpretations that “close accountability gaps”.66 When 
read alongside the existence of the crime of aggression, a specific direc-
tion interpretation of aiding and abetting becomes incompatible with the 
                                                                                                                        
A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1991, p. 142. 
62 David Scheffer and Caroline Kaeb, “The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency 
of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strate-




65 Finnin, 2012, p. 187, at p. 200, see supra note 60. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
fully engage with how “purpose” should be interpreted. For a helpful introduction, see 
SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 26 September 2013, p. 
5, at paras. 446–51, see supra note 58. 
66 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled “Decision giv-
ing notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be 
subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court”, 8 
December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, at para. 77 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
40d015/). 
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Rome Statute due to the impossibly high standard. The ICC is also likely 
to find that Perišić draws a false distinction between different ‘types’ of 
degree of contribution and awareness for remote actors. To argue that 
‘substantial contribution’ before the ICC is, as per the ICTY, inadequate at 
the ICC is to presume a mens rea threshold of perceived inadequacy of 
knowledge, 67  despite the Rome Statute’s adoption of purpose and 
knowledge together. Given that volition and cognition are demanded to-
gether, a specific direction element can reasonably be perceived as a fur-
ther unstated, and therefore non-existent, component of Article 25(3)(c). 
Defendants may cite Appeals Chamber Judge Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi’s dissenting opinion in Mbarushimana as a recognition of 
Perišić that rejects the degree of contribution for interpreting Article 
25(3)(d):  
I am not persuaded that such contributions would be ade-
quately addressed by adding the requirement that a contribu-
tion be significant. Depending on the circumstances of a case, 
providing food or utilities to an armed group might be a sig-
nificant, a substantial or even an essential contribution to the 
commission of crimes by this group. In my view the real is-
sue is that of the so-called “neutral” contributions. This prob-
lem is better addressed by analysing the normative and caus-
al links between the contribution and the crime rather than 
requiring a minimum level of contribution.68 
Defendants, invoking Fernández de Gurmendi, will argue that the 
“normative and causal links” between the contributions of the accused, on 
the one hand, and the crimes’ commission, on the other, must reflect the 
requirements of ‘specific direction’, or at least demand the crimes are the 
reason for assisting the accused. To reinforce that claim, defendants will 
                                                   
67 James G Stewart, “The ICTY Loses Its Way on Complicity”, Opinio Juris, 3 April 2013. 
But see Kevin Jon Heller, “Two Thoughts on Manuel Ventura’s Critique of Specific Direc-
tion”, Opinio Juris, 10 January 2014. 
68 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mba-
rushimana, Appeals Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, 
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 
December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation of charges”, 30 May 2012, ICC-
01/04-01/10-514, at para. 12 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6ead30/). Importantly, the 
rest of the bench in the Appeals Chamber decided the appeal without engaging the ques-
tion of contribution. As such, Judge de Gurmendi’s statement of principle should be con-
sidered persuasive. 
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likely emphasise that both Fernández de Gurmendi and the ‘specific direc-
tion’ jurisprudence at the ICTY were concerned with establishing an ap-
proach that appropriately responded to ‘neutral contributions’ or, as 
Perišić put it, “general assistance” that can be used for lawful or unlawful 
purposes.69  
Given that the language of Article 25(3)(d) makes clear the level of 
contribution and knowledge, an interpretation in line with specific direc-
tion that contradicts the Article’s intent (when read within the intent of the 
Rome Statute)70 is unlikely to be adopted. The Court is also more likely to 
read the above paragraph in de Gurmendi’s dissent as a guide for consid-
ering if a defendant’s contribution was significant, rather than being spe-
cifically directed.71 The jurisprudence advancing the mens rea element of 
specific direction has also been rejected by subsequent jurisprudence. The 
Taylor appeal judgement found that “aiding and abetting liability under 
customary international law is not limited to direct intent or […] pur-
pose”. 72  At the ICTY, the Šainović appeal judgment, Popović appeal 
judgment, and Stanišić and Simatović appeal judgment all rejected specif-
ic direction.73 
                                                   
69 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Perišić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 28 February 2013, at para. 44, 
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70 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
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71 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
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730–32. 
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73 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 23 January 2014, paras. 
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ment, 30 January 2015, para. 1758, see supra note 57; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and 
 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 204 
In the ICC Trial Chamber’s decision in Bemba et al., the Chamber 
noted the word ‘purpose’ introduced a “higher subjective mental element” 
demanding “assistance with the aim of facilitating the offence”.74  The 
accessory’s facilitation (not the principal offence) must be made with the 
knowledge of the assistance to the principal perpetrator in the commission 
of the offence.75 With regard to the principal offence, knowledge of the 
offence in the ordinary course of events and its essential elements is re-
quired.76 However, knowledge of the precise offence intended and com-
mitted in the specific circumstance is not required.77 The Bemba decision 
at the Trial Chamber may not necessarily be adopted at the Appeals 
Chamber. 
21.4.2. Accessorizing under the Rome Statute  
A similar mode of liability, but with a different mens rea element, is that 
of acting as an accessory to crimes committed by a group under Article 
25(3)(d) (herein referred to as ‘accessorizing’).78 This is where a person 
makes an ‘intentional’ contribution to a crime.79 Unlike aiding and abet-
ting, Article 25(3)(d) does not refer to a ‘purpose’, but rather requires 
either a shared intent for the group’s crimes, or knowledge of the group’s 
crimes, including knowledge that they are likely to occur in “the ordinary 
course of events”.80 “Knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a 
                                                                                                                        
Simatović, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 9 December 2015, paras. 104–07, see supra note 
57. 
74 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu 
and Narcisse Arido, Trial Chamber VII, Public Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, 19 October 2016, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, paras. 97–98 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fe0ce4/). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., para. 98. 
77 Ibid. 
78 ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(d), see supra note 1. 
79 Ibid.; Roger S. Clark, “The Mental Element in International Criminal Law”, in Criminal 
Law Forum, 2001, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 291, 320–21; Kai Ambos, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, 
2008, pp. 743–70. 
80 ICC Statute, Article 30(3), see supra note 1. 
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crime”81 is therefore a low bar to meet. The Appeals Chamber ruled that 
for ‘mere’ knowledge of a consequence “in the ordinary course of events”, 
“virtual certainty” of the consequence is necessary.82  
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has also found that criminal liability 
exists when a crime is attempted or committed, the crime was carried out 
by a group with common purpose, and the accused intentionally made a 
“significant” 83  contribution to the crime with the knowledge of the 
group’s intention to commit the crime.84 
Where a group is party to a conflict, which has carried out crimes 
over a number of years, as alleged by credible observers, the requirement 
of near certainty that the group will continue to carry out those crimes is 
met. Where credible organisations like United Nations human rights mon-
itoring bodies, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International publicly 
report a groups’ previous conduct, the requisite threshold is met. It indi-
cates an awareness of a high probability of existence of a fact.85 The exist-
ing fact in such circumstances is that the intentionally supported group is 
nearly certain to continue to commit crimes in the ordinary course of 
events. 
21.5. Aiders, Abettors and Accessories in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan’s conflict has significantly contributed to loss of life and 
global instability over the past three decades. There are also violent con-
flicts with a significant number of external actors supporting parties to 
conflict. 
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82 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
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Record numbers of battle-related deaths were observed in 2016, in-
creasing ten-fold from 2005, the low point since the end of the Cold 
War.86 The three countries with the most casualties in 2016 are also con-
flicts with a high number of external actors: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syr-
ia.87 This section of the chapter considers some of the conduct that might 
be considered by an OTP that incorporates the accused in its preliminary 
examinations and related reports.  
The United States has been involved in Afghanistan for the past 17 
years. Much of that time has been spent fighting insurgent groups such as 
the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Despite a successful ground cam-
paign, the United States has been unable to defeat the Taliban. This is in 
large part due to the large international backing that the Taliban has from 
both foreign governments and private individuals who serve as donors. 
The governments of Iran and Pakistan have served as the Taliban’s prima-
ry backers. In October 2017, the Taliban attacked the cities of Farah and 
Lashkar Gah in Western Afghanistan.88 Afghan National Security Forces 
were barely able to contain the offensive. The Taliban withdrew only after 
the Afghan forces requested a series of US airstrikes. Afghan intelligence 
found four dead Iranian commandos after the attack.89 March 2018 saw 
yet another Taliban offensive to capture Farah. Evidence suggests that 
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provided support to the Taliban 
during the lead-up to the attack.90 Iran has an interest in keeping the west-
ern province of Farah unstable because it is a focal point for the Saudi 
financed TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) pipeline. 
Additionally, Iran holds an interest in preventing the construction of the 
                                                   
86 Marie Allansson, Erik Melander and Lotta Themnér, “Organized Violence, 1989–2016”, in 
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Offensives”, in The New York Times, 9 October 2016. 
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Bakhshabad dam in Farah province because it would serve to limit Iranian 
access to Afghanistan’s rivers.91 Iran has allowed the Taliban to cross into 
Iran so that they may train and replenish their forces before an offensive. 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has additionally become vocal in 
its support for the Taliban mainly because the Taliban manages to simul-
taneously fight Daesh/ISIS and US and NATO forces.92  
Russian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan may seem very sur-
prising given their history with Afghanistan. However, the current US 
commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, has gone on the 
record in an interview with the BBC and has publicly accused the Russian 
Federation of supplying arms to the Taliban. In an interview, General Ni-
cholson states: 
We’ve had stories written by the Taliban that have appeared 
in the media about financial support provided by the enemy. 
We’ve had weapons brought to this headquarters and given 
to us by Afghan leaders and said, this was given by the Rus-
sians to the Taliban. We know that the Russians are in-
volved.93 
Russia has conducted numerous counter terrorism exercises with 
the Tajik Army in southern Tajikistan along the border of Afghanistan. 
General Nicholson believes that when the Russian military moves weap-
ons and equipment for an exercise they intentionally leave surplus materi-
als behind so that they can be smuggled into Afghanistan for use by the 
Taliban.94 While it is currently difficult to determine the quantity of weap-
ons being smuggled in to Afghanistan, the Afghan Police and Afghan Na-
tional Army believe that Russia is supplying medium and heavy machine 
guns, night vision goggles and small arms to the Taliban.95 
Pakistan has long served as a refuge for the Taliban. In 2012, evi-
dence emerged that showed direct ties between Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (‘ISI’) branch and the Taliban. The report states that the “ISI 
is thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior 
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94 Ibid. 
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Taliban personnel”.96 The report also claims that ISI agents were able to 
sit in on the “Quetta Shura” (the Taliban’s top leadership council). Ob-
servers claim that support of the Taliban is part of the ISI’s official poli-
cy. 97  The United States government has requested that UN-proscribed 
NGOs al Rashid Trust, al Akhtur Trust and all successor organizations 
stop funnelling money and providing other forms of support to the Taliban 
and LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) from Pakistan.98 The US has also identified the 
Pakistan-based Haqqani network as a conduit for funnelling weapons and 
fighters across the Afghan and Pakistan border.99  
Saudi Arabia has long praised Pakistan’s support to the Taliban 
while simultaneously supporting the United States in their efforts to defeat 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. Agha Jan Motasim, the former finance minis-
ter of the Taliban explained that he travelled to Saudi Arabia two to three 
times a year to raise funds and gauge support for the Taliban among do-
nors.100 Motasim accomplished all of this while on pilgrimage to Saudi 
Arabia’s holy sites. Motasim would appeal to wealthy Saudi Sheikhs and 
other wealthy Muslims and urge them to donate to the Taliban as private 
individuals. Once Motasim raised money he would move it to Pakistan 
through a series of regional banks or through the ‘Hawala’ (an Islamic 
custom of informal money transfers). The amount of money raised by the 
Taliban in Saudi Arabia was so significant that Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton said that Saudi Arabia was the “most significant source of funding 
to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide”.101 US diplomatic cables further dis-
closed fears and suspicions that that the Taliban were able to raise mil-
lions of dollars from private individuals during annual pilgrimages in 
Saudi Arabia. 
The United States has been funding the fledging government of Af-
ghanistan since its establishment after the Bonn Agreement in 2001. The 
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United States has taken a special interest in shaping and training the Af-
ghan National Security Forces so that they may become a self-sustaining 
force capable of fighting against insurgents. From 2002-2015 the US De-
partment of Defense has spent a total of USD 778.1 billion on the war in 
Afghanistan.102 In 2016, the US State Department approved a USD 60 
million arms sale to Afghanistan through the Defense Security Coopera-
tion Agency, which specializes in foreign military sales. This arms pack-
age includes 4,891 M16A4 assault rifles, 485 M240B machine guns and 
800 M2 machine guns listed under the Major Defense Equipment (‘MDE’) 
category. Non-MDE procurements include M249 light machine guns, 
M110 sniper rifles, MK-19 grenade launchers, machine gun mounts, spare 
parts, and repair kits.103 A press release from the Defense Security Coop-
eration Agency on the sale further elaborates: 
The proposed sale will enhance the foreign policy and na-
tional security objectives of the United States by helping to 
improve the security of a strategic partner by providing 
weapons needed to maintain security and stability, as well as 
to conduct offensive operations against an ongoing insurgen-
cy. A stable and secure Afghanistan is vital to regional stabil-
ity. This proposed sale will also demonstrate the U.S. com-
mitment to Afghanistan’s security. 
However, the OTP has included Afghanistan as a part of its prelimi-
nary examination activities in 2017. In the report, the Afghan National 
Security Forces were accused of “[w]ar crimes of torture, outrages upon 
personal dignity and sexual violence”.104 The other major parties to the 
conflict are also accused of crimes. 
21.6. Conclusion 
As ICC observers begin to confront the institution’s movement towards a 
status of irrelevance, an urgency surrounding the need for real and per-
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ceived integrity and impact emerges.105 The post-Cold War re-emergence 
of international crimes prosecutions at the international level is at risk of 
capture by realist State self-interest.106 A part of that capture is the exclu-
sion from substantive international criminal justice jurisdiction of the 
crime of aggression – the focus on jus in bello crimes. Such a change de-
mands change from a situation where those that fight wars be accountable 
to certain conduct but that those that start wars may do so with impunity. 
As identified, this status quo focuses international criminal justice on the 
symptoms of the problem – how war is fought – and not the problem – the 
waging of war. Further, the current practice of international criminal jus-
tice focuses accountability on local actors for the conduct of war while 
avoiding the conduct of those enabling it via material support.  
The deterrence effect of international criminal justice and in par-
ticular of the ICC, has not been demonstrated. New approaches, aligned 
with the nature of the escalation in violent conflict, are required. Civil 
society, which has refrained from focusing on external actors’ internation-
al criminal law liability, must also play its role in providing credible evi-
dence to substantiate reports on preliminary examination. 
As the situation in Afghanistan is considered, there is an opportuni-
ty to take a bold and meaningful step towards accountability for the con-
duct of local Afghan actors as well as those that enable it. Similarly, in 
Colombia, the US government provides military support to the Colombian 
government for its operations. Secret US assistance, such as eavesdrop-
ping, is funded via a multi-billion black budget. Since 2000, this secret 
support has been supplemented by a public USD 9 billion package of 
mostly military aid called ‘Plan Colombia’.107  
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It is likely that the US will have a hostile response to formal OTP 
investigations in Colombia and Afghanistan, particularly examination of 
external actors. However, the OTP’s continued apprehensive approach, 
which avoids conflict with major powers, can be mitigated by pointing the 
finger at all external actors equally. Boxing oneself in by rendering the 
consideration of external actors a standardized practice, via a policy an-
nouncement, would render such an approach a fait accompli. Such a status 
would increase, via standardization, the consideration of external actors. It 
would establish a stigma around the conduct of providing such support. 
This is needed not only to provide justice to victims, but most importantly 
to reintroduce ICC credibility and efficacy for preventing future war and 
crimes we know accompany it. 
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22. The Standard of Proof in 
Preliminary Examinations 
Matthew E. Cross* 
The ICC is, at times, a controversial institution. Perhaps the most com-
mon allegation is that the Court, and especially the Office of the Prosecu-
tor, has in some way exercised an inappropriate degree of selectivity in 
the situations where investigations are opened, or the time at which inves-
tigations are opened. The Prosecutor’s answer has been to stress that sit-
uation selection is an essentially legal question:1 an investigation shall be 
opened if and when it is determined that the conditions specified in Article 
53(1) of the Statute are met. Such an answer is based on the intention of 
the international community in drafting the Rome Statute, as it is under-
stood. Yet another question necessarily follows from this premise: when 
are the conditions of Article 53(1) met? In other words, what standard of 
proof is applied, and what are the implications of this standard? That is 
the focus of this chapter. Only with clarity about this concept can there be 
a meaningful assessment of the ‘quality’ of any preliminary examination. 
Discussion of the standard of proof may seem prosaic, perhaps even 
trite, to most lawyers. After all, the standard of proof is usually the foun-
dation for legal discussion, its meaning commonly accepted and the un-
derlying assumptions well known and undisputed. But this may not be so 
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in the context of preliminary examinations, given the unusual – perhaps 
even unique – object and purpose of this procedure. To the extent this 
object and purpose is contested, this may imply favouring different ap-
proaches. For example, many (but by no means all) domestic legal sys-
tems would accept the principle that all reported crimes should result in an 
investigation. Such a principle would suggest that any preliminary exami-
nation, as the gateway to investigation, should necessarily apply a very 
low standard of proof (in essence, merely looking to whether a criminal 
complaint exists). Yet it might equally be argued that the ICC cannot 
properly be compared with national authorities, and that the Statute re-
flects an inherent principle of selectivity. The Court is not mandated to 
investigate and prosecute every crime within its jurisdiction but, for ex-
ample, only those which are admissible before it. Such a view favours a 
standard of proof which is somewhat higher, sufficient at least to provide 
a rational distinction between those situations which meet the conditions 
in the Statute and those which do not. 
It is notable that the Court’s (relatively few) judicial decisions ad-
dressing Article 53(1) are rarely unanimous.2 Suspicions that there may 
not (yet) be universal agreement about the applicable standard of proof 
should also be raised by the recent Comoros litigation, in which for the 
first time a Pre-Trial Chamber (by majority) requested the Prosecutor to 
reconsider her decision not to open an investigation.3 In seeking to appeal 
the decision, the Prosecutor asserted that the majority had erred not only 
in its conclusions and the standard of review applied but also in its inter-
pretation of the ‘legal standard’ in Article 53(1)4 – a matter which she 
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described as being of “near-constitutional importance”, with “the potential 
to affect all situations currently undergoing preliminary examination”.5 
She concluded: “To any extent that the standard to be applied by the Pros-
ecution is lower than that suggested by the plain words of the Statute, this 
may radically affect the scope of the Court’s operations, now and for the 
years to come”.6 
Greater clarity about the standard of proof applicable to preliminary 
examinations will yield some particular benefits, beyond dispelling the 
myth that the Prosecutor’s analysis is purely oriented to delivering some 
kind of ‘preferred’ consequence. To the extent that the Prosecutor must 
                                                                                                                        
4 International Criminal Court, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Com-
oros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, Notice of 
Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to initiate an investigation” (ICC-01/13-34), 27 July 2015, ICC-01/13-35, 
para. 20 (‘Comoros Notice of Appeal’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/50ca53/). 
5 Ibid., paras. 5, 23. 
6 Ibid., para. 23. By majority, the appeal was dismissed as inadmissible, since the Comoros 
Reconsideration Request was not considered a decision with respect to admissibility in the 
meaning of Article 82(1)(a) of the Statute. However, the Appeals Chamber emphasised that, 
consequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s views do not bind the Prosecutor in conducting her 
reconsideration: International Criminal Court, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on 
the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate 
an investigation”, 6 November 2015, ICC-01/13-51, paras. 59–60, 64, 66 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/a43856/). The Prosecutor subsequently published her “final decision”, 
in which she confirmed her disagreement with the standard of proof adopted by the majori-
ty of the Pre-Trial Chamber: International Criminal Court, Situation on the Registered Ves-
sels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
Office of the Prosecutor, Notice of Prosecutor’s Final Decision under Rule 108(3), 29 No-
vember 2017, ICC-01/13-57, Annex I, paras. 3-4, 8-9, 12-35 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/298503/). At the time of finalising this chapter, the Government of the Comoros and 
the Prosecution continue to dispute any binding quality of the legal reasoning in the Como-
ros Reconsideration Request, and the Pre-Trial Chamber is likely to rule further on the 
matter: International Criminal Court, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of 
the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Government of the 
Union of the Comoros, Public Redacted Version of “Application for Judicial Review by 
the Government of the Union of the Comoros”, 26 February 2018, ICC-01/13-58-Red 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/24c550/); International Criminal Court, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom 
of Cambodia, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecution’s Response to the Government of the 
Union of the Comoros’ “Application for Judicial Review” (ICC-01/13-58) (Lack of Juris-
diction), 13 March 2018, ICC-01/13-61 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a17312/). 
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undertake a concrete legal assessment which surpasses a clear threshold, 
this has obvious implications for her approach – particularly in evaluating 
the available information; her possible actions when confronted with an 
apparent insufficiency of information; and in the nature and extent of the 
findings she may make in seeking to open an investigation, or terminating 
a preliminary examination. Furthermore, although there is no hierarchy of 
crimes within the Statute – in the sense that no Article 5 crime is a priori 
worthier of investigation than any other7 – practical considerations may 
make some crimes more amenable to identification at the preliminary 
examination stage than others. An appreciation of the standard of proof 
also sheds further light on the nature and limits of the discretion afforded 
to the Prosecutor in situation selection, the applicable standard of judicial 
review, and the nature and scope of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s oversight 
functions in this area. 
From these considerations, it is concluded that the standard of proof 
in Article 53(1) may imply a relatively narrow, and essentially procedural, 
function for preliminary examinations. There is a clear need for compre-
hensive and reliable reporting of alleged human rights abuses and interna-
tional crimes, in the fashion successfully implemented by many interna-
tional bodies and NGOs, but this is not the primary role of preliminary 
examinations – even though, on occasion and as a matter of her discretion, 
the Prosecutor may choose to provide a more fulsome analysis than is 
legally required.  
It follows from the application of a standard of proof that a prelimi-
nary examination – insofar as its external, public results are concerned – 
will not simply be an account of suspicions or allegations of crime, but a 
selective assessment of those allegations which meet the standard of proof. 
Accordingly, the public conclusion of a preliminary examination will not 
necessarily be a reliable guide to the contours of the subsequent investiga-
tion. Frequently, there may be alleged (or even unknown) crimes which 
cannot be substantiated to the Article 53(1) standard in the preliminary 
                                                   
7 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Preamble, Articles 5, 
53 (‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/); International Criminal Court, 
Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Office 
of the Prosecutor, Prosecution’s Final Submissions following the Appeal Hearing, 19 Janu-
ary 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3597 A A2 A3, para. 25 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
70e8cd/). 
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examination stage, but which can be established by investigative measures 
thereafter. Conversely, it is only when a preliminary examination is closed 
without proceeding to open an investigation that the Prosecutor may be 
obliged – at least for situations referred to the Court – to give a reasoned 
analysis explaining the basis for her view that the available information 
does not support any alleged crime, to the requisite standard of proof. This 
is necessary in order to allow the Pre-Trial Chamber to undertake any 
review which might be triggered, applying an appropriate standard of 
scrutiny. 
22.1. Interpreting Article 53(1) of the Statute: Defining the Standard 
of Proof 
In its chapeau, Article 53(1) states generally that:  
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made 
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or 
she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed 
under this Statute. 
In making this determination, Article 53(1) further requires that:  
a) the information available provides “a reasonable basis to believe” 
that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been commit-
ted;8  
b) there is at least one potential case which would be admissible, in the 
meaning of Article 17 (that is, complementarity and gravity);9 and  
                                                   
8 Ibid., Article 53(1)(a). 
9 Ibid., Article 53(1)(b). Although this provision refers to “the case”, this means a “potential 
case”: International Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investiga-
tion into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 50 
(‘Kenya Article 15 Decision’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/); International 
Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14, paras. 190–91 
(‘Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7a6c19/). It suffices, 
moreover, if the admissibility of at least one “potential case” is established to the requisite 
standard: International Criminal Court, Situation in Georgia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation, 27 January 2016, ICC-
01/15-12, paras. 39, 46, 50 (‘Georgia Article 15 Decision’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/a3d07e/). 
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c) there are not “substantial reasons to believe” that opening an inves-
tigation would be contrary to the interests of justice.10 
From the plain text of these provisions, the last analysis – the “in-
terests of justice”’ assessment – is clearly different in nature from the oth-
er two. The first two address the Prosecutor’s appreciation of the facts as 
they presently exist; the last is directed to the Prosecutor’s anticipation of 
the consequences of any investigation and an evaluation of whether those 
consequences are consistent with the notion of ‘justice’.  
The text of the Statute further illustrates the distinction of the “in-
terests of justice” assessment from the other criteria, not only by setting a 
different test (“substantial reasons” rather than “reasonable basis”), but 
also by providing a different oversight structure.11 Likewise, both the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the Prosecution have recognised Article 53(1)(c) as a 
more overt exercise of prosecutorial discretion.12  
For these reasons, Article 53(1)(c) should be treated differently 
from Article 53(1)(a) and (b), and does not represent the straightforward 
application of a standard of proof to given information. In this chapter, 
therefore, it is recognised as a distinct and separate exercise of discretion, 
as a final restraint on the first two criteria (which are largely law- and 
fact-driven), but it is not considered within the discussion of the ‘standard 
of proof’ as such.  
By contrast, Article 53(1)(a) and (b) – the jurisdiction and admissi-
bility analyses – should be understood to be based on the same legal 
standard: whether or not there is a “reasonable basis” to believe the rele-
vant facts exist, based on the information available. Unlike Article 
53(1)(a), Article 53(1)(b) does not itself make any direct reference to the 
standard upon which the Prosecutor shall determine the facts relevant to 
whether a potential case is or would be admissible at the preliminary ex-
amination stage. Yet four cogent reasons support the view that these pro-
                                                   
10 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(c), see supra note 7. 
11 Ibid., Article 53(1), 53(3). 
12 See Comoros Reconsideration Request, para. 14, see supra note 3 (contrasting the “discre-
tion” in Article 53(1)(c) with the “exacting legal requirements” of Article 53(1)(a) and (b)); 
Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, p. 1 (re-
ferring to the “exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion” in Article 53(1)(c)) (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/bb02e5/). 
22. The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 219 
visions apply the same approach to different criteria.13 First, both provi-
sions are equally subject to the chapeau of Article 53(1), which refers to 
the requirement of a “reasonable basis to proceed”.14 Second, notwith-
standing their different wording, both Article 53(1)(a) and (b) have a simi-
lar purpose: requiring an assessment of certain facts based on the availa-
ble information – which is different from Article 53(1)(c). Third, the text 
of Article 53(1)(b), by referring to a conditional assessment of admissibil-
ity (“would be”) manifestly does not require an absolute assessment. 
Fourth, if Article 53(1)(b) does not apply a “reasonable basis” standard, it 
is very hard to discern what alternative standard would be applied for the 
factual assessments which are no less inherent in determininations of 
complementarity and gravity than of jurisdiction.15 
                                                   
13 See also Kenya Article 15 Decision, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul”, para. 
17, see supra note 9. 
14 Notably, in concluding the negotiations for the ICC Statute, the diplomatic conference 
declined to adjust the reference to “reasonable basis” in the chapeau of Article 53(1), even 
though the question had been raised whether a broader term might be needed to capture the 
three criteria in what would become Article 53(1)(a) to (c). Consequently, it can be inferred 
that the drafters saw the concept of a “reasonable basis” as the threshold underlying all rel-
evant determinations in Article 51(1). See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of 
the International Criminal Court: an Article-by-Article Evolution of the Statute, vol. 2, 
Transnational Publishers, 2005, pp. 337 (reproducing the Drafting Committee’s 1998 draft, 
Article 54, which was the result of the diplomatic negotiations at Rome, stating that “[t]he 
Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an 
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed”), 
338 (reproducing the Preparatory Committee’s 1998 draft, Article 54, which was the basis 
for the diplomatic negotiations, stating that “the Prosecutor shall […] initiate an investiga-
tion unless the Prosecutor concludes that there is no reasonable basis for a prosecution”, 
accompanied by a note: “The term ‘reasonable basis’ in the opening clause is also used in 
the criteria listed in paragraph 2(i). If the latter is retained, a broader term in the opening 
clause might be necessary in order to cover all the criteria listed under paragraph 2”) (here-
inafter ‘Bassiouni’). Cf. Manuel Ventura, “The ‘Reasonable Basis to Proceed’ threshold in 
the Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire propio motu investigation decisions: The International Crimi-
nal Court’s lowest evidentiary standard?”, in The Law and Practice of International Courts 
and Tribunals, 2013, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 49, at p. 61 (hereinafter ‘Ventura’). 
15 See also, for example, International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper 
on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, paras. 46–58 (complementarity assess-
ments are based on ascertaining the relevant facts, and applying the law to them) (‘Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/); Giuliano 
Turone, “Powers and duties of the Prosecutor”, in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2002, p. 1152 (describing the “fluctuating” nature of the admissibility assessment) 
(hereinafter ‘Turone’). 
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Consistent with the case law of the Court, and the general approach 
in public international law, provisions of the Statute should be interpreted 
according to the principles set out in the Vienna Convention.16 According-
ly, this analytical framework should be adopted to consider the meaning 
of the “reasonable basis to believe” standard in Article 53(1). 
22.1.1. Ordinary Meaning of the Term “Reasonable Basis to 
Believe” in Article 53(1) 
Article 53(1) states that, based on the available information, the Prosecu-
tor must be satisfied of a “reasonable basis” to proceed. More concretely, 
as specified in Article 53(1)(a), this means a “reasonable basis to believe” 
certain relevant facts. 
There is wide consensus about the meaning of the word “reasona-
ble”, including in the specific context of Article 53(1). To begin with, the 
dictionary definition of a “reasonable belief” is one which is “in accord-
ance with reason; not irrational, absurd or ridiculous” or which is “based 
on specific and objective grounds”.17 Pre-Trial Chambers of the Court – 
                                                   
16 See, for example, International Criminal Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary 
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, 13 
July 2006, ICC-01/04-168, paras. 6, 33, 40 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a60023/); In-
ternational Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto and 
Sang, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of [Mr] William Samoei Ruto and Mr 
Joshua Arap Sang against the decision of Trial Chamber V (A) of 17 April 2014 entitled 
“Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness Summonses and resulting Request for 
State Party Cooperation”, 9 October 2014, ICC-01/09-01/11-1598, para. 105 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/e5eb09/); International Criminal Court, Situation in [REDACTED], 
Prosecutor v. [REDACTED], Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of [REDACTED], 15 February 2016, ICC-ACRed-01/16, paras. 53, 
55–57, 61–62 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c01204/); International Criminal Court, Sit-
uation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber, Judge Fernández de Gurmen-
di’s separate and partially dissenting opinion to the Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-15, para. 10 (‘Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
ea2793/). 
17 “Reasonable”, in Oxford English Dictionary Online, meaning A.4.a, example sentence 2 
(available on its web site). See also Georghios M. Pikis, The Rome Statute for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Analysis of the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
Regulations of the Court and Supplementary Instruments, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, pp. 104 
(mn. 256: “good reason”), 264 (mn. 624: “fair[] infer[ence]”), 268 (mn. 636) (hereinafter 
‘Pikis’); Morten Bergsmo et al., “Article 53: initiation of an investigation”, in Otto 
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which are also called upon to apply the Article 53(1) standard when mak-
ing decisions under Article 15(4), pursuant to Rule 4818 – have consistent-
ly characterised it as a rational or sensible conclusion based on the availa-
ble information.19 The late Judge Kaul, for example, stated that it requires 
“a serious, thorough and well-considered approach”, which would not be 
                                                                                                                        
Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, 3rd edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2016, p. 1370, mn. 12 (“due considera-
tion”) (hereinafter ‘Bergsmo et al.’). 
18 See also Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 21, see supra note 9; Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 
Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, para. 13, see supra note 16; 
International Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Public Redacted Version of ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi’, ICC-
01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, 9 November 2017, ICC-01/17-9-Red, para. 28 (‘Bu-
rundi Article 15 Decision’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8f2373/). 
19 Kenya Article 15 Decision, paras. 30 (“reasonable means ‘fair and sensible’, or ‘within the 
limits of reason’”), 33 (“it is sufficient” that a conclusion “can be supported on the basis of 
the […] information available”), 35 (Article 53(1), in the context of Article 15(4), requires 
“a sensible […] justification for a belief”), see supra note 9; Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Deci-
sion, para. 24, see supra note 9; Georgia Article 15 Decision, para. 25, see supra note 9; 
Burundi Article 15 Decision, para. 30, see supra note 18. In the context of the ‘beyond rea-
sonable doubt’ standard, see further International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rutagan-
da v. the Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 26 May 2003, ICTR-96-3-A, para. 488 
(a reasonable possibility is “based on logic and common sense” and has “a rational link to 
the evidence, lack of evidence, or inconsistencies in the evidence”; it is not “imaginary or 
frivolous […] based on empathy or prejudice”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/40bf4a/); 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and 
Šljivančanin, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 5 May 2009, IT-95-13/1-A, para. 220 (“a fair 
or rational hypothesis which may be derived from the evidence” and not any “hypothesis 
or possibility”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/40bc41/); International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Galić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 30 November 
2006, IT-98-29-A, para. 259 (“just because there is some possibility, however slight, that 
an incident could have happened in another way does not in itself raise reasonable doubt”) 
(‘Galić Appeal Judgment’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c81a32/). The ICC Appeals 
Chamber has cited Rutaganda with approval: International Criminal Court, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment 
on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber II entitled “Judgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the Statute”, 27 February 2015, ICC-01/04-02/12-271, para. 109 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dce8f/); International Criminal Court, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Appeals Chamber, Joint Dis-
senting Opinion of Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova and Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 27 February 
2015, ICC-01/04-02/12-271-AnxA, paras. 54–57 (‘Ngudjolo AJ, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Trendafilova and Tarfusser’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/45f67c/). 
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satisfied by “a somewhat generous or only summary evaluation whereby 
any information, of even [a] fragmentary nature”, suffices.20 
Likewise, the drafting history of the Statute suggests that the ‘rea-
sonableness’ standard ultimately employed in Article 53(1) requires some-
thing more than a mere “possibility” – a term rejected early in the drafting 
process21 – and at least the existence of “objective criteria”.22 Article 42(1) 
also contemplates the Prosecutor receiving “substantiated information on 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”.23 
It would seem to follow that while information meeting the Article 
53(1) standard need not be comprehensive or conclusive,24 it must amount 
to something more than an entirely unsupported allegation. In other words, 
it would not suffice for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation based 
merely on her determination that the allegations in a referral or Article 15 
communication, if true, could satisfy the elements of at least one crime 
under the Statute. She would, instead, need to be assured that there was at 
least some factual foundation for those allegations, consistent with the 
                                                   
20 Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 15, see supra note 9. 
See also Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gur-
mendi, para. 43, see supra note 16. 
21 For example, the Preparatory Committee in 1997 opted to replace the term “possible basis” 
with “reasonable basis”: Bassiouni, pp. 348 (reproducing the Preparatory Committee’s 
1997 draft, Article 26, requiring an investigation “unless the Prosecutor concludes that 
there is no reasonable basis”), 354 (“reproducing the Preparatory Committee’s 1996 draft, 
Article 27, requiring determination “whether the complaint provides or is likely to provide 
a [possible] [reasonable] basis”), 363 (reproducing Article 26 of the ILC’s Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind), see supra note 14. See also Bergsmo 
et al., pp. 1369–1370, mn. 10, see supra note 14. 
22 By analogy, in the context of then Article 59, concerning the arrest of a suspect: see Report 
of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
UN Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 14 April 1998, p. 86, fn. 10 (“reasonable grounds […] em-
body objective criteria”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/816405/). 
23 ICC Statute, Article 42(1) (emphasis added), see supra note 7. If read in isolation, the 
relevant sentence of Article 42(1) could be read disjunctively to suggest that State and UN 
Security Council referrals need not be “substantiated”, but only communications under Ar-
ticle 15(1) need to be. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the context of Arti-
cle 53(1) – also reflected in the constant practice of the OTP – which requires all prelimi-
nary examinations to be based on a substantive evaluation of the information made availa-
ble. See Article 53(1); further infra note 26. 
24 Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 27, see supra note 9; Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, para. 31, see supra note 16; Georgia 
Article 15 Decision, para. 25, see supra note 9. 
22. The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 223 
general practice of the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 15(4).25 Nothing 
in the Statute or the Rules supports any distinction in the application of 
Article 53(1) between referred and proprio motu preliminary examina-
tions, once formally commenced.26 
By contrast, in Comoros, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
suggested that the Prosecutor must, in her preliminary examination, ac-
cept as true allegations which are not “manifestly false”.27 This view, ex-
pressed in the context also of the majority’s assertion that the Article 53(1) 
assessment “does not necessitate any complex or detailed process of anal-
ysis”,28 would seem to support a more formalistic approach, focusing on 
the characteristics of an individual referral, communication, or piece of 
information, and not on an overall assessment of whether the inference to 
be drawn – for example, an element of a crime – is reasonable.29  
The majority did not address relevant previous jurisprudence on 
these issues, and it is unclear whether it viewed its analysis as following 
or departing from this prior case law. In Georgia, however, the same ma-
jority cited all this jurisprudence together, implying that these opinions are 
consistent.30 Yet, on their face, it is difficult to see how this is so. It is thus 
appropriate to consider these interpretations of the standard of proof in 
Article 53(1) in the context of the Statute more broadly, and the object and 
purpose of these provisions. In particular, however, it is hard to see how 
                                                   
25 Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 18 (“the Prosecutor 
must demonstrate his determination under Article 53(1)(a) of the Statute and substantiate it 
with adequate material”), see supra note 9. 
26  Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 12, 27, 35, see supra note 15. 
27 Comoros Reconsideration Request, para. 35, see supra note 3. 
28 Ibid., para. 13. 
29 In other contexts, this approach is not correct. The applicable standard of proof should be 
applied to the legal elements which must be satisfied, and should not be applied in isola-
tion to specific pieces of evidence. See, for example, Ngudjolo AJ, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Trendafilova and Tarfusser, paras. 34, 40–41, see supra note 19; Galić Appeal 
Judgment, para. 218, see supra note 19. 
30 Georgia Article 15 Decision, para. 25, see supra note 9. Judge Kovács again wrote sepa-
rately, disagreeing with the majority on the extent to which the Pre-Trial Chamber should, 
under Article 15(4), undertake an independent review of the available information. 
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this approach can be reconciled with the duty to evaluate the information 
available, which implies some kind of substantive analysis.31 
The Georgia decision is also notable for its reference, in the context 
of admissibility under Article 53(1)(b), to “reasonable doubts” as to 
whether the Russian authorities were “unable” to investigate in the mean-
ing of Article 17.32 This may simply have been a recognition of a factual 
ambiguity. But if the term is afforded legal significance, it suggests that 
the majority considered the standard of proof under Article 53(1)(b) to be 
higher than that under Article 53(1)(a) – on the “reasonable basis to be-
lieve” standard, the existence of a “reasonable doubt” is irrelevant:33 what 
matters is whether there is a reasonable basis to believe a given fact; the 
possibility that there is also a reasonable basis to doubt that fact is imma-
terial. Such an approach by the Georgia majority would also seem to be 
inconsistent with the approach of the same majority in Comoros, where 
they emphasised (still in the context of admissibility, albeit sufficient 
gravity rather than complementarity) that “reasonable alternative explana-
tions” did not matter, provided that one reasonable explanation supported 
the requirements of Article 53(1).34 The incidence of such linguistic ambi-
guities only underlines the need for clarity in the interpretation of Article 
53(1). 
22.1.2. Context of the Standard of Proof in Article 53(1) 
The “reasonable basis to believe” standard is undoubtedly a “low” stand-
ard,35 and the lowest “evidentiary threshold” in the Statute.36 An obvious 
                                                   
31  See infra text accompanying note 123. In this context, the Burundi Pre-Trial Chamber 
notably referred to a concept of “manifest[] unreasonable[ness]”, which may be an attempt 
to reframe the Comoros concept of ‘manifest falsity’ more clearly within the terms of arti-
cle 53(1): Burundi Article 15 Decision, para. 138, see supra note 18. Yet, if so, it is still 
unconvincing – while appropriately shifting the focus somewhat to what is a reasonable 
conclusion, this is still qualified by the concept of what is ‘manifest’ – which itself depends 
on the nature of the evaluation which has been undertaken and the amount of information 
made available. 
32 Georgia Article 15 Decision, para. 46, see supra note 9. 
33 See, for example, infra note 37, and accompanying text. 
34 See, for example, Comoros Reconsideration Request, para. 41 (“the Prosecutor erred in not 
recognising one of the reasonable alternative explanations of the available information, on 
the absence of which she then relied in concluding that the gravity requirement was not 
met”), see supra note 3. 
35 Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 15, see supra note 9. 
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contextual analysis would thus suggest that it must be interpreted to en-
sure it is meaningfully distinct from the other standards of proof which 
the Statute contains. It is uncontroversial that it is less than proof beyond 
reasonable doubt (that is, the standard of proof for criminal conviction, 
requiring that the relevant conclusions constitute the only reasonable in-
ference from the available information),37 and less than “sufficient evi-
dence to establish substantial grounds to believe” the relevant facts (that is, 
the standard for confirmation of charges).38 But there may be insights to 
be drawn from consideration of the relationship between the standards of 
proof in Article 53(1), on the one hand, and Articles 53(2) and 58, on the 
other. In particular, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the Article 
53(1) standard is the lowest of three alternative standards of proof than to 
suggest it is the lowest of five alternative standards of proof (which would, 
presumably, make it very low indeed). Answering this question depends 
on an analysis of Articles 53(2) and 58. 
Article 53(2) provides that the Prosecutor must “inform the Pre-
Trial Chamber and the State making a referral”, or the UN Security Coun-
cil if it made a referral, if she decides that “there is not a sufficient basis 
for a prosecution” in a situation under investigation. Given the independ-
ence of the Prosecutor in “conducting investigations” under Article 42(1), 
Article 53(2) is understood to apply only if the Prosecutor determines she 
cannot initiate “a” prosecution – in the sense of “any” or “at least one”39 – 
                                                                                                                        
36 Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, 
para. 43, see supra note 16; Burundi Article 15 Decision, para. 30; see supra note 18. 
37 Kenya Article 15 Decision, paras. 33-34, see supra note 9; Georgia Article 15 Decision, 
para. 25, see supra note 9. See also International Criminal Court, Situation in Darfur, Su-
dan, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, 3 February 2010, ICC-02/05-01/09-73, paras. 32–33 (‘Al 
Bashir Article 58 Appeal Decision’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9ada8e/). See further, 
for example, ICC Statute, Article 66(3), see supra note 7; International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 25 Feb-
ruary 2004, IT-98-32-A, para. 120 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e35d81/). 
38 See ICC Statute, Article 61(7), see supra note 7. 
39 As such, it cannot properly be seen as a “step” in the process from preliminary examina-
tion to investigation to prosecution. Rather, it is an alternative to prosecution, leading to 
the termination of an investigation. It applies only if the Prosecutor decides that she cannot 
make any applications under Article 58. By contrast, provided the Prosecutor retains the 
intention to bring at least one prosecution within any open investigation, she retains full 
discretion as to whether to make an application under Article 58 or not in any particular 
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in a situation.40 Article 53(2) further defines that an “insufficient basis” to 
prosecute means the absence of “a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek 
a warrant or summons under Article 58”, 41  the inadmissibility of the 
case,42 or a determination that a “prosecution is not in the interests of jus-
tice”.43 For all these reasons, it follows, therefore, that Article 53(2) does 
not contain an independent standard of proof,44 but rather is contingent 
                                                                                                                        
case. Notably, and in contrast to the apparently limited scope of Article 53(2)(a), this en-
sures that she can determine whether to initiate a prosecution not only on the basis of her 
view that she will meet the Article 58 standard, but more broadly on the prospects of ob-
taining a successful conviction. See also International Criminal Court, Office of the Prose-
cutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, paras. 25–55 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205/). Cf. Bergsmo et al., p. 1370 (margin no. 11), see 
supra note 17; De Meester, “Article 53: Initiation of an investigation”, in Mark Klamberg 
(ed.), Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, Torkel Opsahl Aca-
demic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 389 (fn. 419), 395 (fns. 426–427) (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/aa0e2b/); Matthew Brubacher, “Prosecutorial discretion within the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2004, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 
71, at pp. 79–80 (hereinafter ‘Brubacher’). 
40 Self-evidently, if the Prosecutor was required to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
referring party every time she determined that a particular person could not be prosecut-
ed – a population which could run into the thousands – she would no longer be acting in-
dependently but under an intrusive form of supervision. See also Morten Bergsmo, Freder-
ik Harhoff, and ZHU Dan, “Article 42: the Office of the Prosecutor”, in Otto Triffterer and 
Kai Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, 
3rd edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2016, p. 1267, at p. 1270, mn. 9 (“The Pre-Trial 
Chamber may not impose conditions as to how, when or where the investigations are to be 
carried out, for which alleged offences and against whom. These decisions fall within the 
purview of the Prosecutor’s prerogative”) (hereinafter ‘Bergsmo et al.: Article 42’); Daniel 
D. Ntanda Nsereko, “Prosecutorial discretion before national courts and international tri-
bunals”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 124, at p. 138 
(hereinafter ‘Nsereko’). See further Hassan B. Jallow, “Prosecutorial discretion and inter-
national criminal justice”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 1, 
p. 145, at p. 155. 
41 ICC Statute, Article 53(2)(a), see supra note 7. 
42 Ibid., Article 53(2)(b). 
43 Ibid., Article 53(2)(c). 
44 Cf. Marco Longobardo, “Everything is relative, even gravity: Remarks on the assessment 
of gravity in ICC preliminary examinations, and the Mavi Marmara affair”, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2016, vol. 14, no. 4, p. 1011, at p. 1022 (hereinafter ‘Lon-
gobardo’); Bergsmo et al., p. 1370 (mn. 11), see supra note 17; Kai Ambos, Treatise on In-
ternational Criminal Law: Volume III: International Criminal Procedure, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016, p. 380 (hereinafter ‘Ambos’); Brubacher, pp. 79–80, see supra note 39. 
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upon the Prosecutor’s assessment of the prospects for meeting (at least) 
the standard of proof contained in Article 58.45  
Article 58 provides that the Pre-Trial Chamber shall issue a warrant 
of arrest or summons to appear, at the Prosecutor’s application, if it is 
satisfied that: “[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”.46 Whether the 
Pre-Trial Chamber issues a warrant or summons depends on its further 
assessment whether: “[t]he arrest of the person appears necessary” to en-
sure their appearance for trial, to preserve the integrity of the investigation 
or Court proceedings, or to prevent the commission of relevant crimes;47 
or whether: “a summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s appearance”.48 
The Appeals Chamber has emphasised that the Article 58 standard 
must be something less than the two aforementioned standards under Ar-
ticles 61 and 66(3),49 and stressed that, “at this preliminary stage, it does 
not have to be certain that th[e] person committed the alleged offence”.50 
Although opinions may vary as to whether or not the Article 58 standard 
should properly be equated to the concept of ‘reasonable suspicion’ as 
articulated and understood by the European Court of Human Rights,51 the 
                                                   
45 It is in this sense that it is likely that the distinct terminology in Article 53(2) was advertent: 
cf. Longobardo, p. 1022 (citing United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Official Records: Volume III: Re-
ports and other documents, UN Doc. A/Conf.183/13 (Vol. III), August 2002, p. 292 (notes 
contained in the transmittal letters from the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole to 
the Chairman of the Drafting Committee) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e03967/)), see 
supra note 44. The note of 26 June 1998 simply states that: “[i]n article 54”, as it was, “the 
words ‘reasonable basis’ and ‘sufficient basis’ are used intentionally in different para-
graphs”. See also Bergsmo et al., p. 1375, mn. 29, see supra note 17. 
46 ICC Statute, Article 58(1)(a), see supra note 7. See also Article 58(6), (7) (a summons may 
be issued if “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the crime 
alleged”). 
47 Ibid., Article 58(1)(b). 
48 Ibid., Article 58(7). 
49 Al Bashir Article 58 Appeal Decision, para. 30 (“a Pre-Trial Chamber should not require a 
level of proof that would be required for the confirmation of charges or for conviction”), 
see supra note 37. See also paras. 32–33. 
50 Ibid., para. 31. 
51 Cf. Ibid. See Michael Ramsden and CHUNG Cecilia, “‘Reasonable grounds to believe’: 
An unreasonably unclear evidentiary threshold in the ICC Statute”, in Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice, 2015, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 555 (hereinafter ‘Ramsden and CHUNG’); 
Amrutanshu Dash and Dhruv Sharma, “Arrest warrants at the International Criminal Court: 
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practice of the ICC nonetheless shows that Article 58 is not concerned 
with mere abstract suspicions but rather “‘grounds’ founded on evidential 
material giving rise to a reasonable belief that a crime has been commit-
ted”.52 This necessarily follows from Article 58(2)(d), which requires the 
Prosecutor at least to summarise “the evidence and any other information” 
which “establish” that the standard of proof is met.53 
Some authorities have gone further and suggested that the require-
ment of “reasonable grounds to believe” in Article 58 must therefore be a 
distinct (higher) standard of proof than Article 53(1) (“reasonable basis to 
believe”). Thus, the Kenya Pre-Trial Chamber stated without further rea-
soning that: 
bearing in mind that the ‘reasonable basis’ standard under ar-
ticle 15 of the Statute is even lower than that provided under 
article 58 of the Statute […], the Chamber considers that in 
the context of the present request, all the information provid-
ed by the Prosecutor certainly need not point towards only 
one conclusion.54 
This reasoning seems to have been accepted uncritically by the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor to date,55 and by some academic commentators. 
                                                                                                                        
reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds to believe?”, in International Criminal Law 
Review, 2016, vol. 16, no. 1, p. 158; Ventura, pp. 63–65, see supra note 14. 
52 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecu-
tor v. Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise 
en liberté provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”, 13 February 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-824, 
“Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis”, para. 5 (emphasis added) (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/ff3bd8/). 
53 See, for example, Ambos, p. 401, see supra note 44. Cf. Ramsden and CHUNG, p. 572, 
see supra note 51. 
54 Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 34 (emphasis added), see supra note 9. See also paras. 27, 
29. 
55 See, for example, International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Hon-
duras: Article 5 Report, October 2015, para. 37 (fn. 3: referring to “the higher ‘reasonable 
grounds’ standard for arrest warrant applications under article 58”, citing Kenya Article 15 
Decision, para. 34, see supra note 9) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/54755a/); Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Un-
ion of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Situation on 
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) Report, 6 November 
2014, ICC-01/13-6-AnxA, para. 4 (fn. 4) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6b833a/). Indeed, 
it appears that this reasoning by the Kenya Pre-Trial Chamber was initially proposed by the 
Office: International Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Cham-
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Conceiving Article 53(1) as a ‘lower threshold’ has been justified on the 
basis that “[t]he level of information available to the prosecutor at the 
time of the preliminary examination is deemed to be less comprehensive 
and conclusive as opposed to the evidence gathered at the end of such an 
examination [sic]” (understood to mean ‘investigation’).56 It has also been 
suggested that the standard for commencing a prosecution (of an individ-
ual) should “logically” be higher than the standard for commencing an 
investigation of a situation “since the actual prosecution affects the rights 
of the accused, who should be presumed innocent”.57 
Yet on closer examination, this reasoning appears doubtful.58 First, 
the wording of the standards in Articles 53(1) and 58 is “almost the same” 
and “strikingly similar”.59 The only difference – between “grounds” and 
“basis” – is, at most, very fine.60 The other, equally authentic, linguistic 
versions of the Statute likewise reflect minor distinctions in terminology 
(not amounting to a substantive difference in connotation), and thus shed 
                                                                                                                        
ber, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 
2009, ICC-01/09-3, para. 103 (“The expression ‘reasonable basis’ in Article 15 indicates 
that a decision to authorize the commencement of an investigation shall be made pursuant 
to a lower standard than the one required for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or sum-
mons to appear.”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c63dcc/). 
56 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops and Tom Zwart, “The Flotilla Case before the ICC: the need 
to do justice while keeping heaven intact”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2015, 
vol. 15, no. 6, p. 1069, at p. 1082 (citing Bergsmo and Kruger in the first edition of 
Triffterer’s commentary; for the analogous passage of the third edition, see Bergsmo et al., 
p. 1370, mn. 12, see supra note 17) (hereinafter ‘Knoops and Zwart’). 
57 Longobardo, p. 1022, see supra note 44. See also pp. 1023–24, 1030; Ramsden and Ch-
ung, pp. 570 (“The fact that the object and purpose of Article 58 – to ascertain criminal re-
sponsibility of an individual – differs from that of Article 15(4) suggests that a uniform test 
is inappropriate for the two distinct stages”), 577, see supra note 51. 
58 Ibid., p. 569 (acknowledging “the lack of definitive consensus” on this issue). 
59 Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 29, see supra note 9; Ramsden and CHUNG, p. 569, see 
supra note 51. 
60 Compare, for example, “basis”, in Oxford English Dictionary Online, meanings II.8. 
(“That by or on which anything immaterial is supported or sustained; a foundation, sup-
port”), 9.b. (“That on which anything is reared, constructed, or established, and by which 
its constitution or operation is determined; groundwork, footing: a thing immaterial; a 
principle, a fact”), with “ground” (noun), meanings II.5.a. (“That on which a system, work, 
institution, art, or condition of things, is founded; the basis, foundation”), 5.c (“A circum-
stance on which an opinion, inference, argument, statement, or claim is founded, or which 
has given rise to an action, procedure, or mental feeling; a reason, motive […]”) (available 
on its web site). 
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little additional light; indeed, in Russian, the same terms are used for both 
Articles 53(1) and 58.61 Accordingly, bearing in mind the principle that 
like terms should be interpreted alike,62 the standards of proof in Articles 
53 and 58 should be read to be the same.63  
Second, although Articles 53 and 58 do indeed differ in their object 
and purpose (discussed further below),64 this is more than adequately ad-
dressed by the different scope of their application. It is not necessary to 
interpret Article 58 as imposing a higher standard of proof than Article 53 
because it requires proof of facts which are defined with much greater 
specificity, and hence necessarily more burdensome to establish.65 Unlike 
Article 53(1), Article 58 requires proof (at the relevant standard) that a 
particular identified person “committed a crime” – thus, it not only re-
quires evidence of the existence of a crime under Articles 5 or 70 but also 
that the identified person satisfied at least one mode of liability under Ar-
ticles 25 or 28.66 In practical terms, such evidence – often known as ‘link-
age’ evidence (who did what, and how?), as differentiated from ‘crime-
based’ evidence (what happened to the victims?) – is often the most diffi-
cult evidence to obtain in international criminal proceedings. It is thus 
appropriate to condition the beginning of a prosecution on the Prosecutor 
showing that the suspect is sufficiently implicated in the alleged crime – a 
                                                   
61 Compare, for example, ICC Statute, Article 53(1) (Arabic: “معقول أساس”; Chinese: “合理根
据”; French: “base raisonnable”; Russian: “разумные основания”; Spanish: “fundamento 
razonable”), with Article 58(1)(a) (Arabic: “ معقولة أسباب ”; Chinese: “合理理由”; French: 
“motifs raisonnables”; Russian: “разумные основания”; Spanish: “motivo razonable”), 
see supra note 7. 
62  See Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 
209; see also p. 181. 
63 See also Pikis, p. 264, mn. 626, see supra note 17: “A question arises as to whether there is 
any material difference between the above term [‘reasonable basis to proceed’] and the 
corresponding term used in article 15.3 [sic], notably ‘reasonable grounds to believe’. To 
my mind, the answer is in the negative. ‘Grounds’ are what provide the basis for a proposi-
tion. ‘Grounds’ and ‘basis’ in the context under consideration are synonymous terms.” 
Since the term “reasonable grounds” appears in the ICC Statute only in Article 58, Pikis’ 
reference to “article 15.3” in this context must be a typographic error. 
64 Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 29, see supra note 9. 
65 See also Ambos, pp. 380–81, see supra note 44. 
66 Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 29 (“the criminal responsibility of an individual” is “not 
at stake for the authorization of an investigation”), see supra note 9. See Ventura, pp. 76–
77, 80, see supra note 14. 
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showing which is not necessary to justify the opening of an investigation 
(when the perpetrator(s) may be unknown). But it does not necessarily 
follow from this that the standard of proof must be higher. Nor is such a 
view compelled simply by the fact that the Prosecutor has had the oppor-
tunity for investigation by this point.67 The point is simply that Articles 
53(1) and 58 are concerned with different questions.  
Moreover, considering the suspect’s right to liberty may be some-
thing of a red herring when defining the standard of proof under Article 
58,68 and consequently its relation with the standard of proof under Article 
53(1). This is not because human rights are irrelevant to the work of the 
Court – far from it69 – but because the determination whether to deprive 
the suspect of their liberty is not predicated on the standard of proof per se 
(that is, the standard by which the Prosecutor has supported her allega-
tions of the suspect’s criminal conduct), provided it is met, but on a fur-
ther and separate assessment of the necessity of detention. 70  This is 
demonstrated, first and most obviously, by the fact that Article 58 applies 
the same standard of proof (“reasonable grounds to believe”) irrespective 
whether the Prosecutor seeks an arrest warrant (triggering provisional 
detention) or a summons to appear (not triggering provisional deten-
tion).71 What differs in these circumstances is merely the ‘necessity’ anal-
ysis.72 Likewise, once a suspect has been detained, they are entitled to 
                                                   
67 Cf. Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 27, see supra note 9; Bergsmo et al., p. 1370, mns. 
11–12, see supra note 17. 
68 Cf. Ramsden and CHUNG, pp. 570-571, 573–575, see supra note 51; Longobardo, p. 1022, 
see supra note 44; Ventura, p. 76, see supra note 14. 
69 See, for example, ICC Statute, Article 21(3), see supra note 7; International Criminal 
Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on 
the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the 
Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, para. 36 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/1505f7/). 
70 Christopher K. Hall and Cedric Ryngaert, “Article 58: issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 3rd edition, C.H. 
Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2016, p. 1447, mn. 15. 
71 Compare ICC Statute, Article 58(1), with Article 58(7), see supra note 7. 
72 See also International Criminal Court, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Banda, 
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain against 
Trial Chamber IV’s issuance of a warrant of arrest, 3 March 2015, ICC-02/05-03/09-632-
Red, para. 25 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bb2b11/). 
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periodic reviews of the continuing necessity of their detention – but, in 
those reviews, a re-examination of the merits of the case against them will 
ordinarily be inappropriate and unnecessary.73  
To the extent that issuing a summons or arrest warrant (if public) 
may have some adverse reputational implications for the suspect, this 
limited harm is justified even by the “reasonable basis” to believe that the 
suspect committed one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The remedy also lies within their hands – appearing promptly before the 
Court (as a person still presumed to be innocent) triggers the confirmation 
of charges procedure, which will eliminate weak cases.74 
Therefore, it is not the function of Article 58 to test the strength of 
the Prosecutor’s case against the individual, and thus to control whether or 
not the case should be committed for trial.75 That is the distinct function 
of the confirmation of charges procedure – which must be accomplished 
within a “reasonable time” after the suspect’s arrival at the Court76 – and 
which does indeed imposes a higher standard of proof (“substantial 
grounds to believe”) than Articles 53(1) or 58. Precisely because Article 
58 proceedings occur ex parte, they are not well suited to serve as a 
‘gateway’ to trial. It is also plain that Article 58 is not concerned with 
examining the entirety of the Prosecutor’s case against the suspect, but 
only in verifying that there is a case against the suspect. Thus, the Prose-
cutor may not only seek amendment of an arrest warrant by “modifying or 
                                                   
73 See ICC Statute, Articles 60(2), 60(3), see supra note 7; International Criminal Court, 
Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Defence 
Request for the Interim Release of Dominic Ongwen”, 27 November 2015, ICC-02/04-
01/15-349-Red, paras. 6–13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f20956/). 
74 Cf. Ramsden and CHUNG, pp. 574–75, see supra note 51. 
75 Cf. Ibid., pp. 572–573 (arguing for a “high threshold” under article 58, but apparently 
justifying this on the basis that “a higher standard […] applied at the confirmation of 
charges stage” might better filter out weak cases). 
76 ICC Statute, Article 61(1), see supra note 7; International Criminal Court, Regulations of 
the Court, 6 December 2016, ICC-BD/01-05-16, regulation 53 (the confirmation decision 
shall be delivered within 60 days of the close of the confirmation hearing) (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/8a1f87/); International Criminal Court, Chambers Practice Manual, 
3rd edition, May 2017, pp. 7–8, 16 (advocating “[e]fforts […] to reduce the average time 
that passes between the first appearance and the commencement of the confirmation of 
charges hearing”, takining into account “the circumstances of each particular case”) 
(‘Chambers Practice Manual’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0ee26/). 
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adding to the crimes specified therein”,77 but may also add charges prior 
to the confirmation hearing.78 
For all these reasons, recognising the suspect’s liberty interest does 
not require a distinction in principle between the standard of proof appli-
cable when an investigation is initiated and when a prosecution is initiated. 
Rather, the suspect’s right to liberty is adequately guaranteed in the period 
between initiating the prosecution and confirming the charges by the on-
going assessment of the necessity of their detention, if indeed they are 
taken into custody at all. 
Third, even if we attempt, arguendo, to distinguish the standards of 
proof in Articles 53(1) and 58, there is the immediate practical difficulty 
of meaningfully doing so.79 Already, even if there are only three relevant 
standards of proof in the Statute, there is a tendency to define them purely 
on a relative basis – the confirmation standard (“substantial grounds to 
believe”) is ‘lower’ than the conviction standard (“beyond reasonable 
doubt”) and ‘greater’ than the “reasonable basis”/“reasonable grounds” 
standard(s).80  But in concrete terms, what is the difference between a 
“substantial ground” and a “reasonable ground”? And how much harder 
does this become to determine if it is further necessary to distinguish be-
tween a “substantial ground”, a “reasonable ground”, and a “reasonable 
basis”? In short, proliferating standards of proof are likely to lead to con-
ceptual confusion, and gradations based on mere semantics. This serves 
only to obscure the nature of the analysis, and favours neither the suspect 
nor the economy of judicial proceedings. 
                                                   
77 ICC Statute, Article 58(7), see supra note 7. 
78 See, for example, Chambers Practice Manual, pp. 11–12, see supra note 76; International 
Criminal Court, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Status 
Conference of 19 May 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-T-6-ENG, pp. 6–18 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/18d506/). For example, in the Ongwen case, although Mr. Ongwen was originally 
arrested on seven counts, charges were subsequently confirmed against him on 70 counts: 
compare International Criminal Court, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, 
Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Warrant of arrest 
for Dominic Ongwen, 8 July 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05-57, para. 30 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/7a2f0f/); with ICC, Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Onwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 23 March 2016, ICC-
02/04-01/15-422-Red, pp. 71–104 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/74fc6e/). 
79 See Ventura, pp. 78–80, see supra note 14. 
80 See supra note 49, and accompanying text. 
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A contextual analysis of Article 53(1) thus favours interpreting the 
standard of proof to be the same as the standard in Article 58,81 even 
though they are applied to different issues. Accordingly, the Article 53(1) 
standard of proof, while indeed being the lowest standard, is the lowest of 
three principal standards in the Statute.82 Recognising the link in this way 
between the standards of proof in Articles 53 and 58 does not necessarily 
lower the Article 58 standard but, rather, may simply illustrate that Article 
53(1) is also a meaningful legal requirement. It clarifies, in particular, that 
Article 53(1), like Article 58, requires at least some evidentiary basis. 
22.1.3. Object and Purpose of the Statute and Article 53(1): 
A Selective Approach to Investigations 
Finally, in interpreting the standard of proof in Article 53(1), it is helpful 
to consider its object and purpose, and indeed the object and purpose of 
the Statute as a whole.  
In Côte d’Ivoire, the Pre-Trial Chamber described the “underlying 
purpose” of Article 15(4) – which may be considered analogous to the 
Prosecutor’s function under Article 53(1) – as preventing “unwarranted, 
frivolous or politically motivated investigations”.83 But it may be that this 
statement still does not go quite far enough, or at least gives little clue as 
to what an ‘unwarranted’ investigation might mean, in the context of the 
Statute. 
The Preamble to the Statute recalls: “that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for inter-
national crimes” and emphasises that: “the International Criminal Court 
                                                   
81 See also Mark Klamberg, “Article 58: issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of 
arrest of a summons to appear”, in Mark Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the 
International Criminal Court, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, p. 426 
(fn. 464: “The threshold ‘reasonable grounds’ is the least demanding evidentiary require-
ment used in the ICC Statute”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa0e2b/). 
82 At least, three principal standards relevant to significant milestones of the criminal proc-
ess, such as investigation, prosecution, committal for trial, conviction, and so on. Other 
standards may apply as conditions for lesser procedural matters. See, for example, Ambos, 
p. 400 (noting that Article 55(2), relating to investigative safeguards for suspects, applies 
when there are mere “grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime”), see supra 
note 44. This standard, if based merely on the subjective opinion of the investigator, is in-
deed lower than the standard in Articles 53(1) and 58. 
83 Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, para. 21, see supra note 9. See also Kenya Article 15 
Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 15, see supra note 9. 
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established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions”. Moreover, although the crimes within the Court’s jurisdic-
tion are, as such, “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole”,84 the Statute nonetheless recognises that not all 
cases of such crimes are “of sufficient gravity to justify further action by 
the Court”.85 These principles thus imply that some element of selectivity, 
both of situations and cases, is inherent to the Court’s operation, and thus 
favour an interpretation of the standard of proof in Article 53(1) which 
may properly give effect to that interest. In particular, it suggests that the 
Court is not mandated to investigate every allegation of an Article 5 crime, 
but must at least establish that the allegation is sufficiently well-founded 
on its facts (even without the Court itself conducting an investigation) as 
well as being sufficiently grave and not subject to relevant domestic pro-
ceedings. 
There are also significant practical justifications confirming the ne-
cessity of a meaningful form of situation selectivity.  
Although the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor are of a finite 
size, the Statute does not expressly allow for the resource implications of 
a new investigation to be taken into account in the Prosecutor’s Article 53 
determination. Although laudable in principle, this silence might seem 
anomalous from a practical point of view. In the first years of the Court’s 
operation already, 11 situations are under investigation and/or prosecution, 
with another 10 under preliminary examination.86 And this is still at a time 
when the Statute remains far from universal ratification, and when some 
notable situations of apparent international crimes have not even been 
referred to the Court. By contrast, even the ‘basic size’ of the Office of the 
Prosecutor – which is, itself, aspirational and not yet fully funded by the 
ICC Assembly of States Parties – imposes significant limits on the num-
ber of active investigations and prosecutions that can be pursued at any 
                                                   
84 ICC Statute, Article 5, see supra note 7; see also Preamble. 
85 Ibid., Article 17(1)(d); see also Article 8(1) (“The Court shall have in respect of war crimes 
in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy”, emphasis added). 
86 At the time of writing, the situations presently under investigation are: Burundi, Central 
African Republic (I and II), Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Kenya, 
Libya, Mali, Sudan (Darfur), and Uganda. The situations under preliminary examination 
are: Afghanistan, Colombia, Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, Palestine, the Philippines, Ukraine, 
the United Kingdom (Iraq), and Venezuela. A request to the Pre-Trial Chamber, under arti-
cle 15(3) of the Statute, is pending with regard to the Afghanistan situation. 
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one time.87 This apparent lacuna in the Statute is, however, at least partial-
ly resolved if Article 53(1) is understood to apply a meaningful standard 
of proof, requiring allegations of crimes to be substantiated to a threshold 
level.88 This means, at the very least, that investigations are not opened on 
a purely speculative basis, to resolve doubt even about the reasonable 
possibility that at least one international crime might have been commit-
ted. Rather, scarce resources are reserved for those situations where the 
threshold has been reached.89 
Similar reasoning could also be applied to the apparent silence of 
the Statute, in the context of Article 53, concerning the Prosecutor’s antic-
ipation of any difficulties in collecting evidence or obtaining the co-
operation of relevant States (which may be a crucial consideration for 
many of her activities). It is possible that such issues might be reflected in 
the assessment of the interests of justice under Article 53(1)(c) (on the 
theory, perhaps, that an ineffective investigation is less beneficial to the 
victims than the prospect of a more effective investigation later on). But 
by requiring the facts of at least one crime to be established to a meaning-
ful threshold as a condition for opening investigations, again Article 
53(1)(a) and (b) ensure that there is an adequate basis for the expenditure 
of the efforts of the Prosecutor and the Court (even if such difficulties 
may potentially impede initiating any prosecution).  
These views may be supported by Judge Kaul’s separate opinion in 
Kenya. Recalling that “[n]ational prosecutors are called upon to com-
mence investigations if they become aware of any information that a 
crime may have occurred”, he observes that this principle is “not entirely 
transferable” to Article 15 (and, accordingly, Article 53) of the Statute.90 
                                                   
87 See, for example, ICC Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of 
the Office of the Prosecutor, 17 September 2015, ICC-ASP/14/21, paras. 7–8, 21 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/b27d2a/). 
88 By analogy, see also Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 
10 (justifying the necessity of, in his view, a strict definition of crimes against humanity on 
the basis inter alia of “the limited financial and material means” of the ICC, and his con-
cern that a relaxed definition could lead to the Court being “unable to tackle all the situa-
tions which could fall under its jurisdiction with the consequence that the selection of the 
situations under actual investigation might be quite arbitrary to the dismay of the numerous 
victims in the situations disregarded”), see supra note 9. 
89 See also Bergsmo et al., p. 1368, mn. 5, see supra note 17. 
90 Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 16, see supra note 9. 
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Rather, the Prosecutor has a “differ[ent] mandate”.91 Judge Kaul does not 
elaborate on exactly what this means, except by referring to Article 53(1). 
Nor indeed is it correct even to say that all domestic systems favour a 
system of obligatory prosecution; to the contrary, although some States 
favour such an approach, it is by no means universal.92 
Finally, as reflected by the Statute’s emphasis on complementarity, 
it is also important to recall that Article 53(1) balances the Court’s effec-
tive operation in fulfilling its mandate against recognition of the sovereign 
powers and prerogatives of States, and their primary role in enforcing the 
criminal law. It is clear from the drafting history of the Statute that this 
balance was struck with great care, and after extensive negotiation and 
deliberation.93 As such, it cannot be correct to imply that opening an ICC 
investigation, when it is ambiguous whether the Article 53(1) standard is 
met, does “no harm to anyone’s rights”.94 The rights at issue may be the 
rights of States, rather than individuals, but this does not mean that the 
Court may disregard them lightly.95 Indeed, transparent respect for these 
rights – while maintaining full independence, both of opinion and action – 
is highly important for the effective operation of the Prosecutor, and the 
success of international criminal justice more broadly.96  
                                                   
91 Ibid. 
92 Philippa Webb, “The ICC Prosecutor’s discretion not to proceed in the ‘interests of jus-
tice’”, in Criminal Law Quarterly, 2005, vol. 50, p. 305, at pp. 310–12 (hereinafter 
‘Webb’). 
93 Bergsmo et al., p. 1367, mn. 3, see supra note 17; Morten Bergsmo, Jelena Pejić, and ZHU 
Dan, “Article 15: Prosecutor”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 3rd edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 
2016, p. 725, at pp. 726–29, mns. 1-7. See also Alison M. Danner, “Enhancing the legiti-
macy and accountability of prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court”, in 
American Journal of International Law, 2003, vol. 97, p. 510, at pp. 513–515 (hereinafter 
‘Danner’); generally Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, “The role of the international pros-
ecutor”, in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 175. 
94 Cf. Longobardo, p. 1026, see supra note 44. See also Comoros Reconsideration Request, 
para. 13, see supra note 3. 
95 See Ventura, p. 78, see supra note 14. 
96 See Brubacher, pp. 94–95, see supra note 39. See also Danner, pp. 551–52 (noting that 
“[p]rosecutorial guidelines will help the Prosecutor negotiate the tension between account-
ability and independence”, enhancing the Prosecutor’s legitimacy and fostering effective 
 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 238 
22.1.4. The Article 53(1) Standard of Proof: A Summary 
For all these reasons, Article 53(1) can only be correctly interpreted to 
impose a standard of proof which must be genuinely applied to all factual 
matters which require determination under Article 53(1)(a) and (b). It 
requires the Prosecution to be satisfied that the available information 
shows a rational or sensible factual basis to reach the necessary conclu-
sions. In particular, the Prosecutor must be satisfied of a “reasonable basis 
to believe” that:  
• at least one Article 5 crime has been committed (including all the 
requisite legal elements);97 and 
• all other facts which are material to her admissibility assessment ex-
ist (for example, if her ‘sufficient gravity’ analysis turns on the ex-
istence of a plan or policy under Article 8(1), the existence of those 
facts showing that plan or policy, which may not themselves be le-
gal elements of the crime).98  
This is no more and no less than the Pre-Trial Chamber’s analogous 
duty under Article 15(4) and, albeit applied to more specific (and hence 
demanding) types of facts, under Article 58 of the Statute. 
22.2. The Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Article 53(1) 
If Article 53(1) applies an essentially legal test, requiring that an investi-
gation be opened if the conditions in Articles 53(1)(a) to (c) are satisfied, 
it follows that the Prosecutor’s discretion in opening an investigation is 
circumscribed. To be clear, the application of the standard of proof in Ar-
ticles 53(1)(a) and (b) allows no discretion in the legal sense at all.99 Ra-
ther, the only discretion lies in Article 53(1)(c).100 And, so far in the histo-
ry of this Court, this discretion has never been exercised. A clearer and 
wider understanding of this fact, as the present Prosecutor has repeatedly 
urged, would assist in answering many of the allegations of some kind of 
bias in the Court’s approach to preliminary examinations. 
                                                                                                                        
cooperation from States), see supra note 93. Article 53(1) of the Statute is a prosecutorial 
‘guideline’ par excellence. 
97 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(a), see supra note 7. 
98 Ibid., Article 53(1)(b). 
99 See also Webb, p. 319, see supra note 92; Turone, p. 1152, see supra note 15. 
100 See supra note 12, and accompanying text. 
22. The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 239 
However, the non-discretionary nature of the standard of proof in 
Article 53(1) does not mean that there is no room for prosecutorial discre-
tion at all,101 but the specific nature and limits of the concept in this par-
ticular context must be understood. As Knoops and Zwart have recently 
recalled, “prosecutorial discretion” is an “integral part” of prosecutorial 
independence, which is guaranteed by Article 42(1) of the Statute.102 But 
in the context of Article 53(1)(a) and (b),103 this discretion does not mani-
fest itself in discretionary decision-making (because the Prosecutor could 
be objectively wrong in her determination that there is not a reasonable 
basis to believe a given fact is true, whereas a discretionary decision is not 
amenable to such criticism),104 but in discretion as to methodology. To 
                                                   
101 Luc Côté, “Reflections on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in international criminal 
law”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 162, at p. 163 
(“discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a sur-
rounding belt of restriction”, quoting Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard 
University Press, 1977, p. 31). See also Webb, pp. 310–311 (noting that, even in States 
abiding by the “principle of legality” – which “theoretically compels the prosecutor (or in-
vestigating authority) to investigate when there are facts that give enough grounds for sus-
picion” – “in practice there are no ‘pure’ versions of the principle of legality”, citing for 
example the “incidental areas of discretion” which remain and are “used to prioritize cas-
es” in the Italian system, and greater latitude still in systems such as that in Germany), see 
supra note 92; Nsereko, pp. 127–129, see supra note 40. 
102 Knoops and Zwart, p. 1073, see supra note 56. See also Brubacher, p. 76, see supra note 
39; Jallow, p. 146, see supra note 40. 
103 Specifically, this means there is no discretion concerning relevant factual matters in Phases 
2–3 of the preliminary examination process, as conceived by the Office of the Prosecutor: 
see Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 77–83 (Phase 2 “represents the for-
mal commencement of a preliminary examination of a given situation”), see supra note 15. 
By contrast, Phase 1 decision-making – determining which individual communications to 
the Prosecutor under Article 15 should lead to opening a preliminary examinations – is in 
part discretionary, and is not directly governed by Article 53(1): for more information, see 
Amitis Khojasteh, “The Pre-Preliminary Examination Stage: Theory and Practice of the 
OTP’s Phase 1 Activities”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control 
in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2018, chap. 8. 
This is consistent with Article 15(1) of the Statute, given its ordinary meaning, context, 
and object and purpose, which states that “[t]he Prosecutor may initiate investigations pro-
prio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”. 
104 Cf. Knoops and Zwart, p. 1079. “A discretionary power involves the right to choose be-
tween more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable 
people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. Therefore, discretion may 
be defined as the power to make a decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong 
in an objective way”, citing UK House of Lords, Secretary of State for Education and Sci-
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borrow an analogy from trial proceedings, whereas it is well-established 
that final determinations about the guilt or innocence of the accused are 
not discretionary, the Trial Chamber’s management of the trial itself (how 
long to allow the Parties to question witnesses, order of questioning, and 
so on) is a discretionary matter.105 
The fact that Article 53(1)(a) and (b) determinations are not discre-
tionary does not, however, mean that they may be judicially reviewed 
simply on a ‘correctness’ standard. To the contrary, as further explained 
below, such determinations remain entitled to a certain deference in the 
course of any judicial review. 
So how does the residual methodological discretion of the Prosecu-
tor manifest itself in Article 53(1)? As the very term implies, the Prosecu-
tor has control of the process of conducting preliminary examinations, 
consistent with her statutory independence.106 This control, and hence her 
discretion, extends to all aspects of the process. But three notable exam-
ples can quickly be identified, which may impact the preliminary exami-
nation function itself and allow for the Prosecution’s particular approach 
to be suitably adapted to the circumstances.107  
                                                                                                                        
ence v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, 1064, per Lord Diplock; 
Grey, “Discretion in administrative law”, in Osgoode Law Journal, 1979, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 
1070, 1090 (apparently referring to a “broad prosecutorial discretion whether to bring situ-
ations […] before the ICC”), see supra note 56. See also Nsereko, pp. 124–25, see supra 
note 40. 
105 See, for example, ICC Statute, Article 64; International Criminal Court, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the ap-
peal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled 
“Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial”, 25 Octo-
ber 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-1066, para. 50 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/575657/); In-
ternational Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. Ruto and 
Sang, Trial Chamber, Decision on Witness Preparation, 2 January 2013, ICC-01/09-01/11-
524, para. 27 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/82c717/). 
106 ICC Statute, Article 42(1) (“The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a 
separate organ of the Court. It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any substan-
tiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them […] 
A member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source”), 
see supra note 7. 
107  See also Carsten Stahn, “Damned if you do, damned if you don’t: challenges and critiques 
of preliminary examinations at the ICC”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
2017, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 413, at pp. 417–22 (hereinafter ‘Stahn’). 
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First, the Prosecutor allocates and assigns her (limited) resources to 
the various activities of her Office, including to the conduct of particular 
preliminary examinations.108  It follows from this that she controls the 
timing and relative priority of different preliminary examinations. She 
may choose, consistent with her developing practice,109 to explain some of 
the principles which guide her discretion in this respect (through means of 
a policy document), but she cannot be obliged to exercise her discretion in 
a particular fashion.  
Second, the Prosecutor has discretion in the extent to which she 
seeks out open-source information concerning the subject-matter of a pre-
liminary examination. Although she does not enjoy investigative powers 
under Article 54 at this stage of proceedings, as further discussed below, 
she “may seek additional information from […] reliable sources that he or 
she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony”.110 
This means that the Prosecutor is not limited to the content of a referral or 
Article 15 communication, but may seek additional information from 
States, the United Nations, NGOs, or other reliable sources. By these 
means, she may be able to fill ‘gaps’ which appear to exist in the infor-
mation in her possession, if she thinks this is appropriate. But by the same 
token, if a referral or Article 15 communication contains such gaps, she 
cannot be perpetually compelled to seek additional information to resolve 
those deficiencies.111 She is entitled, if she thinks appropriate,112 simply to 
close the preliminary examination.113  
                                                   
108 Ibid., Article 42(2) (“The Prosecutor shall have full authority over the management and 
administration of the Office, including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof”). 
109 The Prosecutor has, so far, published policies on procedural matters including the conduct 
of preliminary examinations, the meaning of the “interests of justice” in Article 53, and the 
process of case selection and prioritisation, as well as on substantive matters such as sexual 
and gender based crimes, and the relationship between international criminal law and chil-
dren. See generally “Policies and Strategies”, available on the Office’s web site; Matthew 
E. Cross and Antonio Coco, “Foreword”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, 
vol. 15, no. 3, p. 407, at p. 409. 
110 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002, Rule 104(2) (emphasis added) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f/). 
111 See, for example, International Criminal Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage 
of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the deci-
sion of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, 19 December 2008, ICC-01/04-556, pa-
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Third, and in part consequent on the first two discretions, the Prose-
cutor controls the duration of a preliminary examination, and when it is 
terminated (by seeking to open an investigation, or by closing), with ref-
erence to relevant circumstances.114 She may be satisfied that the Article 
53(1) standard is met within a matter of months (or, perhaps exceptionally, 
even weeks), or she may require years. Likewise, where she considers that 
the available information does not suffice, or her admissibility assessment 
relates to a manifestly changing or developing situation, she may properly 
decide to maintain a ‘watching brief’ and to defer reaching a determina-
tion until the facts become clearer.115  
The Prosecutor’s methodological discretion may be illustrated by 
one incident in the early case law of the Court, in which Pre-Trial Cham-
ber III queried the progress of the CAR I preliminary examination.116 Alt-
hough providing this information, the Prosecutor stressed that “[t]he Pre-
Trial Chamber’s supervisory role, under Article 53(3), only applies to the 
review of a decision under Article 53(1) and (2) by the Prosecutor not to 
proceed with an investigation of a prosecution”.117 He continued to point 
out that, since Article 53(1) requires “an informed and well-reasoned de-
                                                                                                                        
ra. 51 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dca981/); Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, Sepa-
rate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, paras. 20–22, see supra note 16. 
112 See also ICC Statute, Article 42(3) (“The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be 
persons of high moral character, be highly competent in and have extensive practical expe-
rience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases”), see supra note 7. 
113 This is without prejudice to the preliminary examination being reopened on the basis of 
new facts or information: see infra note 114. 
114 This is supported, furthermore, by the Prosecutor’s discretion to reopen a closed prelimi-
nary examination: ICC Statute, Article 53(4) (“The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider 
a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or infor-
mation”, emphasis added), see supra note 7. 
115 See further Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 90, 101–102, see supra note 
15. 
116 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the 
Situation in the Central African Republic, 30 November 2006, ICC-01/05-6, pp. 4–5 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/76e607/). 
117 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision 
Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in 
the Central African Republic, 15 December 2006, ICC-01/05-7, para. 1 (‘Prosecutor’s 
CAR Report’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dd66a/). See also para. 10. 
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cision”, preliminary examinations must be carried out “in a comprehen-
sive and thorough manner” and that “it must be for him to determine the 
breadth and scope of this preliminary assessment”.118 Moreover, notwith-
standing the uniform legal framework, the practical requirements of any 
particular preliminary examination are “situation-specific”, and the “time 
taken” may depend “on the particular circumstances in each situation”.119 
What Pre-Trial Chamber III thought of this response is lost to history, 
presumably because the Prosecutor nonetheless provided the information 
requested. Subsequently, moreover, the Prosecutor has herself adopted the 
practice of providing annual reports on preliminary examination activi-
ties,120 which may go some way to increasing the transparency of her ac-
tivities in this area.121 But the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 
published in 2013, has nonetheless maintained this view of the Prosecu-
tor’s discretion in managing the ‘process’ of the preliminary examina-
tion.122  
22.3. Consequences of the Standard of Proof in Article 53(1) 
The nature of the standard of proof under Article 53(1)(a) and (b), and the 
confined role of prosecutorial discretion, has some important consequenc-
es for the conduct of preliminary examinations, and hence for any assess-
ment of their ‘quality’. These include: (1) the Prosecutor’s duty to evalu-
ate the information available to her; (2) her response to a lack of infor-
mation on relevant issues; (3) the extent to which she may select and/or 
prioritise the Article 5 crimes on which to make findings under Article 
53(1); and (4) the nature of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judicial review under 
Article 53(3).  
                                                   
118 Ibid., para. 7. 
119 Ibid., para. 8. See also para. 9. 
120 This practice began in 2011, and has been maintained annually since that time. For the 
most recent annual report (at the time of writing), see, for example, International Criminal 
Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, 14 
November 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f30a53/). 
121  Cf. Anni Pues, “Towards the ‘Golden Hour’? A critical exploration of the length of prelim-
inary examinations”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 
435.  
122 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 89, see supra note 15. 
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22.3.1. A Duty to Evaluate the Available Information  
Article 53(1) conditions the Prosecutor’s determination of whether the 
criteria in Article 53(1)(a) to (c) are met on “evaluat[ing] the information 
made available to him or her”. Rule 104(1) further specifies that, “[i]n 
acting pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 1, the Prosecutor shall, in evaluat-
ing the information made available to him or her, analyse the seriousness 
of the information received”. 
Considering these prescriptions in the context of the standard of 
proof in Article 53(1), it is apparent that the Prosecutor is not obliged to 
accept the information presented to her at face value.123 Admittedly, the 
meaning of the reference in Rule 104(1) to analysing the “seriousness” of 
the information is somewhat obscure, since this would seem to duplicate 
the requirements of Article 53(1)(a) or (b). But no matter the particular 
construction placed on it, the conclusion appears inescapable that the 
Prosecutor should reach her own assessment of the meaning, relevance 
and significance of the information available. It will likely be insufficient 
for the Prosecutor simply to accept the contents of a referral or Article 15 
communication as true.124 Consistent with her discretion to seek addition-
al information (without ‘investigating’), previously described, she may 
also attempt to contextualise the information she receives where she con-
siders it appropriate. 
It is implicit in these observations that the Prosecutor may weigh 
the available information as a whole. She may decide, on occasion, that 
some of the available information is less reliable than other information. 
In some instances, she may positively decide that she cannot rely on cer-
tain information, uncorroborated, even to establish a “reasonable basis to 
                                                   
123 Cf. Comoros Reconsideration Request, para. 35, see supra note 3. 
124 Compare International Criminal Court, Situation in Georgia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Kovács, 27 January 2016, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, paras. 6 (“Judicial 
control entails more than automatically agreeing with what the Prosecutor presents”), 20 
(‘Georgia Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Kovács’) (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/28b159/); Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, pa-
ra. 19 (the Pre-Trial Chamber’s article 15(4) analysis is not “a mere rubber-stamping” ex-
ercise), see supra note 9. But see Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, paras. 15 (“while the Chamber and the Prosecutor need to 
examine the same factors and apply the same ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ standard, the 
examination by the Chamber should not become a duplication of the preliminary examina-
tion conducted by the Prosecutor”), 16, 18–19, 27–28, see supra note 16. 
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believe”. This may include, for example, assertions which appear highly 
implausible in the context of all the relevant circumstances. Although the 
Prosecutor should take great care in such situations – and should not reject 
relevant available information merely because it challenges her precon-
ceptions – she is not, for example, required to accept there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that aliens exist, merely because someone tells her so. 
Consistent with the approach adopted in trial proceedings, however, 
the Prosecutor should not enter into the question whether particular pieces 
of information are themselves ‘reasonable’ or not.125 Rather, she should 
apply the standard of proof to the factual findings which are indispensable 
to her determination (for example, the elements of the relevant Article 5 
crime(s) and any factual matters material to her Article 53(1)(b) analysis). 
Only if such an indispensable finding depends on a single piece of infor-
mation should she consider whether that information itself provides a 
reasonable basis to believe the finding in question. 
22.3.2. Prohibitive Effect of Insufficient or Ambiguous Information  
In Comoros, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber observed that: “[f]acts 
which are difficult to establish, or which are unclear, […] are not valid 
reasons not to start an investigation but rather call for the opening of such 
an investigation”.126  The same majority hinted at similar reasoning in 
Georgia,127 and an entirely different bench of the Pre-Trial Chamber re-
peated this statement, without further elaboration, in Burundi.128 Yet, on 
the other hand, Judge Kaul, writing separately in the context of the Article 
15(4) decision in Kenya, had previously stated that a “somewhat selective 
                                                   
125 See supra note 29. 
126 Comoros Reconsideration Request, para. 13, see supra note 3. But see also infra note 130. 
127 Georgia Article 15 Decision, paras. 34–35 (noting concerns by the Prosecutor that, for 
certain allegations, the standard of proof was not met based, in her view, on concerns about 
its reliability, and opining that the Prosecutor had “acted too restrictively and […] imposed 
requirements on the material that cannot reasonably be met in the absence of an investiga-
tion, the initiation of which is precisely at stake”), see supra note 9. Notwithstanding his 
dissent from the reasoning of the majority in Comoros, Judge Kovács appears to agree 
with the majority in this respect: Georgia Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Kovács, paras. 21–23 (“[t]he complexity of the crimes makes it even more compelling to 
commence an investigation to establish whether or not the elements of the offence are ful-
filled”), see supra note 124. 
128  Burundi Article 15 Decision, para. 30, see supra note 18. 
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or summary examination in the hope […] that the investigation may bring 
about the missing pieces of his determination under Article 53(1)(a) of the 
Statute is not enough”.129 
To any extent that the Comoros majority was suggesting that inves-
tigations should nonetheless be opened even when the Article 53(1) stand-
ard of proof is not met,130 Judge Kaul’s opinion is to be preferred. To do 
otherwise – opening an investigation when one or more indispensable 
facts is not established to the Article 53(1) threshold – would defeat the 
entire exercise, and create a wholly circular logic: “an investigation can-
not be opened until these conditions are met; if the information does not 
show that these conditions are met, then an investigation is still necessary 
in order to find such information”. Such logic undermines the object and 
purpose of Article 53(1). 
The correctness of Judge Kaul’s view is moreover supported by the 
consistent statements – even by the Comoros majority – that, until the 
Prosecutor has made a positive Article 53(1) determination, and at least 
one other relevant authority has concurred that an investigation should be 
opened,131 she may not take any ‘investigative’ measure which depends 
upon Article 54. 132  Although the exact definition of an investigative 
measure in this context is not yet established, it may be taken to involve 
active measures to obtain primary source information in order to assess 
                                                   
129 Kenya Article 15 Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, para. 18, see supra note 9. 
130 The significance of the majority’s comment is not entirely clear, however, since it also (in 
the same paragraph) refers to the need for investigation to overcome doubts “[i]f” there are 
“reasonable inferences” that at least one crime has been committed: Comoros Reconsidera-
tion Request, para. 13, see supra note 3. An alternative interpretation of the majority’s re-
marks might be to suggest that the Article 53(1) requires little or no evaluation of the 
available information, and that the standard of proof is satisfied by the mere allegation of 
Article 5 crimes. 
131 Article 13 of the Statute lists three such authorities: a referring State Party, the UN Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the Pre-Trial Chamber approving 
a request from the Prosecutor under Article 15(4). States and the UN Security Council pro-
vide the necessary authorisation through their referrals, prior to the Prosecutor’s prelimi-
nary examination. By contrast, since it provides a check on the proprio motu powers of the 
Prosecutor, applying in the absence of a referral, the Pre-Trial Chamber provides (or with-
holds) the necessary authorisation after the Prosecutor’s preliminary examination. 
132 See, for example, Kenya Article 15 Decision, para. 27, see supra note 9. See also Comoros 
Reconsideration Request, para. 13 (“only during the investigation may the Prosecutor use 
her powers under article 54 of the Statute; conversely, her powers are more limited under 
article 53(1)”), see supra note 3. 
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whether there is criminal responsibility under the Statute, beyond those 
measures which inhere in the preliminary examination process.133 Not-
withstanding the vagueness of the definition, the prohibition of the use of 
investigative measures of this kind seems incontrovertible – if the Prose-
cutor may not open an investigation until the conditions of Articles 13, 15, 
and/or 53 of the Statute are met (as applicable), then necessarily those 
measures which can only be used in the context of an ‘investigation’ can-
not be used in order to bring about this state of affairs.  
22.3.3. Selectivity in Publicly Reported Criminal Allegations in 
‘Positively-resolved’ Preliminary Examinations 
Judge Kovács, in his separate opinion in Georgia, emphasised the im-
portance of “ensur[ing] that the threshold provided for in Articles 15 and 
53 of the Statute is equally applied to all crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court, irrespective of the nature of the alleged crimes at stake”.134 Yet 
applying the standard of proof in Article 53(1) “equally” to all the Article 
5 crimes does not mean that a preliminary examination which supports the 
opening of an investigation is likely to provide a ‘full’ account of all the 
types of crimes which might have been committed. Indeed, the opposite is 
true. Certain Article 5 crimes are, by their nature, more difficult to estab-
lish because they require a greater number of elements to be satisfied. 
Moreover, in the context of preliminary examinations, this logic applies 
even more strongly because some required elements, by their nature, may 
be difficult to establish to the standard of proof on the basis of the “infor-
                                                   
133 See generally ICC Statute, Article 54, see supra note 7. All intrusive measures are likely to 
be investigative measures. Preliminary examinations depend on open-source information, 
or information which is consensually provided to the Prosecutor. Certain measures are thus 
clearly not ‘investigative’ for these purposes, and are expressly contemplated by Article 
53(1) and Rule 104(2). The Prosecutor may receive information (that is, “information 
made available”), and may seek information from any “reliable” source she deems appro-
priate; she may also receive “testimony”. Accordingly, it is certain that the Prosecutor may 
consult any open-source or public domain material. It also may be the case that the Prose-
cutor may receive the accounts of individuals – for example, victims, or ‘whistle-
blowers’ – provided those accounts are made voluntarily and thus do not require the use of 
any measure under Article 54. Nor does anything in the Statute prevent other actors taking 
independent steps at least to preserve potential evidence pending the opening of an investi-
gation. 
134 Georgia Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Kovács, para. 23, see supra note 
124. 
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mation made available”. For example, certain ‘conduct of hostilities’ of-
fences may be especially prone to this phenomenon. 135  The extent to 
which inferences of these elements can reasonably be made from the gen-
eral circumstances is an open, and difficult, question. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, it will generally not impede most 
kinds of preliminary examinations which see allegations of multiple kinds 
of criminality.136 After all, an investigation can be opened if “the infor-
mation available […] allows for reasonable inferences that at least one 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed and that the 
case would be admissible”.137 Likewise, Judge Fernández has recalled that 
“the facts and incidents identified” in an Article 15 application “are not 
and could not be expected to be exhaustive […], but are intended solely to 
give concrete examples to the Chamber of the gravest types of criminality 
that have occurred in the situation”.138 This same reasoning applies to the 
Prosecutor’s reasoning not only when she seeks to open an investigation 
proprio motu, by applying to the Pre-Trial Chamber, but also when open-
ing the investigation of referred situations.  
Yet, although Judge Fernández’s conclusion is correct, it cannot 
necessarily be assumed that the ‘examples’ demonstrating that the Article 
53(1) requirements are met will necessarily prove to be the ‘gravest’ types 
of criminality in the situation. Rather, although the Prosecutor can be ex-
pected to enumerate the gravest types which she finds to be established 
according to the Article 53(1) standard of proof, practical considerations 
will necessarily inform which crimes actually meet the test. 
The story is, of course, different if the Prosecutor resolves to close a 
preliminary examination without proceeding to open an investigation. In 
                                                   
135 See, for example, ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(iv), see supra note 7. 
136 It may, however, bite on situations which feature very narrowly framed allegations. 
Whether this is a negative or positive result of the Article 53(1) test may depend on the 
point of view. On the one hand, it could serve to prevent certain situations in which (for 
example) one or more types of ‘conduct of hostilities’ war crimes may have been commit-
ted from coming readily before the ICC. On the other hand, for a court of limited resources, 
it may help to ensure that attention is naturally focused on situations of more widespread 
‘atrocity’, and to limit situations based on ‘technical’ (although nonetheless serious) 
breaches of IHL. 
137 Comoros Reconsideration Request, para. 13 (emphasis added), see supra note 3. 
138 Côte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, 
para. 32, see supra note 16. 
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that situation alone must she address all the crimes alleged in a situation, 
or which might arguably be considered to have arisen, because Article 
53(1) requires her to have concluded that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed for any Article 5 crime. This is only possible if she has measured 
the available information against all the crimes in the Statute.  
For these reasons, the Article 53(1) standard of proof, combined 
with the prohibition on investigative measures during preliminary exami-
nations, means that the situation described when opening an investigation 
will be the ‘truth’, as it appears, but not necessarily the ‘whole truth’. Ex-
pecting a preliminary examination to correspond “as much as possible to 
the ‘reality’ on the ground” is reasonable in and of itself – but the caveat 
“as much as possible” is critical.139 Inevitably, certain features, possibly 
key features, of the situation may well be suspected at the preliminary 
examination stage, but are only susceptible to proof by means of the in-
vestigation itself. This presents no legal problem as such, since the scope 
of the investigation once opened is not limited to the incidents discussed 
in any public outcomes of the preliminary examination.140 But it is im-
portant to understand, consequently, that such public outcomes are not 
necessarily akin to a ‘monitoring report’ by a human rights organization, 
and may not even aspire to paint a complete picture of the situation. Per-
haps paradoxically, it is only when the Prosecutor does not find a reason-
able basis to proceed with an investigation that she may endeavour to 
                                                   
139 Cf. Georgia Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Kovács, para. 20, see supra 
note 124. 
140 See, for example, Georgia Article 15 Decision, para. 63 (“for the procedure of article 15 to 
be effective it is not necessary to limit the Prosecution’s investigation to the crimes which 
are mentioned by the Chamber in its decision authorizing investigation. To impose such 
limitation would also be illogical, as an examination under article 15(3) and (4) of the 
Statute is inherently based on limited information. […] Binding the Prosecutor to the 
crimes mentioned in the decision authorizing investigation would also conflict with her du-
ty to investigate objectively, in order to establish the truth”), see supra note 9; Côte 
d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, para. 34 
(“this early and necessarily non-comprehensive identification of incidents serves only as 
the basis for determining whether the requirements of Article 53 of the Statute are met and 
[is] not determinative of the case selection that will take place later upon further investiga-
tion”), see supra note 16. In this context, the Burundi Pre-Trial Chamber’s apparent criti-
cism of the Prosecutor for basing her application under Article 15(3) on alleged crimes 
against humanity, and not finding it necessary or appropriate to enter into the question of 
any armed conflict, seems curious. See Burundi Article 15 Decision, paras. 137-141, see 
supra note 18.  
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provide a reasonably comprehensive account of the facts on the ground, in 
order to explain the basis of her conclusion.141 
In this context, it is important to note, of course, that the public out-
comes of preliminary examinations are not the only outcomes. Prelimi-
nary examination activities may also yield internal work product, which 
may be relevant to and relied upon by any subsequent investigation, even 
if it does not meet the Article 53(1) standard of proof and therefore may 
not form part of the Prosecutor’s Article 53(1) determination (and thus 
publicly reported).142 
22.3.4. No De Novo Judicial Review 
Article 53(3)(a) provides that, for situations referred to the Court and at 
the request of the referring body, the Pre-Trial Chamber may review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to open an investigation when based on her 
view that one or more of the criteria in Article 53(1)(a) or (b) is not met. 
In essence, therefore, this provision allows the Pre-Trial Chamber to re-
view the Prosecutor’s evaluation of the facts through the lens of the stand-
ard of proof set out in Article 53(1), as well as the correctness of the law 
to which she directs herself. 
Just like any other proceedings before the Court, however, the ex-
istence of a mechanism for judicial review does not necessarily mean that 
the reviewing body can automatically substitute its own opinion of the 
facts for that of the body under review. Even in criminal trials, where the 
standard of proof applied is especially rigorous, it is still settled that “two 
judges, both acting reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the 
basis of the same evidence, both of which are reasonable”.143 This reason-
ing may apply a fortiori at the lower standard of proof of a preliminary 
examination. 
                                                   
141  See also Stahn, pp. 433-434, see supra note 107. 
142 See also International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual 
and Gender Based Crimes, June 2014, paras. 6, 21, 38–40, 54–55, 71 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7ede6c/); International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on 
Children, November 2016, paras. 53–54, 65, 117, 123 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c2652b/). 
143 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Ntawukulilyayo v. the Prosecutor, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment, 14 December 2011, ICTR-05-82-A, para. 15 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/42d81d/). 
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Accordingly, recognising that Article 53(1) imposes a standard of 
proof, with which the Prosecutor must comply, does not mean recognising 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber may overturn the Prosecutor’s determination 
based merely on its own subjective disagreement.144 This is most especial-
ly the case when the Pre-Trial Chamber does not necessarily have before 
it all the primary information which was available to the Prosecutor in 
making her determination.145 Applying a standard of review with an ap-
propriate measure of deference on factual matters is not directly a matter 
of prosecutorial independence as such, but one of judicial economy and 
judicial procedure. This much should be clear from the example of the 
Appeals Chamber, even if reasonable minds may disagree whether the 
precise standard of review to be applied is better analogised to the stand-
ard for judicial review of administrative or executive action, or the appel-
late standard for factual errors, or the appellate standard for an abuse of 
discretion.146  
22.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to examine the standard of proof under Article 
53(1) – which should be a bedrock principle for the conduct of prelimi-
nary examinations, and for the evaluation of preliminary examination 
activity by the Court’s wider constituency in the international community. 
It seems a simple proposition that, subject to her residual discretion in 
Article 53(1)(c) – as yet, unused – the Prosecutor will open an investiga-
                                                   
144 Cf. Comoros Reconsideration Request, paras. 14–15 (“paragraphs (a) and (b) require the 
application of exacting legal requirements […] the Chamber considers it necessary to add 
that there is also no valid argument for the proposition that in order not to encroach on the 
independence of the Prosecutor, the Chamber should knowingly tolerate and not request 
reconsideration of decisions under Article 53(1) […] which are erroneous, but within some 
field of deference”), see supra note 3. Compare International Criminal Court, Situation on 
the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the King-
dom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kovács, 16 July 
2015, ICC-01/13-34-Anx, paras. 6–8 (doubting the standard of review applied by the ma-
jority, and calling for “a more deferential approach”) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c854cf/). 
145 See, for example, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 107(2), see supra note 110. 
146 See further, for example, International Criminal Court, Situation on the Registered Vessels 
of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-
Trial Chamber, Public Redacted Version of the Prosecution’s Consolidated Response to the 
Observations of the Victims (ICC-01/13-27 and ICC-01/13-28), 14 July 2015, ICC-01/13-
29-Red, paras. 15–18 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/248fd1/). 
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tion if she determines that the information available shows a reasonable 
basis to believe that the criteria in Article 53(1)(a) and (b) are met. Yet, 
despite her recent repeated emphasis on this fact, it remains on occasion 
misunderstood.  
The Article 53(1) standard of proof is indeed relatively low, but it is 
not meaningless. Like any other fact-finding exercise, it requires that the 
standard be satisfied by information and not conjecture or assertion. It 
requires that the standard be genuinely and consistently applied to all the 
factual elements required by Article 53(1)(a) and (b). It requires resources, 
time, and professional analysis, and a due measure of co-operation from 
the international community. Moreover, the link between the standards of 
proof in Articles 53(1) and 58 underlines the view of the drafters of the 
Statute that opening an investigation is just as serious and significant a 
decision as requesting an arrest warrant, with the former impacting largely 
on States and the latter impacting largely on individuals.  
The implications of this analysis are enlightening. First, it under-
scores that preliminary examinations are not a reflection of the Prosecu-
tor’s opinion, or preconceptions, but merely a statement of what the in-
formation made available to her reasonably suggests, without conducting 
an investigation. As such, preliminary examinations neither express a po-
litical opinion, nor represent a statement of what the Prosecutor (or any-
one else) might suspect about a situation.  
Second, consequently, preliminary examinations serve a fundamen-
tally procedural purpose: they are a step to opening an investigation, 
when this is called for, rather than an end in themselves. Accordingly, 
although there may sometimes be benefits in publicising the Prosecutor’s 
finding(s) of a reasonable basis to believe that certain crimes are being 
committed, this is not their core function. Even if an overtly pragmatic 
approach to preliminary examinations were to be taken, where the Prose-
cutor only ascertains the bare minimum necessary to open an investigation, 
this would not mean that the Prosecutor will not carry out the resulting 
investigation fully, comprehensively and impartially, nor that she has 
overlooked (or will overlook) any type of Article 5 crime. In this regard, 
the public outcomes of preliminary examinations may not always reflect 
(some of) the short-term interests of civil society – to the extent this 
means drawing public attention to certain allegations of crime – even if 
such allegations remain material to an ensuing criminal investigation. 
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Third, preliminary examinations reflect a sophisticated balance 
struck by the drafters of the Statute. While ensuring that pragmatic con-
siderations are not a primary consideration in deciding whether to open or 
not to open an investigation, unless they rise to the level of a considera-
tion relevant to Article 53(1)(c), the standard of proof in Article 53(1) also 
ensures that there is a meaningful and objective filter on those situations 
which come before the Court. Care should be taken in ensuring that this 
standard of proof remains fit for purpose. In this context, by giving the 
Prosecutor the primary and independent responsibility for the process by 
which the standard of proof is applied (within her limited resources), and 
giving the Pre-Trial Chamber an oversight role in ensuring that the stand-
ard of proof is applied properly, the Court employs a system which makes 
a fair and reasonable effort to meet the unique constraints under which it 
operates. 
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23. Reconceptualizing the Birth of 
the International Criminal Case: 
Creating an Office of 
the Examining Magistrate 
Gregory S. Gordon* 
23.1. Introduction 
One of the features of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) that has 
been the subject of critical commentary is the preliminary examination, 
which seeks to determine if there is a reasonable basis to proceed with a 
criminal investigation.1 Given its amorphous status as the ‘pre-investiga-
tion stage’ of a case, it permits the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) a 
wide berth in terms of investigatory subjects and topics, length of inquiry, 
and platform for airing views of the incipient case to the public. In addi-
tion, there is a lack of transparency with no oversight or assurance that 
this initial sifting of the evidence is being conducted in a sufficiently neu-
tral or efficient manner. That said, preliminary examinations offer an array 
of possible advantages, including the potential for deterring fresh violence, 
fostering peace negotiations and sparking transitional justice efforts (and 
thus complementarity) on the ground.  
                                                   
*  Gregory Steven Gordon is Associate Professor and formerly served as Associate Dean 
(Development/External Affairs) and Director of the Ph.D.–M.Phil. Programme at the Fac-
ulty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK Law). He is also a Research Fel-
low at the Centre for International Law Research and Policy (CILRAP). In 2017, his book 
Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, Fruition (Oxford University Press), 
which coined a new term for the law related to hate speech in international criminal law, 
proposed a paradigm shift in the field with introduction of the “Unified Liability Theory 
for Atrocity Speech Law”. 
1 See, for example, Carsten Stahn, “Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Challenges 
and Critiques of ICC Preliminary Examinations”, in Journal of International Criminal Jus-
tice, 2017, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 7, noting that the current approach to preliminary examinations 
“has been subject to a number of critiques”.  
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So, is it possible to keep the preliminary examination, with all its 
advantages, while eliminating or reducing its problems? This chapter ar-
gues that it is possible through a reconceptualization of the preliminary 
examination phase by creating an Office of the Examining Magistrate 
(‘OEM’) within ICC Chambers. Thus reconceptualized, the preliminary 
examination would be handled by both the OTP and the OEM. Initial in-
formation on crimes would go through the OTP, which, upon analysis, 
could refer it to the OEM for further action. If the referral were found to 
be sufficiently credible by the OEM, it would analyse the evidence, inter-
view witnesses and undertake other related activities. When necessary, the 
OEM could consult with the OTP during the process, at the end of which 
the OEM would submit a completed dossier to the OTP. If the OTP de-
termined that a reasonable basis to investigate had been established, then 
it would apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber to open a formal investigation. 
The OTP would not be able to comment on the case in public during the 
OEM’s processing. And a time limit of 24 months would be placed on the 
preliminary examination. If additional time were needed at the end of this 
period, then both offices could apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a 12-
month extension (and would then need to apply for additional 12-month 
extensions, if necessary, thereafter). In this way, the OEM would serve 
both an investigative and a judicial function.  
While certain discretion would still be vested in the OTP (initial re-
ferral, applications for time extensions and opening of formal investiga-
tions), the OEM would provide an independent set of eyes and a degree of 
oversight. For all stakeholders, the preliminary examination would have a 
greater veneer of neutrality and, given that it would be more detached 
from the OTP, the OEM would be more likely to collect evidence poten-
tially favourable to future defendants and implicated victims. In this way, 
not only would the process be inherently more fair and efficient, but it 
would also promote equality of arms, as well as concern for restorative 
justice, at an early stage. At the same time, the preliminary examination 
would still be able to promote deterrence, transition and complementarity 
on the ground. To the extent preliminary examinations in municipal juris-
dictions are premised on a comparable lack of initial prosecutorial over-
sight, this proposal could be adopted in them as well for purposes of inte-
grating quality control into the process. 
This chapter will proceed in five sections. Section 23.2. will outline 
the preliminary examination process and describe its various phases, 
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standards and objectives. In light of those objectives, Section 23.3. will 
consider the shortcomings of the current preliminary examination regime. 
In particular, it will focus on the OTP’s inconsistent practices across dif-
ferent preliminary examinations, including length of process, methods of 
information collection and determinations regarding requests to investi-
gate via communication versus referrals. Section 23.4. will set forth a 
solution – creation of the OEM and its integration into the existing 
framework. The nature of the OEM’s mandate, as well as the protocols 
and procedures governing its operation will be explored. This section will 
also consider the OEM’s relationship with the OTP, which would be de-
signed to promote not only oversight and gap-filling but synergistic col-
laboration and reinforcement. Finally, Section 23.5. will summarize the 
advantages as well as anticipate potential objections to the proposed crea-
tion of the OEM, such as the impingement of the prosecutor’s discretion 
and strategic manoeuvring as well as complementarity-promotion-
hampering, the imposition of time limits and possible inefficiency and 
cost of an expanded bureaucracy.  
In the end, the chapter will demonstrate that, notwithstanding these 
possible downsides, integration of the OEM within the preliminary exam-
ination structure will have a net positive effect. In particular, it will better 
achieve the goals of the Rome Statute – promoting complementarity, de-
terrence, efficiency and equality of arms. 
23.2. The Preliminary Examination Process and Objectives 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the purpose of the OTP’s 
preliminary examination is to ascertain whether a full investigation is 
justified. This amounts to marshalling sufficient information on crimes of 
the required gravity, as well as an absence of municipal investiga-
tive/prosecutorial efforts, such that a reasonable basis to open an investi-
gation appears. This analysis is conducted within the framework of four 
‘phases’. Before examining these ‘phases’, it is helpful to consider how 
the Prosecutor receives information that triggers a preliminary examina-
tion. 
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23.2.1. Preliminary Examination Triggers 
23.2.1.1. Communications and Referrals 
The OTP is alerted to the existence of possible relevant crimes, known as 
notitia criminis, 2  via communications or referrals. These channels are 
pegged to the two mechanisms that can activate the Court’s jurisdiction: 
(1) State Party (Article 13(a)) and Security Council (Article 13(b)) refer-
rals; and (2) proprio motu investigations (Articles 13(c) and 15).3 ‘Com-
munications’ (the OTP’s nomenclature for ‘information’, the precise word 
used in the Statute)4 are tied to the latter. Article 15 of the Rome Statute 
declares: 
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu 
on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.  
2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the infor-
mation received. For this purpose, he or she may seek addi-
tional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or 
other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and 
may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court. 
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investi-
gation, together with any supporting material collected. Vic-
                                                   
2 See Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M. El Zeidy and Héctor Olásolo, “The International Crimi-
nal Court’s Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revisited”, in American Journal of International Law, 
2005, vol. 99, no. 2, pp. 421, 426, pointing out that “after receiving a notitia criminis, and 
before actually securing the Court’s formal jurisdiction by way of an Article 12(3) declara-
tion, the prosecutor might carry out a preliminary analysis under Article 15(2) to determine 
whether the situation falls within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione personae, loci, and tem-
poris”. 
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 
1 July 2002, Articles 13, 15 (‘ICC Statute’). 
4 See Human Rights Watch, ICC Course Correction: Recommendations to the Prosecutor 
for a More Effective Approach to “Situations under Analysis”, 16 June 2011 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/43aefb/): “‘Communications’ are information received by 
the OTP under article 15 of the Rome Statute, which permits the prosecutor to open an in-
vestigation proprio motu (‘on his own initiative’) with the authorization of a pre-trial 
chamber of judges”. 
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tims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
4. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request 
and the supporting material, considers that there is a reason-
able basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case 
appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall au-
thorize the commencement of the investigation, without 
prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with re-
gard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case. 
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the in-
vestigation shall not preclude the presentation of a subse-
quent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evi-
dence regarding the same situation. 
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in para-
graphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information 
provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an inves-
tigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the in-
formation. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from con-
sidering further information submitted to him or her regard-
ing the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence.5  
23.2.1.2. The Providers and Nature of Information Received 
There are no restrictions on the identity of persons or entities permitted to 
furnish the Prosecutor with notitia criminis for purposes of triggering an 
ICC investigation. Thus, “the personal scope of the right of access to the 
ICC to report crimes contained in the [Rome Statute] is universal”.6  
‘Information’ on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court can 
consist of a variety of materials, including non-governmental organization 
(‘NGO’) or intergovernmental organization (‘IGO’) reports, witness affi-
davits, news items or other documentary evidence provided to the OTP by 
members of civil society, IGOs, groups, individual concerned citizens, or 
any other reliable sources.7 Nothing in the Rome Statute regulates the 
                                                   
5 ICC Statute, Article 15 (emphasis added). 
6 Hector Olasolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005, p. 54. 
7 International Criminal Court, Understanding the International Criminal Court, p. 17 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9ea9fa/). 
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form or substance of the communications.8 That said, unlike State and 
Security Council referrals, it would be unreasonable to “impose upon the 
senders of communications the burden of investigating for themselves or 
conducting extensive inquiry for the purpose of sending detailed infor-
mation to the Prosecutor”.9 By the same token, if the communication is 
too extensive or vague, it “might be impossible for [the Prosecutor] to 
assess its value without launching a full investigation, something the 
Prosecutor is not allowed to do without authorisation from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber”.10 
23.2.1.3. Procedural Presumptions 
Assuming the communication fits within these parameters, it also triggers 
a procedural response different from that of a referral. Per Article 53, 
when the Prosecutor receives a referral, she shall initiate an investigation 
unless she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed (see 
‘Phase 2’ below).11 This default position is reinforced by the fact that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may only review the Prosecutor’s decision not to pro-
ceed, but does not review an affirmative determination to proceed.12 The 
default position is reversed when the Prosecutor receives a communica-
tion – in other words, she shall not seek to initiate an investigation unless 
she first concludes it is warranted.13 This will be referred to as ‘Phase 1’. 
23.2.2. The Four Phases 
23.2.2.1. Phase 1: Initial Assessment 
So now it is appropriate to outline and unpack the four ‘phases’. As just 
suggested, for ‘Phase 1’, in analysing “the seriousness of information 
received” per Article 15(2), the Prosecutor may filter out data concerning 
                                                   
8 Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the National 
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2008, p. 99. 
9 International Criminal Court, Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office 
of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications, September 2003, sect. I.B. (‘Referrals 
and Communications’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5df43d/). 
10 Ibid. 
11 ICC Statute, Article 53(1). Referrals and Communications, sect. I.A., see supra note 9. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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offences patently outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. Also excluded are situa-
tions already under preliminary examination or investigation, or forming 
the basis of a prosecution.14 Situations that survive this initial sifting then 
move to ‘Phase 2’ and formally become ‘situations under analysis’.15 
23.2.2.2. Phase 2: Jurisdiction Assessment 
So Phase 2 marks the formal start of the preliminary examination proper. 
As part of this, the Prosecutor analyses the factors set out in Article 53(1) 
of the Rome Statute, which govern the Prosecutor’s decision as to whether 
a formal investigation should begin. Article 53(1) declares: 
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made 
available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or 
she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed 
under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investi-
gation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:  
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court has been or is being committed;  
(b) The case is or would be admissible under Article 17; 
and  
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the in-
terests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial rea-
sons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. 
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable 
basis to proceed and his or her determination is based solely 
on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-
Trial Chamber.16  
Thus, Phase 2 boils down to an Article 53(1)(a) inquiry as to wheth-
er there is “a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court has been or is being committed”.17 This further bifur-
                                                   
14 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, para. 78 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/acb906). Communications considered clearly beyond the Court’s juris-
diction may be reconsidered based on new information or circumstances, such as a change 
in the jurisdictional situation. 
15 See Human Rights Watch, 2011, see supra note 4. 
16 ICC Statute, Article 53(1). 
17 Ibid., emphasis added. 
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cates into ‘Phase 2(a)’, which looks at temporal and geographical or per-
sonal jurisdiction, and ‘Phase 2(b)’, which considers whether the alleged 
conduct constitutes crimes under the Rome Statute (that is, if there exists 
subject-matter jurisdiction).18 The date of entry into force of the Rome 
Statute delineates the starting point for the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, 
namely from 1 July 2002 onwards.19 The Court’s subject-matter jurisdic-
tion is laid out in Article 5 of the Statute and extends to genocide (as de-
fined in Article 6), crimes against humanity (Article 7), war crimes (Arti-
cle 8) and, recently, aggression (Article 8bis).20  
The Court’s territorial or personal jurisdiction is established if an 
Article 5 offence is committed on the territory or by a national of a State 
Party (Article 12(2)) or when a non-State Party has lodged a declaration 
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction (Article 12(3)).21 Moreover, jurisdiction 
lies beyond these parameters where the Security Council refers a situation 
to the Court, acting pursuant to its Chapter VII powers under the UN 
Charter (Article 13(b)).  
Phase 2 involves an extensive jurisdiction-focused evaluation of the 
facts and law in connection with the crimes that are the object of the 
communication. The Prosecutor “will pay particular consideration to 
crimes committed on a large scale, as part of a plan or pursuant to a poli-
cy”.22 And she may collect any available materials related to any relevant 
national proceedings. Phase 2 culminates in the submission to the Prose-
                                                   
18 Human Rights Watch, 2011, see supra note 4. 
19 Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012, p. 98. 
20 The Court may also exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, once the necessary 
provision adopted by the Assembly of States Parties enters into force. More specifically, 
this can occur one year after the 30th ratification of the relevant amendment to the Rome 
Statute adopted at the Kampala Review Conference (2010), and no earlier than 2017. See 
Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 11 June 2010, UN doc. RC/Res.6 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/0d027b/); ICC Statute, Articles 15 bis and 15 ter. As this chapter 
goes to print, the aggression jurisdiction has been activated. On 15 December 2017, the In-
ternational Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties adopted the 2010 Kampala aggres-
sion amendments – as of 17 July 2018, the Court will be able to prosecute State leaders re-
sponsible for the illegal use of force against other States. 
21 ICC Statute, Articles 12(2) and 12(3). 
22 OTP, 2013, para. 81, see supra note 14. 
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cutor of an ‘Article 5 report’ focusing on the Court’s subject-matter juris-
diction as defined in Article 5 of the Statute.23  
23.2.2.3. Phase 3: Admissibility Assessment 
Consistent with Article 53(1)(b), admissibility is assessed in ‘Phase 3’. 
This is tantamount to determining whether the ‘complementarity’ and 
‘gravity’ factors have been satisfied. Pursuant to the principle of comple-
mentarity, primacy of jurisdiction lies with a State’s domestic courts un-
less the ICC determines the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the […] prosecution”.24 The other admissibility criterion, gravity, 
requires that the crimes at issue be sufficiently serious to “the internation-
al community as a whole”.25 The Statute describes these crimes as “unim-
aginable atrocities” and “grave crimes” that “deeply shock the conscience 
of humanity”.26 
At this preliminary phase, where there is not yet a ‘case’ proper, the 
Prosecutor analyses only “potential” cases that “could be identified in the 
course of the preliminary examination based on the information available 
and that would likely arise from an investigation into the situation”.27 
Thus, per the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
“admissibility at the situation phase should be assessed against certain 
criteria defining a ‘potential case’ such as: (i) the groups of persons in-
volved that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of 
shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court allegedly committed during the incidents that are likely to be the 
focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s)”.28 
Completion of Phase 3 entails submission to the Prosecutor of an 
‘Article 17 Report’ related to the admissibility issues identified in Article 
17 of the Statute. 
                                                   
23 Ibid. 
24 ICC Statute, Article 17(1)(a). 
25 Margaret M. deGuzman, “Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court”, 
in Fordham International Law Journal, 2008, vol. 32, no. 5, p. 1400. 
26 ICC Statute, Preamble. 
27 OTP, 2013, para. 43, see supra note 14. 
28 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 50. 
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23.2.2.4. Phase 4: Interests of Justice Assessment  
Assuming the requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility are met, the 
“interests of justice” prong is considered in Phase 4. Whereas the Phase 2 
and 3 considerations (jurisdiction and admissibility) are positive require-
ments in the sense that they must be met to proceed with the inquiry, 
Phase 4 (interests of justice) is rather a “potentially countervailing consid-
eration” that may give a reason not to proceed.29 Thus, the OTP will go 
forward absent specific circumstances providing a substantial reason to 
conclude that the interests of justice would not be served by an investiga-
tion at that time.30  
In doing its analysis during this phase, the OTP will take into ac-
count the best interests of victims (and, where relevant, victim representa-
tives), and “other relevant actors, such as community, religious, political 
or tribal leaders, States, and “intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations”.31 That said, the OTP is conscious of not infringing on the 
Security Council’s Article 16 ‘peace and security maintenance’ role. Per 
that provision, “no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with […] for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, 
in a resolution adopted under [UN Charter] Chapter VII, has requested the 
Court to that effect [with allowance of renewal]”.32 Thus, Phase 4 does 
not “embrace all issues related to peace and security”, given that it should 
not operate as “a conflict management tool requiring the Prosecutor to 
assume the role of a mediator in political negotiations”.33  
Phase 4 results in the issuance of an ‘Article 53(1) Report’, which 
provides a non-binding preliminary statement of facts, with relevant sus-
pects, places and times, as well as an initial legal characterization of the 
alleged crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.34  
                                                   
29 OTP, 2013, para. 67, see supra note 14. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 ICC Statute, Article 16. 
33 OTP, 2013, para. 69, see supra note 14. 
34 Ibid, paras. 83–84. 
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23.2.3. Preliminary Examination Activities 
Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute identifies two principal categories of 
activity that the Prosecutor can engage in during preliminary examination: 
(1) seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable 
sources that she deems appropriate; and (2) receive written or oral testi-
mony at the seat of the Court.35 Although, on its surface, this language 
may seem limiting, the actual scope of prosecutorial activity at this stage 
can be rather broad. Given that the OTP is not technically conducting an 
‘investigation’, it cannot officially rely on the modes of co-operation set 
forth in Part 9 of the Statute. 36 However, the OTP can send information 
requests to States, UN organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations and other reliable sources for the purpose of analysing the 
seriousness of the information received. 37 
In connection with this, the OTP may also carry out field missions 
to the relevant jurisdictions “to consult with the competent national au-
thorities, the affected communities and other relevant stakeholders, such 
as civil society organisations”.38 In this context, the OTP acknowledges 
that, as part of the preliminary examination, the “Office also examines the 
general context within which the alleged crimes, in particular, sexual and 
gender based crimes, have occurred and assesses the existence of local 
institutions, international organisations, non-governmental organisations 
and other entities available as potential sources of information and/or of 
support for victims”.39  
In light of these and other considerations, Héctor Olásolo interprets 
the Article 86 ‘investigation and prosecution’ restriction in Part 9 of the 
Statute as not forbidding access to certain parts of the Part 9 international 
                                                   
35 ICC Statute, Article 15(2). 
36 See ICC Statute, Article 86, which declares that “States Parties shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prose-
cution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” (emphasis added). By implication, 
activities outside of ‘investigation’ and ‘prosecution’ would furnish grounds for requesting 
State co-operation. 
37 OTP, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09, Regu-
lations 33–35 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
38 OTP, 2013, para. 85, see supra note 14. 
39 Ibid., para. 86. 
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co-operation regime, in particular those that are of a ‘non-coercive’ nature. 
As explained by Olásolo: 
In this regard, it is submitted that the States Parties duty to 
cooperate with the Court under art. 86 RS [Rome Statute] ex-
tends to all activities of the Court, including the preliminary 
examination and the subsequent triggering procedure. There 
are a number of reasons for this interpretation. First, the ul-
timate purpose of the cooperation scheme provided for in the 
RS is to facilitate the Court’s exercise of any of its jurisdic-
tional powers (not just its power to investigate and prose-
cute). Secondly, Part IX of the RS provides for several forms 
of cooperation that are closely connected with the Court’s 
exercise of powers other than the investigative and prosecu-
torial ones, such as those to enforce sentences and to award 
and enforce reparations rewards. Thirdly, a number of provi-
sions on the adoption and implementation of preventive 
measures in connection with the reparation proceedings are 
based on the general obligation to cooperate pursuant to art. 
86 and on those other provisions that elaborate on such gen-
eral obligation. Thus, as some have pointed out, [the “inves-
tigation/prosecution” language of art. 86] should be under-
stood as a reference to all ways in which the ICC exercises 
its jurisdictional powers. That would include the preliminary 
examination, which is essential for the proper exercise by the 
ICC of the activation dimension of its jurisdictional power.40 
Based on this, Olásolo arrives at the following conclusion: 
It is submitted that art. 15(2) RS leaves room for the OTP to 
resort to many of the forms of State Parties cooperation [of a 
non-coercive nature] provided for in art. 93 RS, including: (i) 
identification and location of persons or items; (ii) voluntary 
questioning of victims and witnesses in the territory of the 
States Parties; (iii) service of documents, including judicial 
documents; (iv) provision of records and documents, includ-
ing official records and documents; (v) examination of plac-
es or sites; and (vi) any other type of assistance not of a co-
                                                   
40 Olásolo, 2005, p. 61, see supra note 6. 
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ercive nature which is not prohibited by the law of the re-
quested state.41 
We will revisit these preliminary examination activities later in this 
chapter when considering them in the context of the proposed OEM. 
23.2.4. Preliminary Examination Termination 
The preliminary examination process is open-ended with the Prosecutor 
taking the position that “imposing rigid timetables on this process of anal-
ysis would not be workable under the framework of the Rome Statute”.42 
This is so, per the OTP, because: (1) the nature of Article 5 crimes, along 
with a broad jurisdictional scope and a mandate to analyse the interests of 
justice, often dictates long monitoring periods before preliminary exami-
nation inquiries can be concluded; (2) given the principle of complemen-
tarity, sufficient time is needed to determine the genuine nature and status 
of national investigation/prosecution efforts; and (3) the OTP’s limited 
resources means that not every situation can be immediately or expedi-
tiously investigated.43  
Relevant persons or entities will be informed of an ultimate deci-
sion by the Prosecutor not to investigate. Per Article 53(3), the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may review such a decision in relation to a referral by a State or 
the Security Council but not pursuant to a communication by other par-
ties.44  
23.2.5. Preliminary Examination Objectives 
Clearly, as we have seen, the chief aim of the preliminary examination is 
to consider if there is a reasonable basis to launch an official investigation 
regarding a situation. However, important subsidiary goals also include 
spurring domestic investigation/prosecution efforts (known as ‘positive 
complementarity’), deterring commission of future crimes, and contrib-
uting toward the end of a culture of impunity.  
But, for these objectives to be realized, the OTP “must adopt a con-
sistent method of analysis”, “increasing transparency”, and “clear time-
                                                   
41 Ibid., p. 60. 
42 Referrals and Communications, sect. I.C., see supra note 9. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ICC Statute, Article 53(3); OTP, 2013, para. 92, see supra note 14. 
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lines”.45 Unfortunately, in its decade and a half of work, it has failed to 
live up to these standards. Examining how that has played out in individu-
al cases will be the object of the next section.  
23.3. A Preliminary Examination Record of Timeline Inconsistency, 
Politicization and Uneven Results 
Despite theoretically furthering important interests beyond verification of 
a reasonable basis to proceed, including deterrence and positive comple-
mentarity, the preliminary examination has often worked at cross-
purposes to the ICC’s larger policy objectives. This is especially the case 
in reference to proprio motu investigations. In its relatively short life, the 
OTP has received over 10,000 Article 15 communications. And yet, only 
three have resulted in proprio motu investigations. Many communications 
have entailed years of OTP effort not yielding an eventual investigation, 
with many still in limbo at the time of writing. By the same token, the 
preliminary examinations themselves have raised political firestorms that 
have not been quelled by OTP strategy. Related to this, they have often 
been ineffective, yielding inconsistent results. These problems will now 
be explored in greater depth. 
23.3.1. Timeline Inconsistencies 
23.3.1.1. Preliminary Examinations Triggered by Communications 
The disparity in timelines with regard to preliminary examinations trig-
gered by communications is marked. Focusing on some case studies helps 
put this in perspective. 
23.3.1.1.1. Expeditious OTP Decisions 
23.3.1.1.1.1. Kenya 
23.3.1.1.1.1.1. Background 
In late December 2007, in a hotly contested presidential election, Kenya’s 
sitting chief executive, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu of the Party of National 
Unity (‘PNU’) was announced the victor by a razor-thin margin against 
opponent Raila Odinga, a Luo of the Orange Democratic Movement 
(‘ODM’). The results enraged dissatisfied Luo voters and the country 
                                                   
45 Claire Grandison, “Maximizing the Impact of ICC Preliminary Examinations”, in Human 
Rights Brief, 10 February 2012. 
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exploded in violence that lasted through January 2008 and left over 1,000 
dead, over 300,000 displaced, over 3,500 seriously injured, with nearly 
one thousand sexual assault victims, and extensive destruction of proper-
ty.46 These atrocities, along with the absence of a meaningful local law 
enforcement response, led to the OTP receiving communications and 
opening a preliminary examination in February 2008.47 At the same time, 
an international commission of inquiry – the so-called Waki Commis-
sion – was established and ultimately recommended creation of a tribunal 
to investigate and prosecute post-election violence perpetrators. 48  The 
Waki Commission eventually sent evidence it collected to the OTP.49 
23.3.1.1.1.1.2. Efforts to Create a National Tribunal and the OTP 
Request for Investigation 
Through 2009, Kenyan authorities held serious discussions about creating 
a national tribunal to try perpetrators of post-election violence.50 Toward 
the end of the year, those discussions had not yet yielded fruit. But as of 9 
November, the Kenyan parliament had begun debate on enacting a consti-
tutional amendment to form a local tribunal.51 In spite of this, on 26 No-
vember 2009, the ICC Prosecutor filed a request seeking authorization 
from Pre-Trial Chamber II to open an investigation in relation to Kenya’s 
post-election crimes.52 That request was granted.53 
                                                   
46 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 131, see supra note 28. 
47 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, “OTP Statement in relation to events in Kenya”, 5 February 
2008 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/765584/). 
48 Philip Waki, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence”, 15 Octo-
ber 2008, pp. 472 ff. (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a1063a/). 
49 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, “ICC Prosecutor receives materials on post-election violence 
in Kenya”, 16 July 2009. 
50 Such discussions surrounded, in particular, the Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill 2009 and 
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 2009, 28 January 2009, Constitution of 
Kenya (Amendment) (No. 3) Bill 2009, 24 August 2009. 
51 International Crisis Group, “Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings”, in Crisis Group 
Africa Briefing no. 84, 9 January 2012, p. 17. 
52 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request for authorisation of 
an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c63dcc/). 
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In December 2010, the Prosecutor requested the issuance of ‘sum-
monses to appear’ for six suspects in the Kenya investigation – William 
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua arap Sang (Case One) and 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohamed Hussein 
Ali (Case Two) – for their alleged responsibility in the commission of 
crimes against humanity.54 Those summonses were issued with the Pre-
Trial Chamber finding reasonable grounds to believe the suspects commit-
ted the alleged crimes. 55  The charges were eventually confirmed, but 
those against Ali and Kosgey were rejected.56  
23.3.1.1.1.1.3. The Case Crumbles 
In March 2013, the Prosecutor withdrew all charges against Muthaura, 
noting problems with recanting witnesses.57 In December 2014, prior to 
trial, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against Kenyatta, again alluding to 
                                                                                                                        
53 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
338a6f/). 
54 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecutor’s Application 
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mo-
hammed Hussein Ali, 15 December 2010, ICC-01/09-31-Red2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/72b726/). 
55 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, 8 March 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6c9fb0/); and ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 8 March 2011, ICC-
01/09-02/11-01 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/df8391/). 
56 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 29 Jan-
uary 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4972c0/). 
57 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial Chamber, Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the 
charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 11 March 2013, ICC-01/09-02/11-687 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/9d2c58/). 
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witness availability issues.58 In April 2016, a majority of judges in Trial 
Chamber V(A) concluded there was insufficient evidence to continue the 
Ruto/Sang trial, which had been running for a year.59  
23.3.1.1.1.2. Côte d’Ivoire 
Echoing the problems in Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire was wracked by sectarian 
violence following disputed presidential elections in November 2010. 
From then through April 2011, supporters of the two election opponents – 
Christian incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, hailing from the south, and Mus-
lim challenger Alassane Ouattara, from the north – attacked one another in 
various cities around the country. The violence left approximately 3,000 
people dead and half a million displaced.60 Many viewed this as a resusci-
tation of the Ivorian 2002-2007 civil war, wherein Muslim rebels from the 
north attacked the government-held south, including the then-capital 
Abidjan. International military forces, spearheaded by the French, ended 
the crisis and installed Ouattara as president.  
Although, via Gbagbo’s referral, the OTP had technically opened a 
preliminary examination in 2003 related to civil war violence, it had lain 
moribund for several years.61 Thus, the 2010-2011 post-election violence 
triggered what was essentially a new preliminary examination. Alleged 
crimes connected to that violence had been committed as recently as April 
2011. But already by 23 June, the Prosecutor requested authorization for 
an investigation.62 That authorization was granted and Gbagbo, along with 
his key lieutenant Charles Blé Goudé, are currently on trial before ICC 
Trial Chamber I.63 A warrant for arrest against Gbagbo’s wife, former 
                                                   
58 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Trial 
Chamber, Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 Decem-
ber 2014, ICC-01/09-02/11-983 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b57a97/). 
59 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and 
Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of 
Acquittal, 5 April 2016, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6baecd/). 
60 See, for example, ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15, 23 June 2011, ICC-
02/11-3, paras. 2 and 113 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1b1939/). 
61 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 13 December 2011, para 120 (http://
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62 Ibid., para. 122. 
63 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, TC I, ICC-02/11-01/15. 
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First Lady Simone Gbagbo, has been issued but she is not in ICC custody. 
Thus, that case remains in the pre-trial phase.64 
23.3.1.1.1.3. Other Situations 
Although not as expeditious as the Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire decisions, the 
OTP has taken relatively quick decisions in other communications-
triggered preliminary examinations. After a 2009 coup d’état in Honduras, 
the government of strong-man coup leader Roberto Micheletti allegedly 
engaged in crimes against humanity stemming from police violence 
against civilians and the murder of campesinos (peasants or farmers).65 At 
the end of 2010, after receiving related communications, the OTP opened 
a preliminary examination.66  The examination was closed in 2013 for 
want of a reasonable basis to proceed. The preliminary examination was 
then reopened in 2014 and summarily closed again in 2015.67 
Two other communications-based preliminary examinations appear 
to have been conducted summarily. The OTP received communications in 
reference to alleged British troop offences during the invasion of Iraq in 
2003.68 The United Kingdom, a junior partner to the United States, re-
mained an occupying authority, until 30 June 2004, when an Iraqi interim 
government assumed full authority. At some unknown point during this 
period, the OTP opened a preliminary examination based on the commu-
nications related to British troop offences (the UK having ratified the 
Rome Statute in 2001). Given that the OTP did not begin operations until 
2003 and was not up and running at full strength for some time after that, 
a February 2006 close date suggests a relatively truncated preliminary 
                                                   
64 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, PTC I, ICC-02/11-01/12. 
65 See, for example, OTP, 2011, paras. 33–41, see supra note 61. 
66 OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on 
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examination.69 That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the OTP reo-
pened the preliminary examination a few years later (in May 2014).70  
Stemming from crimes allegedly perpetrated by the Hugo Chavez 
regime, Venezuela (another State Party to the Rome Statute) was also the 
object of a communications-triggered OTP preliminary examination 
opened on an unknown date. Like the Iraq preliminary examination, the 
one for Venezuela was also terminated in February 2006.71 Again, allow-
ing for the OTP’s start-up period, the early 2006 end date also indicates a 
compressed timeframe.  
23.3.1.1.2. Delayed OTP Decisions 
In contrast, many communications-based preliminary examinations have 
been dragged out for years. The following cases illustrate this other side 
of OTP practice. 
23.3.1.1.2.1. Colombia 
From 1958 until 2012, when peace talks began, a civil war in Colombia 
claimed at least 220,000 lives and created one of the largest displaced 
persons populations in the world. The long conflict saw the rise and de-
cline of various powerful drug cartels, guerrilla groups, and paramilitaries 
but the government’s chief military antagonist was the guerrilla group 
known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (‘FARC’).72  
The OTP opened a preliminary examination in Colombia in June 
2004.73  It has examined materials related to alleged killings, enforced 
disappearances, imprisonment, torture, and other grave crimes committed 
by both government and rebel groups from November 2002 onward.74 In 
2012, the OTP concluded the Phase 2 portion of the preliminary examina-
                                                   
69 OTP, “OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq” [untitled letter from 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo], 9 February 2006 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c90d25/). 
70 OTP, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the pre-
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tion, finding there was a reasonable basis to believe crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes had been committed by the Colombian army, guer-
rilla actors such as FARC and the National Liberation Army, and paramili-
tary groups.75  
Five years later, and thirteen years after the preliminary examina-
tion first began, it lingers on – ostensibly due to efforts by Colombian 
officials to institute domestic proceedings. In 2005, the government had 
enacted the Justice and Peace Law (‘JPL’), which established several Jus-
tice and Peace Tribunals (‘JPTs’) to prosecute members of illegal armed 
groups that demobilized between 2004 and 2006.76 This law has been 
criticized for meting out token punishment and lacking coordination be-
tween judicial and administrative authorities while having inadequate 
technical capacity. In the words of Jennifer Easterday, as early as 2009: 
However, the JPL in effect does little to promote justice, 
truth, reparations, or reconciliation for victims in Colombia; 
instead, it serves as a quasi-amnesty for the worst perpetra-
tors of crimes against humanity and human rights abuses. In-
deed, many aspects of the JPL directly controvert President 
Uribe’s proclamations of “justice,” “truth” and “peace” […] 
Worse still, the JPL is not a comprehensive plan involving all 
of the armed factions. [The focus has been] mainly on de-
mobilizing the paramilitary groups. [Colombia has been tak-
ing advantage] of any ambiguities in its obligations under the 
Rome Statute[…] Other state parties to the Rome Statute, 
unsure of how the future of international criminal law will 
evolve and how the principle of complementarity will be ap-
plied in real world situations, are very likely to mimic the ac-
tions of Colombia by instituting their own sham prosecutions 
in the name of peace or transitional justice.77  
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The 2016 peace deal, whose transitional justice approach seemingly 
flowed from the JPL, was rejected by Colombian voters, in large part be-
cause it was seen as promoting impunity for fighters who had committed 
grave offences.78 And so, as of July 2017, after nearly a decade and a half 
of being open, the OTP’s Colombian preliminary examination continued 
to be mired in Phase 3. 
23.3.1.1.2.2. Afghanistan 
After the attacks of 11 September 2011 against the United States, directed 
by Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Taliban government, a US-led military coalition invaded the country and 
attacked the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda terrorists it harboured. Coalition 
forces soon defeated the Taliban and a new Afghan government was in-
stalled. The Taliban regrouped and has continued fighting against the gov-
ernment, which has been supported by international forces, including 
NATO.79 In connection with the conflict, the Taliban and other armed 
anti-government forces, as well as Afghan government soldiers in tandem 
with international forces, have allegedly committed crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes.80 The OTP has received communications alleging 
criminal conduct in reference to three separate groups of alleged perpetra-
tors: members of the Taliban and their affiliates (anti-government groups); 
members of Afghan government forces; and members of international 
forces.  
Afghanistan deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome 
Statute on 10 February 2003. In 2007, the OTP publicly acknowledged the 
existence of the preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan, 
meaning the preliminary examination has been open since at least that 
time.81 As of 2013, the preliminary examination entered into Phase 3,82 
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and as of 2016, the OTP has acknowledged that the case is admissible. Its 
2016 “Report of Preliminary Examination Activities” recognized that the 
“Government has instituted only a limited number of proceedings against 
alleged perpetrators” and “has not provided any information on national 
proceedings to the Office, despite multiple requests for such information 
from the Office since 2008”.83 Moreover, the OTP has essentially declared 
that its Phase 4 assessment has concluded, that is, there are no interest of 
justice issues:  
In light of the mandate of the Office, as well as the object 
and purpose of the Statute, and taking into account the gravi-
ty of the crimes and the interests of victims, based on the in-
formation available the Office would have no substantial 
reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation would 
not be in the interests of justice.84 
Thus, as of November 2016, at least nine years after the preliminary 
examination was opened, the OTP acknowledged that it was “concluding 
its assessment of factors set out in Article 53(1)(a)-(c), and will make a 
final decision on whether to request the Pre-Trial Chamber authorisation 
to commence an investigation into the situation […] imminently”.85 As of 
July 2017, a full decade after the preliminary examination was initiated, 
no decision has been taken.86  
23.3.1.1.2.3. Guinea 
On 28 September 2009, 50,000 protesters gathered in a national stadium 
in Guinea to express discontent during Independence Day celebrations 
with then-leader Moussa Dadis Camara, who had taken power in a coup 
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d’état the previous year. Protesters were shot, stabbed, beaten and raped 
by government forces. In all, 157 civilians were killed (although Guinean 
military personnel quickly removed bodies from the stadium, making it 
difficult to ascertain the true number of those killed) and dozens of wom-
en were raped. 
In October 2009, after receiving related communications, the OTP 
opened a preliminary examination for this matter. In a December 2011 
report, the OTP concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
Guinean government forces committed crimes against humanity in con-
nection with the 28 September 2009 massacre. Five years later, the Guin-
ean government had engaged in only limited justice efforts related to the 
massacre: 
Since legal proceedings began in 2010 […] only eight people 
have been charged, though offenses were committed by 
scores of members of the armed forces […] Administering 
justice for the victims is all the more urgent because scores 
of victims have died in the past five years from their injuries 
or disease without being vindicated […] Despite the gov-
ernment’s stated commitments, a lack of financial and politi-
cal support has been a major obstacle to the progress of the 
investigation. The government needs to guarantee that all of 
the people summoned for questioning, including members of 
the security forces, regardless of their rank, answer the 
summonses issued by the judges. On several occasions, de-
spite repeated summonses, the judges have not been able to 
interview people summoned for questioning about the events 
of September 28, 2009.87 
Nearly three years later, despite some progress in the proceedings, 
there has still been no trial. In its latest Report of Preliminary Examina-
tion Activities (2016), the OTP concluded its analysis of the Guinea situa-
tion on a pessimistic note: 
Notwithstanding the concrete and progressive investigative 
steps adopted by the panel of judges during the reporting pe-
riod, the Office notes that the appointment in March 2016 of 
General Mathurin Bangoura, former member of the CNDD 
indicted in 2015, as Governor of Conakry was perceived by 
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victims and civil society organisations as a troubling signal 
in the context of Guinean authorities’ stated intention to 
bring to justice the persons allegedly involved in the 28 Sep-
tember case.88 
And yet, as of July 2017, after nearly eight years of a preliminary 
examination for a relatively simple case (by the ICC’s usual standards), 
the matter remains in Phase III. 
23.3.1.1.2.4. Nigeria 
Since at least 2009, the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram has been 
engaged in a violent campaign to control large swaths of territory in 
Northern Nigeria and create an ‘Islamic State’.89 Nigerian Security Forces 
have resorted to scorched-earth tactics to combat this violent uprising.90 
The OTP has received communications regarding alleged crimes commit-
ted by both sides of the conflict. Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute in 2001. 
And the existence of a preliminary examination in respect of it was an-
nounced to the public in 2010 (and thus the preliminary examination has 
been opened since at least that time). As of 2012, the OTP had found that 
there was a reasonable basis to conclude that Boko Haram had committed 
crimes against humanity and thus the preliminary examination could enter 
Phase 3.91  
In the meantime, there is compelling evidence that Nigeria is turn-
ing a blind eye to human rights abuses and grave law of war violations 
committed by its own security forces. According to the 2016 Report on 
Nigeria by Human Rights Watch: 
Authorities have rarely prosecuted members of the police 
and military implicated in abuses. While some soldiers have 
been prosecuted in military tribunals for offences such as 
cowardice and mutiny, the pervasive culture of impunity 
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means almost no one has been held to account for human 
rights crimes.92 
The OTP has implicitly acknowledged this in its 2016 Report of 
Preliminary Examination Activities by alluding to Nigeria’s domestic 
justice efforts in hypothetical and vague terms:  
Crimes allegedly committed by the Nigerian security forces 
that could fall under the Court’s jurisdiction would be exclu-
sively investigated and prosecuted by the military and would 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General of the 
Federation.  
[Both] the DPPF and the military authorities provided 
supporting material including investigative reports and case 
files regarding potentially relevant individual cases, which 
are subject to further examination by the Office.93  
And yet, as of July 2017, the preliminary examination is still locked 
in Phase 3 admissibility stature.  
23.3.1.1.2.5. Georgia 
On gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia was 
soon engaged in its own two-year civil war with separatists from the 
would-be breakaway region of South Ossetia. Upon cessation of hostili-
ties in 1992, although mostly unrecognized by the rest of the world, South 
Ossetia announced it was seceding from Georgia. This extremely fraught 
situation erupted in renewed armed conflict during the first week of Au-
gust 2008, with Russia involved on behalf of the South Ossetians this time. 
By 12 August 2008, a ceasefire had been negotiated, although crimes are 
alleged to have continued after that date. The five-day conflict claimed the 
lives of hundreds of civilians, left approximately 2,000 wounded and re-
sulted in a reported 138,000 individuals being displaced, with many eth-
nic Georgian villages in South Ossetia destroyed. War crimes and crimes 
against humanity were allegedly committed by all three of the warring 
parties. 
After receiving numerous communications, the OTP opened a pre-
liminary examination of the situation in Georgia in August of 2008. After 
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a late 2015 request, opening of a proprio motu investigation was author-
ized on 27 January 2016, nearly eight years after commencement of the 
preliminary examination. And this delay occurred in spite of the fact that, 
early on, there was ample evidence of crimes committed (thanks to NGO 
reports and a European Union fact-finding mission)94 and that South Os-
setia could not conduct legitimate proceedings as an unrecognized State.95 
23.3.1.2. Preliminary Examinations Triggered by Referrals 
23.3.1.2.1. Expeditious OTP Decisions 
Preliminary examinations triggered by referrals have also seen significant 
timeline discrepancies. Many referral cases have been subjected to light-
ning-quick preliminary examinations. For example, on an April 2004 re-
ferral from the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
where large-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity have been 
committed as part of an internal armed conflict since the mid-1990s (in-
cluding sectarian murder and rape in the bloody Ituri region), a mere two 
months of preliminary examination spawned an authorized investigation 
in June 2004. A slew of other State party referrals have also involved pre-
liminary examinations of mere months, including Uganda (January 2004 
referral and July 2004 investigation authorization – seven months), Mali 
(July 2012 referral with a January 2013 green light for the investigation – 
a six-month preliminary examination), Central African Republic II (May 
2014 referral and a September 2014 investigation opening – a preliminary 
examination of only four months).  
Preliminary examinations pursuant to Security Council referrals 
have been similarly brief. Based on Sudan’s genocidal actions in Darfur, a 
March 2005 Security Council referral triggered only a three-month pre-
liminary examination that ended with the start of an investigation in June 
2005. Gross human rights violations committed against protesters in the 
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waning days of the Muammar Gaddafi regime spurred a Security Council 
referral in February 2011. And an investigation was authorized in March. 
Thus, the preliminary examination lasted approximately one month. 
This shortened version of the preliminary examination in referral 
situations even applies to cases not selected for investigation. In connec-
tion with Israel blockading the Gaza territory (controlled by the Hamas 
terrorist organization), in May 2010 a flotilla of boats sailed to the territo-
ry to break the blockade and purportedly provide humanitarian aid to Ga-
za residents. The boats were registered to Comoros, Greece, and Cambo-
dia, among other countries. The Israeli government declared that the flo-
tilla was organized to provoke Israel and manufacture a confrontation that 
would generate negative publicity against it. On 28 May, Israeli military 
forces boarded the ships to inspect them and were violently confronted by 
some of the pro-Palestinian flotilla activists. In response, Israeli military 
personnel used force. Ten activists were killed and many others were 
wounded. Flotilla activists claimed Israeli force was excessive.  
On 14 May 2014, ICC State Party Comoros, to which one of the 
ships was registered, referred the matter to the OTP alleging commission 
of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.96 Less than six months later, on 
6 November 2014, the Prosecutor terminated the preliminary examination, 
finding that the requirements for opening an investigation into the situa-
tion had not been met.  
Following a request for review filed by the Comoros government, 
on 16 July 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber I requested the Prosecutor to recon-
sider her decision. On 6 November 2015, this decision was upheld by the 
Appeals Chamber.97  
23.3.1.2.2. Delayed OTP Decisions 
In large part, referrals tend to yield quick decisions. But one case in par-
ticular may be different. In January 2009, the Palestinian Authority sub-
mitted a declaration recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction over alleged ICC 
subject-matter crimes committed on its territory. Upon receipt, the OTP 
opened a preliminary examination. Nearly four years later, in November 
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2012, the OTP decided that, given Palestine’s UN ‘observer entity’ status, 
the declaration could not be accepted and closed the preliminary examina-
tion. Then, in January 2015, after a change to ‘non-member observer 
State’ status for Palestine and the filing of a new declaration, a new pre-
liminary examination was opened. Two and a half years later, the prelimi-
nary examination is still in Phase 2. In effect, the case has been in the 
‘preliminary examination twilight zone’ for almost nine years.  
23.3.2. Politicization of Cases 
23.3.2.1. Personality-Driven Politics 
It is important not to evaluate the inconsistent timelines in a vacuum. Ra-
ther, a significant part of the problem, apart from more structural obstacles 
such as resource constraints and barriers to evidence collection, is argua-
bly attributable to political considerations exogenous to the merits of the 
case. Some of these political issues are circumstance-driven while others 
are personality-driven. With respect to the latter, the ICC’s first Prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, exerted a tremendous impact on case selection and 
processing, allegedly in reference to consideration of his legacy as well as 
a desire to be in the spotlight. In considering what lies behind the ‘charges 
of politicization’ directed toward Moreno-Ocampo, Kai Ambos noted that: 
The sad truth is that he is a prosecutor who prefers holding 
press conferences to reading files. He enjoys making grand 
statements about being “the world’s most powerful prosecu-
tor”, but does not spend much time diligently assessing intri-
cate legal matters. One particularly embarrassing scene in 
the documentary “Prosecutor”, which tries to paint a flatter-
ing portrait of Moreno-Ocampo, shows him stepping out of a 
helicopter on to a muddy village square in the northeast of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, dressed in a spotless 
white suit. It gives the impression that he had come to this 
godforsaken place to lecture the people about the importance 
of international criminal justice.98  
David Bosco of The Atlantic acknowledged Moreno-Ocampo’s rep-
utation as “a poor manager who enjoys the limelight a bit too much and 
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speaks a bit too freely”.99 Given this situation, Bosco added, “the court 
has been beset by delays”. Mark Kersten has observed that “Moreno-
Ocampo’s willingness to bluntly ‘stick his fingers in it’ has been a con-
stant source of exasperation”.100 The African Union Commission’s former 
Chairman, Jean Ping attributed the AU’s ICC antipathy to Ocampo him-
self: “Frankly speaking, we are not against the International Criminal 
Court. What we are against is Ocampo’s justice – the justice of a man”.101 
How does this relate to specific cases? The quick decisions to pur-
sue investigations in DR Congo and Sudan, for example, arguably signi-
fied the Prosecutor’s “rush to pursue high-profile indictments, contempo-
raneous with his pursuit of the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (supposedly easy cases 
such as that of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo [the first defendant brought to trial 
at the ICC in connection with the DR Congo investigation] suggest a 
prosecutor with sharp political instincts and a recognition of the need for a 
new institution to have a few ‘quick wins’”.102 In contrast, in the non-
African situations, where there was less immediate political gain and pos-
sible high political costs, such as in Iraq or Venezuela, Ocampo was quick 
to dispense with preliminary examinations.103  
By the same token, delaying processing of cases with little political 
value but the potential for political trouble affected the preliminary exam-
inations in non-African cases like Georgia, Palestine, Colombia and Af-
ghanistan. And again, this is in contrast to headline-grabbing African cas-
es like the Kenya post-election crisis that garnered high initial internation-
al interest in prosecution. As explained by Chandra Lekha Sriram: 
[In these cases] the relatively muted approach of the prose-
cutor is noteworthy. In a rare official public statement on a 
non-African situation, the office of the prosecutor issued a 
two-sentence statement on Georgia in 2008, simply stating 
that it was a state party to the statute of the Court and that the 
                                                   
99 David Bosco, “Luis Moreno-Ocampo”, in The Atlantic, November 2011. 
100 Mark Kersten, “The ICC’s Next Top Prosecutor”, in Justice in Conflict, 23 May 2011. 
101 Nicole Fritz, “Congo Provides Justice without Theatrics”, in War and Law, 22 February 
2011. 
102 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “The Prosecutor of the ICC: Too Political, Not Political Enough, or 
Both?”, in Human Rights and Human Welfare, May 2009. 
103 Ibid., noting the Prosecutor failed “to take up cases regarding abuses in places such as Iraq 
and Venezuela given the surrounding “political controversies”. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 284 
Court considers all information pertaining to crimes within 
its jurisdiction. This is notable in comparison to the public 
statements indicating the willingness of the prosecutor to 
pursue investigations into post-election violence in Kenya if 
local or hybrid investigations do not go forward, which have 
been far more forceful. Two other situations which public 
statements by the office of the prosecutor indicate are “under 
examination” – Palestine and Afghanistan – have not been 
the subject of comparable public scrutiny, and indeed refer-
ence to examination of them can only be found in public 
documents from the office of the prosecutor at the end of a 
press release on Kenya investigations. [This] prosecutorial 
strategy – in terms of situations and individual cases, and in 
terms of timing of crucial steps and engagement with peace 
negotiations – illustrate an approach that is […] highly polit-
ical […].104 
Even if the current Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has adopted a much 
less overtly political strategy, it is noteworthy that the preliminary exami-
nations in non-African situations such as Colombia still drag on.105 Ben-
souda took over as Prosecutor in 2012 when the Colombia case, as well as 
that of Afghanistan, had been mired in preliminary examination purgatory 
for several years. Six years later, with Bensouda at the helm, Colombia is 
still in the same place and the Afghanistan preliminary examination has 
only recently wrapped up. 
23.3.2.2. Situation-Driven Politics 
23.3.2.2.1. Palestine and Afghanistan 
Apart from any personal agenda that the Prosecutor may have, certain 
situations may be hamstrung by the political controversy that they gener-
ate in their own right. As summarized by Carsten Stahn: 
[The OTP’s current roster of preliminary examinations in-
cludes] assessments of the some of the most politically sensi-
tive contexts: submissions related to ill-treatment of detain-
ees and unlawful killings by British troops in Iraq from 2003 
to 2008, analysis of alleged crimes committed in the Israel-
Palestine conflict, including the 2014 Gaza conflict and set-
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tlement activities in the West Bank and Jerusalem, review of 
violations committed in the Ukraine conflict (Maidan events, 
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea), and analysis of alleged crimes 
in Afghanistan by the Taliban, Afghan forces and members 
of US armed forces and the CIA, including abuse of detain-
ees and use of prohibited interrogation techniques.106 
Apart from the preliminary examination in Iraq, which has already 
closed, each of the current ongoing preliminary examinations just men-
tioned bears separate consideration here. The Palestine preliminary exam-
ination is a prime example. It is a politically-charged situation since, as 
has been noted: 
[The] Palestinians’ dualistic bid [declaring and acceding] to 
join the International Criminal Court (ICC) amounts to law-
fare, in that they are not motivated by ideals of international 
justice. Instead, they are trying to get the best possible politi-
cal deal for themselves in joining the court with hopes of en-
joying the maximum benefits to be gained from member-
ship.107 
And this engulfs the Court in the cross-currents of strong geo-
political dynamics that can affect its freedom of movement. Thomas Obel 
Hansen explains: 
Palestine joining the ICC may be more a question of playing 
politics and strengthening its position towards Israel – and 
the international community more broadly – than obtaining 
justice for the crimes committed during the conflict. At the 
same time, key players, including the US, have so far been 
opposing active ICC intervention in Palestine, raising ques-
tions as to whether the Court is capable of advancing its 
agenda in the face of great power resistance. The ICC de-
pends on the support of powerful countries, in particular the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil.108 
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The Afghanistan preliminary examination, which dragged on for 
over a decade, was beset by comparable political pressures. According to 
David Bosco: 
Any investigation there would be politically fraught, howev-
er, because Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has received 
information about alleged U.S. torture in the country. And a 
serious investigation of those crimes might lead to scrutiny 
of former U.S. leaders. In late October, the prosecutor de-
clared that a decision on Afghanistan was “imminent.” Six 
months later, and without an explanation, no decision has 
been made.109  
23.3.2.2.2. Ukraine 
Finally, the preliminary examination in Ukraine is also a potential politi-
cal minefield. That case stems from mass violence inflicted against citi-
zens gathered in Kiev’s Maidan Square to protest the refusal of the per-
ceived Russian-controlled government to enact reforms and accede to the 
European Union. In the resulting turmoil, then-President Viktor Yanu-
kovych was removed from power. Pro-Russian separatist rallies in the 
Crimea/Donbas regions following Yanukovych’s ouster resulted in a mili-
tary takeover in those territories and then a disputed annexation of Crimea 
by Russia. This, in turn, sparked an international armed conflict among 
Ukrainian, separatist, and Russian forces. In April 2014, the Ukrainian 
government submitted an Article 12(3) declaration accepting ICC jurisdic-
tion over alleged Article 5 crimes connected to the Maidan Square vio-
lence. Upon receipt, the Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination. A 
second declaration submitted by Ukraine caused the OTP to later expand 
the probe to cover atrocities allegedly committed in connection with the 
armed conflict.  
On November 14, in its Report on Preliminary Examinations, the 
OTP announced its preliminary conclusion that “there exists a sensible or 
reasonable justification for a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court ‘has been or is being committed’” within the Crimean 
and Donbas territories of Ukraine. On issuance of the report, Russia de-
clared that it would withdraw from the ICC because it “failed to meet the 
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expectations to become a truly independent, authoritative international 
tribunal”.110 Despite the OTP’s initial finding, the preliminary examina-
tion is still currently in the Phase 2 subject-matter jurisdiction stage. 
But having drawn Russia’s ire, the process is perceived as vulnera-
ble to political pressure. This is especially true in the case of Ukraine, 
where there is the added Russian animus in reference to the investigation 
in Georgia. Russia has declaimed that the Georgia preliminary examina-
tion resulted in accusations against South-Ossetian militia and Russian 
soldiers, while investigations against Georgian government officials were 
left to the discretion of the national authorities. Considering these devel-
opments, Russia has indicated that it “can hardly trust the ICC”.111 And, 
thus, David Bosco notes that, in reference to Ukraine, the Court “has 
dipped in a toe but not yet committed to a full investigation”.112  
As a result, in relation to the ostensibly politically explosive prelim-
inary examinations in relation to Afghanistan, Palestine and Ukraine, 
Bosco concludes: 
Taken together, [these preliminary examinations] will mark 
an important crossroads for the court. If [Prosecutor Fatou] 
Bensouda moves forward on those fronts, she may eventual-
ly seek to prosecute the citizens of powerful states that have 
spurned the court. And that will almost certainly provoke 
new political turbulence. If she avoids those battles, the ac-
cusations that the court is politically hobbled will intensi-
fy.113  
23.3.2.3. Uneven Results 
From our survey of preliminary examinations to date, the record is littered 
with poor choices, snap decisions, inconsistent positions and on-again-off-
again probes. In Kenya, the Prosecutor’s blitzkrieg preliminary examina-
tion led to an eventual unravelling of the case when crucial evidence end-
ed up being unavailable. In DR Congo, an abbreviated two-month prelim-
inary examination in 2004 yielded the Court’s first trial on the relatively 
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insignificant charges of recruitment and use of child soldiers. As critics 
have noted: 
Given the widespread allegations of systematic rape, sexual 
enslavement and other forms of sexualised violence by the 
UPC military group [of which Lubanga was the leader] in 
the Ituri region of the DRC, the charges against Lubanga 
were too narrow, with special criticism that gender-based 
crimes were not prosecuted. This became even more appar-
ent as evidence of gender-based crimes came out repeatedly 
through documentary and viva voce evidence during the tri-
al.114 
This was followed by less than satisfying results in the Ituri-focused 
trials of two other Congolese warlords. In particular, Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui was acquitted and Germain Katanga was convicted strictly of being 
an accessory in respect of one February 2003 incident in an Ituri village 
and sentenced to only 12 years’ imprisonment. Once again, experts ac-
cused the OTP of taking shortcuts. Per Phil Clark: 
The more important charges around whether Katanga orches-
trated these massacres in Ituri province in northeastern Con-
go; whether he was responsible for rape, sexual slavery, and 
the use of child soldiers. They’ll be disappointed that those 
charges didn’t stick[…] The prosecution has cut corners [and] 
these cases haven’t been systematically built.115  
Other cases have suffered from a herky-jerky decision-making ap-
proach. Honduras is a prime example. Triggered by communications re-
ceived at the end of 2010, the OTP opened a preliminary examination in 
reference to that troubled country. The examination was closed in 2013 
for want of a reasonable basis to proceed. It was then opened again in 
2014 and summarily closed again in 2015. In Côte d’Ivoire, a 2003 pre-
liminary examination connected to alleged crimes committed as part of 
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the north-south civil war lay fallow for years until 2010 violence flowing 
from the same conflict brought it back to life in 2011.  
The Palestinian matters are further evidence of a schizophrenic ap-
proach. As we saw in Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the 
Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, a 14 May 2014 referral 
led to a termination of preliminary examination only months later on the 
grounds the investigation-opening requirements had not been met. How-
ever, upon Comoros’s motion, Pre-Trial Chamber I requested the Prosecu-
tor to reconsider her decision. And that yielded, in fairly quick order, an 
Appeals Chamber decision sustaining the PTC. Similarly, when the Pales-
tinian Authority itself tendered a 2009 declaration accepting the Court’s 
jurisdiction over alleged Israeli offences perpetrated on its territory, the 
OTP was quick to initiate a preliminary examination only to shut it down 
in 2012, given Palestine’s UN ‘observer entity’ status. Then, in January 
2015, after Palestinian deposit of instruments of ICC accession, yet a new 
preliminary examination was launched.  
Questionable outcomes also extend to preliminary examinations 
wherein Phase 1-4 criteria seem satisfied but the matters languish none-
theless. After a decade of documenting Colombia’s failures to render 
meaningful justice to victims of that country’s civil war, the OTP’s con-
tinuing reluctance to request authorization for an investigation flies in the 
face of its own triggering criteria. The Guinea preliminary examination is 
arguably even more egregious given a one-day single-crime-scene matter 
and dithering government justice efforts for nearly ten years. The OTP has 
become a passive observer, transitioning through Phases 1 through 3 and 
then glacially shambling through an incomplete Phase 4. The Nigeria pre-
liminary examination is frozen in the same procedural posture, despite 
ample evidence of the government’s criminality disincentivizing it to take 
meaningful justice measures. 
23.4. A Proposed Solution: Creation of the Office of the Examining 
Magistrate 
23.4.1. Background 
So how can the beneficial aspects of the ICC preliminary examination – 
new atrocity deterrence, peace negotiations fillip, and transitional justice 
facilitator – be preserved while curbing the temporal disparities, personal 
agendas, political pressures and compromised justice just documented? In 
answering this question, it is worth remembering that judicial oversight is 
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a hallmark in ICC procedure. In an effort to convince the world’s super-
powers – especially the United States – that a politically-minded maverick 
prosecutor would not go on a figurative witch-hunt, tight control of the 
Prosecutor’s investigatory prerogatives was built into the Rome Statute. It 
is exercised at various junctures throughout the investigative and prosecu-
torial phases with one glaring exception – the preliminary examination. In 
effect, from a judicial supervision perspective, the preliminary examina-
tion represents an evidence-collection blind spot. In other words, the 
Rome Statute’s framers gave free rein for the Prosecutor to go on a pre-
situation fishing expedition without time limit.  
So it is posited that removing the blind spot will solve the problem. 
But what is the optimal way to achieve this? Rather than simply extending 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s writ to include preliminary examination over-
sight, this chapter proposes a solution that can be more proactive in terms 
of promoting prosecutor-defence equality of arms and sensitivity to vic-
tims’ rights, while preserving the benefits of deterrence and positive com-
plementarity. At the same time, it can offer a judicial authority with over-
sight capability but also with specialized expertise in preliminary exami-
nation techniques and issues. This is possible through creation of an ‘Of-
fice of the Examining Magistrate’. As this proposal is based in part on the 
traditional civil law inquisitorial model, which Jacqueline Hodgson de-
scribes as a possible means of better controlling “discretion in the exercise 
of [investigatory powers]”,116 as well as that of the Office of the Co-
Investigating Judges at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, those institutions will be examined first. From that foundation, 
the details of the proposed ICC OEM will be considered.  
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23.4.2. Foundations: The Civil Law Examining Magistrate and the 
ECCC’s Office of Co-Investigating Judges 
23.4.2.1. The Traditional Civil Law Examining Magistrate 
23.4.2.1.1. Background 
The Examining Magistrate is a traditional feature of civil law jurisdictions 
such as France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands.117 The criminal pro-
cedure of these jurisdictions is characterized by an ‘inquisitorial’ system, 
which denotes “an official inquiry, in contrast to the contest or dispute that 
characterizes the adversarial process [as found in England and the United 
States, for example]”.118 The centrepiece of that ‘inquiry’ is conducted by 
the Examining Magistrate (juge d’instruction in France, juez de instruc-
ción in Spain, and onderzoeksrechter in the Netherlands).  
23.4.2.1.2. A Tripartite System with Victim Participation 
A helpful model for this chapter’s proposal is provided in the French sys-
tem, where the examining magistrate’s traditional role in cases of serious 
crimes fits within a tripartite pre-appeal criminal justice process. It begins 
with a case initiation phase via the police/prosecutor (or by a complaint 
filed by a private citizen), ‘instruction’ under the aegis of the examining 
magistrate, and pre-trial/trial phase presided over by an adjudicating 
judge/jury (that is first filtered by a Chambre des Mises en Accusation – 
somewhat akin to a grand jury in American criminal procedure).119  
It should be noted that the French system, consistent with its sister 
civil law jurisdictions, also allows a citizen to institute a separate civil 
case (action civile) arising from the crime at issue by filing a formal dec-
laration demanding reparation.120 This is significant since, as we shall see, 
                                                   
117 It should be noted that the traditional role of the examining magistrate has been reduced or 
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the ICC’s victim-centred schema is largely modelled on this feature. It 
therefore provides greater conceptual support for the notion of instituting 
the OEM, which is clearly of a piece with the ICC’s inspirational template. 
Within the tripartite system outlined above, there is a rather symbi-
otic relationship between the prosecutor and the examining magistrate. 
The prosecutor’s office initiates the case via citizen’s complaint or sua 
sponte filing. But then it is turned over to the examining magistrate for 
further investigation. Doris Jonas Freed explains the range of the examin-
ing magistrate’s activities at this juncture in the French system: 
To carry out his duties effectively, the juge d’instruction is 
given extensive authority. He may issue warrants of deten-
tion […] make searches and seizures, order a visit to the sce-
ne of the crime, and require expert testimony. If proceedings 
must be held outside the jurisdiction of the juge, he can issue 
letters rogatory to a juge in the proper jurisdiction empower-
ing him to hold the necessary hearings. The formal investiga-
tion is a secret proceeding before the juge and his clerk in 
which the juge examines and cross-questions witnesses and 
confronts them with the accused.121  
23.4.2.1.3. The End-Phase for the Examining Magistrate 
The results of the investigation, including the depositions of any testimo-
ny, are rendered in an expository document with supporting exhibits. This 
constitutes the ‘dossier’ of the case. Based on this record, the examining 
magistrate makes recommendations for further action to the prosecutor, to 
whom he refers the entire record.122 After that referral, the prosecutor has 
a period of time in which to plead (that is, to frame the case for trial-level 
proceedings). It should be noted that, in cases of insufficient basis for 
proceeding, the examining magistrate has the option of entering an ordon-
nance de non-lieu, similar to a nolle prosequi in American law (a dismis-
sal of the case).123  
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23.4.2.1.4. The System’s Advantages  
Although the prosecutor in the French system is technically regarded as 
part of the judiciary and an ‘officer of the court’, Jacqueline Hodgson has 
commented on the fundamentally adversarial nature of her writ. Thus, the 
examining magistrate is crucial in terms of furnishing a kind of “inde-
pendence of the criminal justice system”.124 She refers to this as a crucial 
“due process protection” in the form of “judicial oversight provided by 
the officer in control of the investigation – an investigation that does not 
focus simply on the suspect, but which is oriented towards the discovery 
of both incriminating and exculpating evidence”.  
The French themselves see greater efficiency and procedural fair-
ness in this arrangement vis-à-vis the more strictly adversarial process 
with the prosecutor assuming sole investigative duties. In the words of 
former French Justice Minister Élisabeth Guigou, in addressing the Sénat 
on 15 June 1999: 
The adversarial system of justice is by nature unfair and un-
just. It favours the strong over the weak […] Our own sys-
tem is better, both in terms of efficiency and the rights of the 
individual. I prefer, and I want to make this quite plain, an 
independent judge who investigates evidence both for and 
against the suspect, to police officers who carry out large 
parts of the criminal investigation without any judicial su-
pervision.125  
23.4.2.2. The Internationalization of the Examining Magistrate: 
The Office of the Co-Investigating Judges at the ECCC 
23.4.2.2.1. Background 
The examining magistrate model has been implemented at the interna-
tional level by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(‘ECCC’), which was established pursuant to an agreement between the 
Cambodian government and the United Nations to render justice in rela-
tion to the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. In contrast to previous ad 
hoc or hybrid internationalized tribunals whose criminal procedure was 
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modelled on the adversarial schema, the ECCC follows the French inquis-
itorial template (including the juge d’instruction) incorporated into Cam-
bodian law during its colonial time. 
23.4.2.2.2. Role of the Co-Investigating Judges 
Thus, pre-trial investigations at the ECCC are carried out not by the Pros-
ecution and the Defence but by the two Co-Investigating Judges (one in-
ternational and one domestic – in line with the ‘hybrid’ nature of the insti-
tution). After initial referral of the matter by the Co-Prosecutors via an 
‘Introductory Submission’ (setting out the basic case parameters – the 
prosecution may also file so-called ‘Supplementary Submissions’, if any 
new information comes into its possession), the Co-Investigating Judges 
(‘CIJs’) begin an investigation.126  
The CIJs are tasked with gathering evidence in order to determine: 
(1) whether the information in the Introductory Submission constitute 
crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ECCC; (2) whether the 
suspects identified were senior leaders or most responsible for the crimes 
at issue); and (3) whether the person under investigation should be bound 
over for trial or released for want of sufficient evidence.127 
In performing these tasks, the CIJs are under a duty to: (1) investi-
gate impartially with a view to finding evidence regardless of whether it is 
incriminating or exculpatory; (2) act independently and not accept or seek 
any instructions from any government or any other source; (3) strike a 
balance among the interests and rights of the different parties, that is, de-
fence, victims and prosecution; and (4) conduct the investigation under 
confidentiality in order to protect the rights and interests of the Parties, 
especially the presumption of innocence, to allow for potential protective 
measures for the identity of witnesses and victims, and to conduct an effi-
cient and effective investigation.128 
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23.4.2.2.3. Concluding Duties 
At the conclusion of an investigation, the CIJs notify the parties who then 
have fifteen days to request further investigative action. At the expiration 
of this period, the CIJs forward the case file to the Co-Prosecutors, who 
issue a written final submission, wherein they may request that the CIJs 
indict the suspect at issue or dismiss the case. Not bound by the Co-
Prosecutors’ submissions, the CIJs will issue a ‘Closing Order’ consisting 
of either an indictment or dismissal – both of which are subject to appeal 
by the Co-Prosecutors (and by the defendant and/or civil parties pursuant 
to certain conditions/limitations).129 
If no appeal is filed against a Closing Order, in the case of indict-
ment, the CIJs forward the case file to the Trial Chamber so that a trial 
date can be set (or to the archives in case of dismissal). From this point 
forward, the CIJs play no further role in the case. If new evidence be-
comes available subsequent to a dismissal, though, the judicial investiga-
tion may be re-opened by the CIJs upon request of the Co-Prosecutors.  
23.4.2.2.4. Benefits of the ECCC’s Co-Investigating Judges 
Framework 
In the context of an internationalized mass crimes tribunal, the CIJ model 
is beneficial both in terms of procedural fairness and restorative justice 
responsiveness. 130  With regard to the former, the mechanism may be 
viewed as superior in terms of its truth-seeking function. As explained by 
Lise Reuss Muff: 
The introduction of investigating judges, whose sole purpose 
is to conduct an impartial investigation, examining all kinds 
of evidence regardless of its nature, is a better guarantee of 
the factual correctness of the findings than leaving the inves-
tigative responsibility with the respective parties. No facts 
will be hidden even though neither the defense nor the pros-
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ecutor might find a particular interest in them, and the final 
result and thereby the events found to have occurred should 
only to a very limited extent depend on the skills and capa-
bilities of the lawyers in question but instead reflect the reali-
ty. Rather than being viewed as a dispute between parties, 
the inquisitorial process is thought of as an official and thor-
ough inquiry, and the vital role of the trial judge combined 
with the impartial investigation of the investigating judge en-
sures the best possible investigation of the virtual reality.131 
At the same time, as the ECCC takes into account the interests of 
victims and makes them juridical parties, the CIJ schema also serves the 
interests of restorative justice. The CIJs, as neutral probers focused on 
gathering all relevant evidence pursuant to no litigation agenda, can or-
ganically take victims’ interests into account throughout the investigatory 
process.132 
23.4.3. Integrating the Office of the Examining Magistrate into the 
ICC Preliminary Examination Framework 
In considering introduction of the OEM to the ICC preliminary examina-
tion process, it is necessary to examine four main aspects of the proposal: 
(1) the stages of the process; (2) the timeline of the process; (3) other lo-
gistical considerations; and (4) potential benefits of the process. Each of 
these shall be considered in turn. 
23.4.3.1. The Stages of the Process 
In general, tracking the chronology of initial case management, six main 
stages can be discerned: (1) OTP initial intake; (2) OTP referral to the 
OEM; (3) OEM initial intake credibility assessment; (4) conduct of the 
Phases 2 through 4 probe; (5) OEM submission of a dossier to the OTP; 
and (6) OTP request for additional examination period or application to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation. It is helpful to unpack 
each of these stages. 
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23.4.3.1.1. Stage 1: OTP Initial Intake 
According to this proposal, initial receipt of communications and referrals 
would still go through the OTP. In this way, the OTP could take initial 
decisions regarding patently frivolous communications and filter them out. 
At the same time, for communications that appear facially plausible, as 
well as for State or Security Council referrals, this preliminary intake 
function permits the OTP to register case-initiation activity and put in 
place any case-tracking mechanisms. More generally, especially in light 
of the initial filtering, it signifies that the OTP remains an important actor 
in the preliminary examination process. In other words, while the OEM 
will assume the central probing function during the preliminary examina-
tion, as confirmed by the OTP role in subsequent stages of the process, it 
will not monopolize it.  
23.4.3.1.2. Stage 2: The OTP’s Referral to the OEM 
Assuming the communication or referral is facially plausible, the OTP 
will transfer the matter to the OEM to conduct the balance of preliminary 
examination activities. It should be noted that, either way, the OTP will be 
required to respond to the author of the communication within a reasona-
ble amount of time (six months are recommended here). That response 
must indicate that no further action will be taken at that time or that the 
matter will be referred to the OEM. In cases of non-referral, the author of 
the communication shall have the right to appeal the non-referral to the 
OEM. The relevant regulations shall specify that the OTP’s initial deci-
sion must be granted great deference and the OEM may only open a file in 
such cases if the OTP has engaged in abuse of discretion.  
23.4.3.1.3. Stage 3: The OEM’s Own Initial Intake Credibility 
Assessment 
Of course, assuming the matter is transferred to the OEM, it must then 
make an independent initial credibility determination. Thus, assuming 
OTP transfer of what it perceives as a facially credible communication, a 
second set of eyes at the OEM may find a fault not at first transparent. In 
this sense, it can be said that the OTP and the OEM would share Phase 1 
responsibilities. Of course, if the OEM has questions for the OTP con-
cerning its initial assessment, it can communicate with the OTP to request 
any relevant information. 
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23.4.3.1.4. Stage 4: Conduct of the Phases 2 through 4 Probe 
Conduct of the Phases 2 through 4 probe is the heart of the process. As we 
have seen, Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute clarifies the scope of would-
be OEM activities: (1) seeking additional information from States, organs 
of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organiza-
tions, or other reliable sources that the office considers germane; and (2) 
receiving written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.133  
This could entail, as noted earlier, field visits to implicated coun-
tries “to consult with the competent national authorities, the affected 
communities and other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society organi-
sations”.134 Thus, consistent with OTP policy, the OEM would likely scru-
tinize “the general context within which the alleged crimes, in particular, 
sexual and gender based crimes, have occurred and [assess] the existence 
of local institutions, international organisations, non-governmental organ-
isations and other entities available as potential sources of information 
and/or of support for victims”.135 
Moreover, per the interpretation of preliminary examination scope 
put forth by Hector Olásolo, Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute may permit 
the OEM to avail itself of certain limited forms of non-coercive State Par-
ty co-operation provided for in Article 93, including: (1) identifying and 
locating persons or items; (2) questioning victims and witnesses on a vol-
untary basis on the territory of States Parties; (3) serving documents, in-
cluding those of a judicial nature; (4) seeking records and documents, 
including those of an official nature; (5) inspecting places or sites; and (6) 
                                                   
133 ICC Statute, Article 15(2) ((1) seeking additional information from States, organs of the 
United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable 
sources that the office considers germane; and (2) receiving written or oral testimony at the 
seat of the Court). 
134 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, para. 85, see supra note 14 (“to 
consult with the competent national authorities, the affected communities and other rele-
vant stakeholders, such as civil society organisations”). 
135 Ibid., para. 86 (“[examine] the general context within which the alleged crimes, in particu-
lar, sexual and gender- based crimes, have occurred and [assess] the existence of local in-
stitutions, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and other entities 
available as potential sources of information and/or of support for victims”).  
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seeking other types of assistance not of a coercive nature and not forbid-
den by the law of the requested State.136  
It should be noted that, during this phase, the OTP may receive ad-
ditional related information or develop additional insights while the OEM 
carries on its examination. The OTP will have the opportunity and, indeed, 
would be encouraged to share this information or these insights with the 
OEM during this period. Similarly, if the OEM has questions regarding 
the matters under examination, it can get in contact with the OTP to pose 
those questions. It could be, for example, that the OTP is working on an 
authorized investigation whose subject matter dovetails into an OEM pre-
liminary examination. In such cases, to the extent no conflicting policies 
were implicated, it would promote both efficiency and investigatory co-
herence to allow the two offices to communicate with one another and 
share relevant information. 
23.4.3.1.5. Stage 5: OEM Submission of a Dossier to the OTP 
Analogous to the modus operandi in civil law jurisdictions and at the 
ECCC, the OEM would conclude its preliminary examination activities 
with submission to the OTP of a dossier announcing and supporting its 
conclusions. Where Phases 2 through 4 were satisfied, the OEM would 
certify to the OTP that the latter could file a request with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to open a full-fledged investigation. If the conduct of the prelim-
inary examination established failure to satisfy any of those phases, then 
the dossier would so indicate and advise terminating the matter without 
prejudice. 
Thus, for instance, if the OEM concluded that the preliminary facts 
alleged suggested commission of crimes such as narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism not amounting to genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes, it would recommend termination based on failure to satisfy Phase 
2. To take another example, assuming Phase 2 were satisfied but the OEM 
concluded that the domestic jurisdiction was engaged in genuine justice 
                                                   
136 Olásolo, 2005, p. 60, see supra note 6 ((1) identifying and locating persons or items; (2) 
questioning victims and witnesses on a voluntary basis on the territory of States Parties; (3) 
serving documents, including those of a judicial nature; (4) seeking records and documents, 
including those of an official nature; (5) inspecting places or sites; and (6) seeking other 
types of assistance not of a coercive nature and not forbidden by the law of the requested 
state). 
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efforts, thus signifying inadmissibility, then it could draft its dossier to 
recommend case closure.  
23.4.3.1.6. Stage 6: OTP Follow-Up 
On return of the case file to the OTP, the Prosecutor has a number of op-
tions depending on the recommendation. If the OEM finds each phase has 
been satisfied, and, upon receipt of the dossier, the Prosecutor is in accord 
with the recommendation to proceed to the next stage, she may apply to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to open a full investigation (much as she would 
without the OEM dossier under the current system). 
Alternatively, it is possible the Prosecutor could disagree. For ex-
ample, she might have a different take on the Phase 4 determination re-
garding interests of justice. Significantly, the proposed new framework 
does not provide the OEM with the right of appeal – the decision of the 
Prosecutor not to request opening a full investigation must be accepted 
from the OEM perspective. This is part of the balancing of power between 
the OTP and the OEM, ultimately continuing to vest case strategy deci-
sions with the OTP.  
That said, in the case of a referral, per Article 53, at the request of 
the referring State or the Security Council, the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed. And the same would be 
true if the OEM recommends not proceeding and the Prosecutor accepts 
that decision – the new framework would not amend Article 53 in this 
regard. 
Similarly, if closure is recommended by the OEM instead, the Pros-
ecutor can accept that too. On the other hand, if she concludes closure is 
premature or unjustified, the restructuring proposed herein gives her op-
tions.  
If she believes further probing is necessary, and there is still time on 
the preliminary examination clock (timing will be discussed below but an 
initial preliminary examination of 24 months is recommended), she could 
file a motion for reconsideration of case closure with the OEM. Based on 
a review of the dossier, that motion would require specifying the particu-
lar grounds for reconsideration – for example, internal inconsistencies in 
the dossier or receipt of new information casting doubt on the OEM’s 
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recommendation. The framework would allow for an appeal to the Pre-
Trial Chamber if the OEM denied the motion for reconsideration.137  
On the other hand, if case closure were recommended based on 
failure to satisfy one or more of Phases 2-4 (at the conclusion of the regu-
lar time frame), the OTP could apply for a 12-month extension to the Pre-
Trial Chamber directly.138 If such extension were granted, both offices 
could continue the preliminary examination activities outlined above as 
well as liaise with each other (as will be explained below).  
In any event, were the OTP still resolved that the case should go 
forward against the OEM’s recommendation and denial of the motion to 
extend by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the matter could be resubmitted as a 
new file to the OEM for a fresh preliminary examination if new facts or 
circumstances so warranted.  
23.4.3.2. Timeline Parameters 
23.4.3.2.1. Baseline Ceiling with Extension Mechanisms 
Chronological considerations are key given the inconsistent timelines 
considered above. Thus, the new OEM framework proposes a fixed, base-
line time-limit of 24 months to conduct the preliminary examination. At 
the end of that period, the OEM will need to submit a dossier to the OTP. 
If the preliminary examination can be completed in less time than that, the 
OEM is permitted to submit the dossier to the OTP at any point in ad-
vance (but not before the expiration of the initial mandatory six-month 
period, as set forth below).  
                                                   
137 Appellate jurisdiction at the ICC is currently vested exclusively in the Appeals Division. 
See ICC Statute, Articles 81 and 82. The proposal herein would call for modifying the 
Rome Statute to give a limited appellate function to the Pre-Trial Division in reference to 
review of preliminary examination initiation, closure and extension decisions by the OEM. 
It is submitted that this works best as the OEM has a quasi-investigative function and the 
Pre-Trial Division considers requests for initiation of investigations. 
138 This application would go the Pre-Trial Chamber in the interests of efficiency. As set forth 
below, the OEM will also be eligible to apply for an extension (with a presumption that it 
will be granted as this will be effected through filing a notice of extension) – and that ap-
plication would go the PTC. Presumably, if the OEM had determined that additional time 
had been needed, it would have applied on its own for an extension with the PTC in the 
first place. Having the OTP apply to the OEM, when it is likely the OEM has already de-
termined that additional time is not needed, will most likely be a futile effort. Thus, having 
the OTP apply directly to the PTC makes more sense and promotes efficiency. 
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It is quite possible, of course, that either or both offices believe(s) 
more time is needed beyond the 24-month ceiling. First, as mentioned 
previously, the OTP can apply to the OEM for 12-month extensions. Sec-
ond, the OEM can also file a notice of 12-month extension with the Pre-
Trial Chamber. In such cases, the default will be acceptance of the exten-
sion. However, the OEM will be required to justify the extension in the 
notice via the Pre-Trial Chamber convening a show-cause hearing. If, 
pursuant to the show-cause hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber believes the 
extension is not justified, it will have the power to terminate the prelimi-
nary examination.  
Alternatively, the OEM may conclude at the end of the 24-month 
period that an investigation should not be opened. That conclusion, as 
well as the grounds for supporting it, will be communicated to the OTP 
via the dossier. However, the OTP may conclude that additional time is 
necessary. In that case, the OTP can file a motion to the Pre-Trial Cham-
bers to extend the preliminary examination period for 12-months. If the 
motion is granted, upon expiration of the added 12-month period, the OTP 
can apply for another 12-month extension.  
One can easily imagine how this might play out. In a country where 
a civil war appears to be winding down, the OEM might determine that, 
by the end of the 24-month default period, that the government has begun 
making genuine efforts to investigate and/or prosecute those most respon-
sible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Thus, admissibility 
would not lie and the case would fail at Phase 3. On reviewing the dossier, 
however, the Prosecutor might conclude that the government’s justice 
efforts were ill-formed or too embryonic at that stage. It could thus re-
quest that the Pre-Trial Chamber grant the 12-month extension (and pos-
sibly new ones after expiration of the first).  
23.4.3.2.2. Baseline Floor with Reduction Mechanism 
At the other end of the spectrum, the OTP’s record of relatively snap deci-
sions regarding requests for investigation (for example, Libya – one 
month; DR Congo – two months; Sudan – three months; Central African 
Republic II – four months) mandate a minimum preliminary examination 
period as well. It is posited that a six-month minimum preliminary exami-
nation-period be established. If the OTP can show exigent circumstances 
(as supported by the OEM’s transmittal dossier), then the six-month floor 
could be lifted upon successful motion to the Pre-Trial Chamber.  
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23.4.3.2.3. The Importance of Default Time Markers 
It might be argued that the litigation activities surrounding departures 
from the proposed default timelines makes them more trouble than they 
are worth. But it is submitted that would not be the case. It is true that 
departures entail requests and/or notices and that appeals may flow from 
them. But that actually creates an incentive to finish the work within the 
default period. Besides, the suggested parameters are only advisory at this 
point and they could be adjusted with experience. But setting normative 
chronological points of repair will arguably affect internal work-clocks in 
a positive way that promotes greater efficiency and consistency. At the 
same time, in the truly difficult cases, the means for adjustment are avail-
able. This should give all the actors, as well as the international communi-
ty, the benefit of greater consistency with the needed ability to inject flex-
ibility into the process when truly called for. 
23.4.3.3. Other Logistical Considerations 
23.4.3.3.1. Public Communications during the Preliminary 
Examination Period 
To date, the Prosecutor’s public communications regarding preliminary 
examinations appear to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they 
may be said to help spur positive complementarity. On the other hand, 
especially in reference to the ICC’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, they arguably smack of grandstanding. It is submitted here that 
the visible presence of the OEM during on-site visits to the countries in 
question, along with outreach efforts to other stakeholders both interna-
tionally and in the region, should be a sufficient incentive for inspiring 
municipal justice efforts, deterring fresh violence or sparking peace nego-
tiations. At the same time, perceptions of the integrity of the process, as 
well as an effort at depoliticization related to all preliminary examination 
activities, mandate prohibiting OTP public statements regarding the pre-
liminary examination during the preliminary examination period. In an 
effort to further promote positive complementarity during this time, it is 
recommended that the new OEM continue the OTP’s recent practice of 
publishing an annual report detailing preliminary examination activities 
for each open file. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 304 
23.4.3.3.2. Personnel and Resources 
Although the precise details are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is 
worth commenting on the size and scope of the proposed OEM. Even if 
the proposal calls for only one Examining Magistrate to run the office and 
make final decisions, that judicial officer would be supported by a large 
staff with investigators, analysts and support staff. Presumably, a series of 
senior investigators would lead the examination of each individual matter, 
supported by teams of line investigators. The senior investigators would 
in turn report to the Examining Magistrate. The office would also have a 
Clerk, who would take care of all records, resource management, transla-
tors, and court staff (for depositions, hearings and related proceedings).  
23.4.3.3.3. Examining Magistrate Selection and Placement within the 
ICC’s Organizational Hierarchy 
Although, to a certain extent, the OEM would work in tandem with the 
OTP and would have an investigative function, its primary nature would 
be as a judicial organ. The Examining Magistrate is conceived as a judi-
cial officer who engages in preliminary examination-focused research and 
exercises a quasi-judicial function vis-à-vis the OTP. In this sense, it 
might be said that the Examining Magistrate is at the low-end of the ICC 
judicial hierarchy. Nevertheless, her office should be within the supervi-
sion and administration of the ICC’s judicial branch.  
The Court currently organizes itself into three divisions: Pre-Trial, 
Trial and Appeals Divisions. Pursuant to this chapter’s proposal, the Court 
would be divided into four divisions, with the addition of the new ‘Exam-
ining Magistrate Division’. 
Finally, as a member of the judicial branch, the Examining Magis-
trate should be nominated by the President of the ICC and selected by 
majority vote of the Assembly of States Parties. She would be selected for 
a term of nine years and not eligible for re-election thereafter. She should 
have criminal investigation as well as judicial experience. And she should 
be chosen from among persons of high moral character, impartiality and 
integrity who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices in her home jurisdiction. 
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23.5. Potential Advantages and Disadvantages to Integrating the 
OEM into the Existing Structure 
23.5.1. An Analysis of Potential Advantages 
In discussing the brief of the CIJs at the ECCC, Lise Reuss Muff has re-
ferred to the Ciorciari- Heindel framework of three objectives underlying 
the work at that institution: retributive justice, procedural justice and re-
storative justice.139 That objectives-framework is effective for assessing 
this chapter’s proposal to institute the OEM in the ICC’s preliminary ex-
amination process.  
23.5.1.1. Promoting Retributive Justice 
Promoting retributive justice is essentially coextensive with laying the 
proper investigative/prosecutorial foundation in the interests of combating 
a culture of impunity in reference to atrocity crimes.140 How is creation of 
the OEM, and its attendant framework modifications, advantageous in this 
regard? The answer lies primarily in specialization, concentration and 
efficiency. With respect to specialization, the proposed schema would 
establish an office focused exclusively on conducting preliminary exami-
nations and thereby developing expertise to conduct them more effectively. 
This likely means more expeditious processing in terms of initial intake, 
better cultivation of research sources and skills consciously honed to veri-
fy background facts (thus, for example, creation of more effective general 
databases and NGO contacts), developing the most efficient protocols for 
preliminary examination-focused on-the-ground visits (consultations, 
inspections, etc.), and better sensitization to the reasonable basis standard 
in reference to various permutations of the ICC’s core crimes. 
Regarding concentration, the proposed time limits mean diving 
head first into the preliminary examination with a view to processing in-
formation to assemble a dossier that will serve as the bedrock for any fu-
ture investigation or prosecution. Linked to this, of course, is efficiency – 
superior distillation through the compressed time frame and heightened 
                                                   
139 Muff, 2011, pp. 23–24, supra note 128, citing John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, On 
Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process, Documentation Centre of Cambodia, 
Phnom Penh, 2009, pp. 16–18. 
140 Ibid., p. 24, noting that the “retributive aspect of justice deals with the punishment and 
condemnation of the offender […]”. 
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issue-spotting capability owing to refined expertise means the preliminary 
examination’s fine points will not elude the OEM, while evidence will not 
grow stale nor witness memories fade.  
And this, in turn, is linked to positive complementarity, deterrence 
and peace-promotion. Arguably, many preliminary examinations under the 
current system have turned into a metaphorical dance between the OTP 
and the State. The former dangles the threat of a full-fledged investigation 
while the latter does just enough to stave it off. We see this now in Co-
lombia and Guinea, for example. With a dedicated Examining Magistrate 
and a 24-month ceiling, States will likely have better incentives for im-
plementing domestic justice measures in a more timely and efficacious 
manner. And to the extent State actors may have a hand in atrocity crimes, 
the OEM schema will, for the same reasons, constitute a superior deter-
rence mechanism.  
23.5.1.2. Promoting Procedural Justice 
While retributive justice focuses on the prosecutor’s objective in seeking 
punishment, procedural justice centres on the potential defendant’s inter-
est in fairness in terms of having his rights respected throughout the pro-
cess.141 While this may seem a bit amorphous at the preliminary examina-
tion stage (given that cases against specific defendants have not yet mate-
rialized), it still has important implications. For example, certain prelimi-
nary examinations are more limited in scope and clearly envisage the po-
tential culpability of specific, identifiable high-level leaders. The Guinea 
preliminary examination, for instance, whose scope is limited to the 28 
September 2009 Conakry Stadium massacre, necessarily contemplates the 
junta members in charge of the security forces that beat, raped and mur-
dered civilians that day. This is especially true of junta leader Moussa 
Dadis Camara, who fled to Burkina Fasso soon after the massacre (in fact, 
domestic charges have been filed against Camara but the case has 
stalled).142  In the meantime, as preliminary examinations languish, the 
proverbial Sword of Damocles hangs over these probable defendants. The 
proposed creation of the OEM, with its tight timelines and concentrated 
focus, would not allow such a cloud to hang over these actors indefinitely. 
                                                   
141 Reuss Muff speaks broadly of “the procedural aspects [addressing] the holding of fair 
trials”. Ibid. 
142 “Guinea Stadium Massacre: Former Ruler Camara Indicted”, in BBC News, 9 July 2015. 
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On the flip-side, it would prevent the OTP from moving forward with an 
investigation, and thus immediately casting suspicion on certain suspects, 
straight after receipt of communications or referrals.  
The other clear advantage in terms of procedural justice relates to 
equality of arms. Given that the current preliminary examination process 
largely tracks the adversarial model of investigation, the Prosecutor alone 
gathers evidence. True, the Rome Statute has her pay lip service to impar-
tial investigation. As I have noted previously:  
[The] Prosecutor is not merely an adversarial party to the 
proceedings. As set forth in Article 54 of the Rome Statute, 
she is bound to search for, gather, and pass on to the defense 
both incriminating and exonerating evidence equally. In this 
sense, the Prosecutor acts as an “organ of justice” rather than 
just an opposing party in a contest.143  
That said, I have also pointed out the imbalance that permeates the 
system, notwithstanding a nominally less adversarial role for the Prosecu-
tor. In particular, “a predominately adversarial model invests the prosecu-
tion with a significant resource advantage over the defense and provides 
institutional channels of communication with governments, typically not 
available to the defense, that significantly facilitate collection of evi-
dence”. In light of this, and the more balanced calibration of forces in the 
inquisitorial system, I have called for a hybrid approach: 
A hybrid procedure might employ a specially designated pre-
trial judge to participate in or oversee the collection of evi-
dence. This would promote “equality of arms” by helping to 
facilitate defense collection of evidence abroad and ensure 
prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The ICC 
system, seeking to expand defendants’ due process rights, al-
ready involves a certain degree of judicial pre-trial oversight 
of the prosecutor. A hybrid system extending that oversight 
to the collection of evidence would further level the playing 
field while preserving the inherent assiduousness of prosecu-
torial investigation.144 
                                                   
143 Gregory S. Gordon, “Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspira-
tions and Limitations”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2007, vol. 45, no. 3, p. 
661. 
144 Ibid., pp. 707–708. 
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The creation of the OEM, as proposed herein, entails the hybrid ap-
proach just described. It does so at the preliminary examination stage, 
thus dividing investigative responsibilities with the OTP early on in the 
life of the case and promoting equality of arms. 
23.5.1.3. Promoting Restorative Justice 
If retributive justice tends to be more prosecutor-oriented and procedural 
justice defence-oriented, restorative justice puts the emphasis on the vic-
tim.145 In this sense, the inquisitorial nature of the proposed preliminary 
examination restructuring – via addition of the OEM – has two distinct 
advantages. First, as was true for potential defendants, the Examining 
Magistrate would proceed with a wider institutional mission and focus 
than the Prosecutor. Thus, the interests of victims in compiling the prelim-
inary examination dossier would truly be on equal footing with that of the 
other juridical parties. As Daniel Shuman states: “Likely most individuals 
considering the possibility that they may find themselves in the role of the 
victim would see the benefits of the inquisitorial system that places the 
responsibility [for the matter] in the hands of a neutral judge”.146  
Second, given the neutral fact-gathering perspective, the OEM’s in-
quisitorial features would better serve the victims’ desire to understand 
what happened and memorialize the historical record. As explained by 
Lise Reuss Muff in the context of the ECCC: 
[The inquisitorial system has an advantage] as ascertaining 
the truth is seen as the ultimate goal. The introduction of in-
vestigating judges, whose sole purpose is to conduct an im-
partial investigation, examining all kinds of evidence regard-
less of its nature, is a better guarantee of the factual correct-
ness of the findings than leaving the investigative responsi-
bility with the respective parties. No facts will be hidden 
even though neither the defense nor the prosecutor might 
find a particular interest in them, and the final result and 
thereby the events found to have occurred should only to a 
very limited extent depend on the skills and capabilities of 
                                                   
145 See Muff, 2011, pp. 24–25, see supra note 128. 
146 Daniel W. Shuman, “The Role of Legal Rules in Recollection of Trauma: An Overview 
and Introduction to the Legal Panel”, in J. Don Read and D. Stephen Lindsay (eds.), Recol-
lections of Trauma: Scientific Evidence and Clinical Practice, Springer Science, New York, 
1997, p. 494. 
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the lawyers in question but instead reflect the reality. Rather 
than being viewed as a dispute between parties, the inquisito-
rial process is thought of as an official and thorough inquiry, 
and the vital role of the trial judge combined with the impar-
tial investigation of the investigating judge ensures the best 
possible investigation of the virtual reality. Although [this ar-
rangement] cannot serve restorative justice personally to 
each victim, [due] to the model of independent investigating 
judges, [it is] able to provide [victims] with a great under-
standing of the truth.147 
23.5.2. An Analysis of Potential Disadvantages 
In considering the possible downsides to this chapter’s proposal, three 
main objections come to mind – creating unnecessary rigidity, restricting 
prosecutorial discretion, and detrimentally expanding the ICC’s bureau-
cracy while increasing its expenses. Let us now consider each of these 
potential problems. 
23.5.2.1. Creating Unnecessary Rigidity 
The current framework is supple and allows for the preliminary examina-
tion to flow naturally according to the situation on the ground, the concern 
of the international community, as well as the available re-
sources/manpower and enforcement priorities of the OTP at any given 
time. The new scheme requires the OTP to respond to communications, 
one way or the other, within a recommended period of six months (or any 
other designated reasonable time period). The proposal also sets a 24-
month time limit on conducting the preliminary examination (albeit with 
the possibility of extensions). The OEM model also forbids the Prosecutor 
from making public comments about the preliminary examination during 
the OEM’s work on the matter. To that extent, the flexibility or suppleness 
of the current framework is lost if this chapter’s proposal is implemented.  
23.5.2.2. Restricting Prosecutorial Discretion 
Restricting prosecutorial discretion is very much linked to the rigidity 
issue but has its own dimension. In particular, beyond strict time frames 
and blanket speech limitations, the OEM proposal takes away much of the 
                                                   
147 Muff, 2011, p. 25, see supra note 128. 
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freedom of action currently vested in the Prosecutor. The decision not to 
act on a communication, for example, is within the Prosecutor’s preroga-
tives. But the proposed scheme allows that decision to be appealed to the 
OEM.  
 And then, beyond the ability to comment on a preliminary exami-
nation in public, a number of other prosecutorial privileges are curtailed 
given the role of the OEM – the collection of evidence, communications 
with players on the ground, and, most importantly, the decision about 
whether to open an investigation. Although the OTP can appeal OEM 
recommendations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, there will be a presumption in 
support of the OEM’s conclusions and the OTP will have to overcome 
that presumption. To the extent experts believe that the Prosecutor is best 
situated to make conclusions about case processing at this stage, the OEM 
proposal would be seen as intrusive and problematic. Moreover, the pub-
lic comments ban would deprive the Prosecutor of an effective forum to 
push for positive complementarity during the preliminary examination 
through the naming/shaming option.  
Thus, some have “cautioned against regulation, arguing that the 
process should not be overly codified and that there was a virtue in prose-
cutorial discretion that should be preserved. Otherwise, preliminary exam-
inations would lose some of their leverage”.148 
23.5.2.3. Ballooning Bureaucracy and Expenses 
The ICC is already being criticized for excessive bureaucracy and costs. 
With 34 judges and over 700 staff,149 one commentator has lambasted it 
for its “Kafkaesque bureaucracy” that is “hindering justice” and keeping 
the institution from “becoming […] effective”. Regarding the ICC’s price 
tag for justice, by the end of 2014, Daniel Abebe could complain: 
A brief review of the ICC’s operation suggests that it is fail-
ing. Since 2002, the court has spent over $1 billion, with a 
yearly budget of over $100 million, all for 36 indictments, 
two convictions and six acquittals, with several decisions 
pending. Two convictions hardly constitute a serious deter-
                                                   
148 Lieneke Louman, “Report: Preliminary Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit: Re-
viewing Policies and Practices – Part 1”, in Post-Conflict Justice, 26 October 2015. 
149 David Davenport, “International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 Convictions”, in 
Forbes, 12 March 2014. 
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rent and one wonders if it is money well spent[…] Pouring 
more money into the ICC or expanding its powers won’t 
overcome the constraints of international politics[…] In the 
end, if the supporters of the ICC really think it is necessary, 
they have the burden of explaining why two convictions 
from a flawed court are worth $1 billion.150  
Of course, given the addition of a new office, with its own set of ju-
rists, investigators, analysts and staff, this chapter’s proposal necessarily 
entails adding to the ICC payroll and arguably creating more red tape. The 
larger bureaucratic edifice could be responsible for greater drags on effi-
ciency and the higher costs could significantly hamstring an institution 
already challenged by the demands of bloated budgets. As Peter Cluskey 
pointed out in 2016: 
[The] fact is that the court’s finances too have been shaky. 
Just two years ago, the Dutch government averted a crisis by 
stepping in to pay the rent on the court’s previous premises – 
because, it turned out, many of the countries that should have 
stumped up had become “reluctant” because of the financial 
crisis […] So the ICC as an institution is not without serious 
problems.151  
23.5.3. A Net Positive Assessment 
23.5.3.1. In Reference to Potential Inflexibility and Restricted 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
Notwithstanding the potential disadvantages just considered, it is submit-
ted that the OEM proposal is overall beneficial and should be adopted. 
With respect to inflexibility and prosecutorial discretion, the two main 
bugaboos identified boil down to limiting the Prosecutor in her efforts to 
promote positive complementarity/deterrence/peace and subjecting her 
decisions to judicial scrutiny.  
                                                   
150 Daniel Abebe, “I.C.C.’s Dismal Record Comes at Too High a Price”, in New York Times, 
12 December 2014. 
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23.5.3.1.1. Promoting Positive Complementarity 
Regarding the former, the concern is exaggerated for two reasons. First, 
the key consideration in the preliminary examination is to inform the ICC 
as to “whether to initiate an investigation”.152 Thus, certain experts have 
expressed reservations regarding use of the preliminary examination for 
purposes of influencing the push toward transitional justice: 
It was noted that the use of [preliminary examinations] as 
leverage carries certain risks. It can conflate the judicial 
function of the Court with wider ambitions of restorative jus-
tice. Concerns were expressed that the ICC does not have the 
institutional capacity to exercise both functions, and that 
such engagement might entail a strain on the Court’s re-
sources. It was also argued the ICC intervention can cause 
certain critical side effects: a risk of derailing peace negotia-
tions, rising victim expectations, or ‘mimicking’ of ICC pro-
cesses at the national level.153  
Moreover, even if the impact on positive complementarity were 
considered a priority, the proposed OEM framework can still be effective. 
The spectre of the preliminary examination and possible opening of an 
investigation still hangs over States, whether conducted by the OTP or the 
OEM. If anything, the OEM-conducted preliminary examination may 
have more of a positive impact on the ground given that States will be 
aware of the constricted timeline and seriousness of the inquiry – the 
awkward dance of half-measures followed by public OTP-nudging for 
greater action would be eliminated. And with public comments by the 
Prosecutor taken out of the equation, there would no longer be a percep-
tion of prosecutorial grandstanding as a possible motivation. 
Another hindrance to prosecutorial discretion is the shortened time-
line. But given the inconstancies chronicled in this chapter, setting limits 
has been proposed elsewhere. For example, some have recommended that 
preliminary examinations “should be concluded within one year, with the 
possibility for the Prosecutor to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to extend 
the time limit, if necessary”.154  The proposal herein actually provides 
greater flexibility than this by allowing for an initial 24-month prelimi-
                                                   
152 Louman, 2015, see supra note 146. 
153 Ibid. 
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nary examination. Moreover, even if there were concerns about the time 
limit given “the complexity and fluidity of the situations [that] make it 
difficult to impose timelines” – such as “continuing or recurring violence 
[…] or when peace negotiations are ongoing or agreements have been 
reached and the OTP has to give the state time to proceed with its own 
investigations and prosecutions”,155 the possibility of open-ended year-
long extensions exists.  
23.5.3.1.2. Judicial Review 
With regard to judicial review, that arguably exists in the current system 
to a certain extent. In particular, ICC judges can already review pre-
preliminary examination legal issues via Regulation 46(3) of the Regula-
tions of the Court, which governs the assignment of a “request or infor-
mation not arising out of a situation assigned to a Pre-Trial Chamber”.156 
This regulation has already been put to the test in the preliminary exami-
nation context. Regarding the July 2013 coup d’état that unseated Egyp-
tian President Mohamed Morsi, Pre-Trial Chamber II denied Morsi’s mo-
tion [filed together with the Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt] to re-
view the Prosecutor’s decision not to open a Preliminary Examination.157 
The Chamber held that “the decisions of the Prosecutor pursuant to Arti-
cle 15(6) or 53(1) of the Statute may be subject to judicial review”.158 But 
it limited any potential review powers to Article 53(3)(b), which applies 
“only if the Prosecutor has taken her decision on the basis of the criterion 
of Article 53(l)(c) of the Statute, that is, if an investigation ‘would not 
serve the interests of justice’”.159  
Similarly, as we saw earlier in the Registered Vessels of the Union of 
the Comoros matter, after initially opening a preliminary examination in 
that case, the Prosecutor terminated it, concluding that the conditions for 
                                                   
155 Ibid. 
156 International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, adopted 26 May 2004, ICC-
BD/01-01-04, Regulation 46(3) (‘ICC Regulations’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
05fd20/). 
157 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the ‘Request for Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision 
of 23 April 2014 not to Open a Preliminary Examination concerning Alleged Crimes 
Committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, 
12 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14, para. 9 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bfbb8f/). 
158 Ibid., para. 7. 
159 Ibid., para. 8. 
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opening an investigation into the situation had not been satisfied. Then, 
pursuant to a motion for review filed by the Comoros government, Pre-
Trial Chamber I requested the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision. This 
decision was then upheld by the Appeals Chamber. So prosecutorial dis-
cretion is quite evidently already fettered by the prospect of judicial re-
view.  
Thus, the OEM proposal only modifies the way judicial review is 
conducted in relation to preliminary examinations, not the fact of judicial 
review itself. If anything, the proposal creates conditions of judicial re-
view arguably more sensitive and receptive to the needs of the Prosecutor 
given that the Prosecutor and the Examining Magistrate can communicate 
with one another during the preliminary examination process. Moreover, 
given the Examining Magistrate’s expertise in all things preliminary ex-
amination, it stands to reason that the she is in a position to better appreci-
ate the Prosecutor’s positions regarding the finer nuances of any situation 
that comes under review.  
23.5.3.2. Bureaucracy and Budget 
On the surface, it would appear that adding the OEM would entail addi-
tional bureaucracy and expense for the ICC. But on closer inspection, the 
added value of the proposal may result in a wash or even net gain for the 
ICC. In particular, as the time restrictions mean preliminary examinations 
should, in the main, be shorter and more efficient, this will enhance econ-
omies of scale. Even if it were argued that the OTP could still handle the 
preliminary examinations with the time restrictions and the same savings 
would result, that would be specious. The preliminary examination exper-
tise and specialization of the OEM would likely result in even greater time 
savings and efficiencies.  
23.5.3.3. The Other Advantages Already Considered 
Not only can these potential criticisms be blunted or belied, but the other 
benefits considered above still pertain. Thus, in terms of retributive justice, 
the preliminary examination-expertise and efficiency that the OEM would 
cultivate ought to contribute to higher-quality investigations and prosecu-
tions when a reasonable basis to proceed with a criminal investigation can 
be established. With respect to procedural justice, the OEM proposal 
would contribute toward removing the metaphorical Sword of Damocles 
hanging over the heads of potential defendants during prolonged prelimi-
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nary examinations and remove the possibility of snap decisions to move 
forward with investigations. Additionally, it would help ensure equality of 
arms in evidence collection during what is essentially an inchoate version 
of an investigation. Finally, the proposal is friendly to the interests of vic-
tims. The neutral Examining Magistrate is better positioned to take vic-
tims’ interests into account during the preliminary examination. And she 
is more likely to be guided by the interest in creating an accurate histori-
cal record for purposes of contributing to and preserving the victims’ col-
lective memory of the atrocities at issue. All this helps promote the inter-
ests of restorative justice. 
23.6. Conclusion 
The outsize expectations associated with history’s first permanent global 
penal institution have saddled it with equally Brobdingnagian burdens. 
And those are unfair. The accumulated millennia of impunity cannot be 
erased in less than two decades. Instead, international criminal justice’s 
baby steps ought to be seen as a working-out of proper protocol, not its 
perfection. Part of that exercise entails tinkering with its nascent phases. 
In its current iteration, the preliminary examination crawls on vestigial 
limbs born of adversarial DNA. In that sense, it is culturally cordoned off 
from the balance of ICC procedure, which bears the influence of an in-
quisitorial approach. From the investigation forward, judges play an inte-
gral role in the process – the Pre-Trial Chamber and later the Trial Cham-
ber scrutinize the fruit of investigatory efforts, influence the direction of 
the case and thereby fulfil a quality control function.  
But leading up to that point, the procedural landscape is quite dif-
ferent. The Prosecutor is given tremendous leeway – in time spent, re-
sources devoted, communications made and conclusions drawn regarding 
the quality of evidence, the nature of any domestic efforts and the poten-
tial global impact of ICC proceedings. The proposal advanced herein 
cures many of the ills associated with the current preliminary structure.  
Creation of the OEM helps inquisitorially hybridize what is now an 
essentially adversarial procedure. In doing so, it would fold into the early 
phase the necessary degree of judicial involvement and investigatory effi-
cacy. Chronological points of repair would help regularize the timeline 
and ultimately conserve resources. Depoliticization through legislating a 
professional-responsibility-influenced confidentiality etiquette would 
highlight the solemnity and legal focus of the preliminary examination 
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stage, while shielding the Prosecutor from accusations of untoward mo-
tives. That the current Prosecutor may be less driven by political or per-
sonal considerations does not mean the OTP may not be buffeted by such 
forces under future leadership. The institution’s performance should not 
rise or fall strictly per the vagaries of the current office holder’s personal 
virtues. And, in any event, the shield of procedural equanimity should be 
similarly effective for situationally-driven political heat, as opposed to the 
personality-driven version. 
At the same time, the inherent truth-telling orientation of the inquis-
itorial jurist cum investigator would promote equality of arms vis-à-vis 
potential defendants, look after the possible interests of victims and more 
effectively track down incipient indicia of guilt. Regarding this last en-
deavour, this chapter’s proposal envisages a crucible of preliminary exam-
ination experience that would whet examination instincts, concentrate 
examination knowledge, and ultimately create a repository of examination 
wisdom that, in the long run, would better serve the interests of justice 
and conserve the treasure of an increasingly resource-deprived ICC.  
That the same office may provide the necessary degree of judicial 
oversight in reference to the Prosecutor’s work at this stage only adds to 
the appeal of the proposal. The very reservoir of examination acumen just 
considered lends a normative advantage to the OEM’s quality control 
function. Some might consider the Pre-Trial Chamber the more logical 
actor to assume this role as it already factors into the system. But that 
would deprive the enterprise of the OEM’s anticipated expertise and situa-
tional sensitivity to any unfolding examination under consideration.  
Of course, whereas this proposal considers remedying the ills of 
certain adversarial excesses on the international stage, it could certainly 
be adopted for domestic consumption too (just as the proposal itself was 
informed and inspired by certain domestic procedures). Consider the 
United States, for example. In his 2014 article “Lessons from Inquisitori-
alism”, Christopher Slobogin observed that, as implemented in that coun-
try, “the adversarial system is a significant cause of wrongful convictions, 
wrongful acquittals, and ‘wrongful’ sentences”. 160  And he added that 
“Empirical evidence suggests that a hybrid inquisitorial regime can reduce 
                                                   
160 Christopher Slobogin, “Lessons from Inquisitorialism”, in Southern California Law Re-
view, 2014, vol. 87, no. 3, p. 699. 
23. Reconceptualizing the Birth of the International Criminal Case 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 317 
these erroneous results”.161 He then went on to propose that the American 
criminal justice process incorporate a series of inquisitorial mechanisms 
(including non-adversarial treatment of experts, and required unsworn 
testimony by the defendant).  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider those in detail. 
Although Slobogin’s proposal dealt with the end-phases of the process, it 
is submitted that aspects of the proposal outlined herein could enhance 
American criminal procedure in its preliminary phases from both proce-
dural and restorative justice perspectives. This could also be true for other 
adversarial jurisdictions, including England and Wales, Australia and 
Canada. If the ICC may be considered a laboratory for developing ideal 
hybrid procedures globally, why should municipal institutions not benefit 
from such experimentation domestically too?  
In effect, as the ICC learns and adapts within the milieu of humani-
ty’s common jurisprudential heritage, so should the traditions that give 
rise to that heritage seek to learn and grow in return. Development at both 
levels, municipal and international, can reinforce one another and create 
greater goodwill for the ICC while advancing the latter’s own efficacy. 
Thus, in this sense, the proposal for creation of the Office of the Examin-
ing Magistrate might only be considered a starting point, whose ripple 
effects could ultimately redound to the benefit of greater justice enterpris-
es that still lie on the horizon.  
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24. Deterrence or Withdrawals? 
Consequences of Publicising 
Preliminary Examination Activities 
Ana Cristina Rodríguez Pineda* 
24.1. Introduction 
Preliminary examinations, the procedural step taken prior to determining 
whether or not to open an investigation, have become one of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’s (‘ICC’) principal and most controversial activi-
ties.1 Notably, the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) is using the public 
announcement that a preliminary examination is underway to achieve the 
broader goals that underpin the Rome Statute, rather than fulfilling their 
statutory purpose. In this respect, publicising preliminary examination 
activities can be useful to the extent that it has an impact on the situation 
being considered before a decision to investigate is reached, including by 
creating pressure for national proceedings. Bearing in mind the limited 
capacity of the ICC, there is clear merit to the idea of extracting as much 
                                                   
*  Ana Cristina Rodríguez Pineda is the former Chef de Cabinet of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) President. Before joining the Tribunal, the 
author was the Deputy Permanent Representative and Chargée d’Affaires at the Permanent 
Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations (‘UN’) in New York. From 2006 she was the 
Permanent Mission’s Legal Adviser and counselled on a wide array of political and legal 
issues at the UN with a focus on the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, where she 
served as Vice-Chair, as well as in the Security Council, where she chaired the Informal 
Working Group on International Tribunals. She has facilitated several resolutions for the 
General Assembly, Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Stat-
ute. She is currently pursuing a Ph.D. on International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) preliminary 
examinations at Leiden Law School. This chapter was greatly improved by the contribu-
tions of those who commented on earlier versions, including Annelle Urriola, Gabrielle 
Macintyre, and Sergey Vasiliev. 
1 See Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), Strategic Plan 2016–2018, 6 July 2015, para. 54 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ae957/). Preliminary examinations are one of the Of-
fice’s three core activities that can positively impact on future investigations and prosecu-
tions, in addition to their potential to obviate ICC intervention through prevention and 
complementarity. 
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preventive and deterrent value from preliminary examinations through 
publicity of the OTP’s activities.  
As part of its efforts towards ensuring transparency in its activities, 
as well as managing expectations, the OTP has developed the Policy Pa-
per on Preliminary Examinations (‘2013 Policy Paper’).2 The stated aim 
of this policy paper is to “promote clarity and predictability regarding the 
manner in which the OTP applies the legal criteria set out in the Statute 
for the conduct of a preliminary examination”.3 Although it offers some 
information on the procedures to be followed by the OTP, the policy paper 
does not provide a coherent methodology for deciding what gets publi-
cised or when. This ad hoc approach to publicity surrounding preliminary 
examinations has left the OTP vulnerable to criticism concerning how it 
handles situations and impacted the credibility of the Office as an impar-
tial organ of the Court.  
The 2013 Policy Paper also promotes the idea of maximising the 
utility of preliminary examinations by encouraging genuine national pro-
ceedings and contributing towards the prevention of crimes. As a result, 
the first step in prosecutorial activity is not about applying a standard an-
ymore – the reasonable basis standard – but about applying pressure on 
States involved in situations under consideration. While the OTP’s efforts 
are laudable, purposefully using preliminary examinations in a different 
manner from what the Statute intended can run counter to the interests of 
the ICC as a whole.  
This chapter takes stock of how the OTP has publicised its prelimi-
nary examination activities and the impact of those choices on the OTP’s 
image and credibility. It begins with an overview of the preliminary exam-
ination regulatory framework, followed by an analysis of the consequenc-
es of publicity in general terms. It reviews the different approaches and 
practices developed by the OTP with regard to how specific preliminary 
examinations have been publicised. It then examines whether and how 
such publicity may influence or motivate a decision by a State under pre-
liminary examination to halt its co-operation with the Court or in extreme 
circumstances withdraw from the Rome Statute. Furthermore, it contrasts 
                                                   
2 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, paras. 94–99 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
3 Ibid., para. 21. 
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the current practices of the OTP with those of other international bodies 
with investigative and fact-finding functions in terms of how their work 
products are publicised, if at all.  
Having set the scene, this chapter also argues that prevention is not 
an appropriate policy objective for a preliminary examination, as such a 
focus leads the OTP to side-line its main statutory task: determining 
whether or not there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investiga-
tion. This chapter posits that a much more careful balancing of different 
goals and objectives is required. In this regard, practical recommendations 
are presented to enhance and improve public communications of the OTP 
during preliminary examinations. Finally, it is suggested that the value of 
publicity should be reassessed in light of whether it serves to promote the 
OTP’s prosecutorial strategy and the Court’s credibility as a judicial insti-
tution.  
When discussing the consequences of publicising preliminary ex-
amination activities, this contribution will focus mainly on examinations 
conducted under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.  
24.2. General Framework of Preliminary Examinations4 
The regime governing preliminary examinations raises legal and practical 
questions essential to the effective functioning of the ICC. The legal 
framework contains but a single reference to the wording “preliminary 
examination” in the entire Statute, in Article 15,5 and no explicit mention 
at all in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’).6 According to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) Article 15 is one of the most delicate provi-
                                                   
4 For an overview on preliminary examinations see Pavel Caban “Preliminary Examinations 
by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal”, in Czech Yearbook of Public 
& Private International Law, 2011, vol. 2.  
5 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 42(1) (‘ICC Statute’) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/): provides that the Office shall be responsible for 
‘examining’ referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.  
6 Articles 15 and 53 of the Rome Statute are explicitly linked through [ICC], Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, 2 September 2002, Rules 48 and 104 (‘[ICC] RPE’) (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f). 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 324 
sions of the Rome Statute.7 Its origin resides in the compromise proposed 
by Germany and Argentina,8 in response to intractable debates during the 
Rome Conference concerning the powers of the Prosecutor.9  
This compromise succeeded in addressing several concerns relating 
to the scope of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.10 In particular, leav-
ing it up to Chambers to determine whether a matter should be pursued by 
the Prosecutor or dropped, in the absence of a referral from a State Party 
or the Security Council.11 The compromise also introduced a procedural 
framework, which would prohibit the Prosecutor from initiating an inves-
tigation upon the mere receipt of a complaint. Through a preliminary ex-
amination, the Prosecutor would be required to first satisfy him or herself 
that enough information had been obtained to justify opening an investi-
gation. In addition, the Prosecutor would have to consider whether the 
requirements necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction were present at the 
outset, avoiding a situation where the OTP would invest substantial re-
sources only to discover that it could not exercise jurisdiction.12  
A year after the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002, the 
OTP began developing policy papers on issues before it, including on 
preliminary examinations,13 as well as some informal expert papers con-
                                                   
7 ICC, Situation in Kenya, PTC, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 
2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 17 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/). 
8 Proposal by Argentina and Germany, Article 46, Information submitted to the Prosecutor, 
A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.35, 25 March 1998 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/896cf4/). 
This is the first time the term ‘preliminary examination’ appeared in the draft proposals 
and negotiations of the Preparatory Committee.  
9 The current version of Article 15 is largely identical to the Argentine-German proposal, 
except that it leaves out the duty to assess admissibility. See Morten Bergsmo and Jelena 
Pejić, “Article 15”, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), A Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, C.H. Beck, Hart Publishing, p. 200. 
10 Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during the period 25 March–12 
April 1996, A/AC.249/1, 7 May 1996, paras. 165–168 (Summary of the Proceedings of the 
Preparatory Committee) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d7aad5/). 
11 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Vol. 1, Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March–April and August 
1999, A/51/22[Vol-I](Supp), 14 September 1996, para. 151 (https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/e75432/). 
12 Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee, para. 168, see supra note 10. 
13 Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2003 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f53870/); Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues be-
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cerning essential prosecutorial matters.14 In 2009 the OTP issued its Regu-
lations, 15  containing a section entitled “Preliminary examinations and 
evaluation of information”.16 These Regulations sought to flesh out the 
regulatory framework for the conduct of preliminary examinations. Sub-
sequently, in 2010 the OTP released its first Draft Policy Paper on Prelim-
inary Examinations,17 which eventually was revised and resulted in the 
2013 Policy Paper, which outlines a phased approach towards preliminary 
examinations18 in accordance with Article 53(1).19  
The 2013 Policy Paper suggests that preliminary examinations are 
sui generis to the ICC.20 Drawing a distinction between the ICC and other 
ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, it stresses that, unlike the legal framework of 
these bodies, the Rome Statute does not have predefined specific situa-
                                                                                                                        
fore the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications, 5 September 2003 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5df43d/); Draft paper on some policy issues before the 
Office of the Prosecutor for discussion at the public hearing in The Hague on 17 and 18 
June 2003, 18 July 2003 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/abb9f7/). 
14 Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions of the office of the Prose-
cutor, including international cooperation, OTP-ICC 2003; Informal expert paper: The 
principle of complementarity in practice, OTP-ICC 2003. See Morten Bergsmo and SONG 
Tianying, “The Principle of Complementarity” and the Annexes thereto, in Morten 
Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical Origins of International 
Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2017, pp. 739 ff. 
(http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-song). 
15 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, Regulations 25–31, Sec-
tion 3 (‘OTP Regulations’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
16 Ibid., Regulation 28. 
17 OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 4 October 2010 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/bd172c/).  
18 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para.72, see supra note 2.  
19 It should be noted that in Article 53(1) there is no reference to the trigger mechanisms. The 
Pre Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) has held consistently that the criteria of Article 53(1) of the 
Statute governing the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor equally inform the 
analysis under Article 15(3) and (4) of the Statute as they enable first the Prosecutor and 
then the Chamber to determine whether there is “a reasonable basis to proceed with an in-
vestigation”. Situation in Kenya, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, paras. 21–22, 
see supra note 7; ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14, paras. 17–18 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/7a6c19/). See also ICC RPE, Rules 48 and 105, see supra note 6. 
20 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 24, see supra note 2. 
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tions for investigation. It is the ICC that ultimately determines when and 
where it should intervene in accordance with its statutory criteria. Accord-
ing to the OTP other courts are neither in a position to decide against in-
vestigating or with the jurisdictional capacity to expand their focus to 
other situations.21 The comparison with other courts and tribunals is over-
stated. While it is true that concerned States or the Security Council de-
fined the respective situations of other courts and tribunals, this was only 
for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction and not for determining its exer-
cise. For example, Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) states that the Prosecutor 
“shall assess the information received or obtained and decide whether 
there is sufficient basis to proceed”.22 To some extent this assessment is 
similar to the one carried out by the ICC Prosecutor serving as a basis to 
determine whether or not to proceed with an investigation.23 
Although the term ‘preliminary examination’ might not be universal 
or found in most jurisdictions, its fundamentals are certainly not new. The 
notion of a preliminary examination resonates within any domestic juris-
diction that deals on a daily basis with probabilities of criminal conduct 
and is required to probe and collect information to determine whether 
                                                   
21 Ibid.  
22 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 25 May 
1993, Article 18 (‘ICTY’ Statute) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b4f63b/) concerning In-
vestigation and preparation of indictment reads as follows: The Prosecutor shall initiate in-
vestigations ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly 
from Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and nongovernmental or-
ganisations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained and decide 
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.  
23 See also the Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 12 
July 2007 (Rev.7), 23 February 2011 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d6b146/) containing 
a provision on a pre-investigative phase. While this differs from a preliminary examination 
at the ICC in that it is not part of the formal stage of proceedings of the Court, it is still 
similar in two aspects, one both processes are preliminary steps of procedural nature, sec-
ond their purpose is to establish whether crimes within the respective jurisdictions have 
been committed. Rule 50: Preliminary Investigations. “1. The Co-Prosecutors may conduct 
preliminary investigations to determine whether evidence indicates that crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC have been committed and to identify Suspects and potential wit-
nesses. 2. Preliminary investigations may be carried out by Judicial Police officers or by 
Investigators of the ECCC only at the request of the Co-Prosecutors. The Judicial Police 
and Investigators may search for and gather relevant evidence including documents… 
[I]tems that are of no evidentiary value shall be returned without delay at the end of the 
preliminary investigation”.  
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there is a basis to open an investigation.24 Filtering procedures, together 
with a ‘feasibility to collect evidence’ or ‘more likely than not’ standard 
are common and necessary to avoid overwhelming the limited resources 
of police and prosecutor offices,25 and to ensure that resources are di-
rected towards cases where there is a likelihood of conviction. As rightly 
noted by Human Rights Watch, it would be entirely inappropriate for the 
Prosecutor to be expected to prove a prima facie case or probable cause at 
this stage, before initiating any investigation into the facts.26  
The 2013 Policy Paper sets out a phased approach to determine 
whether a complaint warrants conducting a preliminary examination:  
• Phase 1: Initial assessment;  
• Phase 2: Subject matter assessment;  
• Phase 3: Admissibility assessment; and  
• Phase 4: Interests of justice assessment.  
During Phases 1 and 2, the OTP must determine whether the availa-
ble information provides a reasonable basis to conclude that a crime fall-
ing under the Statute has been committed, establishing that it would have 
jurisdiction over the alleged criminal conduct.27 In Phase 3, it must con-
sider if the situation would be admissible in terms of Article 17 of the ICC 
                                                   
24 At the national level it is not clear when an investigation is commenced, who takes the 
decision to start it and what is the level of discretion to carry it out. Normally there is some 
form of initial information gathering done by the police, as well as mechanisms to file 
complaints but the decision to initiate proceedings for the most part rests with prosecutors. 
For this matter the distinction between civil law and common law systems is also relevant. 
25 The OTP reported that during the initial review of the communications received, approxi-
mately 80% of communications were found to be manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Of the approximately 20% of communications warranting further analysis, 10 situa-
tions have been subjected to intensive analysis. See OTP, Report on the activities per-
formed during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006), 12 September 2006 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/c7a850/). According to the latest OTP Report on Preliminary Ex-
amination activities, 14 November 2016, para. 18, the Office has received a total of 12,022 
Article 15 communications since July 2002 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f30a53/). 
26 Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’), “Justice in the Balance, Recommendations for an Inde-
pendent and Effective International Criminal Court”, June 1998, p. 67. 
27 Temporal, material, and either territorial or personal jurisdiction. 
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Statute.28 If these three phases are satisfied, the Prosecutor must then give 
consideration to the “interests of justice”.29  
Although a general duty to conduct a preliminary examination ex-
ists once the Prosecutor is seised of a matter, there are some procedural 
differences to bear in mind depending on the triggering mechanism.30 
Where the Prosecutor receives a referral, Article 53 provides that the 
Prosecutor shall initiate an investigation unless there is no reasonable 
basis to proceed under the Statute. In that circumstance, the decision to 
initiate an investigation is further simplified in that the PTC may only 
review the Prosecutor’s determination not to proceed, but does not review 
an affirmative decision to proceed. However, when the Prosecutor re-
ceives a communication,31 the test is the same but the starting point is 
reversed. In other words, the Prosecutor shall not seek to initiate an inves-
tigation without determining first that there is a reasonable basis to pro-
ceed and that decision to proceed is subject to authorisation of the PTC.32  
24.2.1. Observations on Preliminary Examinations  
The following basic features can be identified in every preliminary exam-
ination process:33 (1) they apply routinely irrespective of whether the OTP 
receives a referral from a State Party, the Security Council, or acts on the 
basis of communications pursuant to Article 15;34 (2) they are informal, 
                                                   
28 This second factor involves examination of whether national courts are unwilling or genu-
inely unable to proceed; but it also involves an evaluation of the notion of “gravity”. 
29 OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/bb02e5/). 
30 Article 15 is one of the three triggering mechanisms in the ICC Statute established under 
Article 13 in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction.  
31 The OTP has adopted the term ‘communications’ to describe information provided on the 
basis of Article 15. “The primary sources of such communications are individuals and non-
governmental organisations”, in William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court, A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 320. 
32 Annex to the ‘Paper of some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’, see supra 
note 13. 
33 A preliminary examination is not an end in itself, rather it constitutes a process serving as a 
precursor to potential investigations. This idea is explained further see infra, fn. 47. 
34 The author agrees with those considering that these procedural mandates create a general 
duty to conduct a preliminary examination. Jan Wouters, Sten Verhoeeven and Bruno 
Demeyere, “The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor: navigating be-
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inconclusive and distinct from investigations;35 and (3) their function is to 
determine whether or not a reasonable basis exists to proceed with an 
investigation.  
24.2.1.1. Preliminary Examinations Apply Equally to All Triggering 
Mechanisms 
Preliminary examinations are conducted routinely irrespective of whether 
the OTP receives a referral from a State Party, the Security Council, or 
acts on the basis of communications pursuant to Article 15. That said, 
most of the problems surrounding preliminary examinations only come 
into play when the Prosecutor acts proprio motu. This is explained by the 
fact that referrals by States or the Security Council are normally made 
public and the situation is immediately assigned to a PTC.36 As there is no 
need for the OTP to seek authorisation to proceed with an investigation 
these preliminary examinations end up being fast-tracked.37  
The OTP thereby treats preliminary examinations differently de-
pending on whether they arise from a referral by a State or the Security 
Council, or at the Prosecutor’s own initiative. This differentiated treat-
                                                                                                                        
tween independence and accountability?”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2008, 
vol. 8, para. 10. 
35 Situation in Kenya, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the authorisa-
tion of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, paras. 32, 50 and 75, 
see supra note 7: “[t]he Prosecutor has limited powers which are not comparable to those 
provided for in article 54 of the Statute at the investigative stage” and the information 
available at such an early stage is “neither expected to be ‘comprehensive’ nor ‘conclusive’. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that findings at the preliminary examination phase are not 
binding for the purpose of future investigations”. 
36 In the case of an Article 15 proprio motu situation a PTC is assigned pursuant to Regula-
tions of the Court, 26 May 2004, Regulations 45 and 46 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
2988d1/). The Prosecutor shall inform the President of the Court of: (1) the Prosecutor’s 
determination that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. Regulation 
46, sub regulation 2 of the Regulations of the Court, pursuant to which “[t]he Presidency 
shall assign a situation to a Pre-Trial Chamber as soon as the Prosecutor has informed the 
Presidency in accordance with Regulation 45”. 
37 Impetus is to make a decision quickly unless there is not a reasonable basis to proceed, 
Ignaz Stegmiller, The Pre-Investigation Stage of the ICC, Criteria for Situation Selection, 
Duncker & Humblot, GmbH, Berlin, 2011, p. 190.  
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ment results in fast track,38 slow track,39 and protracted40 preliminary ex-
aminations.  
To understand the preliminary examination process, it is important 
to properly construe Article 15 as a triggering mechanism that authorises 
the Prosecutor to initiate proprio motu investigations. It is not a provision 
dealing with the initiation of a preliminary examination per se, but rather 
a means through which the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation. The 
first step, which is compulsory, is the preliminary examination – the 
means by which the Prosecutor can decide whether or not to proceed with 
an investigation. It is thus an over-dramatisation for the OTP to announce 
to the world “the Prosecutor has decided to open a preliminary examina-
tion”, since such a statement exaggerates what is merely a transitory step, 
not only in terms of what it is, but also what it can do.  
24.2.1.2. Preliminary Examinations Do Not Constitute Investigations 
Despite the OTP’s best efforts of bringing clarity through its 2013 Policy 
Paper, it is in part responsible for creating the confusion that surrounds 
preliminary examinations and investigations. The OTP has consistently 
explained that a preliminary examination is not an investigation, but a 
process of examining the information available in order to reach a fully-
informed determination on whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed 
                                                   
38 Situations in Kenya, Libya, Guinea, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, 
Central African Republic II, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Preliminary examinations conducted 
expeditiously with Libya carried out in only five days. Investigations were opened in under 
two years. 
39 Preliminary examinations for the Situations in Honduras, Republic of Korea, Burundi, 
Nigeria, Gabon, Central African Republic I, Venezuela, Iraq/UK (2009), Ukraine, as well 
as the situation referred by Comoros were conducted for more than three years and less 
than five. The Situation in Central African Republic I eventually proceeded to an investiga-
tion. In five other situations the Prosecutor concluded the statutory requirements to pro-
ceed with an investigation had not been met, namely Honduras, Republic of Korea, Vene-
zuela, Iraq/UK and the situation referred by Comoros. Regarding the most recent ones, in 
the Philippines and Venezuela, it is too early to know what pace they will take. 
40 Situations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Palestine and Iraq/UK (2014). An investiga-
tion in Georgia was opened after nearly eight years under examination. Afghanistan and 
Colombia were ongoing for over a decade. At the time of writing the Prosecutor’s request 
concerning Afghanistan was still pending review by the PTC. Palestine and Iraq/UK are 
still under subject-matter consideration.  
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with an investigation under the Rome Statute.41 Yet, when speaking pub-
licly of the preliminary examination process, it does so by referring to 
investigations instead of a precursor to a potential investigation.  
Some authors42 use imprecise terminology when referring to pre-
liminary examinations, 43  such as pre-investigations. 44  Others contrast 
them with ‘full’ investigations or consider them part of the formal stage of 
ICC proceedings.45 Although the Prosecutor requires an authorisation of 
                                                   
41 ICC OTP, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a 
preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine, 16 January 2015, ICC-OTP-
20150116-PR1083 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dcbe5/). Idem., Statement of the Pros-
ecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a Preliminary Ex-
amination into the Situation in Burundi, 25 April 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
155b19/). 
42 Ignaz Stegmiller, 2011, pp. 26–27, see supra note 37. In a similar vein, Giuliano Turone, 
‘Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor’, in Antonio Cassesse, Paolo Gaeta and John R.W.D 
Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the ICC: A Commentary, vol. II, Oxford University Press, 
2002, pp. 1137, 1146; Jan Wouters, Sten Verhoeeven, Bruno Demeyere, 2008, para. 19, see 
supra note 34. 
43 Ignaz Stegmiller, 2011, see supra note 37. Ignaz Stegmiller explains that when referring to 
preliminary examinations as foreseen in Article 15(6) they take place before the (formal) 
investigation stage, in accordance with Article 54, begins. Thus, two different procedural 
stages regarding the ICC procedural law can be identified, namely the pre-investigation 
stage and the formal investigation stage. He goes on to underscore that these stages have to 
be distinguished carefully and provisions have to be tested as to whether they apply to pre-
investigations or (full) investigations. The author dissents with this description because it 
splits the investigation stage in two. Preliminary examinations are not investigations and 
that imprecision remains with the use of the term ‘pre-investigation’. There is also no such 
thing as a ‘full’ investigation. Investigating is either something you are doing or you are 
not. By contrast the author agrees that the investigation stage is formal and that prelimi-
nary examinations are informal and that the powers of the OTP in the course of ‘formal’ 
investigations go far beyond those during preliminary examinations (pre-investigations as 
referred to by Stegmiller). 
44 Ignaz Stegmiller, 2011, pp. 187–189, see supra note 37. Ignaz Stegmiller argues that the 
discretion meant by paragraph 1 [Article 15] covers the right of the Prosecutor to initiate 
pre-investigations only. He also states that one should speak of pre-investigations versus 
full investigations and that the terminology of Article 15(1) has to be interpreted, in light 
of Article 15(6) as referring to pre-investigation steps only. 
45 The ICC web site refers to the Legal Process of the Court as follows: Stages of proceedings. 
There are several stages of the ICC process. Where grave crimes occur, the OTP must first 
conduct a preliminary investigation before an investigation can begin. Investigations may 
lead to several cases, which may go through different stages including Pre-Trial stage, Tri-
al stage and Appeals. See ICC web site, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-
court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess, last accessed on 8 May 2017. Luis Moreno-
Ocampo considers preliminary examinations to be a formal process defined by Articles 12, 
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the PTC to initiate an investigation, this does not mean the power does not 
exist, only that the decision to investigate is not taken alone.46 According-
ly, preliminary examinations constitute precursors to potential investiga-
tions,47 since they either lead to an investigation or not. They are, nonethe-
less, a required precursor because all investigations commence with a 
preliminary examination, but not all preliminary examinations lead to an 
investigation.48 
Preliminary examinations should therefore not be confused with in-
vestigations.49 This is due to several other reasons, starting with the fact 
that Article 15, which governs preliminary examinations, is not a provi-
sion found in Part 5 of the Rome Statute relating to investigations and 
prosecutions.50 Similarly, preliminary examinations fall outside of Part 9 
relating to co-operation obligations. Moreover, Article 17 on admissibility 
is applied differently to preliminary examinations than to investigations, 
leaving the assessment of admissibility entirely to the discretion of the 
Prosecutor.51 Further, the preliminary examination process is exempt from 
                                                                                                                        
15 and 53 of the Rome Statute. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, “The ICC’s Afghanistan Investiga-
tion: The Missing Option”, in Lawfare, 24 April 2017. 
46 The Prosecutor needs to convince the PTC that the standard of a reasonable basis to pro-
ceed has been met (Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute). The Chamber must be satisfied 
“that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court”, a determination that is 
without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction 
or admissibility of a case. 
47 The term of preliminary examinations as precursors is borrowed from the Oxford Univer-
sity Press blog by Iain Macleod and Shehzad Charania, “Three challenges for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, May 2011. The author modified the term by adding the word ‘po-
tential’ to accurately reflect the possibility that not all preliminary examinations lead to in-
vestigations and has removed the word ‘full’ to maintain the clear distinction between the 
informal preliminary examination process and the formal stage of proceedings, which in-
cludes investigations. 
48 Just like not all investigations lead to prosecutions. 
49 Regarding terminology, William Schabas draws a differentiation between ‘preliminary 
examinations’ when the Prosecutor is acting propio motu, and the ‘pre-investigative phase’, 
when the matter results from a referral. See Schabas, 2007, p. 239, see supra note 31. In 
his Commentary on the Rome Statute, Schabas mentions that a distinction between a pre-
liminary investigation and a full investigation has been suggested, with Article 15 govern-
ing the former and Article 53(1) the latter. Idem, pp. 659–660; Ignaz Stegmiller, 2011 see 
supra note 37. 
50 Schabas, 2010, p. 315, see supra note 31.  
51 Complementarity was established for States to protect themselves. During a preliminary 
examination, it is up for the OTP to assess admissibility. Some States possibly find this 
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judicial review or control,52 and finally the information that is collected is 
not treated as evidence.53 Even more problematic is that preliminary ex-
aminations lack defined parameters and methodologies in relation to the 
standard of proof, timelines, duration,54 as well as publicity, which is the 
focus of this chapter.  
24.2.1.3. The Main Function of Preliminary Examinations Is to 
Determine Whether or Not a Reasonable Basis Exists to 
Proceed with an Investigation  
In 2009, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo stated that the “preliminary 
examination of alleged war crimes in Afghanistan was ‘exceedingly com-
plex’ and time-consuming because of the difficulty of gathering infor-
                                                                                                                        
more convenient because in order to enjoy full rights pursuant to Article 17 of the ICC 
Statute the situation would have to be under investigation, which is less desirable given 
that it exposes States even more than during the preliminary examination. 
52 At least until Article 15(3) is prompted, prior to an authorisation by the PTC there is no 
judicial review. It is noticeable that the OTP has so far avoided submitting to the control by 
the PTC. For example, Article 53(3)(c)–interests of justice–has never been used by the 
OTP because that would trigger a proprio motu decision reviewable by the PTC, which 
would be imposing on the Prosecutor. Bergsmo and Pejić explain that the underlying pur-
pose of the PTC check is to control for frivolous or politically motivated charges. See 
Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejić, 2008, see supra note 9. Stigen argues that the authorisa-
tion will presumably and in reality take the form of a “quality check” where the essential is 
to determine whether the Prosecutor’s decision is made in good faith and according to the 
applicable procedures. See Jo Stigen, The Relationship Between the International Criminal 
Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008, p. 107. 
53 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia (‘Situation referred by Comoros’), Decision on the request 
of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investi-
gation, 16 July 2015, ICC-01/13-34, para. 13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/). 
54 The low standard of proof threshold purportedly should impact the duration of the prelimi-
nary examination. Neither the ICC Statute nor the RPE offers any significant guidance on 
how to conduct preliminary examinations. For years the OTP has maintained that there are 
no timelines provided in the ICC Statute for bringing a preliminary examination to a close. 
“Termination of Preliminary Examination. No provision in the Statute or the Rules estab-
lishes a specific time period for the completion of a preliminary examination”. See OTP, 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 14 and 89, see supra note 2. The OTP 
has explained that due to its independence, holding rigid timetables on when to reach a 
“reasonable basis” determination is not in conformity with the statutory framework; Annex 
to the “Paper of some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor”, see supra note 13. 
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mation”.55 While it is understandable that certain situations are more chal-
lenging than others, preliminary examinations have a low standard of 
proof.56 It is therefore difficult to accept that a decade long preliminary 
examination is needed to determine whether the reasonable basis standard 
has been satisfied.57 In this regard, the PTC in the situation relating to the 
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia expressed the fol-
lowing: “The question that is asked of the Prosecutor by article 53(1) of 
the Statute is merely whether or not an investigation should be opened. 
The Prosecutor’s assessment of the criteria listed in this provision does 
not necessitate any complex or detailed process of analysis”.58 
The Rome Statute does not offer a definition of reasonable basis.59 
Providing a definition was left to the judges of the ICC. The PTC, dealing 
with the situation in Kenya, observed that to satisfy the requirements un-
der Article 15, the material provided by the Prosecutor “certainly need not 
point towards only one conclusion”,60 nor does it have to be conclusive.61 
                                                   
55 “Court to Probe Afghan War Crimes”, in BBC News, 10 September 2009. 
56 Article 53 Rome Statute sets a reasonable basis standard, Article 58 of the Rome Statute 
sets a reasonable grounds standard and Article 66 of the Rome Statute sets a beyond rea-
sonable doubt standard. During a preliminary examination there is no need to produce evi-
dence. This is the crucial point in the decision concerning the Situation referred by Como-
ros in which the PTC affirmed that the OTP did not need much to start with an investiga-
tion in response to the argument that an investigation could not be opened because of the 
lack of clarity. See Situation referred by Comoros, Decision on the request of the Union of 
the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, see supra 
note 53. 
57 ICC Statute, Articles 15(6) and 53(1), see supra note 5. 
58 Situation referred by Comoros, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, see supra note 53. 
59 In the decision concerning the Situation in Kenya the PTC found that: “[t]he language used 
in both article 15(3) and (4) and in the chapeau of article 53(1) of the Statute is identical. 
The phrase “reasonable basis to proceed” in paragraph 3 regarding the Prosecutor’s con-
clusion is reiterated in paragraph 4, which governs the Chamber’s review of the Prosecu-
tor’s Request. Exactly the same language is also included in the opening clause of article 
53(1) of the Statute. Thus, these provisions prescribe the same standard to be considered 
both by the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber”. See Situation in Kenya, Decision pur-
suant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the authorisation of an investigation into the sit-
uation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 21, see supra note 7.  
60 Ibid., para. 34. 
61 Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
authorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, para. 
24, see supra note 19. 
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All that is necessary is that there “exists a sensible or reasonable justifica-
tion for a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been or is being committed”.62 In that respect, the PTC provided the Pros-
ecutor with some guidance in its decision on the situation referred by 
Comoros stating: “Even more, if, as stated by the Prosecutor, the events 
are unclear and conflicting accounts exist, this fact alone calls for an in-
vestigation rather than the opposite. It is only upon investigation that it 
may be determined how the events unfolded”.63 
The certainty of obtaining sufficient information to pass the statuto-
ry threshold is rarely uniform. However, the existing regulatory frame-
work provides tools to enhance information-gathering capabilities of the 
OTP during a preliminary examination. Article 15(2) allows the Prosecu-
tor to seek additional information from States, organs of the United Na-
tions, intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, or other reli-
able sources deemed appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimo-
ny at the seat of the Court.64 Moreover, in the absence of any information 
provided by a third party, it would appear from public statements made by 
the Prosecutor that it is the OTP’s policy to actively consider potential 
situations within the jurisdiction of the Court based on information in the 
public domain.65  
With respect to how the Prosecutor considers information that 
comes before him or her, OTP Regulation 24 provides that in the analysis 
of information and evidence regarding alleged crimes, the Office shall 
                                                   
62 Ibid.; Situation in Kenya, Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the au-
thorisation of an investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 35, see su-
pra note 7; ICC, Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorisa-
tion of an investigation, 27 January 2016, ICC-01/15, para. 25 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/a3d07e/). 
63 Situation referred by Comoros, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, para. 36, see supra note 53.  
64 Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute allows for “written or oral testimony” received at the 
seat of the Court whereby the ordinary procedures for questioning shall apply and the pro-
cedure for preservation of evidence for trial may apply pursuant to Rule 47 of the RPE. 
65 This is compatible with the spirit of Article 15. The OTP has reported it “analyses all 
information on crimes within its jurisdiction”, and that it received and analysed new Arti-
cle 15 communications “relating to purported crimes during the reporting period […] In 
parallel, the Office continued the proactive examination of open sources”. See Report on 
the activities of the Court, 29 October 2008, ICC-ASP/7/25, paras. 63–64 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/055a93/). 
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develop and apply a consistent and objective method for the evaluation of 
sources, information and evidence.66 Notwithstanding, the OTP has yet to 
explain what methodology it uses and what steps have been taken to oper-
ationalise this Regulation. For example, how does the OTP determine the 
authenticity and the reliability of sources and information? Remarkably, 
some domestic jurisdictions have adjudicated situations on the basis of 
open sources, particularly those found on the Internet through YouTube or 
Facebook pages.67  
It is difficult to imagine that the OTP could rely on open sources 
without resorting to investigative or forensic techniques to ensure their 
veracity. In addition, it would seem indispensable to have State co-
operation in order to examine the authenticity and reliability of sources. 
The Prosecutor has the capacity to shape the struggle for co-operation and 
opening more investigations can facilitate this.68 Given this necessity, and 
bearing in mind the guidance provided by the PTC in the Comoros deci-
sion mentioned above, there would appear to be a bias in favour of having 
more preliminary examinations advance to the investigation stage. Not 
only would this be consistent with Article 53, which contains a presump-
tion in favour of investigations, but it would also help the Prosecutor fur-
ther the statutory duty to establish the truth.69  
                                                   
66 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 2009, Regulation 24, see supra note 15: 
“Analysis of information and evidence. In the analysis of information and evidence regard-
ing alleged crimes, the Office shall develop and apply a consistent and objective method 
for the evaluation of sources, information and evidence. In this context, the Office shall 
take into account inter alia the credibility and reliability of sources, information and evi-
dence, and shall examine information and evidence from multiple sources as a means of 
bias control”. 
67 In 2017 in Sweden, a Syrian Rebel was given a life sentence for a mass killing caught on 
YouTube video. Christina Anderson, “Syrian Rebel Gets Life Sentence for Mass Killing 
Caught on Video”, in New York Times, 16 February 2017. 
68 Sub-goals within the OTP’s 2016–2018 time period include: (1) further developing coop-
eration activities and networks related to preliminary examinations, (2) further enhancing 
complementarity at the preliminary examination stage, and (3) continuing to increase the 
transparency of and public information on preliminary examinations. OTP, Strategic Plan 
2016-2018, para. 45, see supra note 1. 
69 ICC Statute, Article 54(1), see supra note 5. In the report of the Preparatory Committee, 
“[i]t was further stated that the Prosecutor’s office should be established to seek the truth 
rather than merely seek a conviction in a partisan manner”. Report of the Preparatory 
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24.3. Practices on Publicising Past and Present Situations 
As explained previously, the Prosecutor’s discretion is broad when con-
ducting preliminary examination activities. Taking advantage of this lee-
way and considering resource constraints, the OTP has sought to use the 
preliminary examination process assertively for purposes other than what 
was originally intended in the Statute.70 Indeed, the OTP has transformed 
the procedural step of preliminary examinations into an advocacy tool 
with a view to contributing towards some of the Rome Statute’s overarch-
ing goals, namely ending impunity71 and the prevention of future crimes.72  
Despite the 2013 Policy Paper’s aim of promoting clarity and pre-
dictability regarding the manner in which the OTP applies the legal crite-
ria set out in the Statute, there is a growing gap between the Statute and 
the actual practice of preliminary examinations as developed by the OTP. 
This is illustrated by its publicity approach surrounding these activities, 
which is not properly regulated and is essentially selective. While this 
unfettered approach to publicity is problematic, publicising preliminary 
examinations has also become a crucial tool for the OTP in relation to its 
strategy of maximising utility. The frequent use of the media, public 
statements and other public relations devices by the OTP raises questions 
regarding what drives the decision-making process of the Prosecutor to 
publicise information concerning preliminary examination activities. 
Simply put, is it led by legal and political considerations, or is it simply a 
public relations exercise? 
Publicity of preliminary examination activities was not seriously 
considered during the negotiations in Rome, though there are traces of the 
issue being discussed. In the Summaries of the Proceedings of the Prepar-
atory Committee, the following reference is made in the context of the 
                                                                                                                        
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, para. 46, see supra 
note 11.  
70 David Bosco, “The International Criminal Court And Crime Prevention: Byproduct Or 
Conscious Goal?”, in Michigan State Journal of International Law, 2013, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 
178. 
71 ICC Statute, Preambular paragraph 5, see supra note 5: “Determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of 
such crimes”. 
72 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 16–18 and 100–106, see supra 
note 2.  
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Chamber’s power to decide whether an investigation should be initiated or 
not by the Prosecutor: “up to this point, the procedure would be in camera 
and confidential, thus preventing any publicity about the case and protect-
ing the interest of the States”.73 This understanding was not crystallised in 
the Rome Statute or the RPE. In fact, if the practice of making announce-
ments public concerning preliminary examinations had been foreseen 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute, it is probable that the interest of 
States in keeping these activities confidential would have been addressed. 
In any case, it is unlikely that negotiators in 1998 anticipated the amount 
of publicity given to preliminary examinations, including a preliminary 
examination list on the ICC’s website even prior to the Prosecutor deter-
mining that a reasonable basis to proceed exists or seeking authorisation 
from the PTC to open an investigation.  
The issue of public disclosure of preliminary examinations was ex-
plicitly regulated for the first time in 2009 in the OTP’s Regulations.74 
Later it was included in the OTP’s Prosecutorial Strategy (2009-2012) 
indicating that the Office would start to “regularly provide information 
about the preliminary examination process” and “issue periodic reports on 
the status of its preliminary examinations”.75  Both the Regulations, as 
well as some RPE provisions, conditionally allow for publicity of prelim-
inary examinations, or at least do not prohibit it.76 For example, the RPE 
require the Prosecutor to “analyse the seriousness of information re-
ceived” but do not specify whether this can be done publicly or should be 
treated as a confidential exercise. The OTP’s Regulations provide that 
“the Prosecutor may decide to make public the Office’s activities in rela-
tion to the preliminary examination of information. In doing so, the Office 
shall be guided inter alia by considerations for the safety, well-being, and 
                                                   
73 Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee, para. 166, see supra note 10 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d7aad5/); Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, para. 150, see supra note 11. 
74 OTP Regulations, Regulation 28, see supra note 15.  
75 OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, Objective 3 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/6ed914/). As an example, see also Situation in Palestine, Summary of sub-
missions on whether the declaration lodged by the Palestinian National Authority meets 
statutory requirements, 3 May 2010 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/af5abf/). 
76 OTP Regulations, Regulations 21(1) and 28(1), see supra note 15; ICC RPE, Rules 46 and 
49, Sub-rule 1, see supra note 6.  
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privacy of those who provided the information or others who are at 
risk”.77 
In addition, the OTP is required to send out acknowledgements of 
referrals and communications received and it may decide to make public 
such acknowledgement, subject to the Prosecutor’s duty to protect the 
confidentiality of such information.78 Rule 49 of the RPE requires the 
Prosecutor to promptly ensure that notice in accordance with Article 15(6) 
is provided, in a manner that prevents any danger to the safety, well-being 
and privacy of those who provided information, or the integrity of inves-
tigations or proceedings. The requirement to notify, however, only applies 
once a decision to investigate has been made,79 and the Prosecutor there-
fore does not have to notify States when conducting preliminary examina-
tions proprio motu.80  
David Bosco notes that in 2010 certain court documents seemed to 
suggest that “the process of pre-investigation will normally be conducted 
without publicity and without public statements”, noting further that gen-
erally, work in a situation does not become public knowledge until the 
Office opens an investigation.81 However, the OTP’s first publicised Draft 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations in 2010 already evidenced a 
shift from such an approach by specifically providing for the regular pub-
lication of preliminary examination activities.82  In the past, the Office 
                                                   
77 The OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations sets forth that the Office may only 
publicly confirm receipt of a given communication if the sender has already made that fact 
public. The author believes this practice undermines the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers 
in addition to exposing the Office to the personal agendas of external actors, including 
NGOs or individuals. As a general rule, communications are supposed to be confidential. 
See OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 88, see supra note 2; OTP 
Regulations, Regulation 28(2), see supra note 15.  
78 OTP Regulations, Regulation 46, see supra note 15; ICC RPE, Rule 46, see supra note 6. 
79 ICC Statute, Article 18, see supra note 5. 
80 Article 15(6) requires the Prosecutor after concluding there is no reasonable basis to pro-
ceed to inform those who provided the information. The duty to notify those who provide 
information is a statutory obligation. Pursuant to Rule 49(1), such notification must be giv-
en promptly and must include reasons for the decision; Stigen, 2008, p. 126, see supra note 
53.  
81 Bosco, 2013, p. 178, see supra note 70. 
82 OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para.15, see supra note 17: In 
order to promote transparency of the preliminary examination process the Office aims to 
issue regular reports on its activities and provides reasoned responses for its decision to ei-
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handled internal reports for the consideration of the Executive Commit-
tee83 or the Prosecutor, containing general information on the volume, 
frequency and patterns of communications relating to particular situations, 
as well as analyses and recommendations in line with Article 53.  
By 2011, in line with the 2010 Draft Policy Paper, public reporting 
on preliminary examination activities became more systematic with the 
introduction of annual reports on preliminary examination activities. 84 
These reports were later complemented by situation-specific reports con-
cerning the status of preliminary examination situations. Another report 
containing information on preliminary examinations is the annual report 
on Activities of the Court submitted every year to the Assembly of States 
Parties.85  
                                                                                                                        
ther proceed or not proceed with investigations. Idem., para 20: The Office has made this 
policy paper public in the interest of clarity and predictability over the manner in which it 
applies the legal framework agreed upon by States Parties. Both these paragraphs were re-
tained almost identically in the 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.  
83 The Executive Committee is composed of the Prosecutor and the Heads of the three Divi-
sions of the Office. The Executive Committee provides advice to the Prosecutor, is respon-
sible for the development and adoption of the strategies, policies and budget of the Office, 
provide strategic guidance on all the activities of the Office and coordinates them. OTP 
Regulations, Regulation 4, see supra note 15. 
84 Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda: “My Office began releasing these annual reports in 2011, 
making this the fifth such report we have published. It is not a report to the ASP per se, but 
rather for the public at large, and its publication is timed to coincide with the ASP. We 
adopted the practice of publishing these annual reports in order to promote public aware-
ness and transparency regarding the Office’s preliminary examination process. For this 
purpose, as of last year, I have also adopted the practice of notifying the report through a 
press release”. Remarks by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at the Fourteenth Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties on the occasion of the Launch of the 2015 Annual Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities, 5 November 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
04c7bb/). 
85 ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/3/10, 22 July 2004 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/3fb24f/). ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/4/16, 16 Sep-
tember 2005 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/678b4c/); ICC, Report on the Activities of the 
Court, ICC-ASP/5/15, 17 October 2006 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/afd592/); ICC, 
Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/6/18, 18 October 2007 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8f3363/); ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/7/25, see su-
pra note 65; ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/8/40, 21 October 2009 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/95f2fc/); ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-
ASP/9/23, 19 November 2010 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f45213/); ICC, Report on 
the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/10/39, 18 November 2011 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/c7389a/); ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/11/21, 9 October 
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The OTP prepared its first public situation-specific report on pre-
liminary examinations in December 2006.86 This was in response to a 
motion filed by the Central African Republic (‘CAR’) challenging the 
lack of progress in the situation referred to the OTP in 2004.87 In this re-
spect, PTC III stated that “a preliminary examination of a situation pursu-
ant to Article 53(1) of the Statute and Rule 104 of the Rules must be com-
pleted within a reasonable time from the reception of a referral by a State 
Party under Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Statute, regardless of its complex-
ity”.88 It then requested the Prosecutor to provide the Chamber and the 
Government of CAR, no later than by 15 December 2006, with a report 
containing information on the current status of the preliminary examina-
tion of the CAR situation, including an estimate of when the preliminary 
examination would be concluded and a decision pursuant to Article 53(1) 
would be taken. The Prosecutor reluctantly complied with the request, in 
the interests of transparency,89 while questioning the authority of the PTC 
to request such information, maintaining that no provision in the Statute 
or RPE established a definitive time-period for a preliminary examination. 
The OTP has yet to recognise the significance of PTC III’s decision of 30 
November 2006. 
                                                                                                                        
2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2d3dda/); ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, 
ICC-ASP/12/28, 21 October 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b22709/); ICC, Report 
on the activities of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/13/37, 19 November 2014 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8cdb8d/); ICC, Report on the activities of the International 
Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/14/29, 13 November 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
42f05b/); ICC, Report on the activities of the International Criminal Court, ICC-
ASP/15/16, 9 November 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/144ca9/). 
86 ICC, Situation in Central African Republic, Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial 
Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the 
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic,16 December 
2006, ICC-01/05-7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dd66a/). 
87 The Government of the Central African Republic pursuant to Article 13(a) and 14 of the 
Statute referred the situation in Central African Republic to the Prosecutor on 22 Decem-
ber 2004. The Prosecutor then made a public announcement in relation to said referral stat-
ing an analysis would be carried out in order to determine whether to initiate an investiga-
tion. On 27 September 2006 Central African Republic filed a motion before the PTC re-
questing information on the status of the preliminary examinations of the situation in the 
Central African Republic.  
88 ICC, Situation in Central African Republic, Decision Requesting Information on the Status 
of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, 1 Decem-
ber 2006, ICC-01/05-6 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/76e607/). 
89 Ibid., para. 11.  
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At the time of writing, 10 preliminary examinations were ongoing,90 
four were closed with a decision not to proceed,91 and another 10 were 
completed with a decision to investigate,92 bringing the total number of 
official preliminary examinations to 24 since 2002. It should be noted that 
this figure only covers official preliminary examinations that have, so to 
speak, been made public by the OTP. There are several other situations 
being monitored based on confidential communications. In that sense, 
what is publicly reported by the OTP or submitted to the Assembly of 
States Parties for the purposes of budgeting requirements does not fully 
reflect the number of preliminary examinations that are actually being 
conducted by the OTP. 
It therefore follows that what determines a preliminary examina-
tion’s official status is publicity. That is, a preliminary examination be-
comes official when its existence is made public. The 2013 Policy Paper 
indicates that the commencement of a preliminary examination will only 
become public in relation to activities under Phases 2 to 4.93 Hence, those 
matters falling under Phase 1, the initial assessment phase, are undis-
closed. This suggests that in practice the OTP conducts a pre-preliminary 
examination before a preliminary examination is announced to the public. 
The confidential phase makes it difficult to ascertain when a prelim-
inary examination actually commences once a situation comes to the at-
tention of the Prosecutor on the basis of Article 15 communications.94 The 
                                                   
90 See the Court’s web site on preliminary examinations. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid. 
93 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 95, see supra note 2.  
94 The examination of the situation in Afghanistan from 2006, was made public in 2007 and 
officially reported in 2011 in the OTP Report on Preliminary Examination of 13 December 
2011 with the following mention: “The OTP has received 56 communications under article 
15 of the Rome Statute between 1 June 2006 and 1 June 2011. The preliminary examina-
tion of the situation in Afghanistan became public in the course of 2007”. However, in 
2007 there was no mention of Afghanistan in the Prosecutor’s report to the ASP or in the 
OTP’s annual address to the Assembly. In fact, the wording purposefully stated that the 
“Office was currently analysing information on three continents” but only mentioned two 
situations, namely Colombia and Côte d’Ivoire. One would presume the third situation was 
in Afghanistan on the Asian continent. See OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Ac-
tivities, 13 December 2011 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4aad1d/); Address of the OTP 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Assembly of State Parties, 30 November 2007 
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OTP often alludes to the opening,95 closing,96 conclusion,97 completion,98 
or re-opening of preliminary examinations.99 This language underscores 
the perplexity between preliminary examinations and investigations, be-
cause only the latter are ‘opened’ in the strict sense of the Statute. Moreo-
ver, there are several incongruities regarding the start date of an examina-
tion. For instance, on 7 February 2014, the OTP announced the ‘opening’ 
of a preliminary examination in CAR II.100 Prior to that date, the OTP had 
                                                                                                                        
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6de7d/); “ICC examines possible Afghan war crimes”, in 
Financial Times, 10 September 2009. 
95 ICC OTP, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a 
preliminary examination in Ukraine”, 25 April 2014, ICC-OTP-20140425-PR999 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/e4a2b5/). 
96 For example, the ICC website indicates that the preliminary examination of the situation in 
Iraq, terminated on 9 February 2006, was re-opened on 13 May 2014 upon receipt of new 
information. 
97 ICC OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensou-
da, on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the situation in the Republic of 
Korea”, 23 June 2014, ICC-OTP-20140623-PR1019, 23 June 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/8d0a96/). 
98 While the Press Release on the Situation in Honduras of 28 October 2015 refers to the 
conclusion of the preliminary examination, it is labeled both as a ‘completed’ and a 
‘closed’ examination in the OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, 12 No-
vember 2015 para. 19 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac0ed2/). Similarly, the ICC web 
site places the situation in Honduras under those completed without a decision to investi-
gate, however once the webpage on the Situation in Honduras is accessed its status shows 
it as ‘closed’. 
99 ICC OTP, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the 
preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq”, 13 May 2014, ICC-OTP-20140513 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d9d9c5/). 
100 The Prosecutor’s Statement on a new preliminary examination in the Central African 
Republic asserts that following the Office’s analysis of the jurisdictional parameters re-
garding the situation in the Central African Republic since September 2012, the Prosecutor 
concluded that the incidents and the serious allegations of crimes potentially falling within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC constitute a new situation, unrelated to the situation previously 
referred to the ICC by the Central African Republic authorities in December 2004. See 
ICC OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda on opening a New Preliminary 
Examination in the Central African Republic”, 7 February 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/6b4438/). See also ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Situation in 
the Central African Republic II Article 53 (1) Report, 24 September 2014 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/1ff87e/). On 30 May 2014, the transitional government of the Central 
African Republic referred to the Prosecutor, pursuant to Article 14 of the Statute. See re-
ferral of the Central African Republic II, idem, Annex 1 Decision Assigning the Situation 
in the Central African Republic II to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 18 June 2014, ICC-01/14-1-
Anx1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1cfbfe/). 
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issued statements informing the general public that it was closely follow-
ing the situation in CAR. These statements indicated that the Prosecutor 
had been doing so since the end of 2012. It therefore appears that prior to 
the public announcement of the preliminary examination, the OTP was 
monitoring the situation, but not examining it. The same occurred with the 
situation in Mali. On 18 July 2012, the OTP announced that it had been 
following the situation in Mali very closely since violence erupted there 
around 17 January 2012. However, the Prosecutor’s press release indi-
cates that it was only after receiving a referral from the Malian authorities 
on the same day, 18 July 2012,101 that the Prosecutor publicly instructed 
the Office to immediately proceed with a preliminary examination of the 
situation in order to assess whether the Rome Statute criteria stipulated 
under Article 53(1) for opening an investigation were fulfilled.102 A sepa-
rate issue here is also trying to understand when a situation is being ‘fol-
lowed’, as opposed to ‘examined’, or whether these activities all just fall 
under the OTP’s inherent monitoring role. 
When the Prosecutor determines to close a preliminary examination 
is also ambiguous because situations under examination never seem to 
truly shut down.103 For instance, the public statements of the OTP in 2006 
in relation to the situations in Iraq and Venezuela clearly refer to the Pros-
ecutor’s decision not to open an investigation, which is different from a 
decision to close a preliminary examination.104  The language used for 
these two situations, where the Rome Statute requirements have not been 
met, has been more or less replicated on other occasions in which statuto-
ry requirements to open an investigation were not met, even though these 
statements were headlined as decisions to close a preliminary examination. 
A reading of these decisions reveal a caveat that the Office may reconsid-
er its conclusion not to open an investigation and senders of relevant in-
                                                   
101 Referral Letter by the Government of Mali, 13 July 2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
06f0bf/).  
102 ICC OTP, “ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on the Malian State referral of the situation in 
Mali since January 2012”, 18 July 2012, ICC-OTP-20120718-PR829 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/31525f/). 
103 “To close”, in Oxford Dictionary of English: Bring or come to an end (available on its web 
site). 
104 ICC OTP, OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5b8996/); ICC OTP, OTP response to communications re-
ceived concerning Venezuela, 9 February 2006 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c90d25/). 
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formation are encouraged to continue to bring such information to the 
attention of the Prosecutor.105 This is what occurred with the preliminary 
examination in Iraq when in May of 2014 the OTP publicly announced 
the ‘re-opening’ of the examination under the new heading of Iraq/UK.106 
The language was slightly changed in the Comoros situation where the 
OTP stated the following: “Accordingly, the Office has determined that 
there is no reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation and has de-
cided to close this preliminary examination. The referral and additional 
information submitted by the Comoros will be maintained in the Office’s 
archives and the decision not to proceed may be reconsidered at any time 
based on new facts or information”.107  
There is also lack of clarity regarding what goes on after a situation 
is presumably closed or before it eventually gets ‘re-opened’. Could it be 
that the OTP remains ‘seised of the matter’ or is it that these situations 
pass on to an inactive status ready to be resumed once sufficient infor-
                                                   
105 Ibid. The last paragraph of the OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq 
reads as follows: “For the above reasons, in accordance with Article 15(6) of the Rome 
Statute, I wish to inform you of my conclusion that, at this stage, the Statute requirements 
to seek authorisation to initiate an investigation in the situation in Iraq have not been satis-
fied. This conclusion can be reconsidered in the light of new facts or evidence. I wish to 
remind you, in accordance with Rule 49(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, that 
should you have additional information regarding crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, you may submit it to the Office of the Prosecutor. Bearing in mind the limited juris-
diction of this Court, as well as its complementary nature, effectively functioning national 
legal systems are in principle the most appropriate and effective forum for addressing alle-
gations of crimes of this nature”. See idem, OTP response to communications received 
concerning Iraq. 
106 Closed preliminary examinations resound to the OTP’s equivalent: ‘hibernated’ investiga-
tions that can later be ‘de-hibernated’. The OTP explains that not all investigations lead di-
rectly to a voluntary appearance, arrest, or surrender. Where there is a lapse in time be-
tween the end of an investigation and the apprehension or voluntary appearance of a sus-
pect, a case is considered hibernated. The comparison would be with the lapse in time be-
tween the ‘termination’ of a preliminary examination and the emergence of new facts or 
evidence. See Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor, 17 
September 2015 ICC-ASP/14/21, paras. 17 and 19 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
b27d2a/). 
107 A final decision not to proceed was communicated to the PTC on 29 November 2017. See 
also, ICC, Situation referred by Comoros, Article 53 (1) Report, 6 November 2014 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/43e636/); see also, ICC OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on concluding the preliminary examination 
of the situation referred by the Union of Comoros: “Rome Statute legal requirements have 
not been met”, 6 November 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e745a0/). 
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mation is obtained? Article 15(5) and (6) leaves the door open for the 
Prosecutor to consider whether new information gathered justifies re-
evaluating the situation. The ICC website contains the following three 
categories of preliminary examinations: (1) ongoing preliminary examina-
tions; (2) closed with a decision not to proceed and (3) completed with a 
decision to investigate.108 Accordingly, the second category should also be 
referred to as completed rather than closed.109  Terminology aside, this 
second category would appear to encompass those instances where the 
PTC refuses to authorise an investigation or rejects the Prosecutor’s deci-
sion not to proceed.110 In these circumstances, a preliminary examination 
cannot exactly be considered as completed.111 The same can be said when 
the PTC requests the OTP to review a decision or the Prosecutor decides 
to reconsider it.112 Following this reasoning, the Comoros situation should 
have been placed under the category of ongoing preliminary examinations 
until the OTP’s reconsideration was finalised. 
In 2009, the Palestinian Authority sought to accept the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. On 3 April 2012, after a three-year examination of the situa-
tion in Palestine, the OTP announced that the preconditions for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction were not met.113 This particular statement made no 
reference to the closing of the situation, although in subsequent docu-
ments it was described in those terms.114 The OTP concluded it lacked 
                                                   
108 Preliminary Examinations, ICC website, see supra note 90. 
109 The preliminary examination conducted in the Palestine situation between 2009–2012 
belongs under the second category. In the 2012 OTP Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities the situation is reported as completed. See OTP, Report on Preliminary Exami-
nation Activities, 22 November 2012, paras. 196–203 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
0b1cfc/). 
110 ICC Statute, Articles 15(4) and 53(1), see supra note 5; ICC RPE, Rule 105, see supra 
note 6. 
111 In the same way that the action of investigating may well continue through the proceedings 
and even at the appeals stage (or after, since many investigations can be opened in a same 
situation). 
112 ICC Statute, Article 53(4), see supra note 5; ICC RPE, Rule 107, see supra note 6. 
113 ICC, Situation in Palestine (embargoed until delivery 3 April 2012) (http://www.legal- 
tools.org/doc/f5d6d7/). 
114 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 196, see supra note 109 reads as 
follows: “On 3 April 2012, the Office issued a decision to close the preliminary examina-
tion of the situation in Palestine[…]”. See also the OTP, Report on Preliminary Examina-
tion Activities, para. 48, see supra note 48: “The Office previously conducted a preliminary 
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jurisdiction due to Palestine’s contested statehood, but the situation still 
required an examination to determine whether the statutory requirements 
had been met.115 Technically, the lack of statehood should have led the 
OTP to declare the situation manifestly outside its jurisdiction. However, 
the Prosecutor’s decision to consider this examination publicly resulted in 
greater polarisation of an already controversial matter and placed unnec-
essary pressure on the OTP to deliver results.116 Notably in this situation, 
the Prosecutor determined that a fair process required that the Palestinian 
National Authority, as well as other interested parties be granted the op-
portunity to be heard and by so doing: “[T]he Office therefore ensured 
due process to all parties involved”.117 In the end, the Prosecutor conced-
ed that the Rome Statute provides no authority for the Office to adopt a 
method to define the term “State” under Article 12(3).118 What makes the 
Prosecutor’s approach to the Palestinian matter exceptional is that due 
process considerations have not been a feature of any other preliminary 
examination process in any other situation. 
                                                                                                                        
examination of the situation in Palestine upon receipt of a purported article 12(3) declara-
tion lodged by the Palestinian National Authority on 22 January 2009. The Office careful-
ly considered all legal arguments submitted to it and, after thorough analysis and public 
consultations, concluded in April 2012 that Palestine’s status at the UN as an “observer en-
tity” was determinative, since entry into the Rome Statute system is through the UNSG, 
who acts as treaty depositary. The Palestinian Authority’s “observer entity”, as opposed to 
“non-member State” status at the UN, at the time meant that it could not sign or ratify the 
Statute. As Palestine could not join the Rome Statute at that time, the Office concluded that 
it could also not lodge an article 12(3) declaration bringing itself within the ambit of the 
treaty, as it had sought to do”.  
115 The Office of the Prosecutor carefully considered all of the legal arguments put forth and 
concluded in April 2012, after three years of thorough analysis and public consultations 
that Palestine’s status at the UN as “observer entity” was determinant – since entry into the 
Rome Statute system is through the UN Secretary-General, who acts as treaty depositary. 
The OTP’s position was that the Palestinian Authority’s “observer entity” status at the UN 
at that time meant that it could not sign up to the Rome Statute. As Palestine could not join 
the Rome Statute, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo concluded that it could not lodge an 
Article 12(3) declaration bringing itself under the ambit of the treaty either, as it had 
sought to do.  
116 Palestine applied for Membership in the UN on 23 September 2011. The process was 
stalled in the Security Council, however on 31 October 2011 UNESCO’s General Confer-
ence voted to admit Palestine as a Member State of the Organisation. In 2012, the General 
Assembly granted it a non-member observer State status, which was determinative. 
117 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 17, see supra note 94. 
118 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 201, see supra note 109. 
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The Palestine episode may provide some explanation of why the 
2013 Policy Paper specifies that the commencement of a preliminary ex-
amination will not be publicised before entering Phase 2.119  However, 
Phase 2 concerns jurisdiction as well. Consequently, preliminary examina-
tions should not be publicised at all until jurisdiction has been established 
and ideally not before a decision to proceed or not with an investigation 
has been taken. It is not clear that the OTP could keep a preliminary ex-
amination confidential even if it wanted to, if senders of communications 
or States determine to make them public.120 Regardless, the focus of this 
chapter is when the OTP purposefully publicises preliminary examination 
activities and takes public stances on situations under examination to in-
fluence change. In this respect, it would be preferable if the confidential 
nature of the examination process is maintained until a decision to inves-
tigate is taken. Making announcements before a determination to investi-
gate can do more harm than good. Such is the case with situations under 
Phase 2 in which subject-matter jurisdiction is still being examined. At 
that point, the OTP is not even certain that crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Rome Statute have been committed. What legitimate purpose, if any, 
does it serve to publicise the examination of activities that may not even 
end up constituting Rome Statute crimes? This can be observed in the 
Iraq/UK situation ‘re-opened’ in 2014 and currently under Phase 2.121 
Similarly, in the Honduras situation, after a nearly five-year long 
examination the conclusion was that “[t]he Prosecutor lacks a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation and has decided to close this pre-
                                                   
119 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 95, see supra note 2.  
120 For example, news that the Prosecutor was examining crimes committed in Colombia 
became public in March 2005 when Colombian lawmakers released a letter from Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo requesting information on alleged crimes. See BBC News, “ICC probes 
Colombia on war crimes”, 31 March 2005; School of the Americas, “War Crimes Tribunal 
Asks Colombia for Info” (available on its web site).  
121 Another question that arises is whether preliminary examinations should resume where 
they were left off, that is, when a situation is re-opened, previously finding there was sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction but that the alleged crimes were not of sufficient gravity. How is it 
that the Iraq/UK situation has remained under Phase 2 since its ‘re-opening’ in 2014 when 
in 2006 the OTP had already confirmed jurisdiction over ICC crimes while concluding 
they were not of sufficient gravity, and collected information on national proceedings ob-
serving they had been initiated in respect to each incident. Currently it appears as though 
the OTP starts from scratch when re-opening situations. 
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liminary examination”.122 The OTP asserted that the situation in Honduras 
raised a number of issues that characterised it as a “borderline case”,123 
without explaining why it reached this determination. Rather, it is left to 
interested stakeholders to infer that perhaps the complexity of the situa-
tion or the challenges of having to rely on information in different lan-
guages underpinned the Prosecutor’s decision. Moreover, the OTP’s open-
ended practice to collect information over a long period of time prior to 
making any determination is neither pragmatic nor does it contribute to 
the efficiency of prosecutorial activity. In the Honduras situation, like 
with others, the Prosecutor continuously expanded the grounds for exami-
nation.124 Preliminary examinations do not require the OTP to determine 
all aspects of a potential investigation, only to establish a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation.  
The Article 5 Report on the Situation in Honduras, which contains 
the reasoning for not proceeding with an investigation, is quite compre-
hensive and well-written. The report puts all the pieces together and lays 
bare the OTP’s decision-making process. This approach reinforces hold-
ing off on putting out inconclusive or piecemeal information that can be 
misleading.125 If we go back to the moment when the Honduras situation 
was made public, the OTP issued a newsletter referring to the recent an-
nouncement mentioning that, in “order to fulfil its mandate and maximize 
the preventative impact of its work, the Office will make public its pre-
liminary examination activities when it assesses that this will have a posi-
                                                   
122 OTP, Situation in Honduras: Article 5 Report, 28 October 2015, paras. 31 and 143 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/54755a/). 
123 Unfortunately, the great majority of transnational organised crimes are outside the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC. Attempts to include crimes such as trafficking in drugs into the ICC Stat-
ute were met by great opposition in Rome. See ibid., paras. 30 and 93.  
124 The preliminary examination in Honduras was prompted by the 2009 coup that later ex-
panded to post-electoral violence incidents and eventually led to a full analysis of links be-
tween the alleged crimes and the patterns of violence in the country affected by transna-
tional organised crime. 
125 See OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, see supra note 94; OTP, Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities, see supra note 109; OTP, Report on Preliminary Ex-
amination activities, 25 November 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dbf75e/); OTP, 
Report on Preliminary Examination activities, 2 December 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/3594b3/); OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, see supra note 98; 
Report on the Situation in Honduras and Colombia 2 December 2014; OTP, Situation in 
Honduras: Article 5 Report, see supra note 122.  
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tive impact in stopping violence and preventing future crimes or when the 
senders of communications make them public”.126 Nevertheless, how can 
an assessment of positive impact occur before knowing if Rome Statute 
crimes have been committed? This is not to suggest that the idea is with-
out merit. However, at such an early juncture, it would have been more 
prudent to simply confirm the receipt of communications and announce 
the OTP’s commitment to seriously examine the information in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Rome Statute. The fact that the Honduras 
situation deteriorated during the post-electoral period shows that, despite 
the OTP’s best intentions, the announcement of the preliminary examina-
tion had little, if any, impact on preventing alleged crimes. It would there-
fore seem preferable to keep that process internal, in line with Article 
53(1), until a reasonable basis decision is reached. 
According to the 2013 Policy Paper, the Office will seek to publi-
cise its preliminary examination activities in various ways, including 
through early interaction with stakeholders, dissemination of relevant 
statistics on Article 15 communications, public statements, periodic re-
ports, and information on high-level visits to the concerned States.127 If 
we were to group the different communication methods employed by the 
OTP to keep the public informed about situations under preliminary ex-
amination, we would find the following:  
1. Media reports through press releases,128 statements,129 communica-
tions,130 background notes,131 and questions and answers;132  
                                                   
126 ICC, OTP Weekly Briefing, 16–22 November 2010, Issue #64 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/0250bc/). 
127 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 95–96, see supra note 2. 
128 ICC, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, issues her 
annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2016)”, 14 November 2016, ICC-
CPI-20161114-PR1252 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/834809/). 
129 ICC, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, 
concerning referral from the Gabonese Republic”, 29 September 2016 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/e0b4f6/). 
130 ICC-OTP, OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq, see supra note 104; 
idem, OTP response to communications received concerning Venezuela, see supra note 
104. 
131 A background note on the situation in the Central African Republic and the OTP’s work to 
date (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ed1ee/). 
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2. Statements133 and reports to the Assembly of States Parties, includ-
ing on activities of the Court,134 annual activities on preliminary ex-
aminations,135 situation-specific reports,136 Article 5 reports137 and 
Article 53(1) reports;138  
3. Reports139 and statements to the United Nations;140  
4. Filings by the OTP in relation to situations under preliminary exam-
ination;141  
5. Policy Papers on preliminary examinations142 and related matters;  
6. OTP Weekly Briefings Newsletters;143 
                                                                                                                        
132 Questions & Answers On the decision of the ICC Prosecutor to close the preliminary 
examination in Honduras, 28 October 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0035a/). 
133 Address by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Third Session of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 6 September 2004 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0ada13/). 
134 ICC, Reports on activities of the ICC, see supra note 85. 
135 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, see supra note 25.  
136 Rapport sur les activités menées en 2014 en matière d’examen préliminaire Situations en 
Guinée et République Centrafricaine, 2 December 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
9cc819/); Informe sobre las Actividades de Examen Preliminar de 2014 Honduras y Co-
lombia (Joint Reports Guinea/ and Honduras/Colombia) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
153076/). 
137 OTP, Situation in Honduras: Article 5 Report, see supra note 122; ICC, Situation in the 
Republic of Korea: Article 5 Report, 23 June 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ef1f7f/); 
OTP, Situation in Nigeria: Article 5 Report, 5 August 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/508bd0/). 
138 Situation referred by Comoros: Article 53(1) Report, see supra note 107; Situation in the 
Central African Republic II: Article 53 (1) Report, see supra note 100.  
139 Report of the International Criminal Court on its activities in 2015/16, A/71/342, 19 Au-
gust 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9606ac/). 
140 ICC, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Na-
tions Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), 4 May 2011 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/76ba00/); Statement by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the United Na-
tions Security Council on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, pursuant to UNSCR 
1970 (2011), 4 May 2011 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9bb5db/). 
141 Situation in the Central African Republic, Decision Requesting Information on the Status 
of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, see supra 
note 88. 
142 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 2; OTP, Draft Policy 
Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 17. 
143 ICC, OTP Weekly Briefing, see supra note 126. 
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7. Lectures and speeches presented at seminars, conferences and train-
ing addressing or referring to preliminary examinations;144 and  
8. Diplomatic briefings.145 
The above range of communication methods demonstrates the 
OTP’s creativity and flexibility, as well as how it has evolved in its ap-
proach towards publicity in an effort to be more transparent about its ac-
tivities.146 At the same time, the range of communication methods also 
shows a case-by-case approach with no methodological system in place to 
understand when and what information is made public and for what rea-
son. According to the 2013 Policy Paper, the Office has adopted a policy 
of issuing situation-specific reports to substantiate the Prosecutor’s deci-
sion to ‘close’ a preliminary examination, or to proceed with an investiga-
tion.147 Paradoxically, the rationale provided by the OTP is the same as in 
the 2009 OTP public responses to communications received concerning 
Iraq and Venezuela, both on decisions not to proceed with an investiga-
tion.148  
There are two main types of situation-specific reports: Article 5 and 
Article 53(1).149 Both reports attempt to explain the Prosecutor’s reasons 
for ‘closing’ situations. However, Article 5 reports are limited to circum-
stances where subject-matter jurisdiction is not met. At least that was the 
basis for ‘closing’ the situation in Honduras and in relation to the Repub-
                                                   
144 The International Criminal Court and Africa: A Discussion on Legitimacy, Impunity, Se-
lectivity, Fairness and Accountability, Keynote Speech of the Prosecutor - GIMPA Law 
Conference on the ICC and Africa, 17 March 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
19ff9b/); Speech of the Prosecutor, International Seminar on the imperatives of the Ob-
servance of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Norms in International Se-
curity Operations, Seminar hosted by the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister 
of Justice of Nigeria, 24 February 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4cbd32/). 
145 Most of the texts of these briefings are available at the Court’s web site under “Reports on 
activities”, with search string “Diplomatic Briefing”. 
146 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 14, see supra note 25. 
147 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para.97, see supra note 2.  
148 ICC-OTP, OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq, see supra note 104; 
idem, OTP response to communications received concerning Venezuela, see supra note 
104. 
149 In addition to the joint reports referred to above, see supra note 137, the OTP has issued 
interim reports. In relation to the Interim Report on Colombia of 14 November 2012 the 
OTP explained the presentation of a more detailed report was exceptional in nature, in 
recognition of the high level of public interest generated by this examination.  
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lic of Korea. However, the Article 5 report relating to the situation in Ni-
geria addressed a different matter, namely why the OTP saw merit in 
moving the situation to Phase 3.150 Not only is this a discrepancy regard-
ing the purpose of Article 5 reports, but it also presents an inconsistency 
with regard to other situations that advanced to Phase 3, such as with the 
situation in Afghanistan. What this inconsistency underscores is the seem-
ingly ad hoc and selective approach the OTP has adopted in relation to the 
publication of information about its preliminary examinations. If the OTP 
is committed to transparency in the preliminary examination process, then 
it needs to adopt a consistent approach. The fact that the OTP has to date 
failed to develop a coherent methodology that guides the publication of its 
preliminary examination activities is a matter that requires further scrutiny. 
Some of the possible reasons behind the OTP’s publicity policies are ex-
amined below.  
24.4. Reasons for Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities 
The policy-making activity of the OTP has been regular and substantial, 
covering a wide array of topics.151 According to the OTP’s Regulations, 
the Office shall, as appropriate, make public policy papers that reflect the 
key principles and criteria of the prosecutorial strategy.152 With respect to 
preliminary examinations, the OTP has from the outset been forthcoming 
about regularly fine-tuning its policies and practices. The 2013 Policy 
Paper stipulates it is a document reflecting an internal policy of the OTP 
that does not give rise to legal rights, and is subject to revision based on 
                                                   
150 Situation in Nigeria: Article 53(1) Report, para. 131, see supra note 138 specifies the 
following: “Accordingly, the Prosecutor has decided to move the situation in Nigeria to 
Phase 3 of the preliminary examination with a view to assessing whether the Nigerian au-
thorities are conducting genuine proceedings in relation to the crimes committed by Boko 
Haram”.  
151 OTP, Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice, see supra note 29; idem, Policy Paper on 
Victims’ Participation, 12 April 2010 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3c204f/); idem, Poli-
cy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 2; idem, Policy Paper on Case Se-
lection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/182205/); 
idem, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes and Policy, 5 June 2014 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c/); idem, Policy on Children (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/c2652b/).  
152 OTP Regulations, 2009, Regulation 14(2), see supra note 15. 
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experience and in light of legal determinations by the Chambers of the 
Court.153  
The OTP contends it has decided to put forward a policy paper that 
describes the relevant Rome Statute principles, factors and procedures 
applied by the Office in the conduct of its preliminary examination activi-
ties. It explains it has made the policy paper public in the interest of pro-
moting clarity and predictability regarding the manner in which it applies 
the legal criteria set out in the Statute.154 In this connection, the OTP pro-
duces annual reports on preliminary examination activities aimed at rais-
ing public awareness and promoting transparency regarding the Office’s 
preliminary examination process and related activities. 155  Unlike other 
reports, these are promptly disseminated to the general public through 
press releases and promoted further through informal launch events dur-
ing the sessions of the Assembly of States Parties.  
24.4.1. Manifest Reasons  
By and large, the OTP’s practice of sharing information publicly has been 
well-received. At the same time, it is difficult not to find a political motive 
behind the profile-raising of the preliminary examination activities of the 
OTP when compared to equivalent procedures at the domestic level, 
where preliminary findings generally result from a confidential process 
that occurs away from the public eye. This is not to suggest the ICC does 
not need publicity. Quite the opposite, an international court requires a 
careful handling of its public image to maintain support for its activities 
from the international community.  
24.4.1.1. Transparency 
The raison d’être of having a public policy and reporting regularly is 
transparency. But what does transparency mean in the realm of prelimi-
nary examinations? It should not be just another buzzword to attract sup-
                                                   
153 This caveat is important and recognises the need to enhance preliminary examinations and 
to continue improving the process. Notwithstanding the OTP should abide as much as pos-
sible to its policy otherwise it can give the impression of applying double standards. See 
OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 20, see supra note 2. 
154 Ibid. 
155 ICC, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, issues her 
annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2016)”, 14 November 2016 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/834809/). 
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port or gain legitimacy. For transparency to have a real impact, it must be 
meaningful, exemplifying appropriate communication and ensuring ac-
countability. Transparency as an objective should also aim to give the 
OTP long-term coherence so that its activities become both predictable 
and credible. The 2013 Policy Paper associates transparency with access 
to information.156 Paragraph 94 specifies that in order to promote a better 
understanding of the process of preliminary examinations and to increase 
predictability, the Office will regularly report on its preliminary examina-
tion activities.  
There is a proper level of transparency that is unique for each or-
ganisation and for each of its processes. The OTP cannot be expected to 
share all the information in its possession with everyone who is interested 
in having access to it. What is important for the purpose of transparency is 
the accurate and timely disclosure of information to the appropriate recip-
ient(s).  
Despite the OTP’s paramount and well-intentioned efforts to share 
information, concerns remain in the international community because its 
reporting on preliminary examination activities has not necessarily 
brought about greater transparency or understanding of the OTP’s activi-
ties. Indeed, while some preliminary examinations move very quickly 
(Kenya), others seem to stagnate for years (Colombia and Afghanistan). It 
is also unclear why the Office conducts regular missions to some coun-
tries (Colombia, Guinea and Georgia) but not to others. In November 
2016, the OTP reported that a final decision was “imminent” on whether 
to request the PTC authorisation to investigate the situation in Afghani-
stan.157 This announcement naturally raised expectations. It took the Of-
fice a whole year to request the authorisation from the PTC, resulting in a 
loss of trust and credibility and clearly no sense of increased transparency 
in the activities of the OTP. The long-awaited justification of why such a 
statement was made at that time and the circumstances that caused it to be 
no longer true were not compelling, nor did they help to restore confi-
dence in OTP reporting.158 
                                                   
156 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 94-99, see supra note 2.  
157 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 230, see supra note 25.  
158 In relation to the same situation compare the language in paragraph 4 of the ICC, Report 
on the activities of the International Criminal Court, see supra note 85 which reads as fol-
lows: “[t]he Office began to gather information relevant for assessing whether there are 
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Separately, it was also noticeable, after the PTC in July 2015 reject-
ed the OTP’s decision not to proceed with an investigation in the situation 
relating to the Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, that 
this important development was left out of the preliminary examination 
activities report of that same year. 159  In 2016, the situation was re-
introduced in the preliminary examination activities report, listed as still 
under examination.160 In that report, a new section was added entitled 
“situations under reconsideration” contending that the OTP was nearing 
completion of its review of all information gathered, prior to and since its 
initial report of 6 November 2014, and was preparing to issue the Prose-
cutor’s final decision under Rule 108(3) in “the near future”.161  
The OTP’s choice of terminology is once again at fault. The near 
future was somewhat distant from the 12 months it took the OTP to issue 
its decision. Moreover, it seems impossible to distinguish between an im-
minent decision and one that will be issued in the near future. The lack of 
updates between reports was also not helpful. The OTP should increase its 
efforts to provide more timely and accurate information, along with relia-
ble forecasts. These examples serve to explain why transparency must be 
consistently demonstrated and statements supported by actions. 
As we have seen, the OTP routinely reports on situations under ex-
amination even in the absence of a formal requirement. Although trans-
parency is always desirable, it has to be the right kind and balanced out 
against other values such as the need to maintain confidentiality, the need 
to maintain credibility and the need to maintain the trust of States. If the 
intention of the OTP in publicising its preliminary examination activities 
is to send a particular message – to prevent crimes, encourage national 
prosecutions or to impact in some other way the situation that it is consid-
ering – then the OTP should reflect on what are the most appropriate 
                                                                                                                        
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice 
prior to making a decision on whether to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
open an investigation”. With just one week apart the 2016 OTP Report on Preliminary Ex-
amination Activities indicated convincingly that a final decision to seek authorisation to 
investigate in the situation in Afghanistan was ‘imminent’.  
159 Although the OTP appealed the PTC decision it was still adjudicated before the issuance of 
the 2015 report. 
160 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 20, see supra note 25.  
161 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 331, see supra note 25. 
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means to achieve its goals. For example, resorting to quiet diplomacy. 
When it comes to reporting to the public at large the information should 
serve to update on the situation by presenting factual and legal findings 
that are relevant to the decision to proceed or not with an investigation. 
Anything different or divorced from reality is negligent and may even 
constitute a breach of the Prosecutor’s duty of care as a global public fig-
ure.  
During the preliminary examination stage, the OTP handles infor-
mation that is both sensitive and inconclusive, making it premature to 
share with the general public given the adverse impacts for the States con-
cerned. Under these circumstances, channels of communication should be 
limited to main stakeholders, such as the senders of information and con-
cerned States, until the moment the OTP is truly in a position to announce 
its decision to proceed or not with an investigation. This should not be 
read as a statement against transparency. What the author is advocating 
for is a more meaningful transparency and that thoughtful consideration 
be given to what is publicised when a situation is under examination 
through a proper balancing of all the interests involved. 
24.4.1.2. Raising Public Awareness 
Structurally, within international courts or tribunals, external relations and 
raising public awareness about the work of the Court is a function that is 
mainly carried out by the Registry through outreach activities. However, 
prosecutors also have a valuable role to play in raising awareness and 
educating the public about their work, which is separate and independent 
from the work of the Court as such. Efforts must be made to ensure that 
the work of the Prosecutor is not only known but also understood by the 
societies on whose behalf he or she acts.  
 Under the regulatory framework of the Court, the OTP has a man-
date relating to public information and outreach in general.162 So far, the 
                                                   
162 Pursuant to Regulation 15, the Office shall disseminate information on its activities to, and 
respond to enquiries from States, international organisations, victims, non-governmental 
organisations and the general public, with a particular focus on the communities affected 
by the work of the Office, as appropriate in coordination with the Registry. In doing so, the 
Office shall at all times ensure compliance with its statutory obligations and the decisions 
of the Chambers regarding confidentiality, and the safety and well-being of victims, wit-
nesses, Office staff and other persons at risk on account of their interaction with the Court. 
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Office has focused most of its attention on increasing the visibility of its 
preliminary examination activities. On several occasions, the OTP has 
stressed the benefits that awareness of ICC scrutiny can have: “[T]he an-
nouncement of ICC activities can have a preventive impact. The mere 
monitoring of a situation can deter future crimes. It increases the risk of 
punishment even before trials begin. This effect is not limited to the situa-
tion under investigation but extends to all State Parties and reverberates 
worldwide”.163 However, this comes with particular challenges regarding 
the impartiality and role of the Prosecutor, as envisaged in the Rome Stat-
ute.  
The Office is employing its monitoring of situations and subsequent 
public statements, as a form of targeted deterrence in situations where it 
appears that a recurrence of crimes is likely.164 Promoting preliminary 
examination activities in this way can be counterproductive and to the 
detriment of the main functions of the OTP – investigations and prosecu-
tions. Paragraph 95 of the 2013 Policy Paper underscores that “such in-
formation provided to the public will enable the Office to carry out its 
mandate without raising undue expectations that an investigation will 
necessarily be opened, while at the same time encouraging genuine na-
tional proceedings and contributing towards the prevention of crimes”. 
The reality is that publicising this information has achieved the opposite. 
The policy of the Prosecutor to use preliminary examinations for other 
purposes is well intentioned but, as will be explained below, is simply not 
working. 
                                                                                                                        
It adds that the Office shall contribute to the Court’s outreach strategies and activities. OTP 
Regulations, see supra note 15.  
163 Under ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 2006, 
p. 6 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6e3bf4/): “The third principle [i]s to maximize the 
impact of the activities of the Office. As noted in the Preamble of the Statute, the Court has 
a role in contributing to the prevention of future crimes. The Office has to maximize the 
impact of each of its activities, from the analysis of the information, to the beginning of the 
investigation, to the trial and eventual conviction. Massive crimes are planned; the an-
nouncement of an investigation could have a preventative impact. The mere monitoring of 
a situation could deter future crimes from being committed. It increases the risk of pun-
ishment even before trials have begun. Interestingly, this effect is not limited to the situa-
tion under investigation but extends to different countries around the world”. 
164 Bosco, 2013, p. 181, see supra note 70.  
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In 2009, the OTP incorporated into its Prosecutorial Strategy docu-
ment the goal of prevention through public monitoring, indicating that the 
Office would “make preventive statements noting that crimes possibly 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court are being committed” and 
“make public the commencement of a preliminary examination at the 
earliest possible stage through press releases and public statements”.165 
This preventative goal is also one of the three policy objectives contained 
in the 2013 Policy Paper establishing that the Office may also issue public, 
preventive statements in order to deter the escalation of violence and the 
further commission of crimes, to put perpetrators on notice that they may 
be held to account.166 
This policy objective has led the OTP to issue several ‘early warn-
ings’ and strongly-worded statements directed to States and to perpetrators. 
In situations where conflict has broken out abruptly, the OTP has sig-
nalled to combatants that it is scrutinising events, a clear attempt to use its 
influence to alter the conduct of hostilities. When fighting erupted be-
tween Georgian and Russian forces in August 2008, the OTP released a 
statement indicating that it was analysing alleged crimes committed dur-
ing combat operations.167 Just two days after a massacre at a refugee camp 
in Uganda, the Prosecutor released a statement indicating his intent to 
investigate, which could also be seen as an effort to assure the affected 
Ugandan communities that revenge attacks were unnecessary and to 
thereby help prevent a spiral of violence.168  The Prosecutor also con-
demned the killing of seven United Nations peacekeepers from Tanzania 
and the wounding of 17 military and police personnel of the African Un-
ion–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (‘UNAMID’) on 13 July 
2013 in South Darfur. The statement provided a strong reminder that at-
tacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes.169 
                                                   
165 OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, para. 39 see supra note 75. 
166 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 106, see supra note 2.  
167 ICC OTP, ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Georgia under analysis, 20 August 2008, 
ICC-OTP-20080820-PR346 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1e947b/). 
168 ICC OTP, Statement by the Prosecutor related to crimes committed in Barlonya Camp, 
Uganda, 23 February 2004 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/022076/). 
169 ICC OTP, Statement of the ICC Prosecutor: Attacks against peacekeepers may constitute 
war crimes, 19 July 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac9487/). 
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The OTP has also adopted the practice of issuing statements related 
to electoral violence such as with Kenya, Guinea, CAR and Burundi.170 
Some of these statements have been pre-emptive and others post-facto. In 
Nigeria, the Prosecutor warned ahead of elections that: “Any person who 
incites or engages in acts of violence encouraging or contributing to the 
commission of crimes that fall within ICC’s jurisdiction – is liable to 
prosecution; either by Nigerian Courts or by the ICC”.171  Conversely, 
when violence broke out in Côte d’Ivoire after a disputed election, the 
Prosecutor publicly warned one individual that his incitements to violence 
might be prosecuted. 172  On this point, the United Nations Secretary-
General has recognised that carefully monitoring electoral processes in 
ICC situation countries may help prevent large-scale violence resulting 
from elections by putting would-be violators on notice that impunity is 
not assured.173  
Another striking example where the OTP tried to exert pressure is 
in relation to the situation in the Philippines.174 On 13 October 2016, the 
Prosecutor expressed concerns over alleged extra-judicial killings and 
vowed to closely follow developments “in the Philippines in the weeks to 
come and record any instance of incitement or resort to violence with a 
                                                   
170 ICC OTP, Prosecutor reaffirms that the situation in Kenya is monitored by his office, 11 
February 2009 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acbb26); ICC OTP, Statement of the ICC 
Prosecutor Statement on the occasion of the 28 September 2013 elections in Guinea, 27 
September 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/96982f/); Statement of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, ahead of general elections in the Central 
African Republic: “we will record any instance of violence or incitement to violence”, 23 
December 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b1e153/); ICC OTP, Statement of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding the recent pre-
election violence in Burundi, 8 May 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db08e6/). 
171 ICC OTP, Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensou-
da, ahead of elections in Nigeria: “I reiterate my call to refrain from violence”, 16 March 
2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db08e6/). 
172 ICC OTP, Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, 21 December 2010, ICC-OTP-20101221-PR617 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
3ffcf8/). 
173 Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616, para. 49 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/77bebf/). 
174 ICC OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda 
concerning the situation in the Republic of the Philippines, 13 October 2016 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/bbc78e/). 
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view to assessing whether a preliminary examination into the situation of 
the Philippines needs to be opened”. The statement expressly referred to 
high-level officials condoning or encouraging such actions, which includ-
ed the Head of State of the Philippines. Interestingly it referred to a figure 
of over 3,000 deaths in three months, while clarifying that a preliminary 
examination had not yet taken place. Presumably, this alarming figure 
would be enough to conduct a preliminary examination in accordance 
with the duty to analyse the seriousness of the information communicated 
to the Office. How can the Prosecutor issue statements containing details 
it has not yet assessed? Why announce close scrutiny in the weeks to 
come to assess the need to conduct a preliminary examination, but then 
take 16 months - until February 2018 - to follow through? 
The statement concerning the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham/Greater Syria (‘ISIS’, also known as ‘ISIL’, ‘Daesh’ or ‘IS’)175 was 
quite unique because it served as a clarification in response to criticism 
for not taking any action with respect to alleged crimes committed by this 
entity. After a careful reading of the statement, it seems to imply that a 
preliminary examination was carried out. In the statement, the Prosecutor 
claims to have jurisdiction but that the prospects of the OTP investigating 
and prosecuting those most responsible, within the leadership of ISIS, is 
limited because it involves nationals from two non-States Parties. The 
statement confirms the receipt of communications concerning the com-
mission of crimes against humanity and war crimes by members of ISIS 
involving nationals from States Parties. The Prosecutor nevertheless con-
cludes that: “[t]he jurisdictional basis for opening a preliminary examina-
tion into this situation is too narrow at this stage” taking into account OTP 
policy, which is to focus on those most responsible for mass crimes.176 
                                                   
175 ICC OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bens-
ouda, on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS, 8 April 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/b1d672/). 
176 The contradiction lies in the OTP’s reliance on its prosecutorial strategy as an obstacle to 
proceeding further. At that time the OTP in both Strategic Plans 2012–2015 and 2016–
2018 had already shifted its policy through a strategy of gradually building upwards. By 
then the OTP had already recognised that it might need “first to investigate and prosecute a 
limited number of mid- and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately have a reasonable 
prospect of conviction for the most responsible. Moreover that the Office would also con-
sider prosecuting lower level perpetrators where their conduct has been particularly grave 
and has acquired extensive notoriety”. The ISIS situation seems to fall within this policy 
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Unfortunately, this statement by the Prosecutor did not succeed in clarify-
ing why not even a preliminary examination could be carried out, if in-
deed it had not been, given that the statement itself confirmed that there 
was enough information to do so. Instead the statement reads as an excuse 
for not fulfilling the Prosecutor’s statutory duties. As well as an encour-
agement to those States Parties whose nationals allegedly committed 
crimes to fulfil their primary duty to investigate and prosecute. 
The Prosecutor’s strategy of issuing statements that threaten to 
‘open’ a preliminary examination, or statements asserting that a situation 
is being monitored without a real intention to examine the situation, has 
muddied the waters further with respect to understanding the preliminary 
examination process. The Prosecutor is clearly using the powers to con-
duct preliminary examinations in ways that relate more to the OTP’s poli-
cy objectives of prevention and deterrence or encouraging national pro-
ceedings, than to the task of determining whether a reasonable basis exists 
to open an investigation. Regardless of the Prosecutor’s motives, any pub-
lic statement issued by the Prosecutor should be strategically-framed if it 
is to be effective. Statements also present some advantages over reports, 
allowing for more timely and frequent messaging, whereas reports are 
lengthy and less adjustable given their annual cycles.  
In 2015 the Prosecutor offered to assess the preventive impact of 
preliminary examination activities, though no methodology to do so has 
been developed so far.177 Without convincing evidence that the Prosecu-
tor’s statements have a preventive or deterrent impact on crimes, it is 
premature to attribute so much value to this objective. It would be safer to 
collect more data in this regard.  
                                                                                                                        
and therefore should not have prevented the OTP from pursuing investigations or should 
have at least made the Prosecutor hesitate before issuing such a statement.  
177 OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, para. 54(3), see supra note 1. “Preliminary examinations 
can also help deter actual or would-be perpetrators of crimes through the threat of interna-
tional prosecutions. In accordance with its policy, the Office will seek to perform an early 
warning function by systematically and proactively collecting open source information on 
alleged crimes that could fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Office will also react 
promptly to upsurges or serious risks of violence by reinforcing early interaction with 
States, international, regional organisations and non- governmental organisations in order 
to fine-tune its assessment and coordinate next steps. Such steps may include field visits, 
public statements and media interviews. The Office will further develop criteria for guid-
ing such preventive activities”. 
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24.4.2. Secondary Reasons 
It is conceivable that the OTP has secondary reasons for publicising its 
activities on situations under examination, for example, to mitigate criti-
cism of perceived bias, insufficient workload or marginal outcomes, 
which will be considered in the following section. 
24.4.2.1. To Counter Claims of Geographical Imbalance 
The ICC has been consistently characterised by the African Union178 as 
anti-African.179 The alternative position is that the ICC is not unfairly 
targeting Africans; rather, it is simply and properly targeting alleged war 
criminals. 180  Pursuant to the 2013 Policy Paper, factors such as geo-
political implications or geographical balance are not statutory criteria or 
                                                   
178 Of the 60 ratifications needed for the ICC to begin operations in 2002, 34 – of the conti-
nent’s 55 nations – were African.  
179 Tense relations between African nations and the ICC likely began in 2005 when the UNSC 
referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor. The African Union called upon its 
Member States to adopt a policy of non-cooperation in relation to the ICC. See Decision 
on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Doc. 
EX.CL/639(XVIII), January 2011 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2592b6/); Decision on 
the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Doc. 
EX.CL/670(XIX), July 2011(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3b767f/); Decision on the 
Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on 
the International Criminal Court, Doc. EX.CL/710(XX), January 2012 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/d20b02/); Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court- Doc. EX.CL/731(XXI), July 2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
76d96e/); Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and The International Criminal 
Court Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXI) [Reservation by Botswana to the entire decision], May 
2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/474c18/); Decision on the Progress Report of the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court 
Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXII), January 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8fa4ae/); De-
cision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Previous Deci-
sions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Doc. Assembly/AU/18(XXIV), January 
2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/263bf4/); Decision on the Update of the Commission 
on the Implementation of Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Assem-
bly/AU/Dec.586(XXV), June 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/72bc7a/); Decision on 
the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/987(XXIX), July 2016 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/e48950/); Decision on the International Criminal Court (ICC) – Doc. 
EX.CL/1006(XXX), January 2017 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9645bf/). See also De-
cision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court adopted at the Ex-
traordinary African Union Summit of 13 October 2013, infra note 188. 
180 W. Chadwick Austin and Michael Thieme, “Is the International Criminal Court Anti-
African?”, in Journal Peace Review, 2016, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 344. 
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relevant for a determination that a situation shall be investigated by the 
Court.181 To examine the validity of allegations of racial selection, it is 
worth considering how cases make their way to the Court, the process 
used in selecting them, including whether or not the ICC has inappropri-
ately refused to investigate other comparable offences committed on other 
continents, and finally, the motivations of those claiming a racial bias in 
the African Union.182 
The majority of investigations and prosecutions concerning African 
States before the ICC have arisen from self-referrals by African States, 
including acceptance of the Court’s ad hoc jurisdiction and Security 
Council referrals. Three African investigations have been initiated by the 
Prosecutor. Kenya was the first, and only after the Court ruled that domes-
tic action by the Kenyan authorities was insufficient.183 The 2008 post-
election violence in Kenya was the subject of a preliminary examination 
for less than two years before the Prosecutor sought permission to open an 
investigation in November 2009.184  During that period, the Prosecutor 
visited Kenya and made numerous public statements about the situa-
tion.185  What followed during the investigation and prosecution stages 
                                                   
181 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para.11 and 29, see supra note 2.  
182 On this last point see Austin and Thieme, 2016, pp. 342–343, see supra note 180.  
183 ICC, Situation in Kenya, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by 
the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute’, 30 August 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-307 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/ac5d46/). 
184 The situation in Kenya was under examination since 27 December 2007 until the moment 
the Prosecutor requested authorisation to proceed with an investigation on 26 November 
2009. The proprio motu investigation was opened on 31 March 2010. 
185 The Prosecutor pledged that “[w]e will do justice, we will work together to avoid a repeti-
tion of the crimes […] It has been two years since the post election violence in Kenya. In 
two years another election is planned. The world is watching Kenya and this Court”.
 
He 
later stressed that the court would try to proceed on a timetable that could maximise the 
chances for prevention. “Everyone is worried about the next election in Kenya in 2012”, 
he told the press. “That’s why I understand the importance of speed, and I am working to 
be sure that during 2010 – if the judges authorize investigations – we will be able to com-
plete investigations and to define who are the suspects, who are the accused, that have to 
have justice in Kenya. And that will clean the situation [so] that you can have peaceful 
election [seasons] in 2011 and 2012”. Voice of America News, “ICC Prosecutor Promises 
Speed in Kenya Proceedings”, 7 November 2009. 
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with Kenya became one of the most political186 and legally challenging 
cases at the ICC.187 It also led to the Court’s biggest confrontation and 
hostility with the African Union and its members.188 
While the Kenya situation clearly demonstrated the politically vola-
tile nature of cases dealing with international crimes, the predicament for 
the ICC is that every situation it is called upon to deal with will contain 
politically volatile elements. However, an overarching goal of internation-
al criminal courts is justice for victims of crimes, which should never be 
sacrificed at the altar of political expediency. On the dividing line between 
the political and the legal, the decision to investigate and prosecute is par-
ticularly sensitive. Time and again, ICC Prosecutors have strongly af-
firmed: “I follow the evidence not politics”.189 Sadly, the Prosecutor’s 
actions have belied this assertion and what we have seen until recently is 
the OTP doing its best to avoid taking difficult decisions because of polit-
ical sensitivities. In the early years, the OTP strongly relied on self-
                                                   
186 In 2013 the Security Council voted on a resolution presented by Rwanda calling for the 
deferral of the cases involving the President and Deputy President of Kenya. This resolu-
tion did not receive the necessary nine affirmative votes with seven members in favour and 
eight abstaining. This jurisdictional coup failed, but the attempt clearly demonstrated the 
concern of many African nations. 
187 See interview with Deputy Prosecutor, James Stewart, remarks on the Kenya cases in the 
Justice in Conflict blog, “A Test of Our Resilience – An Interview with the ICC Deputy 
Prosecutor”, 10 August 2016. 
188 The 2013 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC adopted the ruling of the Ex-
traordinary Assembly of the African Union condemning the ICC’s investigations of Afri-
can political leaders and its impact on reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. First, the 
Assembly called for the cessation of any existing charges or future charges against any 
Serving African Union Heads of State or government. Second, that the trials of President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto should be suspended until 
they complete their terms of office. Third, that Kenya should send a letter to the UN Secu-
rity Council seeking deferral, pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, of the proceed-
ings against the President and Deputy President of Kenya; and fourth, that President Uhuru 
Kenyatta would not appear before the ICC until such concerns raised by the African Union 
and its Member States have been adequately addressed by the UN Security Council and the 
ICC.  
189 International Peace Institute, “Moreno-Ocampo: “I Follow Evidence, Not Politics””, 20 
January 2012 (available on the Institute’s web site). BBC HARDtalk, “ICC “following” 
Afghan war crimes claims”, 29 June 2017: Fatou Bensouda stated, “I’m following the evi-
dence, I’m following the law”. See also interview with Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, in the 
Justice in Conflict blog, “Without Fear or Favour – An Interview with the ICC Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda”, 15 October 2015. 
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referrals,190 because it made it easier to open an investigation and in prin-
ciple secure co-operation from the referring State. Indeed, for the most 
part, self-referrals from States are situations referred by States that are 
willing but not able to carry out their own investigations and prosecu-
tions.191 As such, these situations appeared obvious and initially no one 
questioned the Prosecutor’s legitimacy in taking up these cases. Other 
situations have put the OTP’s capabilities to the test, for example, the 
Iraq/UK situation involving a State Party that appears to be both willing 
and able to handle the situation. Under these circumstances, the legitima-
cy of the OTP’s actions is questionable.  
There is no doubt from the list of countries under preliminary exam-
ination that the Court has looked beyond Africa in the conduct of these 
activities. To exemplify the geographical diversity of situations under 
preliminary examination, the OTP has increased their publicity through 
statements, reports and other media related activities. This in turn has also 
highlighted the fact that some of these situations have been under prelimi-
nary examination for over a decade. The longer each non-African situa-
tion continues to languish in the preliminary examination stage, the more 
it becomes visible that situations arising from other geographical regions 
are treated in a vastly different fashion from those arising from Africa. 
African situations are dealt with swiftly while non-African cases remain 
stagnant. Disparate timelines between preliminary examinations also lead 
to the impression that the Prosecutor allocates time and resources uneven-
ly among situations. Not only are unequal classes of preliminary examina-
tions created, but it also makes the OTP come across as if it is the one that 
is not willing and able to move forward. Perhaps the Prosecutor is simply 
not willing, because it does not want the political backlash in circum-
stances where the ICC remains a fragile institution, and is unable, because 
it does not have the investigative capacity to do so. Ironically, in Rome 
the fears regarding the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers were based on 
                                                   
190 The Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations encourages self-referrals. This ex-
plicit reference was not retained in the revised 2013 Policy Paper although it was not re-
moved completely. OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 16 and 
76–78, see supra note 17. 
191 At least appearing to be willing. Uganda, a State Party used the Court for its own political 
purposes securing a one-sided investigation. However, it later withdrew its support for the 
Lord’s Resistance Army investigation because of its impact on the peace process. 
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the belief that there would be too much activity.192 And after more than 15 
years of operations, victims of crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute in places other than Africa, in situations other than those 
arising from self-referrals, deserve more than public statements of concern 
with their plight. They deserve action. 
Publicising information about preliminary examinations allows the 
Prosecutor to showcase geographical diversity. It is also a way of demon-
strating that the Prosecutor is committed to following the evidence and is 
not primarily influenced by political sensitivities in the selection of situa-
tions. In this respect, the Prosecutor took bold steps in January 2016 by 
requesting the opening of its first non-African investigation into the situa-
tion in Georgia where the Russian Federation (non-Party) is involved.193 
Similarly, after more than a decade in November 2017, the OTP requested 
authorisation to open an investigation in Afghanistan, which includes al-
leged crimes committed by nationals from the United States (non-Party). 
If we then look at the list of situations under preliminary examinations we 
find it includes Iraq (non-Party) concerning the United Kingdom, and 
Palestine concerning Israel (non-Party). Currently it would appear that the 
OTP is prepared to take on powerful States, even very powerful non-Party 
States.  
24.4.2.2. Perception of Productivity 
According to the OTP, preliminary examination activities constitute one 
of the most cost-effective ways for the Office to fulfil the Court’s mis-
sion.194 It is unclear what the basis for this assertion is and how effective 
or productive preliminary examinations are in relation to their cost. It is 
also not apparent how the relative costs and outcomes of a preliminary 
examination compare to different courses of action undertaken by the OTP. 
On the ICC website, the OTP notes that it enjoys the following options 
                                                   
192 Insofar as proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor are concerned, both proponents 
and opponents of the idea feared the risk of politicising the Court and thereby undermining 
its “credibility”. In particular, they feared that providing the Prosecutor with such “exces-
sive powers” to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court might result in its abuse. See Report of 
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1996, 
see supra note 11. 
193 Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorisation of an investi-
gation, see supra note 62. 
194 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 16, see supra note 25.  
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when it comes to preliminary examinations:195 (1) decline to initiate an 
investigation; (2) continue to collect information on crimes and relevant 
national proceedings in order to make a determination as to whether to 
initiate an investigation; or (3) initiate the investigation, subject to judicial 
authorisation as appropriate. 
This is a generous interpretation of the Rome Statute given that the 
main function of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there 
is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation. Notably, this determina-
tion results from the same analytical consideration and represents the po-
tential outcome and not choices on how to proceed. Hence, to interpret the 
procedure of preliminary examinations as authorising the Prosecutor to 
monitor national proceedings or gather information for an indefinite peri-
od of time in order to amass the necessary legal and factual basis before 
making a determination is unsubstantiated. Under the Rome Statute, the 
Prosecutor has a positive duty to seriously examine all information that is 
communicated to it and the relatively low threshold that needs to be satis-
fied for the Prosecutor to make a determination cannot justify lengthy 
examinations. Nor does the long-term collation of information lend itself 
to cost-effectiveness. The OTP has at least a dozen dedicated analysts 
working exclusively on preliminary examinations and carries out several 
on-site missions to monitor situations. It is still hard to imagine what the 
Situation Analysis Unit can really do with the information received from 
the IEU196 considering its limited non-investigative role.  
Another aspect is how preliminary examinations are regarded in the 
context of the Prosecutor’s functions.197 The Prosecutor considers prelim-
                                                   
195 See OTP, “Preliminary Examinations” (available on the Office’s web site). 
196 The Information and Evidence Unit (‘IEU’) is entrusted with preparing reports analysing 
the communications received. The reports are sent to Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division. The reports are supposed to identify: (a) those communications that 
manifestly do not provide any basis for the Office of the Prosecutor to take further action; 
(b) those communications that appear to relate to a situation already under analysis, inves-
tigation or prosecution; and (c) those communications warranting further analysis in order 
to assess whether further action may be appropriate.  
197 OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, see supra note 1; see also remarks by Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda at the Fourteenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties on the occasion of 
the Launch of the 2015 Annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities: “Prelimi-
nary examinations are one of my Office’s three core activities, alongside investigations and 
prosecutions. It is an activity I am required to conduct under the Statute, through which I 
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inary examinations to be one of the Office’s core activities. This is agree-
able to the extent that preliminary examinations are conducted in accord-
ance with how they are envisaged under the Rome Statute, that is, they 
can arguably be cost-effective if used to determine whether or not to open 
an investigation. But, when preliminary examinations are used for pur-
poses beyond what was intended, then the notion that they are cost-
effective withers. They actually increase the costs associated with them 
and make measuring their effectiveness impossible. Some of the recurring 
tensions between the Court and States Parties are due to a perceived dis-
proportion between the growth of the Court’s budget and its results. Un-
deniably, preliminary examinations allow the OTP to substantiate its 
workload in a manner that is discernible, complemented by comprehen-
sive reports and frequent public statements. Preliminary examinations are 
also significant because they constitute the genesis of the OTP budget 
even though they are a poor basis for budget requests, given that not all 
preliminary examinations are made public and that some have remained 
stagnant for well over a decade.  
The OTP maintains a public list on the ICC website with a fixed 
number of situations under examination. Once a preliminary examination 
advances to the investigation stage, another preliminary examination is 
added to the list. The tally currently stands at 10.198 This idea of having a 
target number of preliminary examinations invites inaction, even where 
there is no reasonable basis to initiate an investigation. And keeping the 
list full allows for a perception of productivity.  
In this regard, unless preliminary examinations are used more effec-
tively and in the way intended by the Rome Statute, there is a risk that 
they will be seen as an instrument of perceived productivity to beguile 
States Parties. While there are many perspectives on how the OTP can 
demonstrate its productivity, at the very least it should be demonstrated in 
a way that resonates with the expectations of an international court. Under 
the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is expected to establish the truth and to 
do so efficiently through the investigation and prosecution of cases based 
on solid evidentiary grounds. An efficient and focused approach to pre-
                                                                                                                        
decide whether to open new investigations”. Remarks by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at the 
Fourteenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 2015, see supra note 85. 
198 Preliminary Examinations, ICC website, see supra note 90. 
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liminary examinations, including reasonable time-frames for determining 
investigations in all situations, would be one step towards demonstrating 
concrete productivity. In those cases where productivity is contingent 
upon resource requirements, the onus lies on the OTP to be more forth-
coming regarding its needs. It would then be up to States Parties to ensure 
the Office is equipped to deliver in a timely manner.  
24.5. Consequences of Publicising Preliminary Examination 
Activities 
It is generally accepted that preliminary examinations produce effects of 
their own and that they have had some unforeseen successes. We have 
seen this effect in the situation of Colombia where national authorities 
have demonstrated their commitment to the prosecution of their own na-
tionals albeit under the constant watch of the Prosecutor. We have also 
seen this in the situation of Iraq where the United Kingdom was very 
quick to affirm its own commitment to the prosecution of its nationals 
following the Prosecutor’s conspicuous announcement of a ‘re-opening’ 
of the preliminary examination. Undeniably, there is some attractiveness 
about the idea that, as a result of extending preliminary examinations, 
States will undertake their own investigations, relieving the burden from 
the ICC, which is meant to be a court of last resort and is an institution of 
limited resources. However, the practice of protracted preliminary exami-
nations reduces their impact, derogates from their intended purpose under 
the Rome Statute and undermines the trust of States Parties, especially 
those under the OTP’s scrutiny.  
As such, publicising preliminary examinations has consequences, 
intended and unintended, positive and negative. The OTP would do well 
to consider all the factors in play before making a decision to publish its 
intention to conduct a preliminary investigation.  
24.5.1. Positive Consequences 
While preliminary examinations do provide a potential avenue for the 
Court to have a greater impact outside the courtroom, any positive conse-
quences can be undermined by an inconsistent approach to preliminary 
examinations.  
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24.5.1.1. Prevention and Deterrence 
Prevention of serious international crimes is one of the Court’s ancillary 
objectives.199 As we have seen, the Prosecutor’s public approach towards 
preliminary examinations broadens the sphere of influence outside the 
OTP’s main function. Publicising preliminary examinations can increase 
the potential for progress regarding accountability for violations commit-
ted during situations of armed conflicts and internal disturbances, though 
this potential is not always realised. While the Court and the OTP are ex-
pected to contribute to the prevention of crimes, they do not to actually 
have to achieve it.200  
Also, prevention is a much broader concept than deterrence; it is about 
sending messages to States not just perpetrators.201 This is particularly 
relevant because the preliminary examination stage only entails a general 
analysis of situations. Whereas deterrence relates more closely to individ-
uals, which are at the periphery of preliminary examinations. Some au-
thors suggest that it is the increased likelihood of accountability, rather 
than the severity of the punishment, that deters criminal activity.202  
Prevention and deterrence are intangible, which makes it extremely 
difficult to ascertain whether preliminary examinations effectively modify 
                                                   
199 Beth Simmons and Allison Danner argue that the mere ratification of the Rome Statute by 
a government tends to be correlated with a pause in civil war hostilities. Accepting the 
Court’s jurisdiction presents an opportunity for governments to make costly, credible 
commitments to peace. According to their research they have also found that the expecta-
tion of accountability is sufficient enough that some states will not join the Rome Statute 
in the first place. See Beth Simmons and Alison Danner, “Credible commitments and the 
International Criminal Court”, in International Organization, 2010, vol. 64 no. 2, pp. 225–
256. 
200 As the ICC’s first President, Philippe Kirsch, said, “By putting potential perpetrators on 
notice that they may be tried before the Court, the ICC is intended to contribute to the de-
terrence of these crimes”, in Courtney Hillebrecht, “The Deterrent Effects of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya”, in International Interactions, 2016, vol. 42, 
no. 4, p. 616. 
201 On the various stigmatizing features of international criminal law, see Frédéric Mégret, 
“Practices of Stigmatization”, 2014 (on file with the author). 
202 Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary, “Criminal Deterrence: A review of the literature”, in 
Journal of Economic Literature, 2017, vol. 55, no. 1, p. 5; Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sik-
kink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional 
Countries”, in International Studies Quarterly, 2010, vol. 54, no. 4, p. 939–963. It should 
be noted that these authors focus on deterrence in relation to national criminal proceedings. 
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behaviour or prevent behavioural changes. To some, preliminary examina-
tions act as buffers that stand in the way of ICC investigations, allowing 
some States to feel at ease with the status quo, thinking that nothing will 
change, particularly as time passes. Accordingly, no matter how powerful 
the effect of the ICC threat through an initial public statement, it is likely 
to diminish over time if the preliminary examination process does not lead 
to any outcome or is perceived as not leading to anything concrete. In 
fact, an informal proceeding intended to be preliminary that goes on for a 
protracted period runs contrary to any possible prevention/deterrent effect 
the institution may have. Unfortunately, protracted preliminary examina-
tions that imply a threat to investigate more often than not simply contrib-
ute to perpetuating crimes and promoting impunity. This will likely be 
factored in by the State in question only if there is a credible threat to ac-
tually investigate.203  
Due to the elusive nature of prevention/deterrence, the OTP would 
do well to accord less attention to it and focus on actually carrying out 
investigations where a preliminary examination suggests they should do 
so. This is mostly so given the difficulty in measuring whether changes in 
behaviour are attributable to actions or policies of the Court. The preven-
tion/deterrence of crime does not rest on the shoulders of a single institu-
tion, much less a judicial one. Prevention should be viewed as a systemic 
and long-term goal, relying more on non-judicial institutions, such as the 
United Nations, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and NGOs.  
If we take a look at the preliminary examination in Guinea, now 
under Phase 3, and ongoing since 14 October 2009 following the violent 
events of 28 September 2009, it seems to have produced some positive 
                                                   
203 States Parties have addressed deterrence in the context of the peace and justice debate. 
“For justice to have an impact, the most important condition is that justice follows its own 
rules, without interference and without being subject to political considerations. Justice 
contributes to peace and prevention when it is not conceived as an instrument of either, and 
on condition that it is pursued for its own sake. If the ICC is contemplated simply as a lev-
er, it will be undermined, as some will expect it to be turned on and off as political circum-
stances dictate. […]. The ICC would lose legitimacy, which is its strength, and be of little 
value to peace as perpetrators can also play the game of carrots and sticks. Certainty that 
law will be applied is the ultimate tool to ensure lasting peace”. See Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute, “The Importance of Justice in Securing Peace”, 30 May 2010, 
RC/ST/PJ/INF.3, paras. 26–27 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5c0efe/). 
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effects. The national response was immediate prompting an investigation 
in 2010,204 and with a trial in the horizon. The OTP moved this situation 
swiftly to Phase 3 without making public its Article 53(1) analysis. From 
the information publicly available, the OTP appears to have relied heavily 
on the findings of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry and the 
Guinean National Inquiry. Understanding the pace and rationale of the 
Guinean situation would provide more insight into the OTP’s policy on 
preliminary examinations. Such is the case with the phased approach de-
veloped by the OTP. In the Guinea situation we can see it was applied in a 
linear fashion passing from one filtering phase to the next.205 However, 
the Iraq/UK, Colombia and previously Burundi situations reveal a holistic 
application where the OTP simultaneously assesses subject-matter juris-
diction and admissibility in relation to alleged crimes. 
To date, the OTP continues to assess the conduct of the preliminary 
examination and to encourage Guinean authorities to adhere to their 
commitment to complete the proceedings within the best possible dead-
line. It has also announced it will continue to engage with the internation-
al community and relevant partners to facilitate international assistance 
for the organisation of the trial phase.206 This situation has remained under 
preliminary examination despite Guinea’s significant steps in assuming its 
national responsibilities to investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes of 
2009. For these reasons the situation in Guinea is considered by the OTP a 
successful example among preliminary examinations of their contribution 
to preventing/deterring the commission of crimes. Despite Guinea’s posi-
tive response to the Prosecutor’s preliminary examination, it is not evident 
that it is all due to the ICC. This can be explained by the fact that several 
accountability mechanisms have been involved in the situation from the 
                                                   
204 On 8 February 2010, in accordance with the recommendations of the reports of the UN 
Commission and of the la Commission nationale d’enquête indépendante (CNEI), the Co-
nakry Appeals Court General Prosecutor appointed three Guinean investigative judges to 
conduct a national investigation into the 28 September 2009 events. Considering the ad-
vanced stage of the investigation, during the reporting period, the Guinean authorities have 
publicly committed on several occasions their wish for a trial to take place in the near fu-
ture, possibly early 2017. 
205 In the Nigeria Situation, the OTP’s Article 5 Report is also useful in illustrating the phased 
approach applied in a linear fashion, see supra note 137. 
206 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 282–283, see supra note 25. 
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outset.207 Naturally, if the ICC were to have a positive effect on national 
accountability efforts, it would be expected to be in relation to situations 
where the Court works with other actors.208  
The Guinea situation seems ripe for removal from the list of situa-
tions under examination. This does not mean that the OTP should with-
draw its support to the national authorities. It could remain engaged in 
other ways, just not under the umbrella of preliminary examinations.  
24.5.1.2. Positive Complementarity 
The Prosecutor has come to place particular emphasis on encouraging 
national investigations and prosecutions. The OTP adopted the term ‘posi-
tive complementarity’209 to describe the policy of actively encouraging 
investigations and prosecutions by national tribunals of crimes potentially 
falling under ICC jurisdiction.210 The OTP has insisted for years that its 
                                                   
207 For example, the UN International Commission of Inquiry for Guinea, CNEI set up by the 
Guinean authorities, and close follow-up by the UN Secretary-General, the UN Security 
Council, the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States and NGOs 
such as Human Rights Watch. 
208 For example, the ICC’s involvement in Libya was also quite unique because it was initiat-
ed at the behest of the UN Security Council and accompanied by NATO-led military action 
against Qaddafi. Libya is also the only ICC situation in which significant international mil-
itary intervention was contemporaneous to the ICC’s investigations and indictments. These 
features set Libya apart from the other situations, but they also reflect the ICC’s position 
within a larger international and national legal and political architecture meant to counter 
and deter atrocity crimes.  
209 See Address to the Assembly of States Parties 30 November 2007, Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: “States and NGOs have expressed an inter-
est on what we call a positive approach to complementarity. My Office will shortly dis-
seminate a concept paper based on our first years of experience”. Also, the 2010 Draft Pol-
icy Paper on Preliminary Examinations asserts that ‘positive complementarity’ is based on 
the preamble and Article 93(10) of the Rome Statute and that this concept is distinct from 
the principle of complementarity set out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute: “At all phases 
of its preliminary examination activities, consistent with its policy of positive complemen-
tarity, the Office will seek to encourage where feasible genuine national investigations and 
prosecutions by the State(s) concerned and to cooperate with and provide assistance to 
such State(s) pursuant to article 93(10) of the Statute”. The OTP noted that it had followed 
this approach with Colombia. OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, pa-
ras. 93–94, see supra note 17.  
210 “The positive approach to complementarity means that the Office will encourage genuine 
national proceedings where possible, including in situation countries, relying on its various 
networks of cooperation, but without involving the Office directly in capacity building or 
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action in Colombia has been a determining factor in the fight against im-
punity in the country. 211  In political and academic events, Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo presented the Colombian situation as an example of 
‘positive complementarity’ in action. 212  Nevertheless, the preliminary 
examination in Colombia continues after more than a decade because 
national proceedings are ongoing and the Prosecutor has not finalised its 
assessment as to whether these proceedings are genuine. As mentioned 
previously, prolonged preliminary examinations weaken not only the 
Court’s ability to deter crimes but also to encourage national proceedings. 
The dynamic around admissibility, especially during a preliminary 
examination, is not always a positive one and can lead to tensions be-
tween governments and the Court. Occasionally one can also see an ironic 
parallelism between failings of the Court and failings in national proceed-
ings. For example, if the Court is unable to protect witnesses in Kenya, 
then why should the Kenyan national authorities be expected to do so? If 
the OTP is permitted to sit on a preliminary examination for over a decade 
without opening an investigation, what is the standard of timeliness that 
State actions should be measured against? If the Court is unable to lead by 
example, then this inability impacts its effectiveness and the reasonable-
ness of expectations it places upon national jurisdictions.  
Similarly, it is not easy to establish causality when preliminary ex-
amination efforts are directed towards positive complementarity. In fact, it 
becomes quite challenging to gauge both short-term and long-term out-
comes of the impact of preliminary examinations on national proceedings. 
Reforming national judicial systems takes time and is at odds with prelim-
inary examinations, which are meant to be a transitory procedural step 
potentially leading to investigations. As for the need to wait for local de-
velopments to unfold, it does not seem practical, in the case of prelimi-
nary examinations, that the pace of local developments should determine 
                                                                                                                        
financial or technical assistance”. See OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, para.17, see 
supra note 75.  
211 Paul Seils, “Putting Complementarity in its Place”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and 
Practice of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 323. See 
also Keynote Speech by James Stewart, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, “Transitional Jus-
tice in Colombia and the role of the International Criminal Court”, 13 May 2015 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/05d0ce/). 
212 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 84, see supra note 94. 
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the pace of ICC processes. Moreover, the ICC’s long-term preliminary 
examination engagement in situation countries eventually results in the 
development of relationships with national authorities that may call into 
question the OTP’s impartiality. It is therefore erroneous to believe that 
the longer the situation remains under examination, the greater the lever-
age of the OTP on the State in question.213 
Not even the most advanced societies and legal systems in the 
world are fully equipped to deal with Rome Statute crimes.214 States Par-
ties accept that enabling States to prosecute these grave crimes is essential 
in the fight against impunity given the limited resources of the Court. 
However, there is no consensus that it is the role of the OTP or the Court 
to ensure States are equipped to do so. The ICC is not a development 
agency and, while it can provide technical assistance to States, it does not 
have a capacity-building mandate. Accordingly, rather than trying to pur-
sue efforts beyond the scope of the Prosecutor’s mandate, the Prosecutor 
should make more use of Article 18.215 Pursuant to this article, if atrocity 
crimes have allegedly been committed, and the OTP determines through a 
preliminary examination that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation, it would first reach out to the States of jurisdiction in the 
matter to allow them to respond to those crimes and bring the perpetrators 
to justice. If the notified State fails to take action in response to the notifi-
cation, the Prosecutor can take steps under Article 18 to investigate and 
                                                   
213 The OTP has explained that it will engage with national jurisdictions provided that it does 
not risk tainting any possible future admissibility proceedings. First of all, it is difficult to 
ascertain how the OTP can truly assess admissibility when at that juncture the examination 
process is dealing with situations and not cases. Technically all that is needed is that the al-
leged crimes are at least being investigated. More importantly where does this relationship 
stand when the engagement with national authorities develops for several years? What cri-
teria does the OTP use to objectively assess admissibility? 
214 For example, European States have a Network of focal points in respect of persons respon-
sible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The aim of the Network is to 
facilitate cooperation and assistance between the Member States’ investigation and prose-
cution authorities and to exchange information on criminal investigation and prosecution 
of persons suspected of having committed or participated in the commission of these 
crimes. In this forum, the national authorities also share investigative, prosecutorial and 
trial experiences involved with these crimes, related methods and best practices. 
215 Where there has been either a State Party referral or a proprio motu Prosecutor investiga-
tion, the Prosecutor is required to “notify all States Parties and those States which, taking 
into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crimes concerned”.  
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proceed to prosecute. A notification under Article 18 would send a strong-
er message to States than a long drawn out public preliminary examina-
tion, and is consistent with States’ primacy in carrying out their own pro-
ceedings. Disappointingly, the 2013 Policy Paper undermines the potential 
of Article 18 in relation to preliminary examinations conducted under 
Article 15. According to the Policy Paper, once the OTP determines a 
reasonable basis to proceed to investigation exists, it will inform the rele-
vant State(s) with jurisdiction of its determination and inquire whether 
they wish to refer the situation to the Court instead of resorting to Article 
18’s invitation to deal with the matter themselves.216  
There is no doubt that the preliminary examination stage offers a 
first opportunity for the OTP to act as a catalyst for national proceedings. 
However, if the OTP is committed to stimulating credible national pro-
ceedings, it should avoid requesting States to refer the situation to it upon 
the determination that an investigation is warranted and as a means of 
securing ‘easier’ co-operation from that State in the conduct of ICC pro-
ceedings. If the OTP instead relied upon the provision of Article 18, the 
actual need for ICC intervention might be obviated. Such an approach 
would also underscore the nature of the ICC as a court of last resort, im-
prove transparency and credibility, and foster co-operation with govern-
ments. It is envisaged that situation countries would certainly welcome an 
invitation pursuant to Article 18, which shows more respect for State pri-
macy than a referral request.  
24.5.2. Negative Consequences 
The policy of using preliminary examinations as advocacy and political 
tools, along with their extensive publicity, has unfortunately produced 
unintended consequences, in part because of the dangers of publicising 
inconclusive results, but also due to the apparent absence of a communi-
cations strategy to guide the public profile of the OTP’s work. 
24.5.2.1. Withdrawals 
In 2016, South Africa, Burundi and the Gambia initiated proceedings to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute.217 For Burundi the public announcement 
                                                   
216 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 98, see supra note 2. 
217 On 27 October 2016, Burundi deposited its instrument of withdrawal to the Rome Statute 
with the UN Secretary-General (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1bd37c/). On 12 October 
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that it was being placed under examination contributed to its decision to 
withdraw.218 The three African States were joined on 16 November 2016 
by the Russian Federation, a non-Party State, which said it was formally 
withdrawing its signature from the Rome Statute, a day after the OTP 
issued its preliminary examination activities report qualifying the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 as an occupation.219 In 2018 the Philippines 
followed suit starting its withdrawal process after the OTP announced a 
preliminary examination was underway.  
In the Burundi situation, it is difficult to assess what really drove 
this State to take such a measure. Taking into account the Burundian Gov-
ernment’s decision to withdraw came at a time when the UN Human 
Rights Council adopted resolution 33/24, endorsing the United Nations 
Independent Investigation on Burundi (‘UNIIB’) report on “gross and 
abundant” human rights violations in the country between April 2015 and 
June 2016.220 That same resolution also established a Commission of In-
quiry on Burundi.221  
                                                                                                                        
2016, the Burundian Parliament voted in favour of Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute and on 18 October, the President of Burundi signed off the bill. The Gambia also 
followed with a decision to withdraw on 10 November 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/fa227a/). This action was later reversed on 10 February 2017 when the new Govern-
ment took office that year, see Gambia: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/5675c2/). South Africa was the first to deposit its instrument of 
withdrawal on 19 October 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9b2054/). On 7 March 
2017, South Africa proceeded to withdraw its notification of withdrawal as well, see South 
Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/835fda/). 
218 South Africa’s Declaratory Statement on the Decision to Withdraw submits that there is 
also “[t]he perception of inequality and unfairness in the practice of the ICC that do not 
only emanate from the Court’s relationship with the Security Council, but also by the per-
ceived focus of the ICC on African states, notwithstanding clear evidence of violations by 
others”. See Declaratory Statement of the Republic of South Africa on the decision to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, see supra note 217. 
219 On 16 November 2016, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the announcement 
on the orders of the President Vladimir Putin, saying the Court had failed to live up to 
hopes of the international community and denouncing its work as “one-sided and ineffi-
cient”. See Russian Federation: Communication (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c9b51b/). 
220 On 20 September 2016, the final report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on 
Burundi (UNIIB), established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1 on 17 
December 2015, was issued as document A/HRC/33/37 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
82b600/). The report covers violations and abuses of human rights from 15 April 2015 to 
30 June 2016. The recommended actions included the immediate setting up of an interna-
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According to the Burundian authorities, the ICC Prosecutor ignored 
its duty of neutrality in making multiple statements directed against the 
Government by announcing the “opening of a preliminary examination 
based on false reports,222 violating the sacrosanct principle of complemen-
tarity by intervening without first informing the Government what the 
treaty basis for such intervention was, which had a high potential of com-
promising on-going encouraging efforts by the Government to investigate 
and prosecute all the crimes within its national territory”.223  
In October, at the time of Burundi’s withdrawal, the preliminary ex-
amination was under Phase 2 subject-matter assessment. In the subse-
quent preliminary examination activities report, the OTP provided no fur-
ther updates on subject-matter jurisdiction or admissibility, despite sub-
stantial findings in this regard by the UNIIB.224 It is important to note that 
the findings by the UNIIB were established using the “reasonable grounds 
to believe” standard of proof,225 a higher threshold than that applied by 
the OTP when conducting preliminary examinations. With the availability 
of the UNIIB findings it is difficult to comprehend why at that moment 
the OTP was still only assessing whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction.  
During the Assembly of States Parties general debate in 2016, Bu-
rundi criticised the fact that no established ICC policy or process existed, 
and claimed that verifying the actual fulfilment of the right of comple-
mentarity was an “inescapable stage before any publicised intervention of 
                                                                                                                        
tional commission of inquiry, the involvement of other independent international judicial 
processes and reconsideration of Burundi’s membership on the Human Rights Council. 
221 The Burundian Government rejected the resolution as inapplicable in Burundi in a press 
communiqué dated 3 October 2016. Immediately after on 10 October, the Government de-
clared the three experts of the independent investigation on Burundi personae non gratae 
in Burundi. Later, on 11 October, the Government announced the suspension of all co-
operation and collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
office in Burundi for ‘complicity’ in preparing the report of the independent investigation 
on Burundi. 
222 Interview with the Burundi Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, “Why Burun-
di has withdrawn from the Rome Treaty”, in Diplomat Magazine, 5 November 2016. 
223 Ibid. 
224 UNIIB Final Report, paras. 101–117, see supra note 219. Also, Recommendation 154: “In 
light of the ineffectual accountability institutions set up by the Government, independent 
international judicial processes must consider whether international crimes were commit-
ted”.  
225 Ibid., para. 17. 
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a preliminary examination”.226 Burundi pointed to the fact that “the No-
vember 2016 preliminary examination activities report did not contain any 
reliable information determining Burundi had failed to fulfil its comple-
mentarity obligations before a decision to begin a preliminary examina-
tion was taken”. These arguments are not entirely unsubstantiated because 
in its report the OTP acknowledged receiving information on the work of 
investigative committees set up by the Burundian Prosecutor without say-
ing a word regarding its significance. The report concludes by saying “the 
Office may also gather available information on relevant national pro-
ceedings at this stage of analysis”.227 
Surprisingly, the OTP offered comments to some parts of the UNIIB 
report, asserting that not all the killings could be attributed to Government 
security forces alone,228 and that not all of the reported abuses and injuries 
could rise to the level of severity required to constitute other inhumane 
acts under Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute. The OTP noted also that “the 
legal qualification of the alleged conduct required further analysis in the 
context of the preliminary examination of the situation”. Against this 
backdrop, the OTP went ahead with announcing it was considering mov-
ing forward with an investigation as a response to Burundi’s withdrawal 
from the Rome Statute.229  
The Burundi situation should not have been prioritised simply due 
to the State’s withdrawal. Certainly, proceeding to request an authorisation 
is a clear signal that a State Party whose leaders might be defendants can-
not avoid the ICC by withdrawing from the Rome Statute.230 However, 
even if all factual and legal requirements were satisfied, which according 
to the 2016 report were not, Burundi’s effective withdrawal, one year later 
negatively impacts the co-operation and enforcement stages. Unfortunate-
ly, under the current OTP policy, the feasibility of investigations only be-
comes relevant after the investigation stage at the moment of the selection 
                                                   
226 Fifteenth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, Open Bureau Meeting, Relationship 
between the ICC and Africa, 18 November 2016, 15:00-1800 (copy on file with the author). 
227 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, paras. 53 and 59, see supra note 25. 
228 Ibid., para. 44. 
229 Ibid., para. 60. 
230 The preliminary examination of the Burundi situation may also cover other crimes com-
mitted until such withdrawal becomes effective, namely one year after its notification to 
the Secretary-General of the UN.  
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of situations.231  It is not a factor that is considered when determining 
whether to open an investigation.232 The OTP rationale for this position is 
that weighing feasibility as a separate factor in the determination of 
whether or not to investigate could prejudice the consistent application of 
the Statute and might encourage obstructionism by States as a means of 
dissuading ICC intervention.233 This logic has some merit, but ignoring 
this factor as relevant prior to the determination of whether or not to open 
an investigation may be at odds with the OTP’s strategic goals of achiev-
ing high performance in relation to its mandate.234  
Turning to the Russian Federation,235 it became the focus of ICC ac-
tivities through the preliminary examinations of the situations in Georgia 
and Ukraine. Initially, it was the 2016 preliminary examination activities 
report which sparked Russian backlash, with the reference to the annexa-
tion of Crimea as an “occupation” and by qualifying the situation between 
Russia and Ukraine as an “international armed conflict”.236 Later, in Janu-
ary 2016, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that in the light of 
the latest decision (the PTC’s decision to authorise the investigation relat-
ing to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia), the Russian Federation 
would be forced to fundamentally review its attitude towards the ICC.237 
Indeed, the withdrawal of signature by Russia was a symbolic act 
and similar actions have already been carried out by Israel, the United 
States and Sudan. On a practical level, many believe such an action does 
                                                   
231 Feasibility meaning where the OTP can conduct an effective and successful investigation 
leading to a prosecution with a reasonable prospect of conviction. OTP, Policy Paper on 
Case Selection and Prioritisation, see supra note 151. 
232 The OTP has expressed conflicting positions regarding feasibility. See OTP, Annex to the 
‘Paper of some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’, see supra note 13. 
233 OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, para. 70, see supra note 1. 
234 Ibid., paras. 4 and 40. Strategic goal 1: conduct impartial, independent, high quality pre-
liminary examinations, investigations and prosecutions; Strategic goal 3: further improve 
the quality and efficiency of preliminary examinations, investigations and prosecutions.  
235 The Russian Federation signed the Statute on 13 September 2000. It is fair to say it co-
operated with the ICC on an ad hoc basis. In addition, it was regularly in contact with the 
ICC’s leadership in its capacity as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, which 
was seised of the two referrals to the ICC concerning Darfur and Libya. 
236 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 158, see supra note 25. 
237 “On the beginning of ICC’s investigation of events in South Ossetia in August 2008”, in 
“Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova Moscow”, 29 January 2016 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/afeaf2/).  
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not make any difference.238 However, it does matters in that it signifies 
that Russia no longer has any intention of joining the Rome Statute in the 
future. But more important is what this represents in terms of international 
co-operation – not only bilaterally in relation to the situations under pre-
liminary examination, but also multilaterally as a Permanent Member of 
the Security Council and the impact the Russian position may have for 
effective follow-up of existing ICC referrals and on the possibility of any 
potential future referral.  
The departure of any State Party is regrettable and contrary to the 
Rome Statute’s overarching goal of universality. Notwithstanding, these 
situations carry lessons learned, especially for the OTP. They should serve 
as a warning sign that public statements at the preliminary examination 
stage may have negative consequences. To be successful in the discharge 
of its mandate the ICC needs to find more constructive ways to consoli-
date its authority and attract greater support for its activities. The current 
preliminary examination practice does not seem to be contributing to-
wards this aim. 
24.5.2.2. Undermining Future Investigations 
The OTP’s strategic decision to highlight and publicise preliminary exam-
ination activities could create complications for the methodical building 
of a case against perpetrators. A high degree of publicity about prosecuto-
rial activities might lead perpetrators to cover up evidence, destroy docu-
mentation, and intimidate potential witnesses, steps that could complicate 
construction of a case for trial.  
Publicity may also complicate the ultimate enforcement of any ar-
rest warrant, as individuals who expect to be investigated may go into 
                                                   
238 Mark Ellis, Director of the International Bar Association, said: “Russia’s decision to ‘with-
draw’ its signature from the Rome Statute will have little or no impact on the court. Con-
trary to the government’s statement, Russia has never engaged with the court in any mean-
ingful way and, in fact, has violated the prohibited crimes provisions of the Statute through 
its military actions in both Georgia and Ukraine. The more serious threat to the [ICC] is 
the withdrawal of African countries. Unless this alarming tide can be reversed, the court’s 
own legitimacy will be in peril”. Tanya Lokshina, the Russia Program Director at Human 
Rights Watch described the act as a: “[s]ymbolic gesture of rejection, and says a lot about 
Russia’s attitude towards international justice and institutions”. “Russia withdraws signa-
ture from international criminal court statute”, in The Guardian, 16 November 2016 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a01c8f/). 
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hiding or make preparations to do so. There is also a duty, albeit at the 
investigation stage, that measures must be taken to preserve evidence un-
der Article 56(3) of the Statute, as well as to protect victims pursuant to 
Rule 87 of the RPE. The longer preliminary examinations run, the more 
pressing these duties become. Focusing on preliminary examinations as a 
means of deterrence rather than on whether there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed to investigation may also negatively eliminate the prospect of an 
investigation being brought forward as the passage of time impacts on 
memories of events, other evidence may deteriorate and relevant witness-
es die.239  
Overwhelmingly, it is the victims that stand to lose the most from 
this prosecutorial strategy of preliminary examinations as advocacy tools. 
Long delays in preliminary examinations without any indication of 
whether the ICC will initiate an investigation represent an offence to one 
of the Court’s primary constituencies. Although one advantage of publi-
cising preliminary examinations is that it may help with victims and wit-
nesses coming forward with more information, this is not the most com-
pelling argument, considering that evidence collection is not the priority 
at the preliminary examination stage. 
A further risk of widely publicising information about situations 
under preliminary examination is that it may reveal the OTP’s prosecuto-
rial strategy. For example, the 2016 preliminary examination activities 
report states, for the first time, in relation to Afghanistan, that the alleged 
crimes were committed not only on the territory of Afghanistan, but also 
on the territories of Poland, Lithuania and Romania (all States Parties).240 
The OTP’s suggestion that there could be investigations into crimes of 
                                                   
239 OTP Regulations, Regulation 8, see supra note 15 establishes that the Investigations shall 
be responsible for: (a) the preparation of the necessary security plans and protection poli-
cies for each case to ensure the safety and well-being of victims, witnesses, Office staff, 
and persons at risk on account of their interaction with the Court, in adherence with good 
practices and in cooperation and coordination with the Registry, when required, on matters 
relating to protection and support; (b) the provision of investigative expertise and support; 
(c) the preparation and coordination of field deployment of Office staff; and (d) the provi-
sion of factual crime analysis and the analysis of information and evidence, in support of 
preliminary examinations and evaluations, investigations and prosecutions. 
240 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, paras. 194, 199 and 200, see supra 
note 25. 
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torture by the CIA of detainees in these territories is reckless.241 It is hard 
to believe that this is new information, which only surfaced in 2016. Also 
this expansion deflects attention from what should be the main focus of 
this situation and provides opportunities for more of those involved to 
cover their tracks. 
24.6. Practical Recommendations to Enhance and Improve Public 
Communications of the OTP during Preliminary Examinations 
From the preceding sections, it would appear to be a paramount necessity 
for the OTP to develop a coherent communications strategy. Indeed, a 
diverse array of practitioners and policy documents have advocated for a 
more strategic approach to public communication.242 For the sake of con-
sistency in communications, it is key to develop methodology that is 
adaptable to each situation, which restates the function of the preliminary 
examination process, sets out its limitations and what can be accom-
plished through the procedure in order to manage expectations. More 
careful thought should go into the messaging produced by the OTP and 
the terminology crafted to convey it. Having a strategy in place would 
help to mitigate selectivity in the OTP’s publicity practices by having 
clear standards available.  
Within the OTP, the Executive Committee makes the decision on 
when and how to make something public. In this regard, the Executive 
Committee should enhance its decision-making process by agreeing on 
guidelines addressing what the OTP should communicate publicly regard-
                                                   
241 Ibid., para. 200 of the 2016 OTP Report on Preliminary Examinations states that the in-
formation available provides a reasonable basis to believe that at least some crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction were committed on the territory of Poland prior to 1 May 2003 and 
would encompass not only alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003, 
but also other alleged crimes that are sufficiently linked to the situation in Afghanistan and 
that were committed outside of Afghanistan since 1 July 2002.  
242 For example, as an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights policy document 
states: “[I]t is important that the commission/mission discusses early on and decides on a 
media strategy, and does not simply react to events and media pressure”. See Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-
finding Missions on International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law: 
Guidance and Practice, 2013 p. 94. The Siracusa Guidelines state that there is no “one size-
fits-all strategy”. See M. Cherif Bassiouni and Christina Abraham, (ed.), Siracusa Guide-
lines for International, Regional and National Fact-finding Bodies, Intersentia, 2013, pp. 
37–38.  
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ing the preliminary examination process and what should remain internal, 
when the information should be communicated publicly and how the Of-
fice should do so. Clear parameters should be developed to present more 
accurate projections of when preliminary examination decisions will be 
taken instead of using words such as “imminent” and “in the near future”. 
It should also identify what factors should shape OTP communications 
strategies and how these factors should influence the way in which reports 
and statements are drafted. A useful source in this connection is the Guid-
ance and Practice document developed by the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights’ which presents several factors to consider – 
ensuring that the public and relevant governments are informed about the 
mission’s work, avoiding the perception of prejudged conclusions, coun-
tering misinformation, determining the likely impact of a public statement, 
and responding to key events.243 Another relevant factor is clarifying the 
preliminary examination’s uniqueness as a separate and distinct process 
from other accountability mechanisms, including commissions of inquiry.  
In addition, the OTP should only make Article 53(1) reports public, 
refraining from publicising annual, interim or other-related reports. If the 
OTP continues to believe these other reports are useful, they should be 
produced for every situation and not just for some. If other reports, such 
as Article 5 reports, are to remain part of the practice, then they need to be 
more consistent. The OTP should also consider adopting a more discreet 
approach, either through full confidentiality or simply by providing lim-
ited factual information on a gradual basis.244 Alternatively, the OTP could 
just use the Court’s annual activities reports, complemented by periodic 
statements. Greater attention should be given to the announcement of next 
steps and there should be enough safeguards in place to ensure that the 
information publicised is accurate and realistic. More importantly, all the 
actors who have a role to play in the process should be kept well informed 
from start to finish.245 
                                                   
243 International Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-finding Missions on International Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, p. 86, see supra 
note 242. 
244 Rob Grace, “Communication and Report Drafting in Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-
finding Mechanisms”, July 2014, p. 12 (on file with the author). See infra note 248. 
245 Ibid., pp. 11–17. Commissioners also sometimes use public engagement to pressure gov-
ernments to cooperate with the mission, though this form of public advocacy has not prov-
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Second, the OTP needs to improve the quality of its reporting with 
respect to their content, reporting cycles and their frequency. The OTP 
should avoid undermining its work through duplications in reports and 
inconsistencies. For instance, the OTP’s preliminary examination activi-
ties report and the Court’s annual activities reports contain overlaps and, 
more alarmingly, contradictions concerning the exact same situations. It 
appears that the drafters of these reports worked independently from each 
other and contradictions between reports evidence lack of a unified col-
laborative process. In relation to the content of reports and statements, the 
public information on preliminary examinations does not need to be de-
tailed because, prior to the determination on whether to open an investiga-
tion, it will be mostly inconclusive information. During this initial step of 
preliminary examinations, it would suffice to include in reports the rele-
vant statistics on Article 15 communications, overall and by year, how 
many of them are manifestly outside jurisdiction, what type of alleged 
crimes they cover and what regions are involved. For those situations 
under examination that are already public, it would be useful to know 
where and with what frequency missions are conducted. With respect to 
public statements, the OTP is quite swift in issuing early and loud calls for 
accountability, but less dynamic when it comes to moving forward. In this 
respect, public statements will be less effective if they are not followed up 
with swift and decisive action.  
There is also a need to harmonise terminology used for public re-
ports and statements. This would contribute to a better understanding of 
OTP policy and the application of the different phases of the preliminary 
examination process. More clarity should be brought to the use of terms 
referring to the supposed opening, conclusion, completion, re-opening and 
reconsideration of situations under examination. As it has already been 
explained, preliminary examinations are compulsory on the receipt of an 
Article 15 communication and it is therefore inaccurate to announce their 
opening as if they were investigations. The OTP’s monitoring functions 
are also ambiguous and not easily detectable during the preliminary exam-
ination stage. Furthermore, when a situation does not meet the require-
ments of Article 53, the OTP should be more straightforward referring to 
the examination as completed with a decision not to investigate rather 
                                                                                                                        
en successful in terms of securing co-operation. Therefore, the danger always exists that 
public statements can backfire.  
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than closed. Ultimately, a decision not to investigate is a decision not to 
proceed. These situations would still remain ‘on the books’ and can be 
reverted to at a later time, when more information or facts arise as provid-
ed in Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
Third, the OTP should consider alternative ways to build trust. Alt-
hough the field of criminal law investigations is unique, the OTP can ben-
efit from looking at the established working methods and dynamics of 
monitoring, reporting and fact-finding (‘MRF’) missions,246 as well as the 
confidentiality approach used by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (‘ICRC’).247 Notable research has been carried out relating to how, 
when and to what extent MRF mechanisms mandated to investigate al-
leged violations of international human rights and international humani-
tarian law should engage in public communication.248 
In relation to monitoring,249  reporting and fact-finding250  mecha-
nisms, these refer to bodies mandated to investigate alleged violations of 
                                                   
246 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Research conducted by the Program on Humanitarian 
Policy and Conflict Research on monitoring, reporting, and fact-finding (‘MRF’) (availa-
ble on the Initiative’s web site). 
247 The ICRC is a humanitarian organisation established in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1863 that 
adheres strictly to the Fundamental Principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence 
in its operations. The ICRC’s mandate is set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in 
the 1977 Additional Protocols. See “The ICRC: Its Mission and Work”, 2009 (available on 
its web site).  
248 This fascinating paper examines how MRF practitioners have responded to challenges 
such as what should be communicated publicly, what information should be kept private, 
when a mission does communicate publicly, how should practitioners do so? What factors 
should shape practitioners’ communications strategies, and how should these factors influ-
ence the ways that practitioners approach drafting MRF reports. It also focuses on how fif-
teen MRF missions have dealt with these matters over the past decade, including some of 
the most politically sensitive ones. Grace, 2014, see supra note 244. 
249 Monitoring entails examining contextual information in search of patterns that indicate the 
potential perpetration of international law violations. Rob Grace and Claude Bruderlein, 
“Building Effective Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-finding Mechanisms”, Working Paper, 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 2012 (on 
file with the author). 
250 Fact-finding means any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts 
of a dispute or situation, which the competent UN organs need in order to exercise effec-
tively their functions in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Fact-finding should be comprehensive, objective, impartial and timely. Declaration on 
Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace 
and Security, A/RES/46/5, 9 December 1991, paras. 2 and 3.  
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international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 251 
MRF missions abide by three guiding principles: impartiality, neutrality 
and independence, that allow its technical and political aspects to operate 
in congruence with one another to further accountability and conflict reso-
lution.252 Similarly, the preliminary examination process is conducted in 
the context of the overarching principles of independence, impartiality 
and objectivity.253 MRF missions have the potential to feed into investiga-
tions conducted by courts and tribunals, either by helping to generate po-
litical support for initiating an investigation or by gathering evidence that 
can be incorporated into different phases of future investigative and pros-
ecutorial processes.254  
According to some authors, monitoring and institutional fact-
finding are the best way of bringing the weight of the community to bear 
on each Member State.255 Indeed, MRF reports can directly influence the 
behaviour of government actors. 256  However, preliminary examination 
activities must not be managed as MRF mechanisms. While both prelimi-
nary examinations and MRF missions are announced to the public at the 
                                                   
251 MRF emerge from various sources and assume multiple forms in areas such as UN peace 
operations, Security Council mandated commissions, sanctions committees, monitoring 
and expert groups, the UNHRC Special Procedures, truth commissions, regional organisa-
tion mechanisms, as well as the International Humanitarian Fact-finding Commission, es-
tablished by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. 
252 Grace and Bruderlein, 2012, p. 17, see supra note 249. 
253 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, paras. 25–33, see supra note 25. 
254 For example, UNHRC resolution S-19/1, the mandate specified that the mission should 
“preserve the evidence of crimes for possible future criminal prosecutions or a future jus-
tice process”.  
255 Antonio Cassese, “Fostering Increased Conformity with International Standards: Monitor-
ing and Institutional Fact-finding”, in Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 303. 
256 As one article mentions of NGO fact-finding work: The strategy – promoting change by 
reporting facts – is almost elegant in its simplicity. And there is growing evidence that it 
works. Governments frequently have adopted reforms in response to critical reports by 
NGOs, and former political prisoners who had been subjects of Amnesty International let-
ter writing campaigns have often attributed their release from detention to Amnesty Inter-
national. Country reports prepared by the more prominent NGOs often receive front page 
news coverage abroad, and in the Untied States, such reports have prompted Congress to 
adopt legislation suspending foreign aid or conditioning future aid on a country’s compli-
ance with international human rights standards. See Diane F. Orentlicher, “Bearing Witness: 
The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding”, in Harvard Human Rights Journal, 
1990, vol. 84, p. 3.  
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outset, one difference is that the latter derive their mandates from gov-
ernments, international and regional bodies or NGOs. In the case of pre-
liminary examinations, unless they result from a referral by a State Party 
or the Security Council, it is really only the countries concerned and the 
sender(s) of communications who have a legitimate interest in being in-
formed of the conduct and progress of a preliminary examination prompt-
ed proprio motu. At least until the moment that a decision has been taken 
and the OTP determines that a reasonable basis exists to proceed with an 
investigation.257 
MRF missions take into account various factors in relation to public 
engagement while they carry out their mandates. Regarding what type of 
information to release to the public, most MRF mechanisms strive force-
fully to bring the mission’s findings to the public eye.258 In this respect, 
some have argued that keeping reports confidential contributes to an envi-
ronment of impunity.259  As with the OTP’s publication of preliminary 
examinations, disagreements have arisen in relation to what should be 
made public stemming from different perceptions about what the mission 
should aim to accomplish and how it should strategically pursue these 
ends. While NGOs see MRF reports as a way to publicly advocate at the 
national level, diplomats from donor governments are hesitant in this re-
                                                   
257 The OTP’s work overlaps with several accountability mechanisms such as: the Internation-
al Commission of Inquiry on Libya, the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 
May 2010 Flotilla Incident, the Independent, International Commission of Inquiry on Côte 
d’Ivoire, the International Commission of Inquiry for Guinea, the Independent Internation-
al Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mis-
sion on the Gaza Conflict, and the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur. 
258 Either in accordance with their mandated reporting cycles or until the findings and recom-
mendations are final. 
259 UN News & Media, “Council Hears Reports on Côte d’Ivoire and Syria, Holds General 
Debate on Human Rights Situations that Require its Attention”, 15 June 2011 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/cd6612/). Also HRW, “Because They Have the Guns…I’m Left with 
Nothing: The Price of Continuing Impunity in Côte d’Ivoire”, 2016, vol. 18, no. 4, p. 30 
which states: “[T]he U.N. Security Council has yet to make public or discuss the findings 
of the report (Commission of Inquiry), which was handed to the U.N. Secretary General in 
November 2004 and transmitted to the Security Council on December 23, 2004. The fail-
ure to discuss the findings of the report, let alone act on them, sends the wrong signal to 
abusers”. Conversely, the members of the Darfur Commission did little to no publicity up-
on the release of the mission’s report. Regardless, the report wound up being quite impact-
ful, since the mission was followed by a Security Council referral of the situation to the 
ICC, as the Darfur Commission’s report recommended.  
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gard, believing that closed-door sessions with parties to the conflict are 
more effective.260 The general trend is for MRF mechanisms to make their 
final reports public, to distribute them widely and ensure translations are 
available in the relevant languages. These missions are normally mandat-
ed to operate within prescribed timeframes contributing to a more expedi-
ent process of collecting and securing key information and potential evi-
dence. 
With respect to the ICRC, this body carries out a diverse range of 
activities that are mostly field-based. Yet, some parallels can be drawn: (i) 
the ICRC acquires and collects information that is relevant to proceedings 
of a judicial, quasi-judicial, public inquiry, fact-finding or similar nature; 
and (ii) the ICRC’s activities have been described as “preventive” 261 
which in turn is one of the OTP’s policy objectives.262  
ICRC policy dictates that in order to carry out its mandate and fully 
assume its operational role in the protection and assistance of victims in 
armed conflict and other situations of violence, confidentiality is an essen-
tial tool that allows them to build the necessary trust to secure access, 
open channels of communication, influence change and ensure the securi-
ty of its staff.263 Some critics argue that the organisation is too secretive 
and should share its findings publicly. When explaining why ICRC refus-
es to share its findings with the public, their representatives assert that 
“confidentiality does not equal complacency”. The fact that they do not 
speak out publicly does not mean they are silent. Moreover, the ICRC 
                                                   
260 Grace, 2014, p. 20, see supra note 244.  
261 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Rul-
ing Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, 27 July 1999, IT-95-9, paras. 76, 79 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/17bad5/): “The ICRC’s activities have been described as ‘preven-
tive’, while the International Tribunal [ICTY] is empowered to prosecute breaches of in-
ternational humanitarian law once they have occurred. The same rational underpins the re-
lationship with the ICC in which the OTP is empowered to establish the truth, while any 
preventive objective can only be aspirational but not operational”. See also ICRC, ‘The 
role of the ICRC in preventing armed conflict: its possibilities and limitations’, 2001, no. 
844, p. 923–946. 
262 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, paras. 16, 93 and 104–106, see supra 
note 2. 
263 In this regard, the ICRC has developed a Memorandum that explains the rationale for and 
broad practical context of confidentiality as the ICRC’s working method. See Memoran-
dum on the ICRC’s privilege of non-disclosure of confidential information, International 
Review of the Red Cross, 2016, 97 (897/898), pp. 433–444. 
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does not share confidential information with the media or other third par-
ties, nor does it consent to the publication of such information, because 
there is always risk that their observations could be exploited for political 
gain or instrumentalised by one side or another. By discussing serious 
issues, such as abuse or ill-treatment, away from the glare of public atten-
tion, governments and non-State actors are often more likely to 
acknowledge problems and commit to taking action.264 At the same time, 
they recognise that confidentiality is not unconditional and reserve the 
right to speak out or publish findings when their recommendations are not 
taken seriously and all other avenues of discourse have been exhausted.265 
The ICRC’s strategy is based on combining ‘modes of action’ and 
on selecting the appropriate activities depending on the approach(es) cho-
sen.266 Faced with an authority that has chosen to neglect or deliberately 
violate its obligations, persuasion (even with the mobilisation of support 
from influential third parties) may not be effective. In certain circum-
stances, therefore, the ICRC may decide to break with its tradition of con-
fidentiality and resort to public denunciation. This mode of action is used 
only as part of the protection approach, which focuses on the imminent or 
established violation of a rule protecting individuals.267  
24.7. Conclusion 
As set out in this chapter, there are several issues with the OTP’s policy 
on preliminary examinations. One of the most problematic relates to 
transparency and the Office’s largely unregulated use of publicity during 
the preliminary examination process. The idea is not to encourage less 
transparency but rather, to advocate for the right type of transparency. 
Also, this contribution should not be read as being against publicity; in-
stead it is suggesting less of it and handling it more strategically. The OTP 
                                                   
264 Interview with ICRC Deputy Director of operations Dominik Stillhart, “Confidentiality: 
key to the ICRC’s work but not unconditional”, 20 September 2010 (available on ICRC’s 
web site). 
265 Ibid. 
266 Modes of action are the methods or means used to persuade authorities to fulfil their obli-
gations towards individuals or entire populations. Persuasion aims to convince someone to 
do something that falls within his area of responsibility or competence, through bilateral 
confidential dialogue. This is traditionally the ICRC’s preferred mode of action. The ICRC: 
Its Mission and Work, 2009, p. 19, para. 1.a, see supra note 247. 
267 Ibid., pp. 19–20 paras. 1 and 1.c. 
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will often be unable to satisfy all critics; still, the way it publicly com-
municates (or chooses not to publicly communicate) can mitigate and 
contain the effects of critiques that have the potential to inflict public per-
ception damage on the ICC.268 Support and buy-in for the preliminary 
examination process hinges on the OTP’s ability to foster positive public 
perceptions of the Court’s credibility as an impartial and independent in-
stitution committed to ensuring accountability for the worst crimes known 
to humankind.  
While taking account of variations in mandates, the ICC could ben-
efit from best practices on how other bodies handle the information they 
acquire or collect, including the advantages of not sharing inconclusive 
findings with the public and targeting only concerned parties in the shar-
ing of that information. The Prosecutor should therefore adopt a gradual 
approach with regard to the disclosure of information before issuing pub-
lic warnings or reporting prematurely findings in the context of prelimi-
nary examinations. No State likes to have a public finger pointed at it. 
States and other groups that are publicly under examination will naturally 
attempt to delegitimise the preliminary examination process by formulat-
ing critiques geared toward discrediting the Office if they have been pub-
licly called out by the OTP at a time when the factual situation is less than 
clear. These critiques, credible or not, are harmful to the integrity of the 
Court as an institution and impact on the ability of the Court to achieve its 
mandate.  
Purposefully using preliminary examinations in a different manner 
from what the Statute intended can be a legitimate means for the ICC 
Prosecutor to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of his or her work. 
However, if the Prosecutor is afforded too much discretion in determining 
how to prioritise his or her duties under the Rome Statute, he or she may 
act in ways that, while arguably consistent with the Statute, do not fully 
take into account the interests of the ICC as a whole.  
Although the OTP may not be facing a real ‘deterrence or with-
drawal’ dilemma, some of the consequences discussed above should per-
suade it to review its preliminary examination process. This requires re-
considering fundamental aspects of its policy and practice. The OTP 
                                                   
268  See Darryl Robinson, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot 
Win”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 28, pp. 323-347. 
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should advance more readily to investigations, instead of sitting on pre-
liminary examinations for years. If the OTP’s activities prevent future 
crimes or promote national accountability efforts, then these are side-
effects, but should not be at the heart of ICC preliminary examinations, as 
they currently appear to be. The OTP should make the determination it is 
mandated to make, as efficiently as possible, and leave it in the hands of 
the judges to decide on the future of proprio motu investigations. 
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______ 
25. Objectivity of the 
ICC Preliminary Examinations 
Vladimir Tochilovsky* 
25.1. Introduction 
The quality of a preliminary examination in many regards depends on its 
objectivity. A one-sided approach inevitably affects the quality of the ex-
amination. It distorts the situation in general and the relevant facts in par-
ticular.  
While the ICC Statute does not unequivocally require the Prosecu-
tion to examine the situation even-handedly, impartiality and objectivity 
are prerequisites of justice. In the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examina-
tions, the Prosecutor emphasised that the preliminary examination process 
“is conducted on the basis of the facts and information available, and in 
the context of the overarching principles of independence, impartiality 
and objectivity”.1 The Policy Paper further explains that the principle of 
impartiality means that the Office will apply consistent methods and crite-
ria, irrespective of the States or parties involved or the person(s) or 
group(s) concerned.2 According to the document, the Office of the Prose-
cutor is to check “internal and external coherence, and considers infor-
mation from diverse and independent sources as a means of bias con-
                                                   
*  Vladimir Tochilovsky was investigation team leader and trial attorney in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), Office of the Prosecutor from 1994 
to 2010; member (Vice-Chair) of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion in 2010–2016; Deputy Regional Attorney for judicial matters, and District Attorney in 
the Ukraine from 1976 to 1994; and official representative of the ICTY to the United Na-
tions negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) from 
1997 to 2001. He served as a member of two expert groups that prepared recommendations 
for the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) in 2002–2003. He holds a Ph.D. and was a 
professor at Mechnikov National University, Ukraine in 1991–1994. 
1 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, para. 25 (emphasis 
added) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
2 Ibid., para. 28 (emphasis added). 
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trol”.3 The Policy Paper concludes that the Prosecution “also seeks to 
ensure that, in the interests of fairness, objectivity and thoroughness, all 
relevant parties are given the opportunity to provide information to the 
Office”.4 
25.2. Two Categories of Situations 
The situations under the preliminary examination can be divided, for the 
purpose of this chapter, into two categories. The first category includes 
situations involving a conflict between the situation-State and its non-
State opponents. The second category comprises the conflicts where other 
States besides the situation-State are involved.  
It is noteworthy that the preliminary examinations in the first cate-
gory do not take long before the Prosecutor moves to the investigations 
stage. Examination of the situation in Congo lasted only two months, Côte 
d’Ivoire – five months, Uganda and Mali – six months each. 
By contrast, in the second category, the preliminary examinations 
take years. Preliminary examination in Georgia situation took almost eight 
years. The situation in Afghanistan has been under the preliminary exami-
nation for ten years. The situation in Iraq has been under examination 
since 2014, and in Palestine – since 2015. This may be explained by reli-
ance on the notion of positive complementarity (States’ commitment to 
investigate) and the limited ICC resources. In fact, in these situations, the 
Prosecutor remains on standby mode for years. There might also be some 
political considerations behind the Prosecutor’s unwillingness to trigger 
the investigation. In this regard, HRW in its Policy Paper on the meaning 
of the “interests of justice” states: 
A decision whether or not to initiate an investigation […] 
must not be influenced by a) possible political advantage or 
disadvantage to the government or any political party, group 
or individual; and b) possible media or community reaction 
to the decision.5 
                                                   
3 Ibid., para. 32 (emphasis added). 
4 Ibid., para. 33 (emphasis added). 
5 Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’), “The Meaning of “the Interests of Justice” in Article 53 of 
the Rome Statute, Human Rights Watch Policy Paper”, 1 June 2005, para. 3 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/4dc3b4/). 
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So far, only situations in the first category resulted in charges, ar-
rests, and trials. Out of the six situations, five were submitted by the situa-
tion-States themselves under either Article 14 or Article 12(3) of the ICC 
Statute.6 In fact, in these cases, the Prosecutor often encouraged the situa-
tion-States to submit the situations to the ICC. For instance, concerning 
situation in Congo, the Prosecutor stated: 
If necessary, […] I stand ready to seek authorisation from a 
Pre-Trial Chamber to start an investigation under my proprio 
motu powers […] [I]n light of the current circumstances in 
the field, the protection of witnesses, gathering of evidence 
and arrest of suspects will be extremely difficult without the 
strong support of national or international forces.  
Our role could be facilitated by a referral or active sup-
port from the DRC. The Court and the territorial State may 
agree that a consensual division of labour could be an effec-
tive approach. Groups bitterly divided by conflict may op-
pose prosecutions at each other’s hands and yet agree to a 
prosecution by a Court perceived as neutral and impartial. 
The Office could cooperate with the national authorities by 
prosecuting the leaders who bear most responsibility for the 
crimes. National authorities with the assistance of the inter-
national community could implement appropriate mecha-
nisms to deal with other individuals responsible.7 
Soon after this statement, Congo referred the situation to the ICC. Indeed, 
in those situations, the States had been eager to investigate and prosecute 
those who were prosecuted by the ICC. Actually, these situations have 
been comparatively the easiest ones for the investigation as the Prosecutor 
enjoyed the full support of the situation-State and the eagerness of the 
Government to have its opponents prosecuted. 
25.3. Risk of Manipulation 
The first category of the situations under the preliminary examination 
often involve a conflict between the Government of the situation-State 
                                                   
6 Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Congo, Mali, and Central African Republic. 
7 ICC, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 8 September 2003 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8873bd/). 
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and its military or political opponents. This could be election-related vio-
lence like in Côte d’Ivoire or an armed conflict like in Congo and Uganda.  
Formally, in such cases, the ICC Prosecutor has no obligation to ex-
amine crimes committed by all parties to the conflict. There is nothing in 
the law that would prevent the Prosecutor from focusing on only one party. 
This creates a risk of a one-sided ICC examination which adversely af-
fects its objectivity.  
In particular, the objectivity of the preliminary examination may 
suffer if it relies on the material received from the situation-State. The 
experience of the ICTY shows that such material may be of questionable 
credibility and reliability. It is difficult to ensure impartiality of the do-
mestic investigations where the Government itself is a party to the conflict. 
The authorities are often reluctant or unwilling to investigate their own 
forces. Such investigations are considered damaging for the morale of the 
forces. This is also stigmatized as unpatriotic. One can hear arguments 
like “We cannot investigate people who defend our country”. 
25.3.1. Acceptance of Jurisdiction and Self-referrals 
Incorporation of a one-sided, often biased, domestic investigation into the 
Prosecution’s public report makes it a political tool used by the govern-
ment both domestically and internationally. 
This could be one of the reasons behind the acceptance of the ICC 
jurisdiction under Article 12(3) by a State that is not a party to the Statute. 
That is why, whenever the Court receives Article 12(3) declaration from a 
State, special attention should be paid to the actual intention of the Gov-
ernment. This should also apply to a self-referral by a State Party under 
Article 14. 
Such declarations and self-referrals often reveal the intention of the 
governments to have the ICC to focus only on their opponents.  
For instance, in the Uganda situation, the Prosecutor reported:  
In December 2003, I received a referral from the Govern-
ment of Uganda, the first state referral in the history of the 
Court. In the referral letter the Government specifically men-
tioned the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army, the LRA. We 
notified Uganda that we would interpret the referral as con-
cerning all crimes under the Statute committed in Northern 
Uganda and that our investigation would be impartial. In a 
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July 2004 report to the Parliament the Government of Ugan-
da confirmed their understanding of this interpretation.8 
However, despite such commitment, the preliminary examination as well 
as the subsequent investigations and prosecution in this situation were 
limited to the offences committed by the opponents of the Government. 
In Ukraine, the Parliament adopted the declaration “On the recogni-
tion of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by Ukraine 
over crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by senior offi-
cials of the Russian Federation and leaders of terrorist organizations 
‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ [self-proclaimed entities]”. The subsequent letter of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine declaring acceptance of jurisdic-
tion of behalf of Ukraine, however, was worded in accordance with Rule 
44(2) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In particular, the letter 
does not contain any ‘instruction’ as to which particular parties to the con-
flict the ICC examination and investigations shall focused on. According 
to the letter, Ukraine accepted the jurisdiction of the Court “for the pur-
pose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the perpetrators and accom-
plices of acts committed in the territory of Ukraine”.9 
Pursuant to Rule 44, a communication of the situation to the ICC 
under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute has, as a consequence, the ac-
ceptance of jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5 
of relevance to the situation. It was emphasized in the Gbagbo case that: 
“Rule 44 of the Rules was adopted in order to ensure that States that chose 
to stay out of the treaty could not use the Court ‘opportunistically’”.10 The 
Court further noted that: “there were concerns that the wording of Article 
12(3) of the Statute, and specifically the reference to the acceptance of 
jurisdiction ‘with respect to the crime in question’, would allow the Court 
to be used as a political tool by States not party to the Statute who could 
                                                   
8 ICC, “Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants”, 14 October 
2005, ICC-OTP-20051014-109 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d9b3cb/). 
9 ICC, “Declaration by Ukraine lodged under Article 12(3) of the Statute”, 8 September 
2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b53005/). 
10 ICC, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Corrigendum of 
the Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the Basis of Arti-
cles 12(3), 19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute Filed by the Defence for President 
Gbagbo (ICC–02/11–01/11–129)”, 15 August 2012, ICC–02/11–01/11, para. 59 (https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/0d14c3/).  
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selectively accept the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of certain crimes 
or certain parties to a conflict”.11 
25.3.2. Publicity of the Preliminary Examination Reports 
Such attempts of ‘using’ the ICC may also relate to the publicity of the 
Prosecutor’s reports on preliminary examination. 
Public awareness of the fact that the Prosecutor is conducting pre-
liminary examination may by itself serve as a deterrent from further viola-
tions. However, the publicity of the Prosecutor’s interim findings may 
also be counterproductive.  
It is not only because in the interim findings the Prosecutor publicly 
‘designates’ the ‘guilty party’ although no investigation has been conduct-
ed. Such publicity may also have a chilling effect on that party, discourag-
ing it from co-operating, and may disturb peace negotiations and attempts 
of reconciliation. 
Official reports of the ICC Prosecutor often have political ramifica-
tions. The preliminary character of the examination reports does not pre-
vent governments from using them for political purposes. The reports are 
widely scrutinised by public and considered often as the authoritative 
source of the information on the situation in question. Such nuances in the 
report as terms “alleged” and “allegedly” are easily ignored in political 
discourse. In addition, publicity of the reports of one-sided examinations 
may serve as an incentive for other States to use the ICC against their 
opponents. 
One may argue that, after preliminary examination and authoriza-
tion, the Prosecutor may expand the scope of investigation beyond the 
events and parties covered by the report. In its request for authorisation of 
an investigation of situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the Prosecu-
tion informed the Chamber:  
[F]or the purpose of the investigation and the development 
of the proceedings, [the Prosecution] is neither bound by its 
submissions with regard to the different acts alleged in its 
Article 15 application, nor by the incidents and persons iden-
tified therein, and accordingly may, upon investigation, take 
further procedural steps in respect of these or other acts, in-
                                                   
11 Ibid. 
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cidents or persons, subject to the parameters of the author-
ised situation.12 
However, in this case, as in other self-referred cases and cases of accepted 
jurisdiction, the subsequent investigations have been so far conducted 
mostly within the framework of the preliminary examination report. 
25.4. Prosecutor’s Policy and Nexus to Investigation 
In 2005, the Prosecutor outlined his policy in the Uganda situation as fol-
lows: 
The criteria for selection of the first case was gravity. We an-
alyzed the gravity of all crimes in Northern Uganda commit-
ted by the LRA and Ugandan forces. Crimes committed by 
the LRA were much more numerous and of much higher 
gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. We 
therefore started with an investigation of the LRA. […] We 
will continue to collect information on allegations concern-
ing all other groups, to determine whether the Statute thresh-
olds are met and the policy of focusing on the persons most 
responsible is satisfied.13 
In practice, however, this principle of focusing first on the party that 
committed the gravest crimes and then looking into the crimes committed 
by other parties turned out to be unworkable. In all the situations that were 
submitted by the situation-States, the Prosecutor got stuck with the first 
selection of accused. In the Uganda situation, after the warrants of arrest 
where issued for five members of the LRA in 2005, no perpetrators from 
the Government forces were charged.  
If the ICTY Prosecutor had also focused only on a party that com-
mitted more numerous and the gravest crimes, Serbian and Croatian vic-
tims would have little chance to see justice. In this regard, HRW in its 
comments to the Prosecutor’s draft policy paper noted: 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via […] and the Special Court for Sierra Leone have prose-
cuted perpetrators from all of the major parties to the respec-
                                                   
12 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investiga-
tion pursuant to Article 15, 23 June 2011, ICC-02/11-03, p. 10, fn. 14 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/1b1939/). 
13 Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants, see supra note 8. 
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tive conflicts. This contributed to their credibility among the 
communities most affected.14 
HRW also expressed concerns in regard to ICC Prosecutor’s policy: 
Because of the prosecutor’s reliance on state cooperation to 
carry out his mandate, especially in those situations that have 
been voluntarily referred, we believe the prosecutor should 
be sensitive to the risks to his impartiality […] 
The prosecutor’s Policy Paper states that his office will in-
vestigate all groups in a situation “in sequence”, suggesting 
that one group will be investigated at a time. After comple-
tion of an investigation of a particular group, the prosecu-
tor’s office examines whether other groups warrant investi-
gation […] 
We urge sensitivity to the implications of mechanically 
pursuing a policy of proceeding sequentially in all situations. 
In the context of the DRC, our field research suggests that 
this approach may have already undermined the perception 
of the ICC as an impartial institution. As such, to the greatest 
extent possible, we urge the prosecutor to avoid delays in in-
vestigating other groups alleged to have committed crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction.15 
It was also opined in regard to the Prosecutor’s policy in the Congo 
situation: 
In determining its potential role in the conflict in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
ICC must consider the stability of the country’s government, 
[…] the ramifications of unequal justice for victims of the 
entire war, the feasibility of successful prosecutions, […] 
[T]here are various prisms through which the Court could 
consider the questions: it could think of itself first; it could 
think of the donor countries first; it could think of the Con-
golese government first, or it could think of the victims first. 
We hope that the victims will carry the day.16 
                                                   
14 HRW, “The Selection of Situations and Cases for Trial before the International Criminal 
Court. A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper”, 26 October 2006 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/753e9b/). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Pascal Kambale and Anna Rotman, “The International Criminal Court and Congo”, Crimes 
of War Project (emphasis added) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ed751/). 
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Later, the OTP, having adjusted its policy in the preliminary exami-
nation in accordance with jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chambers, as-
serted: 
[T]he consideration of admissibility (complementarity and 
gravity) will take into account potential cases that could be 
identified in the course of the preliminary examination based 
on the information available and that would likely arise from 
an investigation into the situation.17 
As to the ‘targets’ of the preliminary examination, the Policy Paper 
referred to the following jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chambers: 
[A]dmissibility at the situation phase should be assessed 
against certain criteria defining a ‘potential case’ such as: (i) 
the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus 
of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future 
case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court allegedly committed during the incidents that are likely 
to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping 
the future case(s).18 
The Prosecution further reiterated its policy of “focussing on those 
bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes”.19 Accord-
ingly, in the Uganda situation (Article 12(3) declaration), the Prosecution 
                                                   
17 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 43, see supra note 1, with refer-
ence to ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorisation of an investiga-
tion pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/09-3, 26 November 2009, paras. 51, 107 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c63dcc/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant 
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situa-
tion in the Republic of Kenya, 1 April 2010, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, paras. 50, 182, 188 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f0caaf/). 
18 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 50, 
see supra note 17; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum to “Deci-
sion Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation in-
to the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire”, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, pa-
ras. 190–191, 202–204 (emphasis added) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7a6c19/). 
19 Ibid., para. 45, with reference to Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorisa-
tion of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, see supra note 17; ICC, Situation in the Re-
public of Kenya, Prosecution’s Response to Decision Requesting Clarification and Addi-
tional Information, 3 March 2010, ICC-01/09-16 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1f1fec/); 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15, see supra note 12. 
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focused both its preliminary examination and subsequent investigations 
and prosecutions on the offences committed by the opponents of the Gov-
ernment only. In this regard, it was noted: 
If the ICC wishes to establish and retain legitimacy, it must 
investigate all actors of possible atrocities, including the 
Ugandan government and the Ugandan People’s Democratic 
Army (UPDF). “Just days before the ICC unsealed the war-
rants against the LRA leaders, HRW published a report in 
which it documented numerous instances in which the UPDF 
has been responsible for committing rapes, torture, killings, 
arbitrary arrests, and detentions of the civilian population in 
northern Uganda.” […] The investigation and prosecution of 
LRA members suspected of gross violations of international 
law must be accompanied by an equally robust investigation 
of government abuse.20 
Furthermore, it was also reported: 
The ICC […] made mistakes with the LRA case from the 
outset. When then chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
announced the investigation in Uganda, he stood shoulder-
to-shoulder in a London hotel with President Museveni. The 
court turned up with one of the parties to the conflict […] ef-
fectively vindicating the Ugandan army – which also com-
mitted serious crimes – of responsibility in the Ugandan civil 
war.21 
25.5. Safeguarding Objectivity of the Preliminary Examination 
25.5.1. Sources of Information 
Where the State is eager to investigate only its ‘enemies’, one of the rea-
sons for the Prosecutor to step in should be the opportunity to ensure 
even-handed examination. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in its Policy 
Paper, the Prosecutor noted: 
In light of the global nature of the Court and the complemen-
tarity principle, a significant part of the Office’s efforts at the 
                                                   
20 David L. McCoy, “Fostering Peace and Ending Impunity: The International Criminal 
Court, Human Rights, and the LRA”, in International Affairs Review, Special Africa Edi-
tion 2007. 
21 Jessica Hatcher-Moore, “Is the world’s highest court fit for purpose?”, in The Guardian, 5 
April 2017 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/05813d/). 
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preliminary examination stage is directed towards encourag-
ing States to carry out their primary responsibility to investi-
gate and prosecute international crimes. The complementary 
nature of the Court requires national judicial authorities and 
the ICC to function together. […] Where national systems 
remain inactive or are otherwise unwilling or unable to gen-
uinely investigate and prosecute, the ICC must fill the gap 
left by the failure of States to satisfy their duty.22 
Reliable information related to all parties to the conflict can be 
found in the reports of the OHCHR, UN Independent Commissions, UN 
Special Procedures, and NGOs. These sources are especially important in 
the situations where some parties to the conflict do not, for some reasons, 
co-operate with the ICC and do not provide the Prosecutor with any in-
formation. At the very least, the Prosecutor should not ignore these 
sources of information. 
In the Uganda situation, the Prosecution limited its preliminary ex-
amination and subsequent investigation only to the offences of the oppo-
nents of the Government. And this was despite the repeated appeals from 
Human Rights Watch to look also into the serious offences, committed by 
the Government forces.  
In particular, in 2004, Human Rights Watch reported that the viola-
tions committed by the Ugandan government troops include: “extrajudi-
cial killings, rape and sexual assault, forcible displacement of over one 
million civilians, and the recruitment of children under the age of 15 into 
government militias”.23 HRW emphasised that: “the ICC prosecutor can-
not ignore the crimes that Ugandan government troops allegedly have 
committed”, and that the Government’s referral “does not limit the prose-
cutor’s investigation only to crimes allegedly committed by the LRA […] 
The prosecutor should operate independently and has the authority to look 
at all ICC crimes committed in Uganda”.24 A year later, HRW reported 
again that soldiers in Uganda’s national army have: “raped, beaten, arbi-
                                                   
22 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 100, see supra note 1 (emphasis 
added). 
23 HRW, “ICC: Investigate All Sides in Uganda. Chance for Impartial ICC Investigation into 
Serious Crimes a Welcome Step”, 4 February 2004 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
dabb8d/). 
24 Ibid. 
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trarily detained and killed civilians in camps” and that “the Ugandan gov-
ernment has failed to pursue prosecutions of military officers before na-
tional courts that could put an end to such violations”.25 HRW once again 
urged the ICC to “thoroughly examine government forces’ crimes against 
the civilian population as well as those committed by the rebels”.26 
Similarly, concerning the situation in Congo, HRW reported that: 
“both government soldiers and dissident forces have carried out war 
crimes in Bukavu, killing and raping civilians in their battle to control the 
eastern Congolese city […] [C]ivilians have been targeted by all sides”.27 
The Prosecutor may also seek assistance from UNHCHR, UNHRC, 
ICRC, NGOs and others present in the field. Such assistance may include 
screening for identification of potential witnesses or seeking other types 
of information that may be relevant to the assessment of the situation.28 
Under Article 15(2) of the ICC Statute, the Prosecutor may receive written 
or oral testimony at the seat of the Court only. It was opined, however, 
that there is nothing barring the Prosecutor from asking States or organi-
zations to obtain information from potential witnesses as part of ‘seeking 
information’, including through obtaining voluntary written statements. 
Furthermore, it was argued, that the Prosecutor may also be able to direct-
ly obtain information from witnesses as “other reliable sources” with the 
State’s consent, provided these do not amount to “testimony”, which must 
be taken “at the seat of the Court”.29 
                                                   
25 HRW, “Uganda: Army and Rebels Commit Atrocities in the North. International Criminal 
Court Must Investigate Abuses on Both Sides”, 20 September 2005 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/dbcc41/). 
26 Ibid. 
27 HRW, “DR Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu”, 11 June 2004 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
911fb5/). 
28 ICC, Informal Expert Paper: Fact-Finding and Investigative Functions of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, Including International Co-operation, 1 January 2003, para. 30 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/ba368d/). See also Morten Bergsmo and Vladimir Tochilovsky, “Fact-
Finding and Investigative Functions of the Office of the Prosecutor, Including International 
Co-operation”, in Morten Bergsmo, Klaus Rackwitz and SONG Tianying (eds.), Historical 
Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 5, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
Brussels, 2017, chap. 44, pp. 695 ff. (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/24-bergsmo-rackwitz-
song). 
29 Ibid., para. 31. 
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Some may argue that the even-handed approach may discourage the 
situation-States from co-operation with the ICC. However, the ICTY ex-
perience demonstrates that it is not impossible to investigate and prose-
cute perpetrators from all parties to the conflict despite of the lack of co-
operation from some of them. Among those indicted and convicted by the 
Tribunal one can find perpetrators, including high-ranking ones, from all 
parties.  
Indeed, in conducting preliminary examination, the Prosecutor 
should not pursue a ‘fair balance’ of number of perpetrators from all par-
ties to the conflict at all costs. In the ICTY’s early years, it had been criti-
cised for perceived imbalance between the number of Serb and Croat de-
fendants. The Prosecution was often criticized for an alleged ethnic bias. 
The imbalance was reduced to some extent at the end of 1995 when eight 
Croatian nationals were indicted in the Kupreškić et al. case. While this 
indictment temporarily improved the image of the ICTY, the subsequent 
outcome of the case was disastrous for the Prosecutor. Indictment against 
one defendant was withdrawn, another defendant was acquitted by the 
Trial Chamber, three others were acquitted by the Appeals Chamber, and 
one defendant died before the indictment was issued.30 
25.5.2. On-site Visits 
To address deficiency of one-sided domestic investigations, the Prosecu-
tion may seek access to the territory controlled by a non-State party to the 
conflict. Such visit to a self-proclaimed entity does not mean recognition 
of its legitimacy. It is a regular practice for the UN Special Procedures to 
visit such territories during country visits.  
For instance, UN Special Rapporteurs visited Transnistrian region 
as a part of their visits to the Republic of Moldova. In July 2008, Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, visited the self-proclaimed ‘Transnistrian Republic’ (Trans-
nistrian region of the Republic of Moldova) as part of his fact-finding 
                                                   
30 Vladimir Tochilovsky, “Special Commentary: International Criminal Justice – Some Flaws 
and Misperceptions”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2011, vol. 22, pp. 602–603. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 408 
visit to Moldova.31 Similarly, Special Rapporteurs visited self-proclaimed 
entities in eastern part of Ukraine during country visits.  
Similarly, in the Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia case, 
judges of the European Court of Human Rights visited Transnistria region 
of Moldova. The judges, in order to clarify, in particular, whether Moldo-
va and/or the Russian Federation were responsible for the alleged human 
rights violations, conducted an on-site fact-finding mission in Moldova, 
including territory controlled by self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Republic. 
They “took account of the numerous documents submitted by the parties 
and the Transnistrian authorities throughout the proceedings”.32 The Court 
also consulted certain documents filed by the authorities of the self-
proclaimed entity through the OSCE mission.33 
25.5.3. Role of Experts in National Investigations 
The quality and objectivity of the domestic material relied upon in the 
ICC preliminary examination may be improved if it is collected with as-
sistance of experts having experience in practical application of the inter-
national humanitarian law. 
The NGOs and other members of the civil society conducting fact-
finding investigations often lack the necessary legal expertise. Further-
more, even where the State investigators conduct investigations of the 
international crimes, they are not always properly equipped for the task. 
The States may have no shortage of investigators with experience in in-
vestigation of serious crimes such as murder or rape. However, the inves-
tigation of the same acts as international crimes is different. For the 
crimes against humanity, it is not only to prove elements of murders and 
rapes. The investigators shall also collect evidence that would demon-
strate that those crimes were committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack; and that there was a State policy to commit the attack. The 
same is true for the investigation of war crimes. It does not happen often 
that States get involved in armed conflicts. As a result, in most countries it 
                                                   
31 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, Mission to the Republic of Moldova, 
A/HRC/10/44/Add.3, 12 February 2009 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f18040/). 
32 European Court of Human Rights, Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, [GC], Judg-
ment, 8 July 2004, 48787/99, para. 16 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f68a72/). 
33 Ibid., para. 17. 
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is difficult to find investigators with experience in investigation of such 
crimes. Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, there are no experts and mili-
tary analysts in the prosecution office. 
Investigations of international crimes require additional skills and 
knowledge, including the knowledge of the international humanitarian law. 
Investigators with such skills and expertise are not always readily availa-
ble in national jurisdictions. For this reason, domestic investigations of 
international crimes would usually require support and assistance of the 
experts with experience in practical application of the norms of the inter-
national humanitarian law to the facts of the case. 
25.6. Conclusion 
In the situations involving conflict between the Government of the situa-
tion-State and its non-State opponents, the Prosecutor often takes side of 
the Government that submitted the situation to the ICC. By contrast, the 
preliminary examinations in the situations involving other States besides 
the situation-State, seems to be conducted generally even-handedly. How-
ever, it would be premature to assess the objectivity of any ongoing pre-
liminary examination before the examination is completed. 
Declarations of acceptance of the ICC jurisdiction and self-referrals 
have the risk of having the Court used as a political tool by States. The 
situation-States are often unwilling to investigate crimes committed by 
their forces and eager to prosecute its opponents. In such cases, one of the 
reasons for the Prosecutor to step in should be the opportunity to ensure 
even-handed examination. 
Preliminary examinations are unjust if they are one-sided. They are 
discriminatory if they ignore entire classes of victims. The reputation of 
the ICC suffers if it appears unjust and indifferent to victims. In the report 
on Uganda situation, the Coalition for the ICC noted: 
The ICC investigation has not yielded cases against govern-
ment officials and armed forces. According to some civil so-
ciety groups, the absence of such cases—or clear and public 
explanations as to why they are not being pursued—has left 
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too many victims without justice and undermined percep-
tions of the Court’s independence and impartiality.34 
The opponents in the conflict often do not care about the victims of the 
other side. The ICC must be different. The Prosecutor should not take or 
even seen as taking side in the conflict. By siding with the Government 
and turning a blind eye to the crimes committed by its forces, the Prosecu-
tor ignores the victims of those crimes. 
Decisions at this stage may have political ramifications on national 
and international levels. However, the Prosecutor should not be guided by 
political considerations in conducting examinations. An explicit pronunci-
ation of the general Prosecution policy concerning objectivity of the pre-
liminary examinations would be helpful to avoid any appearance of politi-
cal bias in particular situations.35  It should be made clear in a policy 
statement that the preliminary examination shall not be influenced by any 
perceived advantage by Governments. 
                                                   
34 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Uganda” (available on the Coalition’s web 
site).  
35 Informal Expert Paper: Measures available to the International Criminal Court to reduce 
the length of proceedings, 2003, 1 January 2003, para. 18 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
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The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC-
OTP’) has on several occasions launched preliminary examinations pre-
ceding, coinciding with, or following the deployment of United Nations 
(‘UN’) Fact-finding Commissions (‘UNFFCs’) and human rights monitor-
ing bodies and missions. This has been the case in most of the ICC situa-
tions in Africa. Despite their distinct nature (one outside and the other 
inside the criminal justice system), the two processes have experienced 
some levels of interaction. In its first section, this chapter examines this 
interaction, in light of three case studies on Darfur, Libya and the Central 
African Republic (‘CAR’). In the second section, the chapter examines 
the issue of quality control of the information provided by the UNFFCs to 
the ICC-OTP in preliminary examinations and, subsequently, its implica-
tions for judicial review by the ICC Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. The 
chapter concludes by formulating recommendations on ways and means 
to streamline UN fact-finding and ICC-OTP’s preliminary examination.  
26.2. Interaction between the ICC-OTP and UNFFCs in Preliminary 
Examination 
Before reviewing the cases illustrating the interaction between the ICC-
OTP and UNFFCs in preliminary examination, it is important to provide a 
                                                   
*  Mutoy Mubiala has been working as a Human Rights Officer with the Office of the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Geneva, since 1994. He holds a 
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Geneva, Switzerland. He has served several UN Commissions of Inquiry whose findings 
were shared with the ICC-OTP in the context of preliminary examinations of African 
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brief overview of the legal and institutional framework of the co-operation 
between the ICC and the UN. 
26.2.1. Legal and Institutional Framework of the Co-operation 
between the ICC and the UN 
As provided by the ICC-OTP’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 
preliminary examinations rely on various sources of information, includ-
ing international organisations, non-governmental organisations and tes-
timonies received at the headquarters of the Court. In this regard, the ICC 
has signed several agreements with various entities, including with the 
UN on 4 October 2004.1 Of particular importance are Articles 18 and 20 
of the Agreement. 
According to Article 18: 
1. With due regard to its responsibilities under the Charter of 
the United Nations and subject to its rules, the United Na-
tions undertakes to cooperate with the Prosecutor and to en-
ter with the Prosecutor into such arrangements or, as appro-
priate, agreements as may be necessary to facilitate such co-
operation, in particular when the Prosecutor exercises, under 
Article 54 of the Statute, his or her duties and powers with 
respect to investigation and seeks the cooperation of the 
United Nations in accordance with this Article. 
2. Subject to the rules of the organ concerned, the United Na-
tions undertakes to cooperate in relation to requests from the 
Prosecutor in providing such additional information as he or 
she may seek, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 2, of 
the Statute, from organs of the United Nations in connection 
with investigations initiated proprio motu by the Prosecutor 
pursuant to that Article. The Prosecutor shall address a re-
quest for such information to the Secretary-General, who 
shall convey it to the presiding officer or other appropriate 
officer of the organ concerned. 
3. The United Nations and the Prosecutor may agree that the 
United Nations provide documents or information to the 
Prosecutor on condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new information shall not be disclosed 
                                                   
1 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations, 4 October 2004 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9432c6/). 
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to other organs of the Court or to third parties, at any stage of 
the proceedings or thereafter, without the consent of the 
United Nations. 
4. The Prosecutor and the United Nations or programmes, 
funds and offices concerned may enter into such agreement, 
as may be necessary to facilitate their cooperation for the 
implementation of this article, in particular in order to ensure 
the confidentiality of information, the protection of any per-
son, including former and current United Nations personnel, 
and the security or proper conduct of any operation or activi-
ty of the United Nations.2 
Regarding the protection of confidentiality, Article 20 of the Agreement 
further provides:  
If the United Nations is requested by the Court to provide in-
formation or documentation in its custody, possession or 
control which was disclosed to it in confidence by a State or 
an intergovernmental, international or non-governmental or-
ganisation or an individual, the United Nations shall seek the 
consent of the originator to disclose that information or doc-
umentation or where appropriate, will inform the Court that 
it may seek the consent of the originator for the United Na-
tions to disclose that information or documentation. If the 
originator is a State Party to the Statute and the United Na-
tions fail to obtain its consent to disclosure within a reasona-
ble period of time, the United Nations shall inform the Court 
accordingly, and the issue of disclosure shall be resolved be-
tween the State Party concerned and the Court in accordance 
with the Statute. If the originator is not a State Party to the 
Statute and refuses to consent to disclosure, the United Na-
tions shall inform the Court that it is unable to provide the 
requested information or documentation because of a pre-
existing obligation of confidentiality to the originator.3  
It is in the framework of the two above provisions that the UN bod-
ies, in particular the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(‘OHCHR’) and UNFFCs, have developed close co-operation with the 
ICC-OTP in relation to preliminary examinations. 
                                                   
2 Ibid., p. 7. 
3 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
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26.2.2. Case Studies 
The Policy Paper also provides that preliminary examination consists of 
four phases, including:  
1. the initial jurisdictional assessment of all information of the alleged 
crimes received;  
2. the factual and legal analysis of information arising from referrals 
by a State Party to the Statute, the United Nations Security Council 
(‘UNSC’) and the open source information received at the seat of 
the Court, to assess whether there is a reasonable basis to believe 
that the alleged crimes fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Court;  
3. the admissibility of potential cases in accordance with Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute on complementarity, to assess the ability or will-
ingness of the national authorities to prosecute the presumed au-
thors of the alleged crimes; and  
4. the examination of the interests of justice for the opening of an in-
vestigation.4  
On the basis of this division, this section reviews three case studies 
illustrating the interaction between the ICC-OTP and UNFFC in prelimi-
nary examinations representing three scenarios: (1) the UNFFC’s de-
ployment preceding preliminary examination (Darfur); (2) the UNFFC’s 
deployment coinciding with preliminary examination (Libya); and (3) the 
UNFFC’s deployment following preliminary examination (CAR II). The 
work of each of the three UNFFCs deployed in the three countries con-
tributed to the completion of one or several phases of the related prelimi-
nary examinations. The section focuses on one aspect of the contribution 
of each Commission:  
1. the factual and legal analysis of the information and the identifica-
tion of potential cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and of the presumed authors of international crimes (Phase 2) for 
the Darfur Commission;  
2. the review of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court (Phase 2) 
for the Libya Commission; and  
                                                   
4 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, p. 19 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
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3. the implementation of the principle of complementarity (Phases 1 
and 3) for the CAR Commission and other fact-finding bodies and 
missions involved in the country.  
26.2.2.1. Darfur 
UNFFCs were particularly involved in the situation in Darfur. In April 
and May 2003, OHCHR deployed fact-finding missions in Darfur and 
Eastern Chad. The UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on 
Sudan and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the situ-
ation of Internally Displaced Persons also visited Darfur during the same 
period. In October 2004, the UNSC established the International Commis-
sion on Darfur. The Darfur Commission, which operated from November 
2004, submitted its final report to the UN Secretary-General on 31 Janu-
ary 2005.5  This report was presented by the then High Commissioner 
Louise Arbour to the UN Security Council on 16 February 2005.6 Based 
on the findings and recommendations of the Commission, the UNSC, by 
its resolution 1593 (2005) adopted on 31 March 2005, referred the situa-
tion in Darfur to the ICC. 
Evaluating the outcome of the Darfur Commission, Philip Alston 
wrote the following: 
The Darfur Commission Report […], even though miracu-
lously completed in the space of only 90 days, was compre-
hensive in scope, assembled a very detailed factual account 
of the situation, evaluated the extent to which genocide had 
been involved, and succeeded in identifying by name 51 sus-
pected perpetrators of various crimes. Another major accom-
plishment, with broader ramifications beyond this particular 
case, is its clarification of the legal principles applicable in 
such situations. The Report provides a careful and systematic 
analysis, written in clear and comprehensible language, of a 
number of complex legal issues which will arise in most 
comparable cases. They include issues such as the relation-
ship between human rights and international humanitarian 
                                                   
5 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, UN 
doc. S/2005/60, 1 February 2005 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1480de/). 
6 United Nations, Statement by Ms. Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
to the Security Council on the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, New York, 
16 February 2005, p. 1. 
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law (‘mutually reinforcing and overlapping in situations of 
armed conflict’, § 144), the extent and nature of customary 
law in this area (an analysis completed before the publication 
of the ICRC study) and the applicability of the relevant 
norms to non-state actors (an analysis based in part on gen-
eral principles and partly on agreements accepted by the key 
actors in Sudan, §§ 172–174). It is significant that these legal 
analyses were not subject to any noteworthy criticisms or 
challenges in the Security Council or the Commission on 
Human Rights.7 
The findings of the Darfur Commission have been heavily relied on 
by the ICC-OTP in preliminary examination on the situation in Darfur, as 
it was not on the ground. These findings and the list of the suspected au-
thors of international crimes provided by the Commission, among other 
things, enabled the ICC-OTP to conclude to a reasonable basis to believe 
that war crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated in Darfur 
during the period under review,8 leading to the opening of an investigation. 
26.2.2.2. Libya  
The UNSC referred the situation in Libya to the ICC on 15 February 2011. 
A few days after, on 25 February 2011, the UN Human Rights Council 
established the International Commission on Libya, which was granted 
access to Libya. The work and outcome of the investigations of the Libya 
Commission then became instrumental for the preliminary examination 
opened by the ICC-OTP, which had no access to Libya. 
As this author has written elsewhere: 
Traditionally, international fact-finding commissions were 
tasked to investigate serious international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law violations. In many re-
cent mandates, several hybrid commissions have been tasked 
to investigate international crimes as included in the ICC 
                                                   
7 Philip Alston, “The Darfur Commission as a Model for Future Responses to Crisis Situa-
tions”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 604 (footnotes 
omitted). 
8 ICC, Synthesis Sheet: Situation in Darfur, February 2007. 
26. The ICC’s Interplay with UN Fact-Finding Commissions in Preliminary Examinations 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 417 
Statute. This development has led to increased application of 
international criminal law by the hybrid commissions.9 
As far as the Libya Commission is concerned, according to Philip 
Kirsch, who chaired it: 
International human rights law applied at all stages of the 
situation, i.e. both in peace and times of armed conflicts. 
Libya became a party over the years to a number of major 
United Nations Human Rights Treaties and is therefore 
bound by them, as well as by relevant customary internation-
al law. Non-state actors, including the NTC [National Transi-
tional Council] at that time, are not formally bound by trea-
ties but are increasingly seen, when occupying de facto con-
trol over territory, as having the obligation to respect funda-
mental rights of persons in that territory.  
When it comes to situations of non-international and in-
ternational armed conflicts, international humanitarian law 
applies. Here again, Libya became a party to a number of 
applicable international instruments and is bound by them 
and by customary international law. However, it is not a par-
ty to other instruments which may be relevant to the situation 
at hand. 
In addition to the above, international criminal law also 
applies to the Libyan situation, by virtue of the referral by 
the Security Council to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) of the situation in Libya even though Libya is not a 
party to the Rome Statute. The ICC can currently exercise ju-
risdiction on three categories of crimes, two of which, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are relevant.10 
The information provided by the Libya Commission to the ICC-
OTP was instrumental in completing its preliminary examination and con-
                                                   
9 Mutoy Mubiala, “The Historical Contribution of International Fact-Finding Commiss-
ions”, in Morten Bergsmo, CHEAH Wui Ling and SONG Tianying and YI Ping (eds.), 
Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 4, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, Brussels, 2015, p. 523 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/23-bergsmo-cheah-song-
yi). 
10 Philippe Kirsch, “The Work of the International Commission of Inquiry for Libya”, in M. 
Cherif Bassiouni and William A. Schabas (eds.), New Challenges for the UN Human 
Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the Human Rights 
Council Procedures?, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2011, pp. 303–304 (footnotes omitted). 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 418 
cluding that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against 
humanity were perpetrated in Libya, leading to the opening of investiga-
tion, on 3 March 2011,11 less than a month after the UNSC’s referral. 
26.2.2.3. Central African Republic II 
The CAR Commission was established by the UN Secretary-General in 
accordance with the UNSC resolution 2127 (2013) adopted on 5 Decem-
ber 2013 to investigate the international crimes allegedly perpetrated in 
the country from 1 January to 31 December 2013 and to identify the pre-
sumed perpetrators of these crimes. The Commission started its work in 
March 2014. In the meantime, on 7 February 2014, the ICC Prosecutor, 
Fatou Bensouda, announced the opening of a preliminary examination of 
the same alleged crimes. Having an office in the CAR since the opening 
of the investigation into the alleged crimes perpetrated in the CAR in 
2003, the ICC-OTP was in a better position to get the relevant information 
than the CAR Commission, which did not access some of the areas con-
cerned by the investigation for security reasons. The latter then mainly 
relied on the open source information gathered by the OTP. They had 
meetings and co-operated in the exchange of information. In its prelimi-
nary report, the Commission recognised the ICC-OTP support: 
The Commission has also enjoyed the full support of the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
which has opened a preliminary examination in order to as-
certain whether the criteria of the Rome Statute for opening 
an investigation into the alleged crimes committed in the 
Central African Republic, which fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, have been met. On 1 April 2014, the Commis-
sion sent a request to the Prosecutor to facilitate access to 
open-source material gathered by the Office of the Prosecu-
tor, a broad selection of open-source material was subse-
quently provided to the Commission.12  
In addition to the CAR Commission, other fact-finding mechanisms 
were deployed in the CAR by some UN bodies, including the UN Human 
                                                   
11 OTP, Report on the Preliminary Examinations Activities, 13 December 2011, p. 24 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/4aad1d/). 
12 Preliminary Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African 
Republic, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127, S/2014/373, 26 June 
2014, p. 10. 
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Rights Council Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the 
CAR and the Human Rights Division of the Multidimensional Integrated 
Mission in the Central African Republic (‘MINUSCA’). Their work also 
contributed to that of the ICC-OTP, as illustrated by its review of the ad-
missibility of the situation in the CAR. In its Article 53(1) Report, the 
Prosecutor explicitly referred to the findings and recommendations of 
UNFFC:  
245. During the mission of the Office to Bangui in May 2014, 
all of the CAR authorities whom the members of the mission 
met with indicated that the CAR judicial system is currently 
unable to investigate or prosecute individuals for crimes 
committed since 2012 that could fall under the ICC’s juris-
diction. The main challenges raised by the authorities relate 
to the general lack of security and the specific dangers facing 
judicial personnel, as well as the lack of infrastructure and 
capacity at all levels of the criminal justice system, in Ban-
gui and even more so in the provinces. […] 
246. The Office understands that both the general lack of se-
curity and the prevalence of political pressure are the main 
obstacles to conducting domestic proceedings. […] In Au-
gust 2014, the UN independent expert on the human rights 
situation in the CAR also came to the conclusion that securi-
ty concerns, insufficient protection and political pressure are 
preventing magistrates and lawyers from doing their work. 
Similarly, a United Nations multidisciplinary team which 
visited the Central African Republic in 2014 confirmed “an 
almost total lack of capacity of national counterparts in the 
areas of police, justice and corrections” and found that “there 
are no guarantees that national magistrates can render justice 
in an impartial manner and without fear of political interfer-
ence or physical violence.”13 
It is on the basis of these findings, including those by other UN 
fact-finding bodies and missions, that the ICC-OTP concluded the admis-
sibility of the situation of CAR II, in accordance with Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute. 
                                                   
13 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II Article 53(1) Report, 24 September 2014, 
ICC-01/14, paras. 245–246 (footnotes omitted) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1ff87e/). 
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These three case studies illustrate the increased co-operation be-
tween the ICC-OTP and OHCHR, the UN supporting body of UNFFCs in 
preliminary examinations. As pointed out by the report of an international 
expert seminar on the “The Peripheries of Justice Intervention”, jointly 
organised by the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies and the 
Centre for International Law Research and Policy (CILRAP), held in The 
Hague, on 29 September 2015: 
28. Further attention was given to the relationship between 
the ICC and other fact-finders. Participants identified points 
of convergence between PEs and the work of fact-finding 
bodies (e.g. in term of material jurisdiction, applicable 
standard – ‘reasonable basis’/‘reasonable grounds’). Partici-
pants stated that the work of fact-finding bodies can inform 
the OTP analysis and can be complementary to PEs. For ex-
ample, Commissions of Inquiry (COIs) may have better ac-
cess on the ground, while PEs remain remote, and their re-
ports can inform the OTP about patterns of crimes. It was 
further pointed out that COIs have an important role in pre-
serving evidence. These synergies should be used to ‘break 
silos’ between institutions and avoid that each institution 
needs to ‘re-invent the wheel’. At the same time, the se-
quencing of COIs and PEs might require attention.14 
From the review of the above-mentioned three case studies (Darfur, 
Libya and CAR II), one can conclude that UNFFCs played a catalytic role 
in preliminary examinations of the ICC-OTP. This is why it is important 
to pay special attention to the quality control of the information provided 
by UNFFCs, which may be used for judicial purposes. 
26.3. Quality Control in the Relationship between the ICC-OTP and 
UNFFCs in Preliminary Examination  
The Phase-2 analysis of the statutory-based approach procedure is speci-
fied in the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: 
81. Phase 2 analysis entails a thorough factual and legal as-
sessment of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation 
at hand with a view to identifying the potential cases falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Office will pay par-
                                                   
14 Preliminary Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit: Reviewing Policies and Practices, 
Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, The Hague, 2015, p. 6.  
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ticular consideration to crimes committed on a large scale, as 
part of a plan or pursuant a policy. […] Phase 2 leads to the 
submission of an ‘Article 5 report’ to the Prosecutor, in ref-
erence to the material jurisdiction of the Court as defined in 
article 5 of the Statute.15 
One can therefore say that this phase represents the ‘fact-finding’ 
part of preliminary examinations, even though it normally falls outside the 
criminal justice system. Hence, it is important to determine how the two 
processes can influence each other in terms of quality control. The in-
creased reliance of the preliminary examinations on UNFFCs has resulted 
in two trends: (1) the ‘justiciability’ of information and evidence provided 
by UNFFCs, and (2) the ‘criminalisation’ of UNFFCs. Before examining 
these two trends and evaluating their respective challenges, it is important 
to compare preliminary examination with both UNFFCs as well as the 
judicial review of the situations by the Pre-Trial Chambers. 
26.3.1. Preliminary Examination between Fact-Finding and the 
Review by Pre-Trial Chambers 
Items UNFFCs Preliminary Examination 
1. Legal 
framework 
International human rights law, 
international humanitarian law 
and the mandates of the UNFFC 
bodies. 
International criminal law, in 






















                                                   
15 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, p. 19, see supra note 4. 
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• Identification of the sources 
of information; 
• Determination of the mo-
dalities of the assessment or 
verification of information, 
including through field vis-
its;  
• Formulation of the frame-
work to ascertain the consent 
of sources on the judicial use 
of information collected. 
• Applicable standard of 
proof:  
1. Fact-work: The reasonable 
ground threshold; 
2. Account-work: The reasona-
ble suspicion threshold (In-
ternational Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur) 
• Review of information to 
consider whether: 
1. It provides a reasonable 
basis to believe that a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been or is being 
committed; 
2. The case is or would be 
admissible under article 17 
of the Rome Statute; and 
3. An investigation would 
serve the interests of justice. 
• Applicable standard of 
proof: The reasonable basis 
threshold. 
4. Outcome • Submission of a report to the 
mandating body, including 
findings on the allegations of 
violations of IHRL and IHL, 
as well as recommendations, 
including on judicial prose-
cution of the presumed au-
thors of these violations; 
• Publication of the report; 
• Development and sealing of 
the list of the presumed au-
thors of the violations of 
IHRL and IHL for their 
transmission, through the 
Office of the UN Secretary-
General, to the competent 
judicial bodies, including 
and particularly the ICC. 
• Article 53(1) report on the 
existence of a reasonable ba-
sis to proceed with an inves-
tigation or not; 
• Submission of the report to a 
Pre-Trial chamber of the 
ICC; 
• Review of the report by a 
pre-trial chamber and adop-
tion of a decision to author-
ise or not an investigation on 
the situation of the con-
cerned country (Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute). 
Table 1: Fact-Finding and Preliminary Examination 
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Items Preliminary Examination 
Prosecutor/ 
Pre-Trial Chamber 
1. Provision Article 53(1) 
(“The Prosecutor shall, having 
evaluated the information made 
available to him or her, initiate 
an investigation unless he or she 
determines that there is no rea-
sonable basis to proceed under 
this Statute”) 
Article 15 
(“(3) If the Prosecutor con-
cludes that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investi-
gation, he or she shall submit to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber a request 
for authorisation of an investi-
gation, together with any sup-
porting material collected. Vic-
tims may make representations 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. 
(4) If the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
upon examination of the request 
and the supporting material, 
considers that there is a reason-
able basis to proceed with an 
investigation, and that the case 
appears to fall within the juris-
diction of the Court, it shall 
authorise the commencement of 
the investigation, without preju-
dice to subsequent determina-
tions by the Court with regard to 
the jurisdiction and admissibil-
ity of a case.”) 
2. Source of 
infor-
mation 
Various sources, including re-
ports of UNFFC bodies. 
Article 53(1) reports and sup-
porting material submitted by 




The reasonable basis threshold. The reasonable basis threshold. 
4. Outcome Request for authorisation to 
open an investigation into a 
situation. 
Trial Chamber’s Article 15 
Decision on the authorisation of 
an investigation into a situation.  
Table 2: Fact-Finding beyond Preliminary Examination and the Judicial Review 
of the Situations by the Pre-Trial Chambers  
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From the above comparisons, one can conclude that fact-finding 
outside criminal justice and preliminary examinations have similar meth-
ods of work, including a lower standard of proof than that applied by a 
criminal court. The main consequence of this similarity is the increased 
reliance by the ICC-OTP on the information collected by UNFFCs, in 
comparison with the other sources of information (States, non-
governmental organisations, victims’ representations, and so on). There-
fore, preliminary examination plays the role of a ‘Trojan horse’ in the 
injection of information collected by UNFFCs in the judicial proceedings 
of the ICC. This is made easy by the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber re-
viewing the Prosecutor’s requests for authorisation to open an investiga-
tion proceeds from the same standard of proof (the reasonable basis 
threshold), as illustrated by the Table 2. 
Commenting Article 53(1) in relation to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute, an author rightly observes that: 
It follows from the wording of the chapeau of Article 53 that 
the threshold to start an investigation is the presence of a 
‘reasonable basis to proceed’. The same threshold is to be 
found in Article 15 (3), (4) and (6) ICC Statute and in Rule 
48 ICC RPE, with regard to proprio motu investigations. A 
contextual interpretation clarifies that similar considerations 
underlie the ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ standard of Article 
15 and 53. More precisely, it follows from Rule 48 ICC RPE 
that in determining whether there exists a ‘reasonable basis 
to proceed’ under Article 15 (3) ICC Statute, the Prosecutor 
shall consider the factors set out in Article 53 paragraph 1 (a) 
and (c)’. 
This was acknowledged by the Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
when it held that it would be illogical to dissociate the ‘rea-
sonable basis to proceed’ standard in Article 15(3) and Arti-
cle 53(1) (with respect to the Prosecutor) from the threshold 
provided for under Article 15(4) ICC Statute (with respect to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber) […]. The Pre-Trial Chamber empha-
sised that these standards are used in the same or related Ar-
ticles and that they share the same purpose: the opening of 
an investigation […].  
With regard to Article 15(4) ICC Statute, ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber III observed that the purpose of the ‘reasonable ba-
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sis to proceed’ standard lies where it prevents “unwarranted, 
frivolous, or politically motivated investigations” […].16  
As will be demonstrated in the following section, the reliance of the 
ICC-OTP on the information from UNFFCs in preliminary examinations 
has legal and procedural implications for its review by the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chambers and, subsequently, Trial Chambers. 
26.3.2. The ‘Justiciability’ of the Information Provided by the 
UNFFCs 
With reference to the situation in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, this section 
examines the judicial consequences of the cross-cutting of fact-finding 
with preliminary examinations, as well as related issues and challenges. 
26.3.2.1. Kenya 
On 26 November 2009, the Prosecutor submitted a request for authorisa-
tion to open an investigation into the situation in Kenya relating to post-
electoral violence occurred in the country in 2007 and 2008. In his sub-
mission, he recorded the sources of information he collected, where 
UNFFCs’ reports are referred to, as follows: 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), “Report from OHCHR Fact-finding Mission 
to Kenya” (6-28 February 2008)  
32. Between 6 and 28 February 2008, the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) dispatched 
a fact-finding commission that investigated allegations of 
human rights violations. The ensuing ‘Report from OHCHR 
Fact-finding Mission to Kenya, 6-28 February 2008’ pro-
vides an analysis on the context, the patterns as well as a list 
of human rights violations. The OHCHR Mission conducted 
on-site visits to the affected areas and met with a wide range 
of actors in the Government, among the opposition, and met 
with victims, human rights defenders as well as the diplo-
matic community. The OHCHR Mission also analysed un-
derlying civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
issues and formulated recommendations on possible ac-
countability mechanisms. 
                                                   
16 Karel De Meester, “Article 53”, in Mark Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the 
International Criminal Court, available in Lexsitus (www.cilrap-lexsitus.org).  
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Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) Humanitarian report updates 
33. In response to the post-electoral violence in Kenya, the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) has expanded the staff in their Kenya offices and 
has produced a series of publicly available humanitarian up-
dates entitled “Humanitarian Report Updates for Kenya”. 
34. The Prosecution’s application refers to 4 different Hu-
manitarian Update volumes covering the periods between 21 
and 28 January 2008; 11 and 15 February 2008; 23 and 27 
February 2008 and 8 to 30 October 2009. 
UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM and Christian Children’s 
Fund, ‘A Rapid Assessment of Gender-Based Violence 
(GBV) during the post-election violence in Kenya’ (Jan-
Feb 08) 
35. The report consists in an inter-agency gender based vio-
lence assessment carried out in January and February 2008 
in selected sites in the North Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, 
the Coastal Region, Nairobi and Central Province. The as-
sessment examined the nature and scope of sexual violence 
during flight [sic], as well as within the internally displaced 
persons (IDP) camps and alternative settlements. 
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions “Mission to Kenya” (26 
May 09) 
36. Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudi-
cial, summary or arbitrary executions visited the Kenyan 
provinces of Nairobi, Rift Valley Province (Nakuru, Eldoret 
and Kiambaa), Western Province Bungoma and Kap-
sokwony), Nyanza Province (Kisumu), and Central Province 
(Nyeri) from 16 to 25 February 2009 in order to: ascertain 
the types and causes of extra-judicial killings; investigate 
whether those responsible for such killings are held to ac-
count; and propose constructive measures to reduce the inci-
dence of killings and impunity. The main focus was on extra-
judicial killings by the police, violence in the Mt Elgon Dis-
trict, and killings in the post-election period. The Special 
Rapporteur concluded those responsible for the post-election 
violence, including those police responsible for extrajudicial 
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executions, and officials who organized or instigated vio-
lence, remain immune from prosecution.17 
The mentioned reports and the information they provided were in-
strumental for the determination by the Prosecutor of the crimes against 
humanity falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC, including: murders, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population and other inhuman acts. In addition, they also largely assisted 
in the identification of the persons or groups involved in these crimes, as 
well as in their legal characterisation as crimes against humanity.18 
Anticipating the question on the probative value of the information 
provided in his application, the Prosecutor argued that: 
102. The Prosecutor submits that the Court should proceed to 
authorise the investigation so long as it is satisfied that the 
Prosecutor’s Application and supporting material reveal the 
existence of facts or information warranting investigation. 
The standard at this stage of the proceedings relates to the 
investigation of crimes of relevance to the situation as a 
whole and the existence of relevant information that provides 
a foundation to the request. It is not the opportunity to pro-
ceed with the identification of individual criminal liability. 
103. The expression ‘reasonable basis’ in Article 15 indicates 
that a decision to authorize the commencement of an investi-
gation shall be made pursuant to a lower standard than the 
one required for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or sum-
mons to appear. The test of reasonable basis is the lowest 
found in the Rome Statute, which applies four escalating 
tests for the progressive phases of the proceedings.19 
While Pre-Trial Chamber II authorised the investigation on the ba-
sis of the information from UNFFC and non-governmental organisa-
tions,20 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul provided an extensive dissenting opinion, 
                                                   
17 OTP, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3, pp. 13–14. (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c63dcc/). 
18 Ibid., pp. 22–36. 
19 Ibid., pp. 36–37 (footnotes omitted). 
20 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, 
ICC- 01/09-19, 31 March 2010, p. 83 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/). 
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in which he challenged the position of the majority on the characterisation 
of crimes against humanity based on reports of different sources, includ-
ing UNFFCs. He pointed out the following: 
19. […] The decision whether or not the Prosecutor may 
commence an investigation rests ultimately with the Pre-
Trial Chamber. Thus, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision pur-
suant to article 15(4) of the Statute is not of a mere adminis-
trative or procedural nature but requires a substantial and 
genuine examination by the judges of the Prosecutor’s Re-
quest. Any other interpretation would turn the Pre-Trial 
Chamber into a mere rubber-stamping instance. […]  
72. Indeed, crimes, such murder, rape, mutilations, looting, 
destruction of property, arson and eviction, seem to have oc-
curred on the territory of the Republic of Kenya at least in 
the course of events between 28/29 December 2007 and 28 
February 2008, commonly referred to as the post-election 
violence. Numerous abhorrent, brutal and vile incidents have 
been described in the reports upon which the Prosecutor 
based his determinations. But the point is not whether or not 
these crimes took place. The question is, whether those 
events reach the level of crimes against humanity as defined 
under the Statute and are thus subject to the jurisdiction of 
this Court. After having meticulously analysed the infor-
mation contained in the supporting material and the victims’ 
representations, I conclude that this threshold is not met.21 
Contrary to this position, regarding the supporting material, as pointed out 
by two authors, “Pre-Trial Chamber II noted in its decision on Kenya that, 
due to the limited powers the Prosecutor has during the preliminary phase, 
the information available to the Prosecutor is not expected to be ‘compre-
hensive’ or ‘conclusive’, compared to evidence gathered during the inves-
tigation”.22 
                                                   
21 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, pp. 11 and 38 (emphasis in original, 
footnotes omitted). 
22 Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejić, “Article 15 Prosecutor”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai 
Ambos (eds.), Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary, C.H. Beck, 
Hart, Nomos, Munich, 2016, p. 775. 
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26.3.2.2. Côte d’Ivoire 
After the completion of the preliminary examination and the drafting of 
the Article 53(1) report, the Prosecutor submits a request for authorisation 
of an investigation pursuant to Article 175 of the Rome Statute. In the 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the Prosecutor submitted this request on 23 
June 2011, which was then assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber III for review. 
There, in the examination of the available information, the Prosecutor 
started with the information provided by the UNFFC. These included: the 
press releases and reports of the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (‘UNOCI’); the Report of the Independent Commission of In-
quiry on Côte d’Ivoire established pursuant to resolution 16/25 adopted 
by the UN Human Rights Council in May 2011 and released in June 2011; 
the progress reports of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire; other reports established and issued by OHCHR in February and 
June 2011; and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(‘OCHA’) reports.23  
In the Request, UNFFC was the main source of information of the 
Prosecutor. He referred to the materials of the various UN bodies involved 
for the particulars of the crimes (alleged crimes and statements of facts; 
identification of places of their alleged commission; their time period; the 
identification of the persons or groups involved), as well as for their legal 
characterisation (including the reasons that they fall within the jurisdic-
tions of the Court).  
Relying largely on such UNFFC-based information provided by the 
Prosecutor, Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised the opening of an investiga-
tion by its decision of 3 October 2011.24 In her dissenting opinion, Judge 
Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi opined that believed the majority exceeded 
their supervisory role was their “fragmentary approach” to the supporting 
                                                   
23 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, OTP, Request for Authorisation of an 
Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, 23 June 2011, ICC-02/11-3, pp. 11–12 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/1b1939/). 
24 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Decision Pursuant 
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/7a6c19/). 
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material, which she thought should be taken holistically.25 This raises the 
general issue of the scope of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s assessment of the 
material, including UNFFC reports, contained in the Prosecutor’s Request.  
The case studies of Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire illustrate the extensive 
reliance of the Pre-Trial Chambers on UNFFC findings as channelled 
through the Prosecutor’s requests for authorisation of an investigation. 
This trend raises methodological and legal issues. UNFFC has been 
plagued by several weaknesses, as identified by this author elsewhere: 
The basic challenge of international fact-finding commis-
sions is the lack of a (common) regime. With a special em-
phasis on the creation and operation of international fact-
finding commissions, this section examines the reasons for 
the origins of this gap and its main consequences on the 
quality of fact-work and account-work. […]  
The multiplicity of the mandating bodies, their ad hoc 
approach and the lack of a legal framework relating to the 
establishment of international fact-finding commissions have 
caused the political, institutional and legal challenges faced 
by fact-finding in international human rights law, interna-
tional humanitarian law and international criminal law. […] 
The first challenge is caused by the multiplicity of the 
mandating bodies and the risk of competition […] Also, de-
pending on their decision-making process, the main mandat-
ing bodies are not in the same situation while establishing an 
international fact-finding commission. […] [A]s demonstrat-
ed by participants in a workshop jointly organised by the 
Permanent Mission of Portugal (during its presidency of the 
Security Council) and the UN Office of the Coordination for 
Humanitarian Affairs in New York in November 2011, there 
is no consistent approach to fact-finding between the Securi-
ty Council and the other UN mandating bodies. Moreover, 
even the practice of the Security Council itself is not coher-
ent. […] This is largely due to the political process of the de-
cision-making. […] 
                                                   
25 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Corrigendum to 
“Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi’s separate and partially dissenting opinion to the Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire”, 5 October 2011, ICC-02/11-15-Corr, pp. 13–16 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eb8724/). 
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The other consequence of the multiplicity of the man-
dating bodies has been the proliferation of international fact-
finding commissions. There has been a plethora of such 
commissions. Over the past two decades the OHCHR has 
provided support to 40 international fact-finding commis-
sions established by various UN bodies. Some countries 
have hosted several international fact-finding commissions 
in a short period. For example, various UN bodies, including 
the Human Rights Council, the Secretary-General (at the re-
quest of the Security Council) and the OHCHR, have de-
ployed five international fact-finding commissions in Côte 
d’Ivoire from 2002 to 2011. This proliferation is a serious 
challenge in international fact- finding. 
On the legal aspects, international fact-finding commis-
sions have been established on an ad hoc basis, mostly 
through the adoption of resolutions by the mandating bodies. 
Each international fact-finding commission has its legal 
framework and is mostly guided by the practice established 
so far by previous commissions.26 
These observations are relevant to the case studies on Kenya and 
Côte d’Ivoire: diversity and multiplicity of the mandating bodies of 
UNFFCs, in their nature (commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, 
special procedures), composition (independent experts, international civil 
servants, governmental experts, etc.) and in their methods of work (the 
independent commissions of inquiry working on the basis of higher 
standards than OHCHR staff and political missions, like the UN Security 
Sanctions Committee). These weaknesses of UNFFCs have a potential to 
negatively impact on the quality of information collected and used in the 
context of preliminary examinations and, subsequently, in the review of 
the Pre-Trial Chambers, as mentioned in the two dissenting opinions. That 
said, so far, UNFFCs’ reports have been used by the Court as sources of 
leads, rather than probative information. However, the judicial review of 
this information raises several issues, which will be further examined in 
the following section.  
                                                   
26 Mubiala, 2015, pp. 536–38, see supra note 9 (emphasis in original, headings omitted). 
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26.3.2.3. Issues Relating to the Judicial Use of UNFFCs’ Information 
by the ICC  
As seen in the two dissenting opinions above, the judicial consideration of 
the information and evidence provided by the UNFFCs has brought a 
number of legal issues to which ICC jurisprudence has not yet coherently 
responded. As this author has written elsewhere: 
The ICC prosecutor has initiated preliminary investigations 
in some situations, based on the findings and recommenda-
tions of international fact-finding commissions. This has 
been the case in Guinea (2009) and in Mali (2012). In addi-
tion, the Office of the Prosecutor has also requested the 
OHCHR to provide it with documentation and material col-
lected by international commissions of inquiry it has sup-
ported (for example, the 2004 International Commission of 
Inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire, whose report was not officially is-
sued). This raises the question as to whether human rights 
fact-findings could be used for judicial purposes. The juris-
prudence of the ICC on this is not coherent. While the ICC 
Trial Chamber in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case admitted 
the evidence provided by the UN Human Rights Field Office 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber in the Gbagbo case did not attribute probative val-
ue to the materials provided by several sources, including 
United Nations reports.27 
At the doctrinal level, the issue of the relationship between the ICC 
and UN fact-finding bodies was discussed during a Chatham House con-
ference held on 22 January 2014: 
PROBLEMS POSED BY INTERACTION BETWEEN 
FACT-FINDING AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW INVESTIGATIONS 
The main problem that arises when fact-finding commissions 
‘hand over’ to international criminal investigations is the 
multiple interviewing of witnesses. This inevitably entails 
conflicting statements, not because the witness is not truthful 
but owing to varying perspectives and standards of investiga-
tion. There is also the risk of taint of witnesses. Finally, the 
                                                   
27 Ibid., pp. 530–31 (italics in original, footnotes omitted). 
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collection of physical evidence and documents poses prob-
lems in terms of chain of custody and integrity of evidence. 
The first prosecutor of the ICC was heavily criticized 
for over-reliance on preceding investigations by NGOs and 
commissions, as well as human rights reports. Such criti-
cisms were voiced by both commentators and judges. Of late 
there has been an effort within the prosecution to conduct in-
vestigations that are more thorough and to uncover higher-
quality, more reliable information. However, a problem is 
posed by the court’s reliance, at least for lead purposes, on 
information emanating from other inquiries, and from states. 
Further, this poses a risk that a certain narrative becomes 
fixed early in the investigative process as to the course that 
events took and the attribution of responsibility. This can be 
difficult to rebut and test, and is another reason why fact-
finders should be of the highest possible quality.28  
The last observation above explains the move of UN fact-finding towards 
a ‘criminalisation’ of their methods of work. 
26.3.3. The ‘Criminalisation’ of the UNFFCs’ Methods of Work  
The trend of the ‘criminalisation’ of UNFFCs started with the emergence 
and development of the account-work by UNFFCs. This has resulted in 
the extension of their subject matter to international criminal law and to 
the adaptation of their methods of work in line with criminal justice. 
26.3.3.1. The Extension of UNFFCs’ Subject Matter to International 
Criminal Law 
Since 1993, there has been a trend for the UN mandating bodies to task 
UNFFCs with the identification of the perpetrators of the alleged viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian laws for their further 
prosecution. An example is the International Commission on Central Afri-
can Republic established in January 2014 following UNSC resolution 
2127 (2013) of 5 December 2013, where the Council requested the Secre-
tary-General: 
                                                   
28 Sir Nigel Rodley and Alex Whiting (meeting summary by Shehara de Soysa), UN Fact-
finding and International Criminal Investigation, Chatham House, 22 January 2014, p. 4, 
available on the web site of Chatham House.  
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to rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry 
[…] in order immediately to investigate reports of violations 
of international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and abuses of human rights in the Central African Re-
public by all parties since January 2013, to compile infor-
mation, to help identify the perpetrators of such violations 
and abuses, point out their possible criminal responsibility 
and to help ensure that those responsible are held accounta-
ble.29  
Despite the explicit reference to international human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian laws, the Commission interpreted its mandate more 
broadly to include international criminal law in the applicable law: 
2. Bodies of Applicable International Law 
102. The Commission has applied three bodies of interna-
tional law to the situation in the CAR: international human 
rights law, international humanitarian law, and international 
criminal law.  
[…] 
iii) International Criminal Law 
111. Although the Security Council resolution creating this 
Commission of Inquiry makes no specific reference to inter-
national criminal law, this body of law is an essential com-
plement to both international human rights law and interna-
tional humanitarian law, in that it establishes individual 
criminal liability for serious violations of those other two 
bodies of law. The Central African Republic ratified the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 3 Octo-
ber 2001, thereby giving the Court jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as defined in 
the Statute in relation to crimes committed on the territory of 
the CAR or by its nationals since 1 July 2002. On 30 May 
2014 the transitional government of the CAR referred the 
situation on the territory of the CAR since 1 August 2012 to 
the Prosecutor of the ICC.30 
                                                   
29 Emphasis added. 
30 International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic, Final Report, An-
nex, UN doc. S/2014/928, 22 December 2014, pp. 37, 39.  
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This trend for UNFFCs to include international criminal law in their 
subject matter, as seen in the CAR example, has resulted in an increased 
co-operation between the ICC-OTP and UNFFCs. This is illustrated, for 
example, by the Standard Operating Procedures adopted by the ICC and 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the provision of in-
formation collected by the human rights components of peacekeeping 
missions to the ICC-OTP. This co-operation raises the issue of the quality 
control of the information provided by UNFFC, in relation to criminal 
justice. 
26.3.3.2. Quality Control in UN Fact-Finding in Relation to 
Criminal Justice 
Based on the good practices developed during more than two decades, 
UNFFCs and OHCHR have improved the standard of proof in fact-work 
and account-work, developed criteria for information-sharing and taken 
initiatives for the professionalisation of UN fact-finding. 
26.3.3.2.1. Standards of Proof for the Determination of the Facts  
A field of special interest for the interaction between the ICC-OTP and 
UNFFCs in preliminary examinations is their respective methods of work. 
As already mentioned, the lower standard of proof of preliminary exami-
nation is close, if not similar, to that applied in UNFFC. As this author has 
written elsewhere: 
In principle and practice, international fact-finding commis-
sions apply human rights methodology, in the context of 
which valuable information may be collected and contribute 
to the establishment of patterns for criminal investigations. 
Recently, the hybrid commissions have developed quasi-
criminal methodological approaches. Influenced by the for-
mer or current judicial affiliation of their members and staff, 
some commissions of inquiry have adopted the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard of proof, which is relevant to 
criminal investigations, rather than to fact-finding outside 
criminal justice. International fact-finding commissions 
should apply the “reasonable ground to believe” standard of 
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proof (fact-work), as well as the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard of proof (account-work).31 
The Policy Paper, while providing that the ICC-OTP should indi-
cate in its report on preliminary examination the persons involved (if 
identified) in the perpetration of the alleged crimes,32 does not provide the 
applicable standard of proof. To be more relevant and useful for the ICC-
OTP’s preliminary examination, UNFFC should apply the ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ standard of proof. The criteria for the application of this stand-
ard of proof were articulated by the Darfur Commission. According to an 
author:  
The criteria of identifying perpetrators was first spelled out 
by the Darfur Commission of Inquiry, which decided that it 
could not comply with the standards adopted by criminal 
courts (proof of facts beyond a reasonable doubt), or with 
that used by international prosecutors and judges for the pur-
pose of confirming indictments (that there must be a prima 
facie case). It concluded that the most appropriate standard 
was that requiring a reliable body of material consistent with 
other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a per-
son may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the 
commission of a crime. 
The Darfur Commission also set the methodology of 
how to practically approach this issue. While it has collected 
sufficient and consistent material (both testimonial and doc-
umentary) to point to numerous (51) suspects, the Commis-
sion decided to withhold the names of these persons from the 
public domain. This decision was based on three main 
grounds: 1) the importance of the principles of due process 
and respect for the rights of the suspects; 2) the fact that the 
Commission has not been vested with investigation or prose-
cutorial powers; and 3) the vital need to ensure the protection 
of witnesses from possible harassment or intimidation. The 
Commission instead listed the names in a sealed file that was 
placed in the custody of the United Nations Secretary-
General. The Commission recommended that this file be 
handed over to a competent Prosecutor (the Prosecutor of the 
                                                   
31 Mubiala, 2015, pp. 524–525, see supra note 9. 
32 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, p. 19, see supra note 4. 
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International Criminal Court, according to the Commission’s 
recommendations), who may use that material as he or she 
deems fit for his or her investigations.33  
The adoption of the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard of proof by the 
UN Commission on Darfur was a milestone in the criminalisation of 
UNFFCs. Based on this practice, OHCHR has been developing guidance 
on “Attributing individual responsibility for violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law in UN-mandated commissions of in-
quiry, fact-finding missions and other investigations”, which was dis-
cussed at an experts’ meeting convened in Geneva on 18 October 2016. 
The meeting discussed, among other things, issues relating to information 
sharing with the criminal justice system, including in particular the ICC. 
26.3.3.2.2. Information-Sharing 
In several situations under preliminary examination, the ICC-OTP has 
relied on information provided by UNFFC, including OHCHR field offic-
es and human rights components of peace missions, where they exist, 
according to the 2004 UN-ICC Cooperation Agreement. This raises the 
issue of confidentiality. According to OHCHR’s policy, prior and in-
formed consent of victims and witnesses is required for the disclosure of 
information by the ICC. The concerned victim or witness must be in-
formed that the information and/or documentation he/she provides could 
be used for judicial purposes and subsequently give informed consent. 
Sharing this information or documentation with the ICC-OTP or another 
jurisdiction is, therefore, subject to such consent.  
In this regard, the challenges between the rules on the confidentiali-
ty of information and evidence gathered from the UN and the Prosecutor’s 
power to disclosure have been pointed out:  
the UN and the Prosecutor may agree that the former will 
provide documents to the Prosecutor “on condition of confi-
dentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evi-
dence,” and that the documents “shall not be disclosed to 
other organs of the Court or to third parties… without the 
consent of the United Nations.” The Prosecutor is expressly 
                                                   
33 Mona Rishmawi, “The Role of Human Rights Fact-Finding in the Prevention of Geno-
cide”, Paper presented at the International Conference on the Prevention of Genocide, 
Brussels, 31 March–1 April 2014, p. 8 (on file with the author).  
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authorized to enter into such confidentiality agreements by 
Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, which authorizes the 
Prosecutor to “(a)gree not to disclose, at any stage of the 
proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor 
obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of 
the information actually consents…” At the same time, how-
ever, the Prosecutor is required under Article 67(2) of the 
Rome Statute to “disclose to the defence evidence in the 
Prosecutor’s possession or control which he or she believes 
shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to 
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the 
credibility of prosecution evidence. The Prosecution is also 
obligated, under Rule 77 of the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, to “permit the defence to inspect any books, docu-
ments, photographs and other tangible objects in the posses-
sion or control of the Prosecutor, which are,” inter alia, “ma-
terial to the preparation of the defence.” 
Thus, there exists a tension between these provisions of 
the Rome Statute and the Rules, which allow the Prosecution 
to collect “lead” evidence on condition of confidentiality, on 
the one hand, and require the Prosecution to disclose or al-
low access to any potentially exonerating evidence, on the 
other. This tension came to a head in June 2008, when Trial 
Chamber I halted the trial against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
due to the Prosecution’s failure to disclose potentially excul-
patory documents obtained from the UN and other organiza-
tions on condition of confidentiality. […] the problem was 
ultimately resolved for purposes of the Lubanga trial, which 
commenced in late January 2009. However, given the fact 
that the Prosecution has admitted to relying heavily on con-
fidential lead evidence obtained from the UN and various 
non-governmental organizations in its investigations in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and has potentially done the 
same in other situations under investigation by the ICC, it is 
likely that the tension between Article 54(3)(e) and 67(2) of 
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the Rome Statute will become an issue before the Court 
again.34  
The issue of information-sharing of fact-finding in relation to crim-
inal justice system was thoroughly discussed by a Geneva experts’ meet-
ing in October 2016. Based on the outcome of this meeting, OHCHR has 
been preparing a guidance on “Attributing Individual Responsibility for 
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in UN-
Mandated Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-Finding Missions and other In-
vestigations”. It is expected that the guidelines under finalisation will con-
tribute to clarifying the issue of information-sharing by OHCHR and 
UNFFCs in relation to criminal justice system. Due to the increased reli-
ance of the ICC-OTP on the information and material collected by the 
UNFFCs and in order to ensure a high quality of this information, 
OHCHR, in addition to developing methodological tools on fact-work35 
and account-work (on-going), has been doing efforts to professionalise 
UN fact-finding, in particular the staff servicing UNFFC mechanisms. 
26.3.3.2.3. Towards the Professionalisation of UN Fact-Finding  
A main weakness of UNFFC is the ad hoc character of its membership 
and staffing. This has led to inconsistent practice and diverse quality of 
information collected by UNFFCs and shared with the ICC-OTP. To ad-
dress these challenges, OHCHR, as the supporting body to UNFFCs, has 
recently taken an initiative to put in place an arrangement for a dedicated 
staff to support UN human rights inquiries and fact-finding. If established, 
the proposed structure would contribute to streamline UNFFC and to de-
velop coherence as well as institutional memory. Such a structure would 
also facilitate the operational relationship between UNFFC mecha-
nisms/OHCHR and the ICC-OTP in preliminary examination.  
                                                   
34 The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, War 
Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law, American University, August 2009, 
pp. 43–45 (footnotes omitted). 
35 OHCHR, Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, United Nations, 
New York/Geneva, 2015. 
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26.4. Conclusion 
As illustrated by the three case studies on Darfur, Libya and CAR II, UN 
Commissions of Inquiry and FFCs have contributed to preliminary exam-
inations carried out by the ICC-OTP and the shared information has 
played a catalytic role in the opening of investigations by the latter into 
several situations. In turn, as seen in the situation of CAR II, UNFFCs 
have also benefited from the open source information gathered by the 
ICC-OTP in preliminary examinations. Overall, even when they have 
been deployed at the same time, the two entities have proceeded in a 
complementary, rather than competitive, manner. UN fact-finding and 
preliminary examinations are two cross-fertilizing and mutually reinforc-
ing processes. In particular, preliminary examinations include a phase (the 
Phase 2 analysis), which involves factual and legal analyses similar to 
those of UNFFCs. As the two processes relate to two separate systems, 
namely non-criminal and criminal justice systems, their interaction raises 
the issue of quality control of the shared information, as illustrated by the 
case studies on Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. This explains the on-going ef-
forts by OHCHR to streamline and professionalise UN fact-finding, with 
a view to improving the quality of information provided to the ICC-OTP. 
In particular, high-quality information from UNFFCs could contribute to 
increasing its probative value before the ICC.  
The interplay between UN fact-finding and preliminary examina-
tion provides, therefore, a good basis and an opportunity for the develop-
ment of the co-operation between OHCHR and the ICC-OTP. Due to the 
limited capacity of the ICC-OTP, a more institutionalised co-operation 
with OHCHR can revitalise the interplay of UNFFCs with the ICC-OTP 
in preliminary examinations. The exchange of information between 
OHCHR, as the depository entity of the archives of UNFFCs, and the 
ICC-OTP has been based, so far, on the 2004 UN-ICC Cooperation 
Agreement. In this regard, this author recommends that the two entities 
agree on the adoption of standards of operating procedures (SOPs) similar 
to those existing between the ICC-OTP and the UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, which are more specific and complementary to the 
2004 UN-ICC Cooperation Agreement. 
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27. Non-States Parties and 
the Preliminary Examination of 
Article 12(3) Declarations 
LING Yan 
27.1. Introduction 
27.1.1. The Preliminary Examination of Situations 
The duty of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) is 
different from that of national prosecutors and ad hoc tribunals. Prosecu-
tors in national systems are responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
all crimes within national jurisdictions.1 The jurisdiction of the two UN ad 
hoc tribunals (and the Residual Mechanism succeeding them) is limited to 
specific situations, namely, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Pros-
ecutors there have no power to select situations other than cases to inves-
tigate. In contrast, the ICC is a permanent global criminal court facing 
situations and core international crimes which may be committed any-
where. Therefore, the Prosecutor of the ICC has broader powers to inves-
tigate both situations and cases. 
The exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction may be triggered in three 
ways: (i) referral of a situation either by a State Party or (ii) by the UN 
Security Council, or (iii) by a decision of the Prosecutor to initiate an in-
vestigation proprio motu. In the last case, authorization by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber is required. Due to limited resources, the Prosecutor is unable to 
investigate and prosecute all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Prosecutor must select some situations for investigation and prosecu-
                                                   
  LING Yan has been a Professor at China University of Political Science and Law since 
2004 and a Senior Researcher at Collaborative Innovation Centre for Territorial Sovereign-
ty and Maritime Rights since 2014. Formerly, she worked as a legal officer for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998–2004).  
1 William Schabas, “‘O New World’: The Role of the Prosecutor of the International Crimi-
nal Court”, in Die Friedens-Warte: Blätter für internationale Verständigung und zwischen-
staatliche Organisation, 2008, vol. 83, no. 4, p. 29. 
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tion. Article 15 of the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor is vested 
with the primary responsibility to determine whether there are reasonable 
grounds for initiating an investigation. In doing so, the Office of the Pros-
ecutor (‘OTP’) should analyse the seriousness of the information it has 
obtained from various sources to ensure that they are reliable. Rule 48 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence further states that “in determining 
whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under 
Article 15, paragraph 3, the Prosecutor shall consider the factors set out in 
Article 53, paragraphs 1(a) to (c)”, including the jurisdiction of the Court, 
the admissibility and the interests of justice. 
In short, the preliminary examination is a stage in which the Prose-
cutor identifies situations that meet the requirements of the Statute before 
proceeding with an investigation. Although Article 15 seems only to re-
quire a preliminary examination when the Prosecutor exercises its proprio 
motu power, reading Article 15 in conjunction with Article 53 and accord-
ing to the Regulations of the OTP, the Prosecutor may initiate preliminary 
examinations on the basis of any information on crimes, a referral from a 
State Party or the Security Council. Even a declaration under Article 12(3) 
lodged by a non-State Party accepting the jurisdiction of the Court may 
also lead to a preliminary examination.2 
27.1.2. Declarations under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute 
As a permanent international criminal institution established by an inter-
national treaty, the ICC has a mandate to complement national jurisdic-
tions to effectively punish those responsible for the most serious interna-
tional crimes so as to put an end to the culture of impunity and “thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.3 
The jurisdiction of the ICC rests primarily on the consent of States 
Parties and on the basis of the principle of territorial and personal jurisdic-
                                                   
2 Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 
2013, para. 35 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/); International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’), Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, Regulation 25, para. 1 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
3 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Preamble (‘ICC Statute’) (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
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tions recognized in criminal law,4 that is, when the “State on the territory 
of which the conduct in question occurred” or “the State of which the 
person accused of the crime is a national” is a party to the Rome Statute. 
A State Party ipso facto expresses its consent to accept the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion with respect to the core international crimes committed on its territo-
ry or committed by its nationals. As a result, the ICC also has jurisdiction 
over international crimes committed by nationals of a non-State Party to 
the Rome Statute on the territory of a State Party5 (although countries like 
China and the United States have strongly objected to the exercise of such 
jurisdiction).6 The ICC does not have jurisdiction over the situations in 
which a crime has been committed on the territory of a non-State Party 
unless the UN Security Council refers the situation to the ICC.7 
Nevertheless, Article 12(3) provides opportunities for non-States 
Parties to use the ICC to punish perpetrators of core international crimes 
committed on their territories “without putting the States under pressures 
to accede to the Statute” themselves.8 It provides that: “if the acceptance 
of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, 
that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question”. 
The provision existed as early as in the 1994 draft Statute of the In-
ternational Law Commission.9 There was no dispute when drafting the 
Statute on giving non-States Parties the opportunity to use the Court.10 In 
                                                   
4 Young Sok Kim, “The Preconditions to the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute”, in Journal of International 
Law and Practice, 1999, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 78. 
5 ICC Statute, Article 12(1) and (2), see supra note 3. 
6 “Guangya Wang talks about the Rome Statute of the ICC”, in Legal Daily (《王光亚谈国
际刑事法院罗马规约》，法制日报), 29 July 1998, p. 4; David Scheffer, “How to Turn 
the Tide Using the Rome Statute’s Temporal Jurisdiction”, in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2004, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 28. 
7 ICC Statute, Article 12(3), see supra note 3. 
8 Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M. El Zeidy, and Hdctor Olasolo, “The International Criminal 
Court’s and ad hoc Jurisdiction Revisited”, in American Journal of International Law, 
2005, vol. 99, no. 2, p. 422. 
9 International Law Commission, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with 
Commentaries 1994, Article 22(4) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/390052/). 
10 Hans-Peter Kaul, “Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction”, in Antonio Cassese, 
Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, vol. I, p. 610. 
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the discussions of the Bureau of Whole Committee at the Rome Confer-
ence, there was no substantive objection to this provision either. Views 
were positive as this provision would expand the scope of the ICC’s juris-
diction.11 The United States delegation also considered it a “useful and 
necessary provision”.12 
27.1.3. Declarations Lodged by Non-States Parties Accepting the 
Jurisdiction of the ICC 
The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. By the end of 2016, 
Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, Palestine, Ukraine and Egypt had lodged Article 
12(3) declarations. 
27.1.3.1. Uganda 
Uganda ratified the Rome Statute on 14 July 2002, which entered into 
force on 1 September 2002. Thus, Uganda was a non-State Party for a 
two-month period. On 16 December 2003, the President of Uganda re-
ferred the situation concerning the Uganda’s LRA to the ICC.13 On 17 
June 2004, the Prosecutor informed the President of the Court of Ugan-
da’s self-referral and the declaration of provisional acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the two-month period.14 
27.1.3.2. Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire signed the Rome Statute on 3 November 1998, but it had 
not ratified the Statute afterwards. It lodged a declaration in 2003 accept-
ing the jurisdiction of the Court over the crimes committed on its territory 
since 19 September 2002 when a military coup occurred leading to a civil 
war, with no end date.15 The Prosecutor did not take any immediate action 
                                                   
11 Carsten Stahn et al., 2005, p. 423, see supra note 8.  
12 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 288. 
13 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as 
Amended on 27 September 2005, 27 September 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05-53, p. 9 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/b1010a/). 
14 ICC, Situation in Uganda, Decision Assigning the Situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Cham-
ber II, 5 July 2004, ICC-02/04-1, Annex (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b904bb/). 
15 Côte d’Ivore, Déclaration de Reconnaissance de la Competence de la Cour Pénale Inter-
nationale [Declaration recognizing the Jurisidiction of the International Criminal Court], 
18 April 2003 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/036bd2/). 
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on this declaration until 2006. He said a working group would be sent to 
Côte d’Ivoire when security condition allowed.16 The President of the ICC 
reported in 2006 to the United Nations General Assembly that five situa-
tions, including Côte d’Ivoire, had been under analysis.17 By 2010, the 
Prosecutor had not yet announced a conclusion after seven years of pre-
liminary examination. 
In October and November 2010, Côte d’Ivoire held a presidential 
election, in which two candidates, Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Ouattara, were 
announced to be elected by different authorities, leading to a nationwide 
armed conflict. On 14 December 2010, Mr. Ouattara, who was announced 
President-elect by the Independent Electoral Commission, sent a letter to 
the President, the Registrar and the Prosecutor of the ICC respectively 
confirming Côte d’Ivoire’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.18 On 3 
May 2011, when the Constitutional Council also announced his election, 
Mr. Ouattara sent another letter to the Prosecutor reiterating that Côte 
d’Ivoire had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.19 The Prosecutor then 
requested a Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize an investigation into the situa-
tion in Côte d’Ivoire on 23 June 2011,20 which was approved on 3 Octo-
ber 2011.21 
27.1.3.3. Palestine 
Between December 2008 and January 2009, Israel carried out a three-
week military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in response to 
rocket and mortar attacks lunched by Hamas against Israeli civilians. The 
                                                   
16 Sixth Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court, Compilation of Statements, 
23 March 2006, p. 7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b65c5d/). 
17 Report of the International Criminal Court for 2005–2006, UN Doc. A/61/217, 3 August 
2006, para. 32 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/11ef2c/). 
18 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Laurent 
Koudou Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of 
the Proceedings, 12 December 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-321, para. 55 (Judgment on the Ap-
peal) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/649ff5/). 
19 Ibid., para. 56. 
20 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14, para. 2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
7a6c19/). 
21 Ibid. 
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international community has condemned the violation of the law of armed 
conflict by both parties of the conflict, including States, non-State entities 
and individuals.22 The United Nations Human Rights Council established 
a UN Truth Commission led by Justice Richard J. Goldstone, the former 
Prosecutor of the ICTY, to carry out investigations into the event.23 
Before the ‘Goldstone Report’ was released, the Minister of Justice 
of Palestine lodged on 22 January 2009 a declaration with the Registrar of 
the ICC accepting the jurisdiction of the Court over crimes committed on 
the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002.24 Since neither Palestine nor 
Israel was a party to the Rome Statute, it would only be possible for the 
Court to exercise jurisdiction if Palestine lodged an Article 12(3) declara-
tion, or if the UN Security Council referred the situation to the ICC. 
It took three years for the Prosecutor to decide not to consider the 
declaration on the ground that he had no authority to determine whether 
Palestine was a “State” within the meaning of Article 12(3) that could 
accept the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court.25 Even when a majority reso-
lution of the United Nations General Assembly granted Palestine the sta-
tus of an observer State to the United Nations on 29 November 2012,26 the 
Prosecutor insisted that the change in Palestine’s status in the United Na-
tions could not be applied retroactively and it cannot make the declaration 
valid because at the time when Palestine had lodged the declaration in 
2009, it had no statehood.27 On 31 December 2014, Mohammed Abbas, 
the President of the State of Palestine, lodged another Article 12(3) decla-
ration with the Registrar of the ICC accepting the Court’s jurisdiction 
                                                   
22 Yaël Ronen, “ICC Jurisdiction over Acts Committed in Gaza Strip”, in Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice, 2010, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 4.  
23 UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights in Palestine and Other 
Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/ca9992/). 
24 Palestine, Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 21 
January 2009 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d9b1c6/). 
25 ICC, Situation in Palestine, 3 April 2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f5d6d7/). 
26 Status of Palestine in the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/67/19, December 2012 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/3a1916/). 
27 ICC, The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome Statute, 7 January 2015 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/59dd45/). 
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since 13 June 2014,28 and deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations the instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on 2 Jan-
uary 2015.29 Only on 16 January 2015 did the Prosecutor announce the 
start of a preliminary examination on Palestine.30 
27.1.3.4. Ukraine 
Ukraine signed the Rome Statute on 20 January 2000. The Government 
had not ratified the Rome Statute because the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine declared that the Rome Statute was incompatible with the Consti-
tution. From the end of 2013 to early 2014, anti-government demonstra-
tion took place in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, and a fierce conflict oc-
curred between the demonstrators and the riot police maintaining the or-
der as well as internal security force soldiers, causing hundreds of casual-
ties. On 25 February 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a resolution 
declaring, in accordance with Article 11(1) and Article 12(2) and (3) of 
the Rome Statute, acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crimes 
against humanity committed by senior Ukrainian national officials against 
Ukrainian nationals during their peaceful demonstrations between 21 No-
vember 2013 and 22 February 2014. The declaration also named the for-
mer President, the former Attorney General and the former Minister of the 
Interior of Ukraine to be held criminally responsible for the crimes.31 On 
17 April 2014, following the receipt of the declaration, the Prosecutor 
opened a preliminary examination of the situation with a view to ascer-
taining whether the criteria set out in the Rome Statute for initiating inves-
tigations had been met.32 Further, on 8 September 2015, the Government 
of Ukraine lodged a second declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction 
                                                   
28 ICC Registry, Letter from ICC Registrar to President Mahmoud Abbas, 7 February 2015, 
2015/IOR/3496/HvH (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3bea2d/). 
29 The State of Palestine Accedes to the Rome Statute, see supra note 27. 
30 ICC, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Fatou Bensouda opens a prelim-
inary examination of the situation in Palestine”, 16 January 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/1dcbe5/). 
31 Ukraine, Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the International Criminal 
Court on the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by Ukraine 
over crimes against humanity, committed by senior officials of the state, 25 February 2014 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a65fa/). 
32 ICC, “The Prosector of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda open up a pre-
liminary investigation in Ukraine”, 25 April 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8d811f/).  
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in relation to alleged crimes committed on its territory from 20 February 
2014 onwards, with no end date.33 Consequently, the Prosecutor decided 
to extend the temporal scope of the existing preliminary examination to 
include alleged crimes occurring after 20 February 2014.34 
27.1.3.5. Egypt 
In July 2013, after some large-scale protests, the Egyptian government of 
the first elected president, Morsi, was overthrown by the former Egyptian 
military leader and current incumbent President, Abdel Fattah al Sisi. 
Egypt is not a party to the Rome Statute. On 13 December 2013, an Egyp-
tian lawyer representing the Liberty and Justice Party and others submit-
ted a document signed on 13 August 2013 to the Registrar of the Court 
seeking to accept jurisdiction since 1 June 2013. However, the OTP con-
cluded that the document was not submitted by the authorities with “full 
power” on behalf of the State of Egypt,35 and therefore treated it as a 
‘communication’ rather than an Article 12(3) declaration. 
27.1.4. Purposes of Article 12(3) Declarations 
Article 12(3) declarations have two main purposes. First, it allows the ICC 
to exercise jurisdiction over a non-State Party that may want to obtain the 
ICC Prosecutor’s assistance in the investigation and prosecution of core 
international crimes in its territory. The declarations of Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ukraine as well as the unsuccessful declaration of Egypt fall into this type, 
sharing the same purpose as self-referrals by States Parties.36  
The Palestinian declarations of 2009 and 2014 were slightly differ-
ent, intending to enable the Court to investigate and prosecute crimes 
committed by Israeli nationals on its territory, including the Gaza Strip, 
                                                   
33 Ukraine, Declaration by Ukraine lodged under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, 8 Sep-
tember 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b53005/). 
34 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, 12 November 2015, para. 80 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac0ed2/). 
35 ICC, The Determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the Communication Received 
in Relation to Egypt, 8 May 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2945cd/). 
36 They are self-referral of situations in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central 
Africa Republic, Mali and Gabon. 
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although the declaration did not explicitly say so. Their purpose is similar 
to the referral by Comoros, a State Party.37 
Another purpose is to extend the Court’s temporal jurisdiction over 
a situation. This can be seen from the Palestine’s declaration of 31 De-
cember 2014. Palestine deposited a document of accession with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations on 2 January 2015. Pursuant to Article 
126(2), the Rome Statute will enter into force on the first day of the 
month 60 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification. Accord-
ingly, the Rome Statute began to take effect in respect of Palestine on 1 
April 2015. The Palestinian declaration extends the Court’s temporal ju-
risdiction over the alleged crimes to 13 June 2014. Meanwhile, Uganda’s 
declaration was lodged when Uganda was already a State Party. The dec-
laration was merely for filling the temporal gap pursuant to Article 11(2), 
which states that:  
If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into 
force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with re-
spect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration 
under article 12, paragraph 3. 
Although there were discussions among scholars about whether a 
non-State Party can make an Article 12(3) declaration accepting the exer-
cise of the Court’s jurisdiction retroactively,38 this has been confirmed by 
the Court.39 
In addition to those purposes, however, some commentators consid-
ered that Article 12(3) is designed for the Prosecutor to promote the Court 
and the Rome Statute,40 in light of the reference to “request of the Prose-
cutor” in Rule 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This may 
happen where, having received information, “the Prosecutor invites or 
encourages a non-State Party to lodge a declaration so as to allow for a 
                                                   
37 The situation in Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia was referred by 
Comoros.  
38 Kevin Jon Heller, “Yes, Palestine Could Accept the ICC’s Jurisdiction Retroactively”, in 
Opinio Juris, 29 November 2012; Alexander Wills, “The ICC’s Retroactive Jurisdiction, 
Revisited”, in Opinio Juris, 29 January 2013. 
39 Judgment on the appeal, para. 83, see supra note 18. 
40 Carsten Stahn et al., 2005, pp. 421–431 and 423, see supra note 8.  
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possible investigation and prosecution by the Prosecutor”.41 According to 
one commentator, an Article 12(3) declaration is required when a situation 
concerning a non-State Party has been referred to the ICC or investigation 
has been initiated by the Prosecutor.42 The non-State Party may then make 
a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.  
Nevertheless, while the original idea of Rule 44(1) may be specifi-
cally for this type of declaration, this has not happened in practice. So far, 
all declarations have been made on the States’ own initiative without the 
Prosecutor’s involvement. This type of declaration is certainly allowed by 
the Rome Statute. It has been well recognized that Article 12(3) is de-
signed to extend the scope of the Statute’s application by offering non-
States Parties the opportunity to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad 
hoc basis when the crimes in question have been committed on its territo-
ry or by its nationals43 and the situation has not been referred to or inves-
tigated by the ICC Prosecutor. To require that the Prosecutor must already 
have initiated an investigation with respect to a situation before a non-
State Party lodged a declaration to accept the Court’s jurisdiction will 
restrict the scope of Article 12(3)’s application.44 It would also be illogical 
if the Prosecutor could take investigative steps proprio motu with regard 
to a situation in which crimes have been committed by nationals of a non-
State Party on a territory of another non-State Party before the latter has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.45 
                                                   
41 Steven Freeland, “How Open Should the Door Be? Declarations by Non-States Parties 
Under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in Nordic 
Journal of International Law, 2006, vol. 75, no. 2, p. 222. 
42 Sharon A. Williams and William A. Schabas, “Article 12 Precondition to the exercise of 
jurisdiction”, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, C.M. Beck, 2008, p. 559. 
43 Carsten Stahn et al., 2005, p. 423, see supra note 8. 
44 Carsten Stahn et al., 2005, p. 425, see supra note 8. 
45 Ibid., p. 426. 
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27.2. Procedure Applicable to Article 12(3) Declarations in the 
Preliminary Examination Stage 
27.2.1. Applying the Same Procedure to Article 12(3) Declarations 
as the Procedure Applied to the Prosecutor’s Proprio Motu 
Proceedings 
Neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ex-
pressly provide for the procedure following an Article 12(3) declaration. 
Carsten Stahn and others opine that the declaration may be treated “either 
as analogous to a state referral under Article 14 or as a proprio motu pro-
ceeding of the prosecutor under Article 15”.46 At first glance, they seem to 
favour the second procedural option because in the negotiation of the 
Rome Statute, it was considered that non-States Parties should not be enti-
tled to refer a situation. To treat a declaration as a self-referral will entitle 
the non-State Party the privilege that a State Party enjoys.47 In their view, 
an Article 12(3) declaration requires neither actions to be taken by the 
Prosecutor, nor the judicial review by the Court.48 
The Appeals Chamber supported the above approach. It ruled in the 
Gbagbo case that as a member of the Assembly of States Parties, a State 
Party enjoys numerous rights including the right to refer situations, 49 
while a non-State Party accepting the jurisdiction of the Court by lodging 
an Article 12(3) declaration is obliged to co-operate with the Court, but 
does not have all the rights or obligations of a State Party.50 
Further, States’ acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is only a pre-
condition for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction. In this regard, an Arti-
cle 12(3) declaration is said to be similar to the practice of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, which allows a State to accept the jurisdiction of 
the Court on an ad hoc basis in response to the allegation made by another 
State.51 Therefore, an Article 12(3) declaration is only a precondition for 
                                                   
46 Ibid., p. 424. 
47 Ibid., p. 425. 
48 Ibid., p. 423. 
49 Judgment on the appeal, para. 72, see supra note 18. 
50 Ibid., para. 74. 
51 Schabas, 2010, p. 289, see supra note 12. 
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the Court to exercise jurisdiction and it neither refers a situation, nor trig-
gers the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.52 
The Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber have endorsed 
this view by ruling that an Article 12(3) declaration “could not be mistak-
en for a referral”.53 The Court indicated a distinction between Article 12 
and Articles 13–15 of the Statute. The former sets out the preconditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction, while the latter specify the trigger mecha-
nism for such exercise.54 The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that a dec-
laration could involve in a specific situation, but “the question of whether 
a ‘situation’ exists becomes relevant only once the Court considers wheth-
er it may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 13 of the Statute”.55 Con-
sequently, with the exception of Uganda’s declaration as mentioned before, 
the rest of the declarations lodged by non-States Parties have been treated 
as proprio motu proceedings of the Prosecutor under Article 15. 
In fact, the term “situation” appears throughout the Rome Statute 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence without a definition therein. Articles 
13 and 14 merely refer to a “situation in which one or more crimes appear 
to have been committed”. Pre-Trial Chamber I has elaborated that situa-
tions are “generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some 
cases personal parameters”. 56  Therefore, a situation contains “broader 
parameters than that of a case and denotes the confines within which the 
Prosecutor is to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an 
investigation”.57  
                                                   
52 Ibid., p. 289. 
53 ICC, Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Decision on the “Corrigendum of the chal-
lenge to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the basis of articles 12(3), 
19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute filed by the Defence for President Gbagbo 
(ICC- 02/11-01/11-129)”, 15 August 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-212, para. 57 (Decision on 
the Jurisdiction) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0d14c3/); Judgment on the Appeal, para. 
58, see supra note 18. 
54 Decision on the Jurisdiction, para.57, see supra note 53. 
55 Judgment on the Appeal, paras. 81–82, see supra note 18.  
56 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on Applications for 
Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS-1, VPRS-2, VPRS-3, VPRS-4, VPRS-5, VPRS-6, 
17 January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 65 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
2fe2fc/).  
57 Rod Rastan, “What Is a Case for the Purpose of the Rome Statute?”, in Criminal Law 
Forum, 2008, vol. 19 (3–4), p. 435. 
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Whereas the Rome Statute does not prevent a non-State Party from 
making an Article 12(3) declaration with a view to becoming a State Party 
in the future,58 in reality, non-States Parties do so only to accept the exer-
cise of the Court’s jurisdiction over specific situations, for example, the 
Palestinian and the Ukrainian declarations. Having “temporal, territorial 
and in some cases personal parameters” contained in the Article 12(3) 
declarations, those non-States Parties have combined two steps: to express 
their consent to accept the jurisdiction of the Court and to refer their own 
situations to the Prosecutor.  
So far, almost all situations referred by States Parties have concerned 
themselves.59 This is likely because States rarely accuse foreign officials or 
nationals of serious international crimes.60 By analogy, a non-State Party 
accepting the Court’s ad hoc jurisdiction always with crimes committed on 
its territory or by its nationals in mind (not just to support the Court). 
As mentioned, such a non-State Party will not “have all the rights or 
obligations of a State Party”.61 A State Party may involve in the decision 
on the “budget of the Court”, “management oversight to the organs of the 
Court”, and “matters relating to non-cooperation by States”. In addition, it 
has “the right to refer situations to the Court” and “the right to nominate 
candidates for the elected offices of the Court”. It may also propose 
amendments to the Statute and the Rules of the Court and has the right to 
vote on the amendments.62 
In contrast, a non-State Party lodging an Article 12(3) declaration has 
none of those rights – not even the right to refer its own situation. On the 
other hand, the Rome Statute imposes obligations on the non-State Party to 
co-operate with the Court without any delay and exception in accordance 
with Part 9 just as a State Party. Does the phrase “without any delay and 
                                                   
58 Freeland, 2006, p. 223, see supra note 41. 
59 Here, ‘self-referral’ is used to mean that a State Party refers a situation in which one or 
more crimes have been committed in its territory by its nationals. According to Darryl 
Robison, ‘self-referral’ is the term used “when a state party refers a situation on its own 
territory”. See Darryl Robinson, “The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Re-
flections on ICL Discourse”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2011, vol. 9, no. 
2, p. 357. 
60 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 396. 
61 Judgment on the Appeal, para. 74, see supra note 18. 
62 Ibid., para. 72. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 454 
exception” mean that such a State has to co-operate even on matters unre-
lated to the crimes on their territories – for example, to arrest and transfer a 
foreign national who was found in their country? If this is the case, the 
rights and obligations for an accepting State appear to be unbalanced. 
It is argued that it is inappropriate to treat situations arising out of 
Article 12(3) declarations as the Prosecutor’s preliminary examinations, 
because they are not the same. First, the situation was brought to the Pros-
ecutor by a State publicly and formally, unlike information on crimes re-
ceived from various undisclosed sources. In the latter case, the Prosecutor 
has discretion to decide whether to initiate a preliminary examination or 
not, as well as whether to make the situation arising out of the information 
public or not. In addition, Regulation 25 of the Regulations of the OTP 
also makes distinction between the two by listing “any information on 
crimes” in sub-paragraph (a) and an Article 12(3) declaration in sub-
paragraph (c). To treat them with the same procedure applicable to the 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu proceedings makes such separate categoriza-
tion redundant. 
Second, the wording of Articles 12 and 13 makes it clear that by be-
coming a State Party, the State only accepts the jurisdiction of the Court 
(Article 12(1)), which may exercise its jurisdiction if a criminal situation 
is referred by a State Party (Article 13(1)). Article 12(3) states that by 
lodging a declaration, a non-State Party accepts “the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the Court” rather than accepts the jurisdiction of the Court. Con-
sequently, an Article 12(3) declaration has two implications. The accept-
ing State accepts the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court over the situation it 
may refer to the Court and the Court can exercise its jurisdiction with 
respect to the situation arising out of the declaration.  
27.2.2. Application of the Procedure to Article 12(3) Declarations 
and Its Consequence 
27.2.2.1. The Procedure Applied to Article 12(3) Declarations 
While the OTP may initiate preliminary examinations on a referral by a 
State Party or the Security Council, any information on crimes or an Arti-
cle 12(3) declaration, they are treated in two different ways. Regulation 45 
of the Regulations of the Court requires the Prosecutor to “inform the Pres-
idency in writing as soon as a situation has been referred to the Prosecutor 
by a State Party under article 14 or by the Security Council under article 13, 
sub-paragraph (b)”. In contrast, this is not required for any information on 
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crimes and an Article 12(3) declaration. The Registrar need not inform the 
Presidency of the declaration either, but shall merely inform the accepting 
State of the declaration’s consequence.63 Accordingly, whereas the Presi-
dency shall assign a situation referred by a State Party or the Security 
Council to a Pre-Trial Chamber, which shall be responsible for any matters 
arising out of it, the Presidency can do nothing for an Article 12(3) declara-
tion and must leave all matters arising from it to the Prosecutor. 
Further, whereas the Prosecutor can directly investigate a situation 
referred by a State Party or the Security Council after preliminary exami-
nation, for an Article 12(3) declaration, he or she shall request the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s authorization if there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation. It is only then and for that purpose that the Prosecutor will 
inform the Presidency of the situation concerned with the declaration. 
27.2.2.2. Lack of Judicial Oversight as a Consequence of the 
Application 
Due to the different procedures, while the Pre-Trial Chambers take charge 
of situations referred by States Parties,64 there is little judicial oversight 
for preliminary examinations of the situations arising out of Article 12(3) 
declarations. The Prosecutor may protract or even terminate those prelim-
inary examinations, which may not be challenged by the lodging State.65  
                                                   
63 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002, Rule 44(2). 
64 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision Assigning the Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2004, ICC-01/04-01/06-
10 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/65a7bb/); Situation in Uganda, Decision Assigning the 
Situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, see supra note 14; ICC, Situation in the Cen-
tral African Republic, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central African Republic to 
Pre-Trial Chamber III, 20 January 2005, ICC-01/05 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
5532e5/); ICC, Situation in Mali, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Republic of Mali 
to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 19 July 2012, ICC-01/12-1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
f0774d/); ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic 
Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision Assigning the Situation on Registered 
Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambo-
dia to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2013, ICC-01/13-1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
8e4e80/); ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic II, Decision Assigning the Situa-
tion in the Central African Republic II to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 18 June 2014, ICC-01/14-1 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1cfbfe/); ICC, Situation in the Gabonese Republic, Deci-
sion assigning the Situation in the Gabonese Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 4 October 
2016, ICC-01/16-1, 4 October 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e5c5f8/). 
65 Freeland, 2005, p. 227, see supra note 41. 
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This can be observed from the treatment of Egypt’s declaration. On 
5 September 2014, Morsi and the Liberal Party requested the Court to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to act upon the declaration. Pre-Trial 
Chamber II determined that the Prosecutor could take the initiative to deal 
with the information he or she had obtained and make the decision to ini-
tiate the investigation in accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
The conditions for judicial review of the Prosecutor’s decision vary de-
pending on the triggering mechanism or the basis for Prosecutor’s deci-
sion. The Pre-Trial Chamber may only review the decision only if its basis 
is solely that the investigation does not serve the interests of justice. Since 
the Prosecutor’s refusal to open preliminary examination in Egypt was not 
on that basis, the Chamber could not review it.66  
For a situation referred by a State Party, the assigned Pre-Trial 
Chamber can consider relevant matters very quickly. The referring State 
may also request the Pre-Trial Chamber to reconsider the decision of the 
Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation. For example, in the Gaza 
Freedom Flotilla situation referred by Comoros on 14 May 2013,67 fol-
lowing preliminary examination, the Prosecutor publicly announced her 
determination that there was no reasonable basis to proceed with an inves-
tigation.68 Comoros applied to review that decision.69 On 16 July 2015, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I decided on the request.70 This is a safeguard against 
                                                   
66 ICC, Decision on the ‘Request for review of the Prosecutor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not 
to open a Preliminary Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Re-
public of Egypt and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, 22 September 2014, ICC-
RoC46(3)-01/14, paras. 6–9 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ced5a/). 
67 ICC, Referral under Articles 14 and 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute arising from the 31 May 
2010, Gaza Freedom Flotilla situation, 14 May 2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
93705a/). 
68 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Article 53(1) 
Report, 6 November 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/43e636/). 
69 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Public redacted version of application for Review pursuant 
to Article 53(3)(a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014 not to initiate an in-
vestigation in the Situation, 29 January 2015, ICC-01/13-3-Red (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/b60981/). 
70 ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Repub-
lic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015, ICC-01/13-
34 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/). 
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the abuse of power or inappropriate exercise of power by the Prosecutor.71 
The same safeguard should be provided to non-States Parties who have 
made declarations to accept the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. 
27.2.2.3. Lack of Time Limits 
Neither the Statute nor the Rules and Procedures of Evidence of the Court 
provide time limits for the Prosecutor to make a decision on preliminary 
examinations. The Prosecutor has also made similar statements.72  
Schabas considers it “an entirely reasonable position”,73 because the 
Prosecutor needs time to evaluate the issue of complementarity that de-
pends upon the conduct of the national justice system.74 However, some 
commentators have noted that the Prosecutor has progressed with prelim-
inary examination quickly in some situations, while “drawing out his 
analysis in others”,75 which may lead to an impression that the Prosecutor 
does not allocate time and resources evenly among preliminary examina-
tions. It may also make the Prosecutor’s work appear less credible. 
In practice, preliminary examinations initiated proprio motu have 
generally taken a long time. The preliminary examination of the situation 
in Kenya that took about two years (from December 2007 to November 
2009) was both fast and unique. The conclusion of the preliminary exami-
nation of the situation in Republic of Korea took three years and a half 
(December 2010–June 2014), Honduras five years (November 2010–
October 2015), Georgia seven years (August 2008–October 2015) and 
Afghanistan nine years (2007–2016). The ongoing preliminary examina-
tion of the situations in Colombia, Guinea and Nigeria (opened in 2006, 
2009 and 2010 respectively) have not yet been completed. 
In contrast, preliminary examinations in situations referred by 
States Parties have been processed quickly. The shortest preliminary ex-
amination was that of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
                                                   
71 Freeland, 2005, p. 228, see supra note 41. 
72 OTP, Report on preliminary examination, para. 13, see supra note 32. 
73 Williams A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge 
University Press, 2017, p. 238. 
74 Ibid.; “Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Courts”, in Human 
Rights Brief, vol. 19, no. 2, 2012, p. 49 (on the International Criminal Court). 
75 Ibid. 
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Congo, which took only two months from April to June 2004.76 The long-
est one took two years and a half in the situation of the Central African 
Republic I from December 2004 to May 2007.77 Even in the Gaza Flotilla 
situation referred by Comoros on 14 May 2013, it only took the Prosecu-
tor about one year and a half to announce the conclusion of the prelimi-
nary examination on 6 November 2014.78 This is partly because the Pre-
Trial Chambers have overseen the situations. 79  For instance, Pre-Trial 
Chamber III said in the situation in Central African Republic:  
[T]he preliminary examination of a situation pursuant to arti-
cle 53(1) of the Statute and rule 104 of the Rules must be 
completed within a reasonable time from the reception of a 
referral by a State Party under articles 13(a) and 14 of the 
Statute, regardless of its complexity.  
Having noted that the preliminary examinations of the situations in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Northern Uganda were completed 
within two to six months, the Chamber requested the Prosecutor to provide 
the Chamber and the Government of the Central African Republic with a 
report on the status of the preliminary examination on a certain date.80 
Since situations specified in Article 12(3) declarations have been 
treated as Prosecutor’s proprio motu proceedings, their preliminary exam-
inations also took much longer. For example, after the government of 
Côte d’Ivoire made a declaration in 2003, it was only at the end of 2010 
that the Prosecutor resumed analysing the situation. It concluded that the 
statutory criteria established by the Rome Statute for the opening of an 
investigation were met on 19 May 2011.81 Also, more than three years 
                                                   
76 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (available on the Court’s web site). 
77 Situation in the Cenral African Republic (available on the Court’s web site). 
78 ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on 
concluding the preliminary examination of the situation referred by the Union of Comoros: 
“Rome Statute legal requirements have not been met”, 6 November 2014 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/e745a0/). 
79 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 246. 
80 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Decision Requesting Information on the 
Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, 1 
December 2006, ICC-01/05-6, pp. 4–5 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/76e607/). 
81 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Decision Assigning the Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 20 May 2011, ICC-02/11-1 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/aa6613/). 
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(from January 2009 to April 2012) had passed after the Palestinian author-
ity made a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction before the Prose-
cutor decided that he could not determine whether Palestine had the right 
to lodge such a declaration.  
27.3. Determination of the Validity of Article 12(3) Declarations 
In preliminary examinations, according to Article 53 of the Rome Statute, 
the Prosecutor shall consider whether a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been or is being committed, the admissibility, gravity and 
the interests of justice. The Statute, Rules and jurisprudence of the Court 
have never envisaged that the Prosecutor shall determine whether a decla-
ration is valid or not in the first place.  
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor has examined the validity of the decla-
rations made by Palestine and Egypt. In contrast, some scholars have 
questioned the validity of the Ukraine’s declaration, which was neglected 
by the Prosecutor.  
27.3.1. Authority to Determine Whether Palestine is Qualified as a 
State Capable to Make a Declaration 
After receiving the declaration lodged by the Palestinian authority, the 
Prosecutor identified that the first step in the determination of jurisdiction 
was to ascertain whether the declaration meets statutory requirements,82 
namely the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 12. In 
other words, although the determination of jurisdiction involves analysing 
whether the situation fulfils the “temporal requirements; meets territorial 
or personal jurisdiction, and falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the Court”,83 the Prosecutor added one more step.84 Between 2009 and 
2012, the Prosecutor focused on the issue of whether Palestine was a 
“State” and thus entitled to make an Article 12(3) declaration at all. The 
Prosecutor endeavoured to collect opinions and views “from the Palestini-
an National Authority, the Israeli authorities, as well as from a variety of 
                                                   
82 ICC, Situation in Palestine, Summary of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged 
by the Palestinian National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements, 3 May 2010, para.2 
(Summary of Submissions) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/af5abf/). 
83 OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 4 October 2010, para. 46 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/bd172c/). 
84 Situation in Palestine, para. 3, see supra note 26. 
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experts, academics, international organizations and non-governmental or-
ganizations”.85 In the autumn of 2009, the Prosecutor suggested that Pales-
tine should be accepted as a State if Palestine had the ability to enter into 
international agreements and to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Israeli 
nationals.86 It gave an impression that his Office should address the issue. 
However, whether Palestine qualified as a “State” for the purpose of 
the Rome Statute is controversial. After three years of consideration, the 
Prosecutor suddenly announced that he had no authority to make that de-
termination,87 because “the status granted to Palestine by the United Na-
tions General Assembly is that of an observer, not as a non-member 
State”.88 It meant that Palestine could not sign the Rome Statute and could 
not declare its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.89  He decided to 
leave the issue whether Palestine was a State to be resolved by competent 
organs of the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties.90 
Although the Prosecutor correctly acknowledged that he had no au-
thority to define “State”,91 the solution of the legal issue by relying on the 
United Nations is questionable. The Prosecutor supported his conclusion 
by observing that States must deposit with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations instruments of accession to the Statute under Article 125.92 
In case the statehood of the depositor is controversial or unclear to the 
Secretary-General, he will follow or seek directives from the UN General 
Assembly on the matter.93 The Prosecutor therefore considered competent 
organs of United Nations had authority to determine whether Palestine is 
qualified as a “State” under Article 12(3) of the Statute. 
However, the “Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties” reveals that the Secretary-General 
                                                   
85 Summary of Submissions, para. 16, see supra note 83. 
86 Michael Kearney, “The Situation in Palestine”, in Opinio Juris, 5 April 2012. 
87 Situation on Palestine, see supra note 26. 
88 Ibid., para. 7. 
89 ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda: 
“The Public Deserves to know the Truth about the ICC’s Jurisdiction over Palestine”, 2 
September 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e3fe6c/). 
90 Situation on Palestine, para. 8, see supra note 26. 
91 Ibid., para.6. 
92 The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome statute, see supra note 27. 
93 Situation in Palestine, paras. 5–6, see supra note 26. 
27. Non-States Parties and the Preliminary Examination of Article12(3) Declarations 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 461 
will need a complete list of the States provided by the General Assembly 
to implement the deposition only when the status of a State was contro-
versial or unclear where “treaties adopted by the General Assembly were 
open to participation by ‘all States’ without further specifications”. 94 
There are multilateral treaties not adopted within the framework of the 
United Nations. The Rome Statute is one not adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly, although it was adopted at a conference con-
vened by the United Nations. It is doubtful if the Secretary-General would 
seek the General Assembly’s directives if Palestine deposited the instru-
ment of accession at the time it lodged the Article 12(3) declaration. In 
any event, since Palestine was admitted by UNESCO as a Member State 
on 30 October 2011, even if Palestine had deposited its instrument of ac-
cession to the Rome Statute with the Secretary-General in April 2012, the 
Secretary-General would not likely object. 
Furthermore, the Prosecutor wrongfully confused the existence of a 
State with the recognition of a State and the admission of a State member-
ship in an international organization. The United Nations has made its 
position very clear that:  
[T]he recognition of a new State or Government is an act that 
only other States and Governments may grant or withhold 
[…] The United Nations is neither a State nor a Government, 
and therefore does not possess any authority to recognize ei-
ther a State or a Government.95  
The conditions for the admission of any States to membership in the 
United Nations are that they are “peace-loving states which accept the 
obligations” contained in the Charter and are “able and willing to carry 
out these obligations”.96 Obviously, neither the General Assembly nor the 
Security Council has the authority to determine whether an entity is a 
State. Also, because of the veto power of the five permanent member 
States in the Security Council and for political reasons, some States had 
been excluded from the UN membership or had chosen not to join the UN. 
                                                   
94 Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, 
prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, UN doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, 
19 July 1994, para. 81 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7749a6/). 
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96 Charter of the United Nation, 26 June 1945, Article 4 (UN Charter) (http://www.legal- 
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It does not necessarily mean that they are not States. In short, the Prosecu-
tor made a mistake to refer the legal issue to the United Nations, which is 
a political organization and does not possess an authority to determine 
whether Palestine is a State. 
Instead, it is argued that the Chambers of the ICC have the authority 
to make an authentic interpretation of the term “State” in Article 12(3). 
The authentic interpretation is an “interpretation made by a body author-
ized to apply the law”,97 namely the Chambers.  
Furthermore, according to the doctrine of competence-competence, 
each Court has “jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction”,98 which 
has been confirmed by the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the ICTY and the ICC 
itself.99 Article 12(3) declarations concern the exercise of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The judges of the Court shall therefore have authority to deal 
with the issue. Moreover, statehood is a legal issue with theories and crite-
ria under international law. The Prosecutor should seek a legal resolution 
on this issue instead of relying on a resolution for an administrative matter 
from the Secretary-General and General Assembly of the United Nations. 
That a Pre-Trial Chamber has not been assigned to deal with the is-
sue does not excuse the Prosecutor from seeking the Chambers’ determi-
nation. Article 19(3) of the Statute provides that “the Prosecutor may seek 
a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction”. Even if Arti-
cle 19(3) does not apply to the stage of preliminary examination, the Reg-
ulations of the Court require the Prosecutor to “provide the Presidency 
with any other information that may facilitate the timely assignment of a 
situation to a Pre-Trial Chamber”.100 The Presidency shall assign a situa-
tion to a Pre-Trial Chamber or pass the information on to the President of 
the Pre-Trial Division, who could direct the situation to a Pre-Trial Cham-
                                                   
97 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds.), Treaty Interpretation 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, 2012, p. 115. 
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ber to deal with “any matter, request or information not arising out of a 
situation assigned to a Pre-Trial Chamber”.101 Regrettably, the Prosecutor 
did not consider bringing the matter to the attention of the judges at all. 
Indeed, after receiving the declaration made by the Palestinian authority, 
the Registrar predicted that it was ultimately possible for the judges to 
resolve the issue.102 
Alternatively, as the Prosecutor stated, the interpretation of the term 
“State” can be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The Rome Stat-
ute being a treaty, “[i]t is for the power that imposed the law to interpret 
the law”.103 Article 31(2) and (3)(a)–(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties refer to “any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the trea-
ty” or “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and so on for 
the interpretation of treaties, which “represent forms of authentic interpre-
tation whereby all parties themselves agree on (or at least accept) the in-
terpretation of treaty terms by means which are extrinsic to the treaty”.104 
Therefore, the Assembly of States Parties may reach such an agreement 
on the interpretation of the term “State”, though it may take a long time. 
Indeed, on 7 August 2009, a group of eminent international law scholars 
jointly wrote to the President of the Assembly of States Parties urging the 
inclusion of the issue on statehood of Palestine in the agenda of the elev-
enth annual conference of the Assembly (November 2012) to achieve 
international criminal justice and to maintain the Court’s reputation.105  
27.3.2. Authority to Determine a Government of a State 
On 8 May 2014, the OTP rejected an Article 12(3) declaration made by 
Egyptian lawyers on behalf of the government of Egypt because they 
                                                   
101 Ibid., Regulation 46.  
102 Questions and Answers. para. 1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8cb916/). 
103 Seymour S. Peloubet, A Collection of Legal Maxims in Law and Equity: With English 
Translations, George S. Diossy, 1880, p.65; Gaetano Arangio Ruiz, The United Nations 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of International Law, 
Brill, 1979, pp. 81–83. 
104 Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 429.  
105 Dapo Akande, “ICC Assembly of States Parties Urged to Decide on Status of Palestine”, in 
EJIL: Talk!, 24 September 2012. 
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lacked the requisite authority and full powers on behalf of Egypt.106 First, 
the Prosecutor referred to the UN Protocol List to determine Dr. Mo-
hamed Morsi was not the head of Egypt. Therefore, he could not deposit 
an instrument of accession on behalf of Egypt.107 Second, under the ‘ef-
fective control’ test, Dr. Morsi no longer had the governmental authority 
with the legal capacity to incur new international legal obligations on be-
half of Egypt.108 
The Prosecutor’s positions are controversial. In contrast to the state-
hood of Palestine, the Prosecutor believed that she was fully competent to 
determine the legitimacy of a government. The two tests that the Prosecu-
tor adopted were also debatable. The first referred again to the views of the 
UN and depository of the Rome Statute. As for the second test of ‘effective 
control’, scholars disagreed on whether it is the only criterion on which 
recognition can be based.109 Popular support, ability and will to fulfil in-
ternational obligations, and legitimacy have been proposed additional cri-
teria for recognition as a government. Legal scholars and policy-makers 
have also considered non-dependence on foreign support in the exercise of 
control and respect for human rights as additional criteria.110 
Bearing in mind that the General Assembly and the Security Coun-
cil are political organs, several cases reveal that effective control has been 
irrelevant in terms of the governmental representative accepted by the 
United Nations. For instance, the People’s Republic of China was not 
awarded a seat in the United Nations until 1971 in spite of her effective 
control over most of China’s territory since 1949. Also, Cambodia’s con-
tested seat in the United Nations was awarded to the Khmer Rouge 
throughout 1980s after it was overthrown in 1979, rather than to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Kampuchea, which gained de facto control of the coun-
try.111 As has been observed: “although the new regime may be all too 
                                                   
106 The Determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the Communication Received in 
Relation to Egypt, see supra note 35. 
107 Ibid., Point 3. 
108 Ibid., Point 4. 
109 M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments, Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815–
1995, Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 33. 
110 Ibid., p. 77. 
111 Benny Widyono, “The Spectre of the Khmer Rouge over Cambodia”, in UN Chronicle, 
April 2008, vol. 45, nos. 2 and 3. 
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clearly in effective control of the territory”, “recognition may be withheld 
as a sign of political displeasure”.112 In short, determination of a govern-
ment is a complicated issue. The ‘effective control’ test may not fully re-
flect the theory and practice of recognition of governments in internation-
al law. Some scholars have pointed out that ICC’s jurisdiction might be 
most needed when a democratically elected president was ousted by a 
military coup.113 
27.3.3. Representative to Sign the Declaration on Behalf of the State 
A valid declaration must be signed and lodged by a person who is consid-
ered as representing his/her State. In view of their functions, Heads of 
State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs are consid-
ered representing their State.114 Although the Prosecutor mentioned “full 
power” when he determined the declaration made by Egyptian lawyers, he 
never questioned whether the declarations of Palestine and the Ukraine 
had been signed and lodged by the persons representing their States with 
“full power”. Unlike Palestine’s 2014 declaration, which was signed by 
the President of the State of Palestine, the 2004 declaration of Palestine 
was signed by the Minister of Justice for the Palestinian authority. Both 
the first and second declarations of Ukraine were signed by the chairper-
son of the Ukrainian parliament, although Article 106 of the Constitution 
of Ukraine conferring upon the Ukrainian President the power to represent 
the State in international relations and to conclude international treaties.115 
The first declaration can be explained on the ground that the chairperson 
of the parliament was also in his capacity as ex officio Head of State under 
Article 112 of the Constitution of Ukraine because the then President of 
Ukraine fled the country.116 It is, however, questionable why the second 
declaration was not signed by the incumbent President.117 
                                                   
112 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 25. 
113 Eugene Kontorovich, Effective Control and Accepting ICC Jurisdiction, in Opinio Juris, 4 
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114 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Article 7(2)(a) (http://www.
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Determination on issues relevant to validity of Article 12(3) decla-
rations involves several legal issues such as the criteria for statehood, 
legitimacy of government, persons representing States and so on, which 
should be resolved on a case-by-case basis. A declaration may be in con-
flict with a fundamental domestic law of the accepting State,118 which 
may also affect the validity of the declaration in accordance with Article 
46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Present practice 
shows that leaving these issues in the hands of the Prosecutor without 
judicial oversight can be troublesome. While the Prosecutor is certainly 
“highly competent in and have extensive practical experience in the pros-
ecution or trial of criminal cases”,119 he or she does not necessarily pos-
sess the requisite competence in international law. That is why the deter-
mination of the Prosecutor on validity of Article 12(3) declarations has 
some obvious flaws and has been challenged and criticized. As discussed 
above, in dealing with the 2004 declaration of Palestine, the Prosecutor 
not only wrongfully disregarded the ability of the Palestinian government 
in foreign relations with more than 130 States and international organiza-
tions, but also referred the issue to the United Nations, an international 
political body, rather than seeking the judicial resolution in the first place. 
That had inevitably damaged his image of independence. 
Again, the issues on the validity of the declarations should be de-
termined by Chambers because judges have competence in “relevant areas 
of international law”.120 They can decide the criteria for statehood, choose 
a proper approach to determining the legitimacy of governments and con-
sider other legal obstacles in accordance with international law. As similar 
issues concerning the validity of Article 12(3) declarations may occur 
again, there should be a separate procedure regarding the validity of Arti-
cle 12(3) declarations to be determined by a Pre-Trial Chamber when 
necessary, leaving other issues concerning the jurisdiction of the Court in 
the preliminary examination to be conducted by the Prosecutor.  
                                                   
118 Ukraine did not ratify the Rome Statute because the Constitutional Court had decided that 
its Constitution would not allow its judicial functions to be delegated to other institutions 
or officials. 
119 ICC Statute, Article 42, see supra note 3. 
120 ICC Statute, Article 36, paragraph 3(b)(ii), see supra note 3. 
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27.4. Conclusion and Suggestions 
So far, the Court and the Prosecutor has considered the Article 12(3) decla-
ration as only a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction and applied the 
same procedure as the Prosecutor’s exercise of his/her proprio motu power 
in preliminary examinations. However, in reality, most Article 12(3) decla-
rations are a combination of acceptance of jurisdiction and self-referrals of 
their own situations by non-States Parties. In so far as there were worries 
that an accepting State might intend to use the Court unilaterally against 
other States, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization understandably plays 
the necessary role of a gatekeeper. Nevertheless, one should not overlook 
the downside of this treatment. It took a longer time to process the prelimi-
nary examination of the situation arising out of the declaration, which 
made the results uncertain. In addition, the whole period of preliminary 
examination lacks judicial oversight, which is unfair to accepting States.  
This chapter argues that the Article 12(3) declaration is different 
from communications and information obtained by the Prosecutor from 
undisclosed sources. A declaration is formally lodged by a non-State Party. 
The Prosecutor should inform the accepting State his conclusion on the 
relevant preliminary examination within a reasonable time as he does to 
the referrals of States Parties. In so doing, there needs to be “clear guide-
lines” and “a general timeline”121 for the Prosecutor to conduct prelimi-
nary examination. The Prosecutor needs longer time for situations arising 
from received communications partly because he/she must determine 
whether there are already national proceedings covering the same conduct 
that would likely be the focus of an ICC investigation. This is usually not 
the case for Article 12(3) declarations if the situations merely involve 
their own nationals and territories. The preliminary examination of the 
situation in the Central African Republic that took two years and a half is 
the longest one among situations referred by States Parties. The prelimi-
nary examination of situations related to the Article 12(3) declaration 
should also take a similar time.  
In the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, it seemed that the Prosecutor could 
not conclude that there was a reasonable basis to proceed with an investi-
gation after two to three years of preliminary examination, but he did not 
                                                   
121 “Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Courts”, 2012, see supra 
note 74. 
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inform Côte d’Ivoire any conclusion. A declaration without an end-date 
does not mean that the Prosecutor should continue examining the situation 
until crimes are eventually committed many years in the future. For the 
purpose of saving resources, focusing on graver situations and enhancing 
efficiency, the Prosecutor should conclude the examination of a situation 
that does not meet the requirements to proceed with an investigation. The 
Prosecutor could reserve the right to reopen the preliminary examination 
later if necessary. By doing so, it can at least release the Chamber’s bur-
den to determine that the events occurred many years later in 2010-2011 
and the previous mentioned events of 19 September 2002 in the 2003 
declaration of Côte d’Ivoire is one and the same situation.122 
Scholars have stressed that the treatment of the declarations require 
judicial involvement or monitor. Freeland points out that it would be of 
concern if a decision not to proceed with an investigation into a situation 
that a non-State Party cries for help by lodging the declaration “could be 
taken by the Prosecutor without recourse to judicial scrutiny under any 
circumstances”.123 CHAN James suggests “placing incoming declarations 
under preliminary oversight by the Pre-Trial Division” to ensure that 
“declarations are valid and sets guidelines for the OTP”.124 This chapter 
suggests that it should consider a separate procedure of determination of 
the validity of the declaration when such issues arise. The following pro-
visions should be added to the Regulations of the Court:  
Upon receipt of a declaration under article 12(3), either the 
Prosecutor or the Registrar shall inform the Presidency the 
declaration. The Presidency shall assign a Pre-Trial Chamber 
to consider any issues with respect to the validity of the dec-
laration at the request of the Prosecutor or when the Presi-
dency considers necessary.  
                                                   
122 Decision on the Jurisdiction, paras. 63–64, see supra note 53. 
123 Freeland, 2006, p. 231, see supra note 41. 
124 CHAN James, “Judicial Oversight over Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute”, FICHL Policy 
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28. Making Sense of the Invisible: 
The Role of the ‘Accused’ during 
Preliminary Examinations 
Dov Jacobs and Jennifer Naouri* 
I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to 
see me. 
Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man 
28.1. Introduction 
International criminal justice deals with the most visible crimes receiving 
international attention allegedly committed by people that are pre-
identified as responsible and perceived as guilty even before any proceed-
ings are even remotely considered, especially when it comes to public 
figures of a State. In other words, for most people, international crimes 
are directly associated with known figures of international relations as 
their perpetrators. 
In the context of the actual criminal proceedings, consideration for 
the accused, and more particularly his/her rights, are usually not very high 
up on the list of priorities of the stakeholders of international criminal 
justice. There are obvious reasons for that, which need not be developed 
in the present chapter.1 They include: (i) the collective nature of interna-
tional crimes, which allows for a dilution of the consideration of an indi-
vidual as a perpetrator; (ii) the increased focus on victims; and (iii) the 
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moral stigma attached to international crimes, which leads to a desire to 
reach a guilty verdict for its symbolic and narrative effect. For many, ob-
servers and participants of the international justice project alike, a convic-
tion is a ‘victory for justice’ while an acquittal is necessarily seen as a 
failure, especially for the victims. 
While there are therefore reasons for ignoring the rights of the de-
fence, it does create a sort of paradoxical cognitive dissonance: while 
outside the courtroom, the focus of the attention is symbolically on the 
perpetrator, inside the courtroom, the accused and his rights often does not 
have a central role in the procedure. 
The result of this situation is that the rights of the accused, when 
they are taken into account, are always being balanced with other consid-
erations, such as the costs of the proceedings, the rights of the victims, the 
interests of various stakeholders and overarching – and therefore neces-
sarily vague – concepts such as the ‘fight against impunity’. 
While this assessment could apply at all stages of the process, one 
wonders if it applies equally throughout, especially for the present discus-
sion, to preliminary examinations. A basic appraisal of the nature of a 
preliminary examination could lead to the conclusion that, until the pre-
liminary examination moves to the next stage, and then cases are selected, 
there is technically no ‘defendant’ whose rights are to be protected and 
more generally who needs to be considered in the process. A preliminary 
examination could be seen as the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) simply 
gathering general information about a possible situation in order to decide 
whether a more formal investigation is required. One could say that this 
does not require precise identification of alleged perpetrators of crimes 
nor does it entail involving these alleged perpetrators in the process. 
But the discussion does not end here. It is obvious that the OTP is 
going to be identifying during the preliminary examination not only con-
textual elements and details of the possible crimes, but also information 
relating to possible perpetrators. This is true from both a practical per-
spective (it is not possible to artificially distinguish between evidence 
relating to the crimes and evidence relating to the possible perpetrators of 
the crimes) and from a legal perspective (to the extent that during the pre-
liminary examination the OTP is under an obligation to assess the admis-
sibility of any future cases, there will necessarily be some assessment of 
potential defendants). 
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This chapter will highlight the ways in which alleged perpetrators 
are considered during the preliminary examination and what impact this 
might have for future practice of the OTP. The underlying idea is that po-
tential defendants cannot simply be ignored during a preliminary exami-
nation. Experience has shown that the conduct of the preliminary exami-
nation, despite its preliminary nature, can affect the way the actual inves-
tigation and prosecution unfold. It is usually when the OTP starts develop-
ing its theory of the case, which will set in motion and influence a series 
of investigative choices, even many years down the road. If the initial 
direction is based on incomplete information or a general misunderstand-
ing of the situation, it will be harder to correct at a later stage. Moreover, 
the understanding of the context and role of the protagonists in what are 
most of the time highly complex factual situations necessarily requires 
hearing what the alleged perpetrators (from the point of view of the OTP) 
have to say. In other words, the OTP cannot pretend that the potential de-
fendant were invisible.2 
Considering the ‘accused’, in a broad sense, during a preliminary 
examination, is therefore a fundamental component of ensuring the quali-
ty control of that particular phase of the process. 
This chapter will start by providing some insight on how the authors 
approach the notion of ‘quality control’ in the context of preliminary ex-
aminations (Section 28.2.). The chapter will then move on to discuss 1) 
how the role of the Defendant comes into play in the legal assessment 
done under Article 53, namely whether there exists a reasonable basis to 
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been commit-
ted (Section 28.3.) and whether the case would be admissible (Section 
28.4.), and 2) how the potential defendant might be treated and ap-
proached during the preliminary examination (Section 28.5.). 
                                                   
2 What we mean by ‘invisible’ here is not necessarily that the Office of the Prosecutor 
(‘OTP’) would not mention alleged perpetrators at all during the preliminary examination. 
As shown in subsequent sections of this chapter, the analysis of formal requests made by 
the OTP to open an investigation under Article 15 shows that the OTP generally does take 
into account, in more or less precise terms, possible perpetrators in the course of the pre-
liminary examination, most notably when it comes to determining jurisdiction and admis-
sibility. These alleged perpetrators are therefore not ‘invisible’ because they are not men-
tioned at all, but ‘invisible’ on a human level: they are reified as objects of study rather 
than considered as subjects that can be interacted with and whose input could provide the 
OTP with a better understanding of the situation it is examining. 
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28.2. Quality Control of the Preliminary Examination Phase: 
Some Basic Groundings 
28.2.1. The Nature of a Preliminary Examination 
28.2.1.1. The Legal Nature of a Preliminary Examination 
The difficulty of establishing a framework to assess the quality of a pre-
liminary examination is complicated by the uncertainty about the exact 
legal nature of a preliminary examination. While the language of the first 
sentence of Article 53(1) seems to suggest an obligation (“shall”) to open 
an investigation, the legal framework surrounding preliminary examina-
tions seems to suggest a large – and sometimes absolute – margin of dis-
cretion for the OTP for a finding that there is no reasonable basis to pro-
ceed.3  
Indeed, a preliminary examination is not a formal ‘judicial process’ 
since it is not systematically subject to judicial review.4 The only outcome 
of a preliminary examination that is necessarily subject to judicial review 
by a Pre-Trial Chamber is a decision to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu under Article 15.5 Some decisions may be subject to review by a 
Pre-Trial Chamber: (1) the decision not to open an investigation after a 
State or UNSC referral (upon request from the referring State or the 
UNSC),6 and (2) the decision not to proceed in the interests of justice (on 
the own initiative of the Pre-Trial Chamber).7 In the first case, the Court 
                                                   
3 For an interpretation along these lines, see “Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation” where the 
Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) claimed that Article 53(1) created a presumption in favour of 
opening an investigation: “In the presence of several plausible explanations of the availa-
ble information, the presumption of article 53(1) of the Statute, as reflected by the use of 
the word “shall” in the chapeau of that article, and of common sense, is that the Prosecutor 
investigates in order to be able to properly assess the relevant facts” (International Crimi-
nal Court (‘ICC’), Situation on registered vessels of the union of the Comoros, the Hel-
lenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the 
Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, 
16 July 2015, ICC-01/13-34, para. 13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/). 
4 On the nature of the preliminary examination, see Hector Olasolo, “The Prosecutor of the 
ICC before the initiation of investigations: A quasi judicial or a political body?”, in Inter-
national Criminal Law Review, 2003, vol. 3, p. 87. 
5 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 15(4) (‘ICC Statute’) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
6 ICC Statute, Article 53(3)(a), see supra note 5.  
7 ICC Statute, Article 53(3)(b), see supra note 5. 
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cannot compel the OTP to start an investigation, but can merely ask the 
Prosecutor to reconsider.8 In the second case, while the language of the 
provision is ambiguous,9 it appears from the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence that if there is no confirmation from the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Prosecutor must proceed.10 Some decisions are not subject to judicial re-
view: the decision to open an investigation after a State or UNSC referral 
and a decision not to proceed further proprio motu. 
What does this framework say of the nature of preliminary exami-
nations? First, from a theoretical perspective, if Article 53 was thought of 
as providing a clear legalized process, then one would expect that judicial 
oversight would have been provided for in a systematic way. The fact that 
Article 53 is in the Rome Statute does not necessarily mean that it of itself 
creates any legal obligation or integrates the preliminary examination in 
the judicial process. In our view, the key consideration is whether there is 
judicial or quasi-judicial oversight. In the absence thereof, it makes no 
sense to speak of a legal process or even of an obligation in the abstract. 
In the current state of affairs, it seems rather that Article 53 has, at 
best, a dual nature: on the one hand, it could be considered as providing 
an imperative legal framework to be followed by the Prosecutor during a 
preliminary examination in situations where his or her decision to proceed 
would be subject to judicial review; on the other hand, it could be consid-
ered as merely indicative of possible elements to take into consideration 
for the Prosecutor to decide to proceed or not, in situations where no judi-
cial review is provided for. 
Second, it is apparent that Pre-Trial Chambers can never force the 
OTP to initiate an investigation based on their own determinations on 
jurisdiction or admissibility. As noted previously, the only moment where 
judges have authority to trigger the commencement of an investigation is 
                                                   
8 ICC Statute, Article 53(3)(a), see supra note 5. 
9 Article 53(3)(b) provides that: “the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effective only if 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber”. It is however not clear what it means for a decision 
not to proceed to be “effective”, given the fact that a decision not to proceed does not tech-
nically have any legal effect. 
10 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 9 September 2002, Rule 110 (‘[ICC] RPE’): 
“When the Pre-Trial Chamber does not confirm the decision by the Prosecutor referred to 
in sub-rule 1, he or she shall proceed with the investigation or prosecution” (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f). 
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when the Prosecutor had decided not to proceed based on the interests of 
justice, but this is due to the particular nature of exercise on the evaluation 
of the “interests of justice”, which only occurs when the Prosecutor has 
determined that the crimes would fall under the jurisdiction of the Court 
and that the case would be admissible.11 As a consequence, it becomes 
clear that, whatever the language of Article 53(1) might suggest, decisions 
to investigate are largely – when not exclusively – within the realm of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
This has an impact on evaluations of quality from a legal perspec-
tive. While all discretion can be subject to some control and oversight, 
there is always a margin of appreciation that escapes a rational and objec-
tive analysis. In this sense, calls for full transparency and control when it 
comes to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion when deciding to open a 
formal investigation are something of an illusion, especially given that the 
prosecution is unlikely to be open about certain criteria that come into 
play, for example: (i) the likelihood of co-operation by States, (ii) the like-
lihood of obtaining custody of potential defendants, (iii) the quality of 
evidence for certain crimes, which might explain a more focused charging 
strategy, and (iv) budgetary considerations, which might justify focusing 
resources on more promising investigations. These common-sense criteria 
for anyone closely following the workings of international criminal justice 
will always appear as unacceptable in the highly morally charged context 
of international criminal law where the fight against impunity is seen as 
the consideration that trumps all others. 
28.2.1.2. The ‘Investigative’ Nature of a Preliminary Examination 
It is clear from the wording of the Rome Statute, particularly in the con-
text of proprio motu enquiries, that the preliminary examination is, at the 
very least, a pre-investigation. This is particularly clear in Article 15, 
where it is indicated that the OTP can rely on information the Office re-
ceives, but it also has the power to “seek additional information”.12 There-
fore, the preliminary examination is not limited to an assessment of the 
information presented to the OTP. The moment the OTP decides to initiate 
                                                   
11 For a recent discussion on the “interests of justice” in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, see 
Maria Varaki, “Revisiting the ‘Interests of Justice’ Policy Paper”, in Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, p. 455. 
12 Cf. ICC Statute, Article 15(2), see supra note 5. 
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investigations based on information that crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court might have been committed, his or her work is to start building 
a case from evidence whatever the stage of the proceedings. One cannot 
artificially distinguish what it means to build a case at the different stages 
of the proceedings. The standard of proof can be different depending on 
the stage of the proceeding, which means that the assessment made of the 
evidence will be different, but this does not mean that there are different 
ways to build a case. 
Moreover, the OTP should, from the moment it undertakes to build 
a case, bear in mind that as officers of the Court they have the duty to 
examine incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.13 
A policy of the OTP that would portray the preliminary examination 
as a mere ‘assessment’ of information provided to them and not an inves-
tigation or pre-investigation would mean forgetting about the purpose of a 
preliminary examination. To be able to decide whether to ask for the 
opening of a formal investigation, one has to take active steps to find out 
what happened in a given situation. The OTP cannot simply be at the mer-
cy of the sources that volunteer information. Therefore, the Office itself 
also needs to seek information, which is de facto an investigative step. 
This means, concretely, that the OTP should, from very moment it starts 
analysing information presented to them, have a systematic approach of 
the evidence to set the ground work for building a case. 
From the moment the prosecution starts a preliminary examination, 
it is their duty to: learn about the recent history of the country concerned 
by the situation, analyse facts, cross-reference information, interview po-
litical leaders, academics, journalists, lawyers, civil society leaders (in-
cluding church leaders), local NGOs, take victims and/or witness state-
ments, organize field mission, and so on. These steps constitute the core 
of an investigation regardless of the stage of the proceedings. And these 
steps are the first landmarks of building a legal case. This approach is 
exactly what distinguishes the Prosecutor of the ICC from an NGO or any 
other quasi-investigative bodies, such as UN commissions of Inquiry Any 
evidence collected (that may eventually be presented to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber) by the OTP must be the result of a neutral, unprejudiced, seri-
ous (pre-)investigation. If the OTP does not act independently and does 
                                                   
13 ICC Statute, Article 54(1), see supra note 5. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 476 
not seek information on its own, the Office will never be able to assess the 
seriousness of the information it receives and thus the concrete need to 
open an investigation. 
In sum, just because the preliminary examination is not legally a 
‘formal investigation’ does not mean that the actions undertaken during a 
preliminary examination are essentially different from those in a formal 
investigation. The term ‘formal’ only means that the ‘case’ that the OTP 
has built during the preliminary examination is sufficient to move to a 
next step, when there is a referral from a State or the Security Council, or 
authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Moreover, whereas in the latter 
case the judges will give the OTP a clearer picture of the scope of his or 
her investigation, this procedural step does not mean that the OTP had not 
been investigating as such. On the contrary, if the OTP has not built a 
proper case during a preliminary examination, it will be quite unlikely that 
authorization to open a formal investigation would be granted. This does 
not mean that at the end of a preliminary examination the investigations 
are finished – far from it. The investigations of the OTP, if a formal inves-
tigation is opened, will continue and the evidence collected will have to 
allow the OTP to prove the case to reach a higher standard of proof (for 
example, the OTP will collect more testimony, forensic evidence, consult 
experts, and so on). 
Furthermore, the analysis made during a preliminary examination 
will set out the framework of a future formal investigation. This means 
that the factual narrative arising from and the potential perpetrators identi-
fied during a preliminary examination will be the factual foundation of the 
case to be further built during the OTP’s formal investigation. This means, 
in practice, that because the OTP will be building a case from the very 
beginning, they are going to be identifying during the preliminary exami-
nation not only contextual elements and details of possible crimes, but 
also information relating to possible perpetrators. 
The need to see preliminary examinations in the general context of 
investigations is summarized aptly by Carsten Stahn:  
the connection between preliminary examination and inves-
tigation needs to be improved. The Statute seems to imply 
that there is a clear-cut distinction between preliminary ex-
amination and investigation, according to which preliminary 
examination focuses on situation-related analysis while in-
vestigations involve the framing and testing of cases. Prac-
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tice has shown that boundaries are more fluid. As part of the 
gravity test, the OTP has to make an assessment of hypothet-
ical cases. There is a need to draw connections between inci-
dents and suspects, even before the formal start of investiga-
tions. In ‘hard cases’, a preliminary examination may require 
onsite presence on the ground, and deeper engagement with 
the situational context. This would improve the quality of as-
sessment and allow better hypotheses.14 
28.2.2. The Temporal Dimension of Quality Control 
There is also a temporal dimension to quality control. It is difficult to 
judge the quality of the preliminary examination, whatever the perspective, 
without considering the expected outcome of the process. Indeed, the pre-
liminary examination phase is but the first step in a procedure that will 
have to go through various hurdles, such as the issuance of an arrest war-
rant, the confirmation of charges and the trial itself. What is expected of 
the preliminary examination necessarily depends on the expectations of 
these other phases. For example, the way the preliminary examination is 
conducted will likely have an impact on the nature and quality of evidence 
presented at later stages of the proceedings, even if the OTP does not have 
formal investigative powers at this stage nor do States have a duty to co-
operate. 
Also relevant from a temporal perspective is the extent to which the 
perspective of victims would be considered in presenting a complete, even 
if not necessarily detailed, overview of the nature, scope and diversity of 
the violence suffered. 
28.2.3. Quality Control of the Preliminary Examination Phase: 
A Question of Perspective 
These considerations come into play when considering the perspectives of 
the different participants of the criminal process. 
More generally, there obviously cannot be a rigid objective defini-
tion of quality control of the preliminary examination phase, with boxes 
to be ticked, one that is universally applicable. Indeed, what one considers 
                                                   
14 Carsten Stahn, “Damned if you do, Damned if you don’t, Challenges and Critiques of 
Preliminary Examinations at the ICC”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, 
vol. 15, p. 413. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 478 
of ‘quality’ is necessarily contingent on the normative preferences of the 
various stakeholders in the process. Different stakeholders will have dif-
ferent objectives, which can range from financial efficiency to the quality 
of investigations. Others might approach the question from the perspec-
tive of the interaction with domestic jurisdictions, through concepts of 
‘positive complementarity’.15 Under this approach, the quality of the pre-
liminary examination might be assessed through a broader lens of how the 
OTP might contribute to domestic capacity-building and the conduct of 
their own investigations and prosecutions. 
More specifically, three perspectives stand out as more particularly 
relevant for the evaluation of the quality of a preliminary examination. 
From the perspective of the prosecution, the efficiency of the inves-
tigation is also not necessarily straight forward. Indeed, when you consid-
er what strategy should be adopted towards evidence, should the OTP aim 
at securing minimal evidence to justify the formal opening of an investi-
gation, which is, in the case of referrals by States Parties and the UNSC, 
not subject to judicial review, and in the case of a proprio motu investiga-
tion, subject to a fairly minimal oversight by pre-trial judges? Should the 
OTP see further and already try to assess, independently whether this evi-
dence, when it comes under scrutiny, is likely to survive judicial debate? 
From the perspective of victims, the objectives will not necessarily 
be aligned with those of the OTP. While victims of crimes looked at by 
the prosecution will be more likely to support the preliminary examina-
tion, victims which are not on the OTP radar – or who have suffered 
crimes that the OTP will not be looking at – will have a different agenda. 
For all victims wishing the ICC to intervene, one dimension which will 
affect their perception of the preliminary examination, whether it can be 
deemed as successful and as a criterion of ‘quality control’, is whether the 
outcome reflects their particular understanding of the situation in terms of 
responsibility. This puts a special burden on the prosecution, independent-
ly of its own desire to do so, to be seen as balanced. 
                                                   
15 Carsten Stahn, “Taking Complementarity Seriously: On the sense and sensibility of ‘clas-
sical’, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ complementarity”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Internation-
al Criminal Court and Complementarity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, 
pp. 233–282. 
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From the defence’s perspective, the situation is different. The quali-
ty of the preliminary examination will only have one yardstick of evalua-
tion: whether it has respected the rights of the accused.16 
What does this mean specifically in the context of the preliminary 
examination? The defence will ask that the prosecution take steps from 
the beginning to secure evidence in a way that can be later challenged, 
when it comes to chain of custody or authenticity. 
As another corollary of the protection of the rights of the accused at 
the preliminary examination phase, the prosecution must take seriously its 
obligation to investigate exonerating and incriminating evidence equally. 
This is necessary not just as a legal obligation, but a practical one as well. 
First, a serious enquiry during the preliminary examination will ensure 
that the OTP builds strong cases in the future from the start. Second, such 
an approach might also elicit useful information for the defence, which 
likely has less capacity to investigate than the Prosecutor. It has fewer 
means and less access to relevant information, particularly in cases where 
the political opponents of the potential defendant will be in power. While 
States do not have a formal obligation to co-operate with the OTP during 
the preliminary examination, the OTP can use the institutional weight of 
the ICC to obtain relevant information, including for the defence. This is 
all the more crucial because the earlier evidence is secured, the better 
quality it is likely to be, whether it is eye-witness testimony or forensic 
evidence. Of course, this preliminary investigation by the prosecution 
cannot and should not replace the autonomous capacity of the defence to 
investigate, and any discussion on the adequacy of means provided for the 
defence in the international context. The prosecution cannot build a case 
for and against the defence at the same time. Instead, it should be contin-
uously aware that during the preliminary examination it might be in a 
position to have access to evidence that might be useful for the defence 
                                                   
16 While this yardstick is presented from the ‘perspective of the defence’, it should not be 
confused with a ‘defence perspective’. Indeed, the rights of the accused are enshrined in 
the Rome Statute. Referring to this criterion to assess the quality of a preliminary examina-
tion is therefore nothing other than applying the Rome Statute. Dov Jacobs, “A Tale of 
Four Illusions: The Rights of the Defense before International Criminal Tribunals”, in Col-
leen Rohan and Gentian Zyberi (eds.), Defense Perspectives on International Criminal 
Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 561. 
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and might not be available later on, and to take all necessary steps to se-
cure this investigation. 
28.3. Jurisdiction and the Potential Defendant 
Under Article 53(1)(a), the first part of the OTP’s evaluation is whether 
“the information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to 
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is 
being committed”.17 While, technically, this provision refers specifically 
to the material (that is, subject-matter) jurisdiction of the Court and not, 
for example, its personal jurisdiction, this does not mean that individual 
involvement cannot be looked at in that context, as highlighted in the case 
law.18 
As noted in the OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 
among the factors that could be looked into is the “alleged perpetrators, 
including the de jure and de facto role of the individual, group or institu-
tion and their link with the alleged crimes, and the mental element, to the 
extent discernible at this stage”.19 It should be noted, however, that given 
the collective and organizational nature of most international crimes, the 
persons prosecuted are often not the direct perpetrators of the alleged 
crimes. As a result, looking into alleged perpetrators does not necessarily 
mean identifying possible suspects for prosecution. 
Such a determination of the role of individuals or groups makes 
sense both factually and legally. Factually, it would be somewhat artificial 
to distinguish between what is alleged to have happened and the authors 
of those acts, especially as sources used by the OTP during the prelimi-
nary examination are more than likely to provide some analysis of the 
authors of the alleged crimes. Legally, as a criminal court, as opposed to a 
human rights fact-finding commission, the ICC cannot avoid discussion 
of perpetratorship. An act is only technically a crime when both the actus 
reus and the mens rea are established. How can a finding, even of a pre-
                                                   
17 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(a), see supra note 5. 
18 Morten Bergsmo, Pieter Kruger and Olympia Bekou, “Article 53”, in Otto Triffterer and 
Kai Ambos (eds.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, C.H. 
Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2016, p. 1372. 
19 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013, p. 10 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
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liminary nature, of the possible commission of an international crime be 
made without some discussion of possible perpetrators and their intent?20 
This section will first assess what it means to identify a potential 
perpetrator from a practical perspective, before looking at the current 
practice of the ICC. 
28.3.1. Identifying a Potential Perpetrator during Preliminary 
Examination (from a Practical Perspective) 
Building a case is not a theoretical exercise, which is why the Prosecutor 
will necessarily, by the time of the preliminary examination, have infor-
mation at his or her disposal that relates to the alleged existence of a war 
or mass attack against civilians, to the alleged commission of crimes and 
to alleged perpetrators. This information will of course not be presented in 
such a systematic manner. There will not be one specific document indi-
cating that a murder has been committed, another document that contains 
information that relates to a common plan of government to target civil-
ians and a report that gives information on an alleged perpetrator. Each 
piece of evidence sent to the OTP will contain information of a different 
nature. When building a case, it is the task of the investigator assessing 
the evidence to try to establish the seriousness of the information to ana-
lyse the evidence, to organize it and to verify its authenticity, its credibil-
ity and supplement the information received with other sources of infor-
mation. Only then, after having started building a case will the investiga-
tor be able to determine if the information available during the prelimi-
nary examination is sufficiently serious to establish that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court may have been committed in a given situation. 
One type of evidence that will be important is the testimony of vic-
tims (which can be included in NGO reports or taken directly by the OTP). 
This testimony will cover different facts. The victim often explains what 
he or she has suffered but also who attacked him or her, as well as the 
broader context of the attack. This means that specific testimony, even 
                                                   
20 Interestingly, international criminal law has to some extent developed as a body of law 
where discussion of the perpetrators has somewhat taken a back seat as opposed to estab-
lishment of the commission of crimes, as can be seen from the structure of international 
judgments, notably at the ad hoc tribunals, where hundreds of pages are devoted to dis-
cussing the crimes, with minimal or no discussion of the actual intent of the direct perpe-
trators of the crimes, before the accused and his hypothetical mens rea is even considered. 
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anonymous, can provide both information on the alleged crime and on the 
alleged perpetrator. Every detail can be of importance. 
In particular, the information about the potential perpetrator can be 
crucial because it can be cross-referenced with other available information. 
It is fundamental to keep in mind that when it comes to international 
crimes the perpetrator that the OTP might target for prosecution is usually 
not the alleged perpetrator of the crime reported by the witness. So the 
investigator of the OTP will have to find a link between the ‘direct perpe-
trator’ and the person that is responsible for him or on whose behalf the 
‘direct perpetrator’ was acting. Therefore, all information in the victim 
statement can be an important lead and the information cannot be artifi-
cially logged into a specific category of information. For instance, the 
victim, in his/her statement, can explain in detail where the incident hap-
pened, at what time, who was present, and so on. This can be a lead to an 
assessment of the context of the crime but also to an investigation of the 
potential perpetrator. Indeed, if one cross-references just the information 
available in a statement where the victim describes the uniform or badge 
worn by the attacker, it may be possible for the investigator to have an 
idea of who the alleged perpetrator may be by ascertaining (1) what squad 
of the army wears the described uniform and (2) if members of that spe-
cific squad have been deployed at the location mentioned by the victim. 
Additionally, this same victim statement found in an NGO report 
will also have to be cross-referenced with other evidence available: meet-
ing with the author of the report, interviewing State officials, the military, 
members of civil society, other victims, and so on. If the investigator fol-
lows the leads of the anonymous victim statement and this lead is corrob-
orated by other sources, the investigator will be in a position to identify an 
alleged perpetrator. This analysis also applies to any other type of infor-
mation that might have been communicated to the OTP during a prelimi-
nary examination or that the OTP obtained during a preliminary examina-
tion. 
As a consequence, if the OTP analyses the information during a pre-
liminary examination and starts building a case, they will undoubtedly 
investigate the possible perpetrator of the alleged international crime. Not 
to mention that, in practice, most sources that reach out to the OTP con-
cerning crimes that might have been committed will point in the direction 
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of a person or persons that they consider to be responsible of those 
crimes.21 This is why it is virtually impossible, from a practical perspec-
tive, to artificially distinguish between evidence collected relating to 
crimes and evidence relating to the possible perpetrators of crimes. 
28.3.2. Current ICC/OTP Practice 
The following analysis is based on the public redacted versions of OTP 
requests to open an investigation. It should be noted in that respect of all 
requests, the OTP has provided a confidential list of possible perpetrators 
that could be the target of future cases at following a formal investigation. 
This list is submitted under Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the Court 
which provides that the statement of facts in support of a request to be 
authorized to open an investigation should include: “The persons involved, 
if identified, or a description of the persons or groups of persons in-
volved”.22 What one can note is first that this reference to “persons of 
groups of persons involved” was not included in the Rome Statute or the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but added by the judges when drafting 
the Regulations of the Court. Second, there is no formal obligation to spe-
cifically identify individuals (“if identified”), merely a general description 
of the involvement of persons or groups of persons. Third, this obligation 
does not explicitly involve providing any information on modes of liabil-
ity. 
Moving on to the practice of the OTP in particular situations, one 
can note a number of differences, depending on the request. 
In the request for authorization to open an investigation in Kenya,23 
discussion of alleged perpetrators and/or potential suspects is minimal. 
The OTP refers on occasion to the “perpetrators”,24 and mentions the fact 
that “political leaders, businessmen and others had enlisted criminal ele-
                                                   
21 ICC, Situation in Gabon, Requête aux fins de renvoi d’une situation par un Etat partie 
auprès du Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale, 20 September 2016 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/3b6e3e/). 
22 ICC, Regulations of the Court, 26 May 2004, Regulation 49(2)(c) (Regulations) (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/2988d1/). 
23 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c63dcc/). 
24 Ibid., para. 57–58 
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ments and ordinary people to carry out attacks against specifically target-
ed groups”.25 The section entitled “persons or groups involved” is com-
posed of two paragraphs and refers to low level perpetrators who commit-
ted the violence on the ground, “persons in position of power” who “ap-
pear to have been involved in the organization, enticement and/or financ-
ing of violence targeting specific groups”, “political leaders of all sides”, 
as well as the security forces. One can note that while there is some dis-
cussion of the organized nature of the alleged crimes for the purposes of 
establishing the contextual elements of crimes against humanity, there is 
no direct discussion of modes of liability. Moreover, possible perpetrators 
or those that might end up being the target of a formal investigation are 
never named. One could therefore say that the OTP was very careful to 
remain very general in its request, in order to preserve the possibility for 
the formal investigation to yield more specific results. 
The request for authorization to open an investigation in the situa-
tion of the Ivory Coast26 is very different. Within three paragraphs of the 
request, Laurent Gbagbo is named and the violence is described as being 
“pursuant to a policy to retain Laurent Gbagbo in power by all means”,27 
and there is no mention of possible violence on both sides in the introduc-
tion. Later on in the request, however, the Prosecutor mentions the exist-
ence of a “list of persons or groups belonging to or associated with the 
pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara sides that appear to bear the greatest re-
sponsibility for the most serious crimes, with an indication of their specif-
ic role”.28 Under the heading of “persons or groups involved”, the possi-
bility of both sides having committed crimes is also mentioned.29 In the 
subsequent discussion on the crimes, the Prosecutor states that “pro-
Gbagbo forces committed widespread and systematic attacks against civil-
ians associated with his political opponent in pursuance of a policy of the 
State of Côte d’Ivoire under the leadership of former President Gbagbo to 
launch violent attacks against political opponents or persons perceived to 
                                                   
25 Ibid., para. 63. 
26 OTP, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investiga-
tion pursuant to article 15, 23 June 2011, ICC-02/11-3 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
1b1939/). 
27 Ibid., para. 3. 
28 Ibid., para. 46. 
29 Ibid., para. 70–71. 
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support the political opponents in order to retain power by all means”.30 
While modes of liability are not directly referred to, this is the closest 
indication that the OTP did explore the intent of those who had allegedly 
organized the violence. In the next paragraph, the Prosecutor affirms: “the 
information currently available to the Prosecution does not suggest that 
there is a reasonable basis that crimes against humanity were committed 
also by pro-Ouattara forces”.31 This statement is striking because, of all 
four requests to open an investigation, this is the only where the OTP ex-
plicitly reaches a conclusion – be it preliminary – that one side of a con-
flict did not commit a particular crime. This makes sense, because there is 
no legal necessity to do so under Article 15 in order to obtain the opening 
of a formal investigation. Indeed, a decision authorizing the Prosecutor to 
open a formal investigation will not limit the scope of the investigation in 
terms of crimes or alleged perpetrators, irrespective of the evidence 
brought forward by the Prosecutor in his original request. There is there-
fore no need to explain what crimes were not committed, only explain 
what crimes were committed in order to justify the opening of an investi-
gation. 
The request to open an investigation in Georgia,32 similarly to the 
request in the Kenya situation, does not go into much detail either on the 
direct perpetrators of the crimes or on those that might bear the greatest 
responsibility for the purposes of being identified as potential defendants. 
There is also no discussion of modes of liability. The only individual men-
tioned specifically in the section on “persons or groups involved” is Pres-
ident Eduard Kokoity, presented as the de facto President of South Osse-
tia33 and later on in the request the holders of various positions of im-
portance in the South Ossetian administration or military are also 
named,34 as well as “a south Ossetian sniper, Oleg Galavanov”.35 Con-
                                                   
30 Ibid., para. 74. 
31 Ibid., para. 75. 
32 OTP, Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of an investiga-
tion pursuant to article 15”, 16 October 2015, 17 November 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr, 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/eca741/). 
33 Ibid., para. 63. 
34 Ibid., para. 94–95. It should be noted that these names are given not directly for the pur-
poses of identifying possible perpetrators or potential accused, but to determine the institu-
tional links between South Ossetian forces and Russia by showing that a number of senior 
figures in the South Ossetian army are also part of the Russian military. 
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versely, the structure of the Russian or Georgian military is not detailed, 
nor are specific military or civilian leaders of post holders mentioned. 
In the report issued by the OTP when deciding to not open a formal 
investigation in the situation on registered vessels of Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, one can note that the Prosecutor provides a minimalist 
discussion of the alleged perpetrators, referring throughout to the “IDF”, 
without any information on names, ranks or modes of liability. 
In relation to the situation in Burundi which was opened on 25 Oc-
tober 2017 by a Pre-Trial Chamber,36 while the OTP has not made availa-
ble a public redacted version of its request, one can note in the decision 
itself that only the President of Burundi is explicitly named in the section 
concerning the assessment of jurisdiction. 
Finally, in the request to open an investigation in Afghanistan, the 
Prosecutor, in a section entitled “persons or groups involved”, provides 
some general discussion on groups that might have been implicated in the 
commission of the crimes, but does not indicate the role of specific indi-
viduals, other than mentioning their role as leaders of such or such 
group.37 
28.3.3. Assessment of the OTP Practice 
What conclusions can thus be drawn from OTP practice to date? First of 
all, none of the documents produced includes any direct discussion of 
modes of liability. One can note that the Kenya request is probably the 
most detailed in distinguishing the direct perpetrators of the violence and 
those who had organized it, financed it and incited it. Moreover, the Ivory 
Coast request is the only one that seems to indicate the existence of an 
                                                                                                                        
35 Ibid., para. 184. 
36 On the controversy surrounding the issuance of the decision, a mere two days prior to 
Burundi’s withdrawal of the Rome Statute becoming effective, see Dov Jacobs, “Peek-A-
Boo: ICC authorises investigation in Burundi, some thoughts on legality and cooperation”, 
in Spreading the Jam, 11 November 2017. 
37 OTP, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Public redacted version of “Request 
for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC-
02/17-7-Conf-Exp, paras. 53–71 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db23eb/). 
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overall plan that could be linked with a mode of liability of indirect co-
perpetratorship.38 
One can wonder to what extent the increasingly flexible approach 
by judges in relation to modes of liabilities in the early stages of the pro-
ceedings and during trial affects the work of the OTP during the prelimi-
nary examination. Pre-Trial Chambers initially refused to confirm multi-
ple modes of liability, considering that a person could not be considered to 
be both a direct perpetrator and an accomplice of the commission of a 
crime. For example, Pre-Trial Chamber II in 2011 held that: “Although 
the Prosecutor may generally charge in the alternative, he should be con-
sistent throughout his Application about the actual mode(s) of liability 
that he intends to present to the Chamber. Moreover, the possibility for the 
Prosecutor to charge in the alternative does not necessarily mean that the 
Chamber has to respond in the same manner. In particular, the Chamber is 
not persuaded that it is best practice to make simultaneous findings on 
modes of liability presented in the alternative. A person cannot be deemed 
concurrently as a principal and an accessory to the same crime”.39 Starting 
with the Ntaganda confirmation of charges decision,40 Pre-Trial Cham-
bers started to accept that cumulative modes of liability could be con-
firmed. The consequence of this flexibility is that there is no incentive, 
from the prosecution perspective, to focus too much attention on modes of 
liability during the preliminary examination (this is equally true during 
the confirmation of charges hearing and even the trial). 
To this situation must be added the pervasive use of Regulation 55 
in most cases at the ICC thus far, which allows the Chamber to consider a 
legal re-characterization of the facts to fit another crime or mode of liabil-
ity than the one charged. The result of this legal framework is that there is 
                                                   
38 There is some indication of such an alleged coordinated plan in the Burundi decision of 25 
October 2017, but it is unclear whether the Chamber has drawn such conclusions, or 
whether they were initially put forward by the OTP in its request. 
39 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, PTC II, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
Arap Sang, 8 March 2011, ICC-02/11-3, para. 36 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6c9fb0/). 
40 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 
PTC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges 
of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/5686c6/). 
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less emphasis on the requirement for the prosecution to be specific about 
the modes of liability at any stage of the proceedings, which necessarily 
affects its work during the preliminary examination.41 This is not merely a 
procedural development, it says something about how these trials and how 
the role of the alleged perpetrator are perceived. Indeed, to put it simply, 
modes of liability are often seen as a mere technical hindrance on the im-
plementation of the principle that the perpetrators must have done some-
thing wrong. Again, given the possibility that Regulation 55 might be 
used up until the final stages of the proceedings, there is less need for the 
Prosecution to be precise in relation to modes of liability during the trial, 
which necessarily changes how these questions are approached during the 
preliminary examination. 
A second takeaway from the OTP practice is that there does not 
seem to be a unified practice when it comes to identifying specific indi-
viduals within the request for authorization.42 While no individual was 
named in the Kenya and Comoros situations, the same is not true in the 
Côte d’Ivoire and Georgia requests. 
One can wonder if there should there be a unified practice at all? 
Possibly not, to the extent that the content of the request will depend on 
the availability of information on details of perpetrators in one situation 
but not another. 
One risk of identifying certain possible perpetrators in the request, 
especially if they come from only one side of the conflict, is that it might 
suggest an imbalance in the approach of the OTP to the investigation, 
which might affect its credibility and legitimacy. The OTP could answer 
that this naming takes place in the context of a preliminary examination, 
and therefore does not provide any conclusion on the responsibility of the 
given individual. While technically true, this answer ignores the symbolic 
function of the work of the ICC and the disconnect between the legal na-
                                                   
41 Ironically, one of the justifications for Regulation 55 was that it would compel the OTP to 
be more precise in its charging policy. In fact, the exact opposite has occurred and the use 
of Regulation 55 has led to less specificity in both the charging policy and the charges con-
firmed. On Regulation 55, see Dov Jacobs, “A Shifting Scale of Power: who is in charge of 
the charges at the international criminal court”, in William Schabas, Yvonne McDermott 
and Niamh Hayes, (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal 
Law, Ashgate, 2013, p. 205. 
42 With the caveat that the analysis is based on publicly available documents. 
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ture of a procedure and the way it might be perceived from the outside. 
The fact that an official document issued by the OTP mentions a particular 
individual will necessarily give the impression that this individual is al-
ready the target of the OTP, as early as the preliminary examination. To 
avoid this risk, the OTP could possibly adopt a policy of generally not 
mentioning any names in the requests to open formal investigations, at 
least publicly.43 
28.4. Admissibility and the Potential Defendant 
Besides jurisdiction, another criterion to be taken into account during the 
preliminary examination is whether the case would be admissible under 
Article 17.44 As part of this assessment, the Prosecutor is bound to verify 
whether domestic investigations and prosecutions exist, and, if they do, 
whether they are conducted in respect of certain individuals which could, 
at a later stage, be potential defendants before the ICC. Another aspect of 
the admissibility test is gravity and this might also involve the determina-
tion of potential defendants. This section will address these two aspects in 
turn, before providing a short critical assessment. It should be noted that 
the following discussion focuses exclusively on the core of this chapter, 
that is, whether potential perpetrators are identified during this phase of 
the proceedings. It does not purport to provide a general discussion of the 
admissibility test and how it is applied, which would be beyond the scope 
of this chapter. 
28.4.1. Identifying alleged perpetrators when assessing 
complementarity. 
This section will first highlight OTP official policy in that respect, before 
looking at how it applied in OTP requests to open an investigation and 
how the various Chambers have decided on the matter.  
28.4.1.1. OTP Policy 
In relation to complementarity, the OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Ex-
aminations indicates that: “At the preliminary examination stage there is 
                                                   
43 It should be noted here that the question here is whether potential perpetrators should be 
named in the request, not whether they should be the subject of the preliminary examina-
tion or even be approached in that context. As noted below, they should (Section 28.5.). 
44 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(b), see supra note 5. 
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not yet a ‘case’, as understood to comprise an identified set of incidents, 
suspects and conduct. Therefore the consideration of admissibility (com-
plementarity and gravity) will take into account potential cases that could 
be identified in the course of the preliminary examination based on the 
information available and that would likely arise from an investigation 
into the situation”.45 
The OTP later clarifies that: “Where there are or have been national 
investigations or prosecutions, the Office shall examine whether such 
proceedings relate to potential cases being examined by the Office and in 
particular, whether the focus is on those most responsible for the most 
serious crimes committed”,46 a statement corresponding to “its stated pol-
icy of focussing on those bearing the greatest responsibility for the most 
serious crimes”.47 
Nevertheless, nowhere in the policy paper is there any explanation 
as to what is meant by “those bearing the greatest responsibility”, which is 
problematic given the somewhat subjective moral assessment that is re-
quired for such a determination. Does one focus on the direct perpetrators, 
or on those possibly higher up in the command structure, which seems to 
be a traditionally accepted way to understand the concept of “those bear-
ing the greatest responsibility” in international criminal law? 
The Regulations of the OTP do not shed light on the issue, merely 
indicating that: “The joint team shall review the information and evidence 
collected and shall determine a provisional case hypothesis (or hypotheses) 
identifying the incidents to be investigated and the person or persons who 
appear to be the most responsible”.48 
The 2016-2018 OTP Strategic Plan issued in 2016 provides the fol-
lowing explanation: “Where deemed appropriate, the Office will imple-
ment a building-upwards strategy by first investigating and prosecuting a 
limited number of mid- and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately 
have a reasonable prospect of conviction for the most responsible. Pursu-
ing this in-depth and open-ended approach, the Office will first focus on a 
wide range of crimes to properly identify organisations, structures and 
                                                   
45 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 43, see supra note 19. 
46 Ibid., para. 49. 
47 Ibid., para. 45. 
48 Regulations, Regulation 34, see supra note 22. 
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individuals allegedly responsible for their commission. It will then con-
sider mid- and high level perpetrators in its investigation and prosecution 
strategies to build the evidentiary foundations for subsequent case(s) 
against those most responsible. The Office will also consider prosecuting 
lower level perpetrators where their conduct was particularly grave and 
has acquired extensive notoriety”.49 
This explanation calls for two remarks. First, it shows a desire on 
the part of the OTP not to provide a clear and objective definition of who 
is considered to be the most responsible, even if the suggestion seems to 
be here that “most responsible” is somehow linked to the position of the 
perpetrator. Second, whatever is meant by “most responsible” it is not 
seen as a limiting criteria on who might actually be prosecuted, given that 
all levels of perpetrators might be a target for the OTP.50 
The will on the part of the OTP to keep their options open is further 
confirmed in the Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation issued 
in 2016, where it is indicated that: “The notion of the most responsible 
does not necessarily equate with the de jure hierarchical status of an indi-
vidual within a structure, but will be assessed on a case-by-case basis de-
pending on the evidence. As the investigation progresses, the extent of 
responsibility of any identified alleged perpetrator(s) will be assessed on 
the basis of, inter alia, the nature of the unlawful behaviour; the degree of 
                                                   
49 OTP, Strategic plan 2016–2018, 6 July 2015, p. 16 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
7ae957/). 
50 One could also question the fact that case selection might be based on the fact that conduct 
has “acquired extensive notoriety”. This criterion, which makes prosecution partly depend-
ent on whether a particular situation or case has received media attention, is difficult to jus-
tify in light of the complex dynamics which make certain issues newsworthy or not. In that 
respect, one can note that the Appeals Chamber rejected the idea that the “social alarm” 
created by a crime could be a relevant factor to be taken into account as part of the gravity 
assessment. However, more recently, it seems to have received some revival in the Como-
ros PTC decision, where the Majority expressed the following view: “As a final note, the 
Chamber cannot overlook the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the Prosecutor’s con-
clusion that the identified crimes were so evidently not grave enough to justify action by 
the Court, of which the raison d’être is to investigate and prosecute international crimes of 
concern to the international community, and, on the other hand, the attention and concern 
that these events attracted from the parties involved, also leading to several fact-finding ef-
forts on behalf of States and the United Nations in order to shed light on the events” (Sit-
uation on registered vessels of the union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of Greece 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, para. 51, see supra note 3).  
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their participation and intent; the existence of any motive involving dis-
crimination; and any abuse of power or official capacity”.51 
28.4.1.2. OTP Practice 
Does the practice of the OTP provide more clarity? 
In the Kenya request, the OTP simply indicates that, “[b]ecause no 
national investigations or proceedings are pending against those bearing 
the greatest responsibility for the crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed, the Prosecutor submits that the cases that would arise from its 
investigation of the situation would be currently admissible”.52 There is, 
however, mention of a list of names of those bearing the greatest respon-
sibility for the alleged crimes, established by the Waki Commission and 
provided in a sealed envelope to the OTP.53 
In the Côte d’Ivoire request, the Prosecutor seems to have taken a 
more specific approach by providing a list of names of those it considered 
to bear the greatest responsibility: “the Prosecution has attached two con-
fidential, ex-parte, annexes. Annex 1B presents a preliminary list of per-
sons or groups belonging to or associated with the pro-Gbagbo and pro-
Ouattara sides that appear to bear the greatest responsibility for the most 
serious crimes, with an indication of their specific role. As set out in the 
Office’s Prosecutorial Strategy, the category of persons bearing the great-
est responsibility includes those situated at the highest echelons of re-
sponsibility, including those who ordered, financed, or otherwise orga-
nized the alleged crimes”.54 
                                                   
51 OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection, 15 September 2016, para. 43 (http://www.legal- 
tools.org/doc/182205/). The OTP refers in a footnote to Rules 145(1)(c) and 145(2)(b) of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as guidance. These provisions relate to sentencing 
and aggravating circumstances and one can wonder to what extent they should logically be 
taken into account in the preliminary examination phase, particularly in assessing admissi-
bility of the case. Indeed, if aggravating factors for sentencing are taken into account dur-
ing case selection, what is the point of having aggravating factors at all in the Statute or 
RPE? This is true both for complementarity and for gravity, PTCs having themselves had 
recourse to such criteria in their determination of the gravity of the situation (see for ex-
ample, Kenya decision, para. 62). 
52 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant 
to Article 15, para. 55, see supra note 23. 
53 Ibid., para. 15. 
54 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15, para. 46, see supra note 26.  
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The mention of this list is, however, preceded by the following ca-
veat: “The Prosecution’s selection of the incidents or groups of persons 
that are likely to shape future case(s) is preliminary in nature and is not 
binding for future admissibility assessments, meaning that the Prosecu-
tion’s selection on the basis of these elements for the purposes of defining 
a potential ‘case’ for this particular phase may change at a later stage, 
depending on the development of the investigation”.55 In other words, 
those which might be the target of a potential prosecution might be sub-
ject to change in the course of the actual investigation. 
In the remainder of the request, the Prosecutor does not specify 
what is meant by “those who bear the greatest responsibility”, simply 
concluding that: “Because no national investigations or proceedings are 
pending in Côte d’Ivoire against those bearing the greatest responsibility 
for the most serious crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court 
allegedly committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 28 November 2010, the Prose-
cution submits that the potential cases that would arise from its investiga-
tion of the situation would be currently admissible”.56 
In the Mavi Marmara report, the OTP provides no direct assessment 
of those it considered might bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes, 
although in subsequent proceedings regarding its report, it explained that, 
albeit in the context of gravity, “the Report shows that the Prosecution 
expressly considered key indicators in this regard in its gravity analysis – 
notably, that the available information did not suggest that the Identified 
Crimes were systematic or resulted from a deliberate plan or policy, hav-
ing regard especially to the commission of the Identified Crimes on just 
one of the seven vessels of the flotilla and the manner in which those 
crimes were committed. These factors suggested that the potential perpe-
trators of the Identified Crimes were among those who carried out the 
boarding of the Mavi Marmara, and subsequent operations aboard, but not 
necessarily other persons further up the chain of command”.57 Further, as 
“the Report shows, the Prosecution’s analysis did not support the view 
                                                   
55 Ibid., para. 45. 
56 Ibid., para. 53. 
57 ICC, Situation on registered vessels of the union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of 
Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Response 
to the Application for Review of its Determination under article 53(1)(b) of the Rome Stat-
ute, 30 March 2015, ICC-01/13-14-Red, para. 60 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0e4e4c/). 
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that there was a reasonable basis to believe that “senior IDF commanders 
and Israeli leaders” were responsible as perpetrators or planners of the 
apparent war crimes”.58 
This seems to suggest a rather straightforward approach to “those 
who bear the greatest responsibility” as being linked to the position within 
the military command. 
In the Georgia request, the Prosecutor annexed an ex parte “prelim-
inary list of persons or groups that appear to be the most responsible for 
the most serious crimes, with an indication of their specific role”,59 but 
does not provide specific information on this list in the request itself. The 
discussion on complementarity focuses exclusively on the absence of pro-
gress in domestic enquiries and lack of prosecutions. 
The Prosecutor also provides a similar caveat as in the Côte d’Ivoire 
request: “The Prosecution’s identification of the incidents or groups of 
persons that are likely to shape future case(s) is preliminary in nature and 
should not be considered binding for future admissibility assessments. 
Should an investigation be authorised, the Prosecution should be permit-
ted to expand or modify its investigation with respect to these or other 
alleged acts, incidents, groups or persons and/or adopt different legal 
qualifications, so long as the cases brought forward for prosecution are 
sufficiently linked to the authorised situation”.60 
In the Afghanistan request, the Prosecutor apparently provided an 
ex parte list of persons or groups most likely to be the object of an inves-
tigation,61 and explains, relying on the case law of the Court, that “as for 
the level of specificity and detail required to make an admissibility deter-
mination, the Prosecution has borne in mind the nature of the present 
stage, the low evidentiary threshold which applies, and the object and 
purpose of the article 15 stage”.62 
                                                   
58 Ibid., para. 62. 
59 Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15”, para. 276, see supra note 32. 
60 Ibid., para. 277. 
61 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Public redacted version of “Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, para. 264, see supra note 37. 
62 Ibid., para. 263. 
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28.4.1.3. ICC Case Law 
Given the approach taken by the OTP, it remains to consider how various 
Chambers have decided upon the issue. 
In the 2010 decision to authorize an investigation in the Kenya situ-
ation, the Pre-Trial Chamber had to resolve the question of what the ad-
missibility of a “case” could mean at the situation phase and found that: 
“since it is not possible to have a concrete case involving an identified 
suspect for the purpose of prosecution, prior to the commencement of an 
investigation, the admissibility assessment at this stage actually refers to 
the admissibility of one or more potential cases within the context of a 
situation”.63 
The Pre-Trial Chamber went on to specify that: “admissibility at the 
situation phase should be assessed against certain criteria defining a “po-
tential case” such as: (i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to 
be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future 
case(s); and (ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly 
committed during the incidents that are likely to be the focus of an inves-
tigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s)”.64 
This test is picked up in subsequent case law,65 but interestingly, no 
Pre-Trial Chamber has explicitly included in the complementarity branch 
of admissibility the question of “those bearing the greatest responsibil-
ity”.66 
Another interesting point to note in the case law, is that Pre-Trial 
Chambers are very careful to situate this complementarity assessment in 
                                                   
63 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, PTC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 48 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/). 
64 Ibid., para. 50. 
65 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, PTC III, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Re-
public of Côte d’Ivoire, 3 October 2011, ICC-02/11-14, para. 191 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/7a6c19/). ICC, Situation in Georgia, PTC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for 
authorization of an investigation, ICC-01/15-12, 27 January 2016, para. 37 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/a3d07e/). 
66 However, this criteria reemerges in the context of the gravity assessment (see infra, Sec-
tion 24.4.2.). 
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the context of the preliminary nature of the examination, with the conse-
quence that such assessment is not definitive. 
For example, the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Kenya situation found 
that “the Prosecutor’s selection of the incidents or groups of persons that 
are likely to shape his future case(s) is preliminary in nature and is not 
binding for future admissibility assessments. This means that the Prosecu-
tor’s selection on the basis of these elements for the purposes of defining 
a potential “case” for this particular phase may change at a later stage, 
depending on the development of the investigation”.67 
Similarly, the Appeals Chamber has remarked that: “For the pur-
pose of proceedings relating to the initiation of an investigation into a 
situation (articles 15 and 53 (1) of the Statute), the contours of the likely 
cases will often be relatively vague because the investigations of the Pros-
ecutor are at their initial stages. The same is true for preliminary admissi-
bility challenges under article 18 of the Statute. Often, no individual sus-
pects will have been identified at this stage, nor will the exact conduct nor 
its legal classification be clear”.68 
28.4.2. Assessing Gravity 
The Regulations of the OTP provide little guidance on how potential de-
fendants are taken into account in the gravity assessment, simply stating 
that: “In order to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in 
                                                   
67 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 50, 
see supra note 63. This approach was confirmed in the decision to open an investigation in 
the situation in Burundi: “The Chamber recalls that the Prosecutor’s evaluation of these 
criteria is preliminary in nature and may change as a result of an investigation” (ICC, Situ-
ation in the Republic of Burundi, PTC I, Public Redacted Version of “Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Burundi”, 25 October 2017, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, para. 143 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/8f2373/)). 
68 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility 
of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute”, 30 August 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-
307, para. 39 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac5d46/). 
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the situation the Office shall consider various factors including their scale, 
nature, manner of commission, and impact”.69 
According to the 2013 policy paper: “The manner of commission of 
the crimes may be assessed in light of, inter alia, the means employed to 
execute the crime, the degree of participation and intent of the perpetrator 
(if discernible at this stage), the extent to which the crimes were systemat-
ic or result from a plan or organised policy or otherwise resulted from the 
abuse of power or official capacity, and elements of particular cruelty, 
including the vulnerability of the victims, any motives involving discrim-
ination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a means of destroying 
groups”.70 
This paragraph suggests that the conduct of the potential defendant 
could be taken into account in several ways: (1) “the degree of participa-
tion and intent of the perpetrator” and (2) “the abuse of power or official 
capacity”. It is not entirely clear what these expressions mean, because 
there is no explanation of what a “degree of intent” is (presumably, there 
is either criminal intent, or no criminal intent) or what kind of intent 
would be more or less grave, nor is there a definition of what might con-
stitute “abuse of power or official capacity”. Moreover, the policy paper is 
very clear (“if discernible at this stage”) that such determination of the 
conduct of the potential defendant is not a definitive prerequisite at this 
stage. 
Also interesting to note is that the Prosecutor never puts forward as 
a distinct gravity criterion the fact that the person might “bear the greatest 
responsibility”. In fact, the OTP, in the policy paper, relies on the case law 
of the Court to minimize this requirement: “The Appeals Chamber has 
dismissed the setting of an overly restrictive legal bar to the interpretation 
of gravity that would hamper the deterrent role of the Court. It has also 
observed that the role of persons or groups may vary considerably de-
pending on the circumstances of the case and therefore should not be ex-
clusively assessed or predetermined on excessively formulistic 
grounds”.71 
                                                   
69 Regulations, Regulation 29(2), see supra note 22. 
70 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 64, see supra note 19.  
71 Ibid., para. 60. 
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Indeed, in 2006, the Appeals Chamber had rejected the gravity cri-
teria that the Pre-Trial Chamber had devised of focusing only on highest 
ranking perpetrators on the basis that: “The predictable exclusion of many 
perpetrators on the grounds proposed by the Pre-Trial Chamber could 
severely hamper the preventive, or deterrent, role of the Court which is a 
cornerstone of the creation of the International Criminal Court, by an-
nouncing that any perpetrators other than those at the very top are auto-
matically excluded from the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
particular role of a person or, for that matter, an organization, may vary 
considerably depending on the circumstances of the case and should not 
be exclusively assessed or predetermined on excessively formalistic 
grounds”.72 
Given the minimal importance given by the Prosecutor to the con-
duct of the potential defendant in the gravity assessment in light of the 
Appeals Judgment of 2006, it is unsurprising that there is little infor-
mation on this aspect in the first request filed by the Prosecutor. There is 
therefore no mention of potential perpetrators in the gravity assessment 
part of the Kenya request. 
However, despite the fact that this was not a criteria relied on by the 
OTP in its request, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered in the decision to 
open an investigation that: “As for the first element [“the groups of per-
sons involved that are likely to be the object of an investigation for the 
purpose of shaping the future case(s)”], the Chamber considers that it 
involves a generic assessment of whether such groups of persons that are 
likely to form the object of investigation capture those who may bear the 
greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes committed. Such assessment 
should be general in nature and compatible with the pre-investigative 
stage into a situation”.73 
There is some indication of what is meant by “those who may bear 
the greatest responsibility” later on in the decision, where the Court notes 
                                                   
72 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”, 13 July 2006, ICC-01/04-
169, paras. 75–76 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8c20eb/). 
73 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 60, 
see supra note 63. 
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that: “With respect to the first element concerning the groups of persons 
likely to be the focus of the Prosecutor’s future investigations, the sup-
porting material refers to their high-ranking positions, and their alleged 
role in the violence, namely inciting, planning, financing, colluding with 
criminal gangs, and otherwise contributing to the organization of the vio-
lence”.74 This seems to suggest that the high-ranking position of the po-
tential defendant is a key element in the determination made by the 
Chamber. This appears, on the face of it, at odds with the Appeals Cham-
ber decision from 2006 quoted previously. The fact that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber was applying the test at the “situation” phase rather than at the 
“case” does not affect this apparent discrepancy in the case law, because 
the underlying rationale of the Appeals Chamber was to avoid sending out 
a message that lower level perpetrators would not be prosecuted before 
the ICC, a rationale which applies whether at the situation phase or the 
case phase. 
Following this decision, the OTP logically adopted the criteria as 
his own in subsequent requests,75 noting each time that potential defend-
ants were high-ranking officials, persons in position of command or per-
sons with levels of responsibility in the commission of the crimes.76 And 
all decisions authorizing an investigation so far have applied this criterion 
consistently. 
One decision that stands out in that respect is the decision request-
ing the Prosecutor to reconsider its decision not to open an investigation 
in the Mavi Marmara situation. As noted above, the Prosecutor had indi-
cated, in considering that the situation did not meet the gravity threshold, 
that no “‘senior IDF commanders and Israeli leaders’ were responsible as 
                                                   
74 Ibid., para. 198. 
75 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15, para. 55, see supra note 26; Situation in the Islamic Republic of Af-
ghanistan, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursu-
ant to article 15”, para. 336, see supra note 37. 
76 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15, para. 57, see supra note 26; Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version 
of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, para. 337, see su-
pra note 32; Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Public redacted version of 
“Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, para. 338, see supra 
note 37. 
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perpetrators or planners of the apparent war crimes”. 77  The Pre-Trial 
Chamber did not find this determinative. It held instead that: 
Contrary to the Prosecutor’s argument at paragraph 62 of her 
Response, the conclusion in the Decision Not to Investigate 
that there was not a reasonable basis to believe that “senior 
IDF commanders and Israeli leaders” were responsible as 
perpetrators or planners of the identified crimes does not an-
swer the question at issue, which relates to the Prosecutor’s 
ability to investigate and prosecute those being the most re-
sponsible for the crimes under consideration and not as such 
to the seniority or hierarchical position of those who may be 
responsible for such crimes. […] there appears to be no rea-
son, in the present circumstances and in light of the parame-
ters of the referral and scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, to 
consider that an investigation into the situation referred by 
the Comoros could not lead to the prosecution of those per-
sons who may bear the greatest responsibility for the identi-
fied crimes committed during the seizure of the Mavi Mar-
mara by the IDF.78 
This decision seems to be at odds with prior case law of the assess-
ment of gravity at the situation phase.79 Moreover, the assertion that the 
investigation would lead to the prosecution of those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for the identified crimes, when stripped of any qualifier 
(such as rank), is somewhat empty. Indeed, it is obvious that, taken in its 
literal sense, an OTP investigation will focus on those most responsible 
for the commission of a crime (as opposed to those not responsible). That 
is not a gravity criterion, that is common sense. As a result, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in the Comoros situation, rather than just doing away with the 
                                                   
77 Situation on registered vessels of the union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of 
Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Response 
to the Application for Review of its Determination under article 53(1)(b) of the Rome Stat-
ute, para. 62, see supra note 57. 
78 Situation on registered vessels of the union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of 
Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the Union of the Como-
ros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, paras. 23–24, see 
supra note 3. 
79 Interestingly, one Judge, Cuno Tarfusser, sat both on the PTC in the Kenya situation, where 
the high-ranking level of potential Accused was initially adopted as a gravity criteria, and 
on the Comoros Bench, which rejects it. 
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requirement that the investigation focus on “those who may bear the 
greatest responsibility”, kept it, but emptied it of any meaning. 
28.4.3. Critical Evaluation 
In light of the current practice at the ICC, one could raise doubts on the 
opportunity of devolving so much time and resources to a determination 
of admissibility at such an early stage of the proceedings, during the pre-
liminary examination. 
28.4.3.1. Is a Determination of Admissibility a Legal Requirement 
during a Preliminary Examination? 
It is not entirely clear from the Rome Statute that such an assessment is 
legally required. Of course, Article 53 does explicitly mention the ques-
tion of future admissibility of a case as an element to take into account in 
deciding whether to open an investigation. However, this should not be 
equated with a legal requirement. Indeed, as noted previously, Article 53 
has a dual nature in the Rome Statute depending on the existence of a 
judicial control over prosecutorial discretion. Moreover, it can be noted, 
specifically in the context of proprio motu investigations, that Article 15(4) 
tasks the Pre-Trial Chamber explicitly to verify “that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Court”, not to verify admissibility.80 
What led to this situation is probably a confusion between, on the 
one hand, the OTP having to take into account whether a case would be 
admissible as a policy consideration in deciding whether to open an inves-
tigation, which is what the Statute says in our view, and on the other hand, 
the idea that opening an investigation actually requires a formal determi-
nation of admissibility, which, in our view is not the case. Indeed, it is not 
for the OTP to decide whether a case is admissible or not, it is part of the 
judicial function. This conclusion that an admissibility determination is in 
fact not a formal legal requirement to open an investigation also finds 
some support in the case law of the Court. 
                                                   
80 In that respect, while beyond the scope of the current contribution, one can question how 
the PTC interpreted the Statute in order to determine that the language of Article 17 (relat-
ing to the admissibility of a “case”) could somewhat be applied in the “situation” phase 
because the drafters somehow decided to let the Judges decide such an important matter. 
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For example, in deciding that the Pre-Trial Chamber decision for 
the Prosecutor to reconsider its decision not to open an investigation in 
the Comoros situation was unappealable, the Appeals Chamber clearly 
said that the impugned decision, even though it used the language of ad-
missibility, was not strictly a decision on admissibility that could be ap-
pealed under Article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.81 
A more striking example is the decision allowing the Prosecutor to 
open an investigation in Georgia. In that decision, the Chamber was not in 
a position of making a definitive finding that potential cases that were 
being investigated in Russia would be admissible at the ICC. However, 
instead of either requesting further information or declaring the potential 
cases inadmissible, the Chamber allowed the Prosecutor to proceed, in-
cluding on those contentious cases, pushing back to the formal determina-
tion of admissibility to a later stage: “It is therefore more appropriate to 
allow the Prosecutor to conduct her investigation, which will naturally 
extend to issues of admissibility, and for the question to be authoritatively 
resolved at a later stage if needed”.82 
Finally, it is difficult to argue that a determination of admissibility is 
a legal requirement to be satisfied to open an investigation, while at the 
same time accepting that, during the actual investigation, the OTP is free 
to completely change the parameters of potential cases, or even choose 
entirely different cases than the ones he put forward when deciding to 
open an investigation, which is the current situation today, as noted previ-
ously. If the determination of the admissibility of potential cases was le-
gally decisive in deciding to open an investigation, then, at minimum, the 
OTP should be bound to stick to those potential cases during the formal 
investigations. This would obviously be contrary to prosecutorial discre-
tion in choosing specific cases to pursue and therefore reinforces the con-
clusion that admissibility during the preliminary examination is at best a 
policy consideration. 
                                                   
81 ICC, Situation on registered vessels of the union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of 
Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the admissibility of 
the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros 
to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, 6 November 2015, 
ICC-01/13-51 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a43856/). 
82 Situation in Georgia, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investi-
gation, para. 46, see supra note 65. 
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28.4.3.2. Does a Discussion of Admissibility Have Any Practical 
Merit during a Preliminary Examination? 
Even if one were to consider that a judicial determination, or at the very 
least a judicial discussion, of admissibility was required during a prelimi-
nary examination, one can wonder if it has any value in the current situa-
tion. 
Indeed, given the OTP’s discretion to determine the scope of poten-
tial cases, it will always be in a position to frame its request in order to 
make the situation as a whole admissible by focusing on those cases that – 
in the event that there are or have been relevant domestic prosecutions – 
are not being dealt with by domestic authorities. This applies equally to 
the gravity assessment because the Prosecutor simply has to claim to want 
to focus ultimately on those persons holding positions of responsibility 
within a State or organization. 
Ultimately, as noted above, because the Prosecutor has full discre-
tion to choose what cases to prosecute within a given situation, it does not 
seem to make much sense to devote so much time discussing the admissi-
bility of ‘potential cases’ in the abstract during the preliminary examina-
tion. 
Avoiding discussions on the admissibility of potential cases might 
also contribute to reducing the length of preliminary examinations, which 
is a common criticism. Indeed, the length of preliminary examinations to 
date seems to be in part due to, on the one hand, the difficulty in obtaining 
relevant information about domestic proceedings for the purpose of de-
termining the admissibility of potential cases and, on the other, to the 
‘positive complementarity’ approach adopted by the OTP in a number of 
situations, notably Colombia.83 
28.5. The Status of the ‘Accused’ during a Preliminary Examination 
As noted in Section 28.1., it is difficult to identify the exact position of the 
potential defendant during a preliminary examination, when alleged per-
petrators are normally not the primary focus of the OTP’s enquiry. The 
Rome Statute is silent on this issue, notably because the preliminary ex-
                                                   
83 Annie Pues, “Towards the ‘Golden Hour’: A Critical Exploration of the Length of Prelimi-
nary Examinations”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, vol. 15, p. 440. 
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amination is mostly not per se subject to the judicial process.84 This does 
not mean that interaction with potential defendants cannot be subject to 
some judicial framework, even in this early phase of the proceedings, 
particularly through the operation of Article 55 of the Rome Statute. 
Moreover, taking things forward, there should be some thought into ad-
dressing the particular position of the potential defendant during the pre-
liminary examination and providing some specific legal status for him or 
her to be heard by the OTP. 
28.5.1. The Importance of Taking into Account the Potential 
Defendant during the Preliminary Examination 
It is our opinion that from a policy perspective, the OTP could and should 
try to open lines of communication with possible perpetrators identified 
during a preliminary examination. This is a safeguard for the quality of a 
preliminary examination and further down the line for the quality of a 
formal investigation and for the proceedings as a whole. 
If the OTP is allowed to reach out, in a defined framework, to a po-
tential perpetrator during a preliminary examination,85 it will inevitably 
spur the OTP do to so. Thus the OTP will be able, from the very begin-
ning, to concretely assess the seriousness of the information received. 
Indeed, once the OTP has analysed all the information received from a 
broad spectrum of different sources, even from a potential perpetrator, it 
can have a clearer picture of what might have taken place in a specific 
country at a specific time and then the OTP can decide on solid grounds if 
it wishes to open an formal investigation or not. Plus, the OTP would be 
beyond reproach of any bias and there would be no doubt that starting 
from the preliminary examination it is examining incriminating and exon-
erating circumstances equally. Analysing a situation taking into account 
only ‘one side of the story’ bears an inherent risk of prejudice. This is why 
the OTP should always balance incriminating evidence that is presented to 
them with exonerating information at their disposal. To be beyond any 
reproach and fulfil their duty as officers of the Court, the OTP has to ex-
amine equally all obtainable information from the very start. It is the duty 
of the OTP on a policy and legal level to ensure that the rights of a poten-
                                                   
84 See supra Section 24.1. 
85 As we are going to explore the different statuses of a person who is targeted during a pre-
liminary investigation we will refer to this person as a potential perpetrator. 
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tial perpetrator are respected from the very beginning. In doing so the 
right to a fair trial is also ensured from the beginning. The OTP cannot, 
especially at such an early stage, ignore the presumption of innocence of 
potential perpetrators. To build a case in an unprejudiced manner the OTP 
has to explore all the leads at their disposal and the potential perpetrator is 
undeniably one of those leads. Finally, it would benefit the Court as a 
whole because making sure a potential perpetrator can fully exercise his 
or her rights from the beginning of the proceedings is essential in giving 
meaning to rights that are enshrined in the Rome Statute and is essential 
to make sure that the ICC adheres to its own values. 
More specifically, if a person is targeted during a preliminary exam-
ination because, for example, victims or NGOs are accusing him or her of 
being the perpetrator of a crime, he or she should have the opportunity to 
put forward his or her side of the story. This is even more so during a pre-
liminary examination, which often occurs in a context broadly covered by 
the media and thus the opinion of the international community is usually 
already decided. In such a context, it is critical that the prosecution does 
not assume that the allegations presented to his or her office are well-
founded. It is then the duty of the OTP to examine the situation impartial-
ly and seriously. Only then can the OTP decide if it is reasonable to open 
a formal investigation.  
Article 15(2) provides: “The Prosecutor shall analyse the serious-
ness of the information received. For this purpose, he or she may seek 
additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, inter-
governmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable 
sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral 
testimony at the seat of the Court”. It is not because the Article does not 
expressly mention the potential defendant that he or she is not a reliable or 
appropriate source. Quite on the contrary, keeping a balance between op-
posing parties is crucial to maintain a non-biased approach to the situation 
at hand. In addition, not opening such lines of communication with all 
parties to a conflict, including possible perpetrators, might give rise to the 
question of whether the fact that the person that was targeted during a 
preliminary examination without having been heard or put in a position to 
defend him or herself is the reason why a formal investigation might have 
been opened in the first place. If the potential perpetrator that was targeted 
during a preliminary examination had been able to give valuable infor-
mation to the OTP during a preliminary examination some or maybe all 
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allegations might have appeared unfounded. In addition, denying the pos-
sibility to a potential perpetrator targeted during a preliminary examina-
tion to be heard may be counterproductive as suspicion of bias may arise. 
But, of course, the question is now, in what capacity should he or 
she have been approached? A witness? A suspect? A defendant? One 
could consider that once a formal investigation is opened, his legal status 
will become clearer and so might his rights. But is it not too late? And 
how does the OTP have a clearer picture of the situation at hand if they do 
not reach out to one of the main actors of the situation they are investigat-
ing? 
28.5.2. The Applicability and Scope of Article 55 during the 
Preliminary Examination 
One provision of the Rome Statute which can arguable apply during the 
preliminary examination to provide some protection to the potential de-
fendant is Article 55 which concerns the “rights of persons during an in-
vestigation” and provides that: 
1. In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person: 
(a)  Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or 
herself or to confess guilt; 
(b)  Shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, du-
ress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(c)  Shall, if questioned in a language other than a lan-
guage the person fully understands and speaks, have, 
free of any cost, the assistance of a competent inter-
preter and such translations as are necessary to meet 
the requirements of fairness; and 
(d)  Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detent-
ion, and shall not be deprived of his or her liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedures as are established in this Statute. 
It is not entirely clear during what phase of the proceedings this 
provision applies. On the face of it, this provision seems to apply during 
“an investigation”, which suggests that it would not apply during the pre-
liminary examination. Such a reading, however, would lead to strange 
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results.86 Indeed, contrary to when a Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes the 
opening of an investigation under Article 15, there is no formal (that is, 
judicially controlled) moment when an investigation is opened, which 
would render the temporal scope of the protection of this Article ambiva-
lent. Persons should have the same protection, irrespective of the trigger 
mechanism used. Moreover, a broad interpretation would be justified by 
the application of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute which provides that: 
“the interpretation and the application of law pursuant to this article must 
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights”. 
There is little case law on the application of this article. However, it 
is interesting to note that in Gbagbo, the defence had argued that after his 
arrest on the 11 April 2011, Laurent Gbagbo had been detained without 
proper due process (access to courts, access to his lawyers) and that the 
circumstances of his detention constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
akin to torture, because he was held in poor facilities, in isolation and 
little access to the outside world, despite his dire health conditions.87 
The defence argued that Laurent Gbagbo should benefit from the 
protection of Article 55 from his arrest up until his surrendering to the 
Court in November 2011.88 This period covered the preliminary examina-
tion which was only transformed into a formal investigation in October 
2011, with the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize a formal 
investigation, following a request that was submitted in June 2011. In its 
decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber at least implicitly accepted that this pro-
vision could apply before the opening of a formal investigation. Indeed, it 
rejected the defence’s claim that Article 55 applied, not on the basis that it 
did not apply during the preliminary examination, but because the defence 
had not, according to the Judges, established that the alleged violations of 
Laurent Gbagbo’s rights could be linked to the OTP.89 This suggests that 
                                                   
86 Christopher K. Hall and Dov Jacobs, “Article 55”, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds.), 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A Commentary, C.H. Beck, Hart, No-
mos, 2016, p. 1397. 
87 ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Corrigendum of the 
challenge to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the basis of articles 
12(3), 19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute filed by the Defence for President 
Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-129), 29 May 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-129-Corr-tENG (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/1a94c2/). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., para. 97. 
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the Pre-Trial Chamber accepts that, on principle, the Article does apply 
during the preliminary examination. 
If the provision applies, under what conditions can it be invoked? 
The Gbagbo case provides yet again some guidance in that respect. In that 
case, the defence had invoked a general obligation on the part of the pros-
ecution to ensure that a person of interest for the OTP has his rights re-
spected, for example, to enquire whether Laurent Gbagbo was detained 
under adequate conditions. The defence argued that Laurent Gbagbo was 
clearly held in custody for the purposes of being sent to the ICC and that 
this could be deduced easily from statements made by Ivorian officials at 
the time.90 This was combined with the fact that, at the time, there was 
clear evidence that Laurent Gbagbo was already an identified target for 
the OTP. 91  The conclusion of the defence was therefore that Laurent 
Gbagbo fell under the protection of Article 55. 
The Chamber adopted a stricter test than the one proposed by the 
defence and found that the protection of Article 55 only arose if it were 
established that the alleged human rights violations had been committed 
either by the OTP or by Ivorian authorities on the OTP’s behest.92 
In the case at hand, the reasoning of the Chamber was as follows: 
“With respect to the allegations of the Defence, the Chamber considers it 
decisive that the alleged violations of article 55(1) of the Statute were not 
perpetrated by the Prosecutor or by the Ivorian authorities on behalf of the 
Prosecutor or any organ of the Court. The Chamber in fact notes that Mr 
Gbagbo was arrested in the course of an operation carried out, as the De-
fence points out, by Mr Ouattara’s forces. He was subsequently trans-
ferred to the north of Côte d’Ivoire and kept in detention there. Thus, the 
information provided shows that Mr Gbagbo was arrested and detained by 
                                                   
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., para. 236. See Section 24.5. infra. While the evidence might have been considered as 
circumstantial at the time, it is interesting to note that recent information seems to suggest 
more clearly that Laurent Gbagbo was indeed held by Ivorian authorities at the request of 
the Prosecutor of the ICC from the moment of his arrest (see Fanny Pigeaud, “Procès 
Gbagbo: les preuves d’un montage”, in Mediapart, 5 October 2017). 
92 ICC, Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, PTC I, Decision on the 
“Corrigendum of the challenge to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on 
the basis of articles 12(3), 19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute filed by the Defence 
for President Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-129)”, 15 August 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-212, pa-
ra. 9 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0d14c3/). 
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the Ivorian authorities and subsequently charged with economic crimes in 
circumstances seemingly unconnected to the proceedings before the Court. 
Article 55(1) of the Statute is thus not applicable”.93 
The reasoning of the Chamber can be challenged on a number of 
levels. First, the emphasis of the Chamber on the way Laurent Gbagbo 
was arrested is misplaced given that his subsequent custody was, as noted 
previously, arguably entirely aimed at ultimately sending him to the ICC. 
There is no logical reason why the protection of Article 55 should depend 
on such a contingent factor as whether the Prosecutor has to officially ask 
for a person to be put in custody (which might trigger the protection of 
Article 55) or whether the person just happens to be in custody already 
(which would not trigger the protection of Article 55). Second, the fact 
that Laurent Gbagbo was being prosecuted domestically for economic 
crimes is not persuasive. Indeed, not only is that not incompatible with the 
fact that the person can also be the object of an investigation from the 
OTP, but in the Ivory Coast case, the Ivorian authorities explicitly exclud-
ed grave crimes to avoid any admissibility problems at the ICC.94 It is 
thus somewhat ironic that the judges took into account the fact that Lau-
rent Gbagbo was charged with economic crimes “in circumstances seem-
ingly unconnected to the proceedings before the Court”, when these 
charges were designed specifically with the proceedings before the Court 
in mind. Third, it seems rather restrictive to require that the Prosecutor 
directly commit or order others to violate a person’s human rights. As 
noted elsewhere: “It is less than likely that the Prosecutor will directly 
order a person to be tortured. More likely, the person will be subject to 
mistreatment by national authorities without any formal link with the 
Prosecutor being established. In light of this, it would be more in con-
formity with the broad protection enshrined in article 55 for the Court to 
consider that once a person is under investigation, they fall under the pro-
tection of the ICC and that the Prosecutor has a duty to ensure that the 
                                                   
93 Ibid., para. 97. 
94 Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum of the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court on the basis of articles 12(3), 19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome 
Statute filed by the Defence for President Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-129), para. 245, see 
supra note 87. 
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rights of that person, especially if they are being detained, are respected 
by the local authorities”.95 
28.5.3. A New Formal Status for Potential Defendants? 
On the one hand, opening lines of communication with a potential perpe-
trator could benefit the quality of the preliminary examination as it allows 
the OTP to conduct an unprejudiced preliminary examination. On the 
other hand, if one of the targeted perpetrators of a preliminary examina-
tion is interviewed, this might constitute a risk for him or her in the future. 
For example, what he or she might say could be used against him or her 
later in a formal investigation. The OTP may also argue that if one of their 
staff wants to meet with a potential perpetrator it might constitute a risk 
for them. And this might be true in some circumstances, because a person 
interviewed by the OTP during a preliminary examination can thereafter 
allege that he or she was coerced, that his or her rights might not have 
been respected, and so on. Safeguards for the OTP and the potential per-
petrator are a necessity. This is why the status and thus the rights of these 
targeted perpetrators, which until now have been invisible, should be clar-
ified. For example, if approached by the OTP, they should be informed in 
detail of the risks of meeting with the OTP, the risk of testifying and cer-
tainly the possibility to be assisted by counsel, just to mention some obvi-
ous rights. 
Therefore, it is fundamental that if the lines of communication be-
tween the OTP and the potential perpetrator where to be opened more 
than they are today, this should occur in a defined legal framework. The 
person should have a specific status and the Rome Statute should guaran-
tee his or her rights. Some will argue that the person may not be a suspect 
yet. But this really depends on the situation; from one preliminary exami-
nation to another it can be clear if a person is already targeted by the OTP. 
But assuming that we are in the situation in which a person is clearly un-
der suspicion during a preliminary examination, we consider that it should 
be formally announced to that person. As a suspect, he or she should ben-
efit from all the rights provided by Article 55 of the Rome Statute, waiting 
for a formal investigation is too late and is simply ignoring the power of 
the OTP during a preliminary examination. 
                                                   
95 Christopher K. Hall and Dov Jacobs, 2016, para. 4, see supra note 86. 
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The rights provided by Article 55 of the Rome Statute can be con-
sidered roughly to be an equivalent of the ‘Miranda rights’96 in the United 
States. There, if a person is in police custody or is being interrogated by 
the police, he or she is considered a suspect and as a suspect he or she has 
to receive the Miranda warnings. The same situation should apply at the 
ICC. 
Meeting with a suspect that is targeted during a preliminary exami-
nation must be feasible thus there must be a legal framework that allows 
the OTP to meet with that person. And we should emphasize that a pre-
liminary examination by the OTP covers, by definition, potential grave 
crimes. In these circumstances it is even more crucial to protect the target 
of a preliminary examination if he or she would to be interviewed by the 
OTP. He or she cannot be simply treated as a ‘person of interest’ (who has 
no specific rights) or even a witness. There must be a balance between the 
benefits for the OTP to interview a target of their preliminary examination 
and the rights of that person. 
The status of ‘témoin assisté’97 (assisted witness) in France is an in-
teresting example in helping to determine what the status of a person tar-
geted during a preliminary examination might be. The témoin assisté is a 
person that is under investigation by an investigative judge98 but that has 
not been indicted yet. This person is considered a témoin assisté because 
he or she has been specifically named either by a victim or in a criminal 
complaint.99 The témoin assisté has more rights than a simple witness but 
                                                   
96 United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, Judgment, 13 June 1966, 384 U.S. 436: 
You have the right to remain silent; 
 Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law; 
 You have the right to consult with a lawyer and have that lawyer present during the 
interrogation; 
 If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you; 
 You can invoke your right to be silent before or during an interrogation, and if you 
do so, the interrogation must stop. 
 You can invoke your right to have an attorney present, and until your attorney is pre-
sent, the interrogation must stop. 
97 Code de Procédure Pénale, 2 March 1959, Article 113–1 ff (French Criminal Procedure 
Code) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/388101/). 
98 The investigative Judge in France (Juge d’instruction) is in charge of investigation only 
concerning crimes (not for felonies) (French Criminal Procedure Code, Article 79, see su-
pra note 97) and he has to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally. 
99 French Criminal Procedure Code, Article 113–2, see supra note 97. 
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less than a person that has been indicted. For example, the témoin assisté 
has to be heard in the presence of his or her lawyer, the témoin assisté has 
the right to be confronted to the person that accuses him or her and the 
témoin assisté can see part of the evidence collected by the investigating 
judge. But the témoin assisté cannot request that investigative steps be 
undertaken. The témoin assisté does, however, have the ability to request 
to be indicted because then he would benefit from all the rights guaran-
teed to the defence (and not just some of them).100 This is an interesting 
example, because during a preliminary examination it is unavoidable that 
victims or NGOs will expressly name some people as being perpetrators. 
Sometimes, it is also possible that a situation will be referred to by a State 
Party that will identify by name who they think are responsible.101 Some-
times, it also possible that the Prosecutor him or herself makes it clear 
whom he or she is targeting during the preliminary examination (as in the 
Ivory Coast situation).102 In those circumstances, if the Prosecutor, like 
the French investigative judge, would like to reach out to the potential 
perpetrator, he should be able to so in a determined legal framework that 
would guarantee the rights of the ‘suspect’ or the ‘témoin assisté’. 
Acknowledging the existence of these potential perpetrators of a 
preliminary examination and his or her rights is also fundamental because 
sometimes the time lapse between a preliminary examination and a formal 
investigation can be short. Until now, in most cases, the time lapse be-
tween the two is quite long, but this is not always the case. In the Gbagbo 
case, for example, it went very quickly: three months. This short time-
lapse is not surprising as the OTP was already making statements target-
ing Laurent Gbagbo just before its request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for 
leave to open a formal investigation. In the case, Laurent Gbagbo could 
already be considered a defendant more than a suspect or ‘témoin assisté’. 
In such a situation, it would have been beneficial to Laurent Gbagbo to be 
officially informed (not by the press) that he was a target of the OTP’s 
preliminary examination. And if Laurent Gbagbo’s status during the pre-
liminary examination was recognized in some way, he and his lawyers 
could have chosen to act in a determined legal framework. Instead, he was 
                                                   
100 French Criminal Procedure Code, Article 113-6, see supra note 97. 
101 See for example, Situation in Gabon, Requête aux fins de renvoi d’une situation par un 
Etat partie auprès du Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale, see supra note 21. 
102 Infra, Section 24.5.4. 
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identified as a target by the Prosecutor but invisible in the procedure. For 
example, what happened to the information and evidence his lawyers send 
to the OTP within the context of the preliminary examination? And maybe 
because there was no legal framework the Prosecutor never reached out to 
the Government of Laurent Gbagbo during the preliminary examination in 
the Ivory Coast situation. In this particular case, opening lines of commu-
nication between the Laurent Gbagbo and the OTP might have been bene-
ficial to the OTP on two different levels: first, the OTP could have inter-
ceded with the Ivorian authorities concerning the detention of Laurent 
Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire, and second, the OTP could have obtained, from 
the very start, information about the rebels that had been active in Ivory 
Coast for over a decade and committed crimes in Abidjan and the rest of 
Ivory Coast during the post-electoral crisis. 
The quality of the case that has been built during the preliminary 
examination cannot be stressed enough and the Gbagbo case is a clear 
example of the importance of a real investigation starting from the prelim-
inary examination. Indeed, in the Gbagbo case, until now, only one of the 
two sides to the conflict has been prosecuted as such. What about the oth-
er side? The OTP has declared that they will investigate both sides.103 
Until now this has not been the case. During the preliminary examination 
the OTP exclusively focused on a few specific perpetrators and only on 
one side. This has impacted the whole proceedings. If, during the prelimi-
nary examination the OTP would have opened lines of communications 
with one of the persons they were targeting, they might have obtained 
more information about the situation and get a clearer picture of what had 
happened. Ignoring the potential perpetrator during a preliminary exami-
nation is a policy that is not sustainable anymore, especially as it is a re-
ality that the OTP does target specific individuals as of a preliminary ex-
amination. 
                                                   
103 ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Transcripts of 28 January 2016, ICC-02/11-
01/15-T-9-ENG, p. 42, lines 12–18: “Our investigations in the country are ongoing, but 
they do take time. And I encourage the people of Côte d’Ivoire to be patient, and I urge the 
national authorities to continue to cooperate with my office in its activities. My office will 
seek to ensure justice and accountability on all sides. This should be clear, my office is in-
vestigating both sides of the conflict. And this is what the office’s legal mandate requires, 
this is what the victims deserve, and that is what the Prosecution is committed to and is 
working to achieve.” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/73746b/). 
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28.5.4. Illustrating Differences in Approach: The Côte d’Ivoire and 
Gabon Situations 
28.5.4.1. The Côte d’Ivoire Situation: Targeting an Individual with 
No Communication 
In the Gbagbo case, it was clear that from the start that the OTP targeted 
Laurent Gbagbo and members of his government. As early as the prelimi-
nary examination, Laurent Gbagbo was presented by the Prosecutor of the 
ICC as a defendant more than a suspect or a potential target. As a matter 
of fact, it is our position that for a preliminary examination to be unpreju-
diced it is unavoidable, even indispensable, that from the moment that the 
OTP starts examining a situation they will examine who the potential per-
petrator of the alleged crimes may be. As we already explained previously, 
it is hard to build a case or even assess the seriousness of situation where 
crimes have been committed without mentioning by whom they might 
have been committed. 
During the Ivory Coast preliminary examination, ICC documents 
and press releases show that the OTP focused from the very beginning on 
a specific side and that the OTP had already targeted specific individuals 
during the preliminary examination. For example, in a press release from 
the OTP dated 21 December 2010, the Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
made the following statement on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire: “First, let 
me be clear: I have not yet opened an investigation. But, if serious crimes 
under my jurisdiction are committed, I will do so. For instance, if as a 
consequence of Mr. Charles Blé Goudé’s speeches, there is massive vio-
lence, he could be prosecuted. Secondly, if UN peacekeepers or UN forces 
are attacked, this could be prosecuted as a different crime. I think African 
states play a critical role in this, to find a solution to the problem. But if 
no solution can be found and crimes are committed, African states could 
be willing to refer the case to my Office and also provide forces to arrest 
those individuals who commit the crimes in Côte d’Ivoire. Therefore, 
violence is not an option. Those leaders who are planning violence will 
end up in the Hague”.104  
The Prosecutor’s press release in December 2010 explicitly point-
ing towards Charles Blé Goudé as a potential perpetrator occurred not 
                                                   
104 ICC, Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, 
21 December 2010, ICC-OTP-20101221-PR617 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3ffcf8/). 
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only at a very early stage of the proceedings but at the very beginning of 
the crisis in Ivory Coast, when there were no elements at the Prosecutor’s 
disposal to determine what was actually going on in Ivory Coast. 
After this press release it became clearer that the main target of the 
preliminary investigation of the OTP was Laurent Gbagbo. For example, 
during an interview with France 24 as early as January 2011, the Prosecu-
tor warned the Gbagbo camp explicitly and exclusively of the risks of 
prosecution by the Court.105 On 7 April 2011 – even before the capture of 
Laurent Gbagbo by the rebel forces – the Chief of the Situation Analysis 
Section of the OTP stated that Laurent Gbagbo “may be granted amnesty 
at the national level, in which case he will not be prosecuted in the nation-
al courts, but that will not shield him from prosecution at the international 
level”.106 This statement is also very clear: the OTP has already taken a 
stand: Laurent Gbagbo will be the main target of the OTP’s preliminary 
investigation. One must keep in mind that at the moment this statement 
was made the war in Ivory Coast was not over,107 so no one in Ivory Coast 
was in a position to decide if amnesty would be granted to Laurent Gbag-
bo. This premature statement made by the OTP shows that they had al-
ready pointed to Laurent Gbagbo and treated him as the main suspect of 
the post-electoral violence. Still in April 2011, during an interview in a 
Kenyan television documentary on Laurent Gbagbo’s prosecution by the 
ICC, the Prosecutor responded to the question of whether Laurent Gbagbo 
would be prosecuted one day by saying that he would come to a “bad 
ending”.108 There is no doubt that the OTP clearly focused its examination 
on Laurent Gbagbo, even prior to its 23 June 2011 request to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for leave to open a formal investigation into the situation in 
Côte d’Ivoire.109 
                                                   
105 France 24 video, “Le Procureur met en garde le camp Gbagbo”, 27 January 2011. 
106 Afrik.com, “Côte d’Ivoire: ‘pas d’amnistie qui tienne pour Gbagbo’, selon la CPI”, 7 April 
2011. 
107 The legal qualification of the situation is still being discussed in the case The Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé but both the Prosecution and the Defense seem to 
agree on the fact that at least from the end of the crisis there is, at least, a non-international 
armed conflict in Ivory Coast. For this reason, we use the term ‘war’ here. 
108 K24TV video, “3 sides of a coin”, 17 April 2011 (available on YouTube). 
109 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15, see supra note 26. 
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But based on what evidence did the OTP so openly target Laurent 
Gbagbo? It is certain that the circumspection inherent in the position of 
Prosecutor and respect for the presumption of innocence to which he is 
bound by the Court’s Statute imply that he could not have reached such a 
conclusion without being privy to concrete facts to support his statements, 
and thus that he was in possession of evidence on which to base such an 
assertion. This means that during a preliminary examination a case was 
already being built and if a case was being built a potential perpetrator is 
identified. 
28.5.4.2. The Gabon Situation: An Indication of Future Policy of the 
OTP towards a Potential Perpetrator? 
In the Gabon situation it is even clearer that the OTP will be confronted 
during the preliminary examination with information provided by very 
different sources alleging that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
might have been committed both by the State itself and by the political 
opposition; but more interestingly for us the OTP will be confronted with 
information that will clearly identify alleged perpetrators. 
To understand how the Gabon situation can be a turning point con-
cerning the place of a potential perpetrator targeted during a preliminary 
examination we have to briefly present the legal situation. On 21 Septem-
ber 2016, the OTP received a referral regarding the situation in Gabon 
since May 2016 with no end-date. The referral made by Gabon identifies 
as potential perpetrator Jean Ping. In their assessment of the evidence they 
sent to the OTP, Jean Ping would have committed the crime of incitement 
to commit genocide and the crime of persecution namely by setting fire to 
official buildings.110 Three months later, on 15 December 2016, Jean Ping, 
leader of the Gabonese democratic movement, Gabonese civil society 
officials and victims of the repression led by the Gabonese authorities 
against the country’s population together filed, through their Counsel 
Emmanuel Altit, a communication with the OTP.111 The communication 
was the result of three months of investigations conducted in Gabon and 
abroad and had as goal to demonstrate the existence of crimes against 
                                                   
110 Situation in Gabon, Requête aux fins de renvoi d’une situation par un Etat partie auprès 
du Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale, see supra note 21. 
111 “Crimes against humanity committed in Gabon by Security Forces/Communication filed at 
the International Criminal Court”, in Jean Ping (personal web site), 15 December 2016. 
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humanity committed by the Gabonese authorities. According to the com-
munication, the Gabonese security forces implemented, in particular on 
31 August 2016 in Libreville, a planned attack against the population to 
enable the loser of the presidential election, Ali Bongo, to remain in pow-
er and prevent any democratic expression of the population. 
Therefore, in the Gabon situation the OTP had to examine on the 
one hand a referral that identifies, by name, Jean Ping as a potential per-
petrator and on the other hand a communication that identifies as potential 
perpetrators members of the Gabonese security forces. 
During this preliminary examination the OTP could choose to open 
lines of communication with both the author of the referral and the author 
of the communication. In that scenario, the OTP could not be perceived as 
biased. But to be able to do so, the OTP would probably feel more com-
fortable to act within a legal framework. However, it can also act in good 
faith and with common sense and decide to meet with both parties while 
respecting the right established in Article 55. This is in light of the most 
important right both potential perpetrators benefit from: the presumption 
of innocence. 
In the Gabon situation, the OTP went to Gabon between 20 and 22 
June 2017 as part of its preliminary examination. During this mission they 
met with opposing parties. The OTP’s new approach is very encouraging. 
In doing so the OTP can hope to obtain maximum co-operation during its 
pre-investigation while still maintaining a sense of balance between op-
posing parties to a conflict. But of course this has to be premised on an 
independent investigation, where the members of the OTP also act on 
their own or seek additional information from both parties. It cannot only 
be a public relations operation; it has to be followed by facts. 
The Gabon situation is the perfect opportunity to put in place, dur-
ing the preliminary examination, the examination of incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally but also to examine thoroughly the 
seriousness of the information received by the both parties in addition to 
information provided by victims, representatives of the civil society, or-
gans of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental or-
ganizations, or other reliable sources. For example, the European Union 
Election observation mission on Gabon published a report on 12 Decem-
ber 2016 stating that anomalies in the electoral process call into question 
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the integrity of the process of consolidating the results and the final result 
of the election.112 It would make sense that the OTP also reach out the 
European Union Election observation mission on Gabon to obtain more 
information. 
If a first effort is to be acknowledged it is not clear if the lines of 
communication timidly opened by the OTP will be pursued in the future. 
To be on the safe side, it would be best to create a framework that allows 
these lines of communication to be opened without any risk and also al-
lows the OTP to be transparent about their pre-investigation as early as 
the preliminary examination. 
28.6. Conclusion 
On a concluding note, it would be mistaken to view this chapter as being 
merely a ‘defence perspective’ to be lumped in a one out of many factors 
to be shaken and stirred into the cocktail of quality control. Ignoring po-
tential defendants, and more generally the ‘other side’, is not just detri-
mental to the rights of the accused, it is illustrative of a state of mind that 
undermines the quality of preliminary examinations at their core: that of a 
de facto investigation. 
As highlighted throughout, making sure that no one, including po-
tential defendants, is invisible during a preliminary examination and the 
subsequent investigations is a beneficial policy for everyone, not just for 
the potential defendant. Indeed, opening lines of communications with all 
parties to a conflict ensures the neutrality and impartiality of the OTP 
because they will be perceived as following the evidence, which is the 
foundation of any good case, rather than starting with a particular perpe-
trator in mind. It will also ensure the quality of the preliminary examina-
tion because the OTP will have access to all aspects of a situation and be 
in a better position to assess the evidence at its disposal. 
Ultimately, this will enhance the quality of the investigation and fa-
cilitate the work of the judges in assessing the evidence and the fairness of 
subsequent proceedings.  
The Prosecutor of the ICC is arguably the most visible figure of the 
Court and is often perceived as the voice of victims around the world and 
                                                   
112 Cf. Rapport Final de la Mission d’observatoire électoral de l’Union Européenne en Ré-
publique Gabonaise, p. 4 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1eb7f9/). 
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the beacon providing hope for justice for mass atrocities. This is of course 
an unreasonable and misguided weight to put on one organ of a complex 
institution. However, what is true is that, given its essential role in launch-
ing investigations, the OTP does have the key to making sure that all pro-
ceedings in a particular situation or subsequent case are fair and efficient, 
which contributes to the overall legitimacy of the system, and it all starts 
with the quality of the preliminary examination. Indeed, preliminary ex-
aminations conducted by the OTP are the first step towards ensuring the 
ICC is filling its expected role towards the international community as a 
whole, and it is fundamental that this first step is taken in the right direc-
tion. 
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29. Quality Control in 
the Preliminary Examination of 
Civil Society Submissions 
Andreas Schüller and Chantal Meloni* 
Pre-investigations within criminal justice systems have recently garnered 
much attention with regard to core international crimes. Careful scrutiny 
is warranted as this is one of the most sensitive stages of such proceedings, 
often characterized by a complex mixture of factors such as: broad prose-
cutorial discretion, limited public communication, delays, high public 
expectations, and political pressure.  
Civil society organizations (‘CSOs’) involved in such proceedings 
as triggers of (pre-)investigations into egregious crimes and mass human 
rights violations have a unique vantage point in these proceedings. Those 
CSOs, which are usually in close contact with victims of such violations, 
are particularly well-placed to observe the pre-investigation stage of crim-
inal proceedings, including experiencing how deficiencies in preliminary 
examinations can be fatal to the prosecutorial process. 
This chapter aims to provide some observations and critical remarks 
drawn from the practical experience of the authors in their work as part of 
a CSO as well as from an academic standpoint, both (1) at the domestic 
level, specifically in Germany, and (2) at the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’). 
                                                   
*  Andreas Schüller (LL.M. (adv.)) is a lawyer registered at the Berlin Bar and Head of the 
International Crimes and Accountability Program at the European Center for Constitution-
al and Human Rights (‘ECCHR’). Chantal Meloni is Associate Professor at the University 
of Milan and Legal Advisor at the ECCHR. While working together on the whole paper, 
they contributed in particular to Section 29.1. and Section 29.2. respectively. The authors 
would like to thank Fiona Nelson for her valuable support and comments. 
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29.1. Quality Control at the Preliminary Examination Stage: 
The Role of Civil Society Submissions and Practice at the 
Domestic Level in Germany 
In seeking criminal justice for core international crimes, the domestic 
level plays the most important role. According to the complementarity 
principle of the Rome Statute, it is primarily the responsibility of States to 
investigate and prosecute core international crimes. In addition, a number 
of human rights and international humanitarian law treaties include obli-
gations for States to investigate and prosecute, for example, grave breach-
es of the Geneva Conventions or human rights crimes such as torture or 
enforced disappearance. 
While the jurisdiction of the ICC depends on ratifications or decla-
rations by States as well as referrals by States and the United Nations Se-
curity Council (‘UNSC’), domestic courts can usually exercise jurisdic-
tion if core international crimes have been committed on the State’s terri-
tory, by a State’s national, against a State’s national or under the principle 
of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction means that a State can 
assume jurisdiction because the nature of the crime means it is of concern 
for the international community as a whole; there is no need for a link to 
the territory or a national of that State.1 
The scope of the jurisdiction will depend on the particular State’s 
legislation, which will, in the best case, be in full accordance with all in-
ternational obligations. Especially with regard to universal jurisdiction, 
many States have limits to this form of jurisdiction such as the require-
ment that a suspect of a core international crime is present on the State’s 
territory, not allowing for investigations against suspects resident outside 
the country, if no national of that State is involved. 
For civil society, the jurisdictional requirements and the limitations 
that often apply are of utmost importance, especially for those expert 
groups that work transnationally in different jurisdictions as well as for 
CSOs that are seeking access to justice globally for a group of victims. 
Differences in jurisdictions often entail differences in litigation strategies. 
This is one of the most important factors when it comes to case strategies, 
                                                   
1 TRIAL International with ECCHR, FIBGAR, FIDH and REDRESS, Make way for Justice 
#4: Momentum Towards Accountability, 2018, p. 101 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
b01bcf/). 
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in addition to political circumstances and access to witnesses and further 
evidence. 
Besides the jurisdictional aspect, the criminal procedure of each 
State varies. Therefore, although the authors have experience with regard 
to jurisdictions and preliminary examinations in a number of European 
States and beyond, the following part focuses on the practice of prelimi-
nary examinations and the role of civil society in Germany (Section 
29.1.2.). Turning to Germany, it is crucial to understand the general role 
of civil society in developing strategic criminal complaints before exam-
ining quality control of preliminary examinations of civil society submis-
sions (Section 29.1.1.). 
29.1.1. The Role of Civil Society in Developing Criminal Complaints: 
From Fact-finding to Submissions Triggering Preliminary 
Examinations 
To understand the role of civil society submissions in preliminary exami-
nations, both at the domestic and international level, it is important to 
analyse the processes leading up to the filing of a submission and the 
commencement of a preliminary examination. 
Where large-scale human rights violations occur or in conflict situa-
tions, civil society plays a crucial role not only in documenting these vio-
lations, but also in developing ways to sanction them. Hence, victims, 
activists, lawyers, local CSOs and others often connect with international 
expert CSOs and jointly discuss strategies about how to achieve criminal 
justice. 
The earlier local and international groups engage in the process, the 
better. A discussion process about strategies over months or years often 
leads to knowledge building and sharing on all sides whereby internation-
al experts learn about the specific conflict, culture and country while local 
groups learn about international law, jurisdiction and legal practice. Al-
ready at this stage, the usually intense discussions focus on selecting the 
best sets of cases for criminal complaints in a domestic transitional justice 
mechanism, third State or international jurisdictions. An early case selec-
tion strategy also impacts the way incidents are documented. In many 
conflicts, local groups focus on crime-based evidence, such as infor-
mation about a specific aerial attack or a massacre, but no information is 
gathered about the perpetrators, units or the command system behind the 
crimes. Evidence on the latter is crucial for prosecutions, but it is in most 
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instances the most difficult information to gather. With early focussed 
strategic discussions, the way can be paved for seeking information on 
perpetrator structures in combination with crime-based evidence for the 
coming years.2 
In discussing case selection and litigation strategies, there are many 
factors to be considered. For instance, it is significant whether the focus 
lies on the gravest and most outrageous incidents or rather on the best-
documented ones. The latter might have higher chances in terms of prose-
cutions, but the former might have a bigger impact in terms of justice for 
victims, enforcement of legal standards, or deterrence. Another option is 
to focus on groups of perpetrators and the policies behind the commission 
of the crimes and to seek information about incidents matching these poli-
cies. Within this case selection process, jurisdictional requirements play a 
significant role, as many States require a specific citizenship of a victim 
or perpetrator or the presence of the suspects in that State’s territory. This 
means that considerations in case selection may include potential travel 
movements of suspects as well as the nationality of victims or perpetrators. 
Thus, there is often a long and intense phase before filing a submis-
sion and entering preliminary examinations in order to present the best 
cases of interest to affected communities and societies with realistic 
chances of leading to full criminal investigations. This process also re-
quires the best possible documentation of incidents as well as the attribu-
tion to specific groups of perpetrators. Case selection based on the de-
mands of local groups and victims often has more value in terms of the 
impact of prosecutions than prosecutor-driven case selection within pre-
liminary examinations, in which more technical, evidence-based consid-
erations tend to prevail over interests of victims. Civil society submissions 
in preliminary examinations can thus contribute to a stronger case selec-
tion with improved long-term impact as compared with what tends to be a 
short-term, merely prosecution-focused, case selection. 
Taking, for example, the cases of international crimes committed in 
Syria and parts of Iraq since 2011, factors for strategic discussions for a 
                                                   
2 See, especially taking a (self-)critical view on power dynamics between international 
NGOs and local communities, our ECCHR-colleaguesʼ article, Wolfgang Kaleck and Car-
olijn Terwindt, “Non-Governmental Organisation Fact-Work: Not Only a Technical Prob-
lem”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Control in Fact-Finding, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, Florence, 2013, pp. 403–26 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/19-bergsmo). 
28. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of Civil Society Submissions 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 525 
criminal complaint in Germany – in which the authors’ organization is 
involved – included choosing sets of cases from crimes committed in the 
context of detention, chemical attacks, attacks on city centres, sexualized 
violence, and genocidal attacks against minorities such as the Yazidis. In 
addition, jurisdictional requirements played a crucial role in case selection 
discussions. Whereas Germany has ʻpureʼ universal jurisdiction and thus 
can investigate international crimes regardless of whether or not there is a 
link to Germany, other States require the presence of a suspect on its terri-
tory or for the victim to be one of its citizen. As such, case selection in the 
context of Syria often also depends on the nationality of a victim or in-
formation about the whereabouts of suspects. These factors certainly limit 
the case selection options and make it much more dependent on the 
chance occurrence of such links as compared with the more comprehen-
sive investigations available from jurisdictions like Germany. Here it is 
more feasible to further discuss in which cases suspects at the top of a 
chain of command are known, can be named by ‘linkage witnesses’ (wit-
nesses with insider knowledge), and thus become targets for arrest war-
rants. At this point, civil society can assist in finding linkage witnesses 
through networks of local activists or refugee communities, but at the 
same time they can also arrange for a lawyer to advise key witnesses who 
do not want to talk for security or political reasons. 
In addition, the communication strategy around the presentation of 
a submission is crucial. There are situations in which there is no public 
communication to avoid risking the loss of evidence if suspects are publi-
cally informed that they might soon be under criminal investigation. On 
the other hand, many cases depend on a strong communication strategy in 
which messages by victims, local activists, lawyers and expert CSOs 
reach different audiences to build support. This aims at garnering public 
support for the cases, reaching out to other potential witnesses and victims 
and helping war crimes units within prosecution authorities to internally 
secure the allocation of further resources given the public attention and 
importance of the cases, but also at building public pressure on prosecu-
tors to act on the cases and begin investigations. 
Finally, by submitting a case and making it public, CSOs involved 
in such proceedings as triggers of (pre-)investigations often experience 
both foreseen and unforeseen developments. With a filing of a criminal 
complaint and public communication around it, if it is done in a profes-
sional way, groups gain a lot of trust within communities as they are pub-
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 526 
lically standing up for the victims and affected communities and support-
ing their quest for justice. This often leads to more victims and witnesses 
approaching the groups for advice and potentially joining the complaint 
and related activities. 
Thus, when CSOs present submissions within already existing pre-
liminary examinations or in order to initiate them, there is often a longer 
process with numerous strategic discussions in order to present cases with 
the biggest impact for the affected communities and on the groups of per-
petrators involved. This differentiates civil society submissions from pre-
liminary examinations initiated by a prosecution service. The latter often 
focus on a rather technical case selection for prosecutions or are merely 
opportunistic – even though still necessary in terms of fighting impunity – 
for example, when low-level suspects reside on a Stateʼs territory. 
29.1.2. Preliminary Examinations in Germany and the Role of Civil 
Society Submissions 
Once a criminal complaint has been filed, the next phase starts, often with 
an initial period of preliminary examinations. In Germany, examinations 
and investigations can be differentiated in three types: (1) monitoring pro-
cedure (without investigatory powers); (2) structural investigation (with 
full investigatory powers); (3) formal investigation of a specific case 
against known or unknown suspects.3 
Only the first type is comparable to preliminary examinations under 
the Rome Statute. Unlike the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) of the ICC 
with its Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, giving this phase a 
certain structure in terms of content as well as decision-making, the moni-
toring procedure in Germany has neither transparent policies nor struc-
ture.4 It basically serves as an opportunity, even before examining juris-
dictional questions, to gather a pool of publically available information 
                                                   
3 See, for the German laws and practice of preliminary examinations, Matthias Neuner, 
“German Preliminary Examinations of International Crimes”, in Morten Bergsmo and Car-
sten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 1, Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018, chap. 6. See also the article of two German Federal 
Public Prosecutors, Thomas Beck and Christian Ritscher, “Do Criminal Complaints Make 
Sense in (German) International Criminal Law?”, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 2015, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 229–35. 
4 Office of the Proscutor (‘OTP’), Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 
2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
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which includes submissions from CSOs in order for the Federal Public 
Prosecutor General (Generalbundesanwalt) to be in a position to react in 
case a suspect enters German territory and thereby making the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction obligatory. At any point in time, the Federal Public 
Prosecutor General can also move from the monitoring procedure to a 
structural or formal investigation.  
The standard required under German criminal procedural law for 
this step is one of ‘initial suspicion’ that a crime has been committed. In 
the case of a suspect or a victim of German nationality or the presence of 
a suspect on German territory, the Federal Public Prosecutor General is 
legally obliged to open formal investigations. In pure universal jurisdic-
tion cases, the Federal Public Prosecutor General has discretion as to 
whether to proceed to the investigatory phase, for example, in order to 
secure evidence.5 
The discretionary decision must be based on factors laid down in 
Article 153 lit. f of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, the 
prosecutor can refrain from pursuing a case if no suspect is present or 
expected to be present on German territory, there are no victims of Ger-
man nationality or there is a pending prosecution in another State or be-
fore an international court. 
CSOs formally only have the right to submit criminal complaints, 
just as every person or legal entity can submit information to a prosecutor 
or police station. Other more specific rights, such as receiving information 
about decisions during investigations, access to files and the right to file 
appeals against decisions, are reserved only for the victims. 
In Germany, there are a number of uncertainties and shortcomings 
in the practices of preliminary examinations and monitoring procedure by 
the Federal Public Prosecutor General.  
29.1.2.1. Selection Criteria in Universal Jurisdiction Cases 
There is no transparency on the criteria for opening structural investiga-
tions on a general situation in which core international crimes have been 
committed. This step is the most important one, moving from a monitor-
ing procedure to an investigation with full investigatory powers. The im-
                                                   
5 Strafprozeßordnung, StPO, 7 April 1987, last amendment 30 October 2017, Section 153f 
(‘German Code of Criminal Procedure’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f7d369/). 
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portance of starting investigation proceedings is briefly explained in the 
following section as it is crucial to examine the preliminary examination 
part of the process. 
In recent years, the Federal Public Prosecutor General relied on the 
concept of anticipatory mutual legal assistance as a criterion for opening 
structural investigations.6 This means that the Federal Public Prosecutor 
General secures evidence in order to be prepared to act upon requests by 
other States or international courts in the future. In order to be prepared 
and not to lose evidence over time, testimonies can also be taken and 
stored. 
At the same time this evidence can also be used in case a suspect of 
a crime of the same situation enters Germany. In the past cases occurred 
in which suspects came to Germany but left before the Federal Public 
Prosecutor General took action, although civil society had informed the 
office about the presence of the suspect and provided access to evidence.7 
Furthermore, if sufficient evidence is gathered during structural in-
vestigations, the Federal Public Prosecutor General can separate individu-
al investigations from the structural ones and request the issuance of an 
arrest warrant against a suspect at the Federal Supreme Court. The suspect 
does not have to be present in Germany at any point in this process, but 
could then be wanted internationally. A trial in absentia is not possible in 
Germany. Examples exist from the local Nuremberg-Fuerth prosecutor’s 
office with regards to Argentinean torture perpetrators.8 These cases were 
opened before Germany’s Code of Crimes against International Law (in-
cluding universal jurisdiction) entered into force in 2002 and were based 
on the passive personality principle as a number of victims were Germans. 
After five years of investigations, the district court in Nuremberg issued 
arrest warrants against former members of the military junta Jorge Rafael 
                                                   
6 Martin Böse, “Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch und der Gedanke ‘antizipierter Rechtshilfe’”, in 
Florian Jeßberger and Julia Geneuss (eds.), Zehn Jahre Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, 2013, pp. 
167–76; Wolfgang Kaleck, “Strafverfolgung nach dem Völkerstrafgesetzbuch: Ein kurzer 
Blick in die Zukunft – ein Kommentar zum Beitrag von Martin Böse”, in Florian Jeßberger 
and Julia Geneuss (eds.), Zehn Jahre Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, 2013, pp. 177–84. 
7 ECCHR, “Criminal complaint against Zakir Almatov” (available on the ECCHR’s web 
site). 
8 ECCHR, “Argentinean Dictatorship Cases: the German “Coalition against Impunity” to 
Press Criminal Charges” (on file with the author). 
28. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of Civil Society Submissions 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 529 
Videla and Emilio Eduardo Massera. Germany officially requested their 
extradition, which was denied, but the accused later faced prosecutions in 
Argentina as a result of collective efforts of civil society in Argentina, 
Germany and other States. In this process, the role of civil society in 
many different countries and judicial fora was crucial to push for prosecu-
tions in the territorial State in which the crimes had been committed. 
Whereas in the last years several structural investigations have been 
opened, including one on Libya and two on Syria and Syria/Iraq, in other 
cases that has not happened. Certainly, given the large numbers of victims 
and witnesses living in Germany from areas in which international crimes 
have been and are being committed (for example, from Syria, Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Sudan as well as Sri Lanka, Chechnya and Uzbekistan), not all testimo-
nies can be taken and preserved. Thus, it is paramount to secure evidence 
from linkage witnesses and to cluster cases. In many cases it is not fore-
seeable at an early stage, whether there will be sufficient evidence acces-
sible in Germany in order to request arrest warrants, whether a suspect 
will ever enter German territory, or whether there will be legal assistance 
requests from other States or international courts in the future. However, 
civil society can support demands of affected groups to focus on their 
cases, to open a monitoring procedure in order to collect open-source in-
formation, to further submit information from different sources and to 
inform the Federal Public Prosecutor General about available key wit-
nesses, sources of evidence as well as travel plans of suspects, so that 
structural investigations will be opened to secure evidence and prepare 
cases. 
One emblematic case that has not yet led to the opening of structur-
al investigations is the case of war crimes committed by United States 
(‘US’) officials in overseas detention facilities such as Guantánamo Bay. 
Although victims and crime-based witnesses are living in Germany, their 
testimonies have not been secured. In addition, a number of other crime-
based and linkage witnesses offered to provide testimonies in Germany to 
the Federal Public Prosecutor General on detainee treatment by the US in 
specific detention centres. Thanks to the publication of large numbers of 
internal documents through Freedom of Information Act litigation, further 
evidence is available to prove the connection of the relevant structures in 
the US military, the CIA and the US government to the alleged crimes. 
Taking together all these sources of accessible evidence, which have been 
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presented by CSOs to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office,9 there would 
be a higher likelihood than in other situations that investigations would 
lead to the issuance of arrest warrants by the Federal Supreme Court. Giv-
en the criteria formulated by the prosecutors themselves, that “one can 
assume that such media reports [about situations of relevance for interna-
tional criminal law] containing enough information as to the potential 
commission of international crimes will lead to the initiation of an inves-
tigation procedure and to the lodging of a formal investigation”,10 the 
opening of investigations into US war crimes based on the information 
and analysis provided by civil society – which far exceeds information 
from regular media reporting – is long overdue. However, no reason has 
been given on the failure to do so. 
The selection criteria of the Federal Public Prosecutor General re-
mains opaque as to why in some situations preliminary examinations con-
tinue while in others structural and/or formal investigations have been 
opened. On the one hand, the situation in Syria and Iraq and the compara-
bly large number of witnesses currently living in Germany certainly justi-
fied the opening of structural investigations in this situations in 2011 and 
2014 respectively. On the other hand, cases are selected for structural in-
vestigations when evidence is secured from witnesses in Germany on 
international crimes committed in Libya, whereas investigative leads with 
regard to US war crimes are not followed, although in both cases there are 
only a small number of relevant witnesses in Germany.11 This leads to the 
public perception of double standards in international criminal justice.  
29.1.2.2. Duration of Preliminary Examinations 
In other cases, where there was no prosecutorial discretion but instead a 
legal obligation to investigate, the Federal Public Prosecutor General 
failed to open formal investigations within a reasonable time by keeping 
cases in the monitoring procedure phase. 
                                                   
9 See for submissions, ECCHR, “Germany: CIA director Gina Haspel should face arrest on 
travelling to Europe” (available on the ECCHR’s web site). 
10 Beck, Ritscher, 2015, p. 233, see supra note 3. 
11 On double standards in international criminal justice, see Wolfgang Kaleck, Double Stand-
ards: International Criminal Law and the West, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brus-
sels, 2015 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/26-kaleck). 
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In cases such as the one of an airstrike ordered by a German colonel 
in Afghanistan in September 2009, killing about 100 people, preliminary 
examinations took almost six months, despite the legal obligation to open 
an investigation as a German national was the suspect. After six months, 
the formal investigation was opened for four weeks, during which two 
suspects and two witnesses were heard, before the case was closed. 
In another case of international crimes, in which a German citizen 
was killed by a US drone strike in Pakistan in October 2010, preliminary 
examinations took about 20 months before a formal investigation was 
opened in order to question a witness who had been extradited to Germa-
ny. Eleven months later, this investigation was closed. During preliminary 
examinations, the Federal Public Prosecutor General reviewed a number 
of reports, by experts and the Federal Intelligence Service, for example, 
but did not formally request information from Pakistan or the United 
States, nor take testimonies of witnesses present in Germany. 
Steps such as ordering expert reports or asking other States through 
diplomatic channels for information can certainly be considered as part of 
an investigation, as they are examined in light of the question whether 
there is an initial suspicion whether a crime was committed. However, by 
keeping this process part of preliminary examinations, the Federal Public 
Prosecutor General has avoided any form of transparency or public scruti-
ny and deprived the victim of his or her right to access the files or to fur-
ther contribute to the investigation. In such cases, CSOs can exercise pub-
lic pressure in order to enforce the victims’ rights or advise victims on 
how to challenge delays before domestic courts or the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
29.1.2.3. Transparency and Public Outreach 
As addressed in the previous section, there is no transparency in prelimi-
nary examinations and generally also no public outreach. Victims cannot 
access files and the Federal Public Prosecutor General usually does not 
publicize about the opening of a preliminary examination, but will in cer-
tain situations confirm, on request, that one exists. 
CSOs can ask members of parliament to pose questions to the Gov-
ernment in order to get some information about activities by the Federal 
Public Prosecutor General. With such information, CSOs can then inform 
the public or interested persons and groups on specific requests. 
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As there is also no public outreach about activities within prelimi-
nary examinations, the public and especially the victims do not know 
what activities are being conducted, in which direction the focus on a sit-
uation might go and whether or not CSOs can even confidentially con-
tribute information on specific parts of a conflict. In terms of quality con-
trol of preliminary examinations, civil society could make an important 
contribution to the monitoring procedure if basic information would be 
made public. In addition, the impression often prevails that German law 
enforcement authorities are not acting at all on international crimes cases, 
which is inaccurate as well. This criticism is based on a lack of infor-
mation and transparency which leads to less support of those authorities in 
charge of international crimes investigations. More quality control here 
could also mean more support and also more political discussion around 
case selection, which is important in terms of quality control and address-
ing double standards in international criminal justice.12 
29.1.2.4. Limited Rights of Victims to Appeal a Decision 
If the Federal Public Prosecutor General does not open investigations, 
victims – but not CSOs – have a limited right to appeal the decision. 
CSOs can support victims in exercising their rights before the courts, in-
cluding with activities to gather new facts that could prompt the re-
opening of an investigation.  
The limitation of German criminal procedure lies in the fact that a 
complaint mechanism is foreseen only at the end of investigations, but not 
at the end of preliminary examinations or if an investigation is terminated 
at an early stage.13 This mechanism is meant to provide the relevant as-
pects of the investigation file to the Appeals Court so that the judges can 
determine whether the Federal Public Prosecutor General has made the 
right decision not to indict a suspect based on the results of the full inves-
tigation. In order to exercise this right, the victim also needs access to the 
full file, otherwise the case cannot be fully presented to the Court. How-
ever, in many of the aforementioned cases, a full investigation was never 
conducted, nor was a decision made not to indict a suspect. 
                                                   
12 German Federal Public Prosecutors also see some value in public outreach during prelimi-
nary examinations under specific circumstances, see Beck, Ritscher, 2015, p. 235, see su-
pra note 3. 
13 German Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 172, see supra note 5. 
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In the case of the airstrike in Afghanistan, investigations were first 
delayed and then closed within a month without giving the victim the 
right to express his views on the evidence gathered at the point of the de-
cision. The case on the drone strike in Pakistan was also closed at a very 
early stage, similarly without the possibility for the victims’ relatives to 
comment on the content of the investigation file. This would have been 
particularly important as the decision was based on a number of contro-
versial facts, for instance, concerning the nature of local groups and their 
alleged involvement in the conduct of direct hostilities, as well as legal 
findings of importance on questions of international humanitarian law. As 
the case was never fully investigated, there was no avenue to lodge a 
complaint to a court whereby judges could review the prosecutor’s deci-
sion whether to indict the suspect or not. As it stands, the factual and legal 
findings of the Federal Public Prosecutor General remain unchallenged by 
a court, thus it is the prosecutor who sets interpretation of international 
humanitarian law norms, but not judges after hearing at least two parties 
in a proceeding. Without a full judicial review, there is no quality control 
of preliminary examinations nor investigations of international crimes 
cases possible in Germany. 
29.1.3. Conclusions on Quality Control of Preliminary 
Examinations in Germany through Civil Society Submissions 
Civil society submissions play a key role in preliminary examinations. As 
shown above, those submissions are often based on intense discussions 
and selection processes, involving different key players, such as victims’ 
groups, experts on criminal and transitional justice or local civil society of 
a concerned country. Thus, civil society submissions can reflect not only 
single individual cases of victims of core international crimes, but a com-
prehensive submission on the most emblematic cases within a context of 
systematic human rights or international humanitarian law violations. 
Civil society is in the best position to present such comprehensive sub-
missions, as individual submissions will often lack the discussion of the 
political context of an affected group whereas submissions by other States 
or political groups will potentially serve political interests more than the 
interests of criminal justice. 
CSOs conduct their own research with regard to information about 
the commission of core international crimes. As a result, civil society can 
identify patterns and systems of core international crimes committed as 
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part of a conflict or in the context of repression. At the same time, CSOs 
can establish contact with victims, witnesses and perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus provide useful links for future evidence gathering. 
Moreover, many CSOs are victims’ representation groups. Such 
groups have larger networks of victims and witnesses which can contrib-
ute to criminal justice. As those groups are often self-founded, they have 
the trust and confidence of other victims as well as the necessary contacts 
to other CSOs that can provide expertise with regard to substantive law. 
At the same time, they can speak and represent victims’ voices and de-
mands – something that is of paramount importance in the process of 
transitional justice, of which criminal justice mechanisms form only one 
part. 
CSOs can also provide political support for investigations and pros-
ecutions. Those offices of a prosecution service dealing with international 
crimes can then benefit from this overall support, in seeking more finan-
cial support from the government in order to be able to fulfil their tasks. 
At the same time, civil society can also shift the focus and argue why cer-
tain investigations are of greatest importance, even if politically more 
controversial. 
Civil society submissions often contribute to the quality control of 
preliminary examinations. On the one hand, they support the competent 
prosecutor’s office with valuable information and analysis; on the other 
hand, they support victims’ rights to get their cases heard and challenge 
the authorities if they refuse, in violation of their obligations, to pursue 
investigations. 
29.2. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination: 
Civil Society Submissions at the International Criminal Court 
As in domestic systems, the ICC must take questions of efficiency into 
consideration to ensure its proper functioning. The limited resources of 
the Court require that the Prosecutor carefully select investigations cases 
to pursue. The way in which the Prosecutor evaluates the myriad of com-
munications and victims’ complaints alleging the commission of crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction and selects which investigation to pursue or 
not, is currently one of the most critical issues before the ICC. Undoubt-
edly, the improper exercise of the discretional power in this regard can 
have tremendous consequences for an institution, such as the ICC, which 
is, to a certain extent, still seeking to establish its legitimacy.  
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Unlike at the domestic level (as discussed above), the preliminary 
examination phase at the ICC is now regulated and heavily ‘procedural-
ized’. In fact, despite the lack of specific provisions in the Rome Statute 
and its related documents, which do not even mention the term ‘prelimi-
nary examination’, over the years the OTP has refined its modus operandi 
with regard to the initial phase of the proceedings, and in particular, with 
regard to decisions whether to open an investigation. The outcome has 
been published in subsequent documents: the first draft was published in 
2010,14 followed by a November 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Ex-
aminations (‘Policy Paper’).15 In respect of transparency,16 the Prosecutor 
decided to make public the OTP’s activities in relation to preliminary ex-
aminations. The OTP has indicated that it will regularly report on its pre-
liminary examinations activities,17 which has indeed been done since 2013 
through yearly reports.18 Thus, not only is the commencement of prelimi-
nary examinations made public but the OTP also provides updates on the 
activities in respect of the various phases of its analysis.19 This move to-
wards transparency, an absolute pre-condition for the effective participa-
tion of victims, non-governmental and CSOs in ICC proceedings, is wel-
come. However, as will be discussed, several points remain problematic in 
the way the ICC deals with this delicate phase of proceedings, in particu-
lar, from the point of view of CSOs which, representing the victims, have 
been involved for many years in a constructive dialogue with the Court. 
Firstly, although the OTP must heavily rely on victims’ communica-
tions and CSO submissions in deciding whether, pursuant to Article 15(3) 
of the Rome Statute, there is a “reasonable basis to proceed with an inves-
tigation”,20 victim and CSO participation in preliminary examinations is 
                                                   
14 OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 4 October 2010 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/bd172c/). 
15 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 4. 
16 ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, Rule 28(2) (‘Regulat-ions’) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/).  
17 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 94, see supra note 4. 
18 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 14 November 2016 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/f30a53/). 
19 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 95, see supra note 4. The OTP has 
also indicated there that it will seek to early interact with stakeholders, for example, on Ar-
ticle 15 communications. 
20 See ibid., paras. 34–71, for OTP’s interpretation of the standard.  
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very restricted. More precisely, there appears to be a gap in the ICC-
designed system of preliminary examinations with regard to the tools vic-
tims and CSOs have at their disposal to defend their interests at this early 
stage of the proceedings vis-à-vis the broad prosecutorial discretion. In 
particular, this becomes clear when the Prosecutor fails to make any deci-
sion on whether to open an investigation and keeps the preliminary exam-
ination ongoing for years. 
The latter is also illustrated by the OTP’s Policy Paper that high-
lights that neither the Rome Statute, nor the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence (‘RPE’) mentions a specific time period for the completion of pre-
liminary examinations.21 Thus, the OTP is not obliged to indicate a time 
limit for preliminary examinations. The rationale is to ensure that the 
OTP’s analysis is adjusted to the specific features of each particular situa-
tion instead of being confined by arbitrary time limits.22 Furthermore, the 
Policy Paper mentions that examinations must be continued until the in-
formation provides clarity on whether or not a reasonable basis for an 
investigation exists. This could include assessing national proceedings 
over an extensive period of time, as epitomized in the Colombia situa-
tion.23 Even though the Policy Paper outlines a transparency policy by the 
OTP in the preliminary examination phase, the decision of whether or not 
to share information with CSOs and other stakeholders seems to be at the 
OTP’s discretion.  
Moreover, over the years, as the practice of the ICC developed, the 
amount of resources that the ICC poured into the analysis of data and in-
formation in this pre-investigative stage has grown exponentially. Notably, 
many elements (for instance, gravity and complementarity) which are 
reviewed during a preliminary examination are those which, according to 
the Rome Statute, shall also be reviewed, eventually, during the investiga-
tion phase. Thus, the question is whether it is useful to double the analysis 
in terms of both resources and expediency of proceedings, especially con-
sidering that the OTP has far fewer powers during preliminary examina-
tions, in which it basically only relies on open source material and on 
                                                   
21 Ibid., para. 89.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., para. 90.  
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what States or CSOs submit.24 In other words, it is questionable whether 
doubling the analysis (before and after opening the investigation proper) 
can be seen as waste of resources, a source of delays and a ground for 
ineffectiveness of the ICC proceedings. Both the never-ending prelimi-
nary examination of the Colombia situation and the stalled one of the 
UK/Iraq situation, for instance, indicate these difficulties. 
29.2.1. A Preliminary Observation 
Before getting into the discussion of the above-mentioned points, it can be 
observed that the current practice of the ICC shows that it is much more 
unlikely that an investigation be opened in the absence of a State or 
UNSC referral. Article 13 of the Rome Statute provides three trigger 
mechanisms for an investigation to be opened at the ICC: (1) upon referral 
by a State Party; (2) upon referral by the UNSC, acting pursuant to Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter; and (3) proprio motu, that is, on the Prosecu-
tor’s initiative. With regard to this last triggering mechanism, Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute specifies that: “the Prosecutor may initiate investiga-
tions proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the juris-
diction of the Court”. Here, CSO submissions and victims’ communica-
tions play a major role as a source of information pointing at the commis-
sion of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Regardless of the source of the information received, the Prosecutor 
is never obliged to proceed with an investigation: in fact, the Rome Stat-
ute always leaves the decision whether to open such an investigation in 
the sphere of the Prosecutor’s discretion. Undoubtedly a referral, either by 
a State or by the UNSC, does not automatically imply the opening of an 
investigation: the power to decline the opening of an investigation into a 
situation even when the Court has received a State or UNSC referral lies 
at the heart of the independence of the ICC Prosecutor and ultimately of 
the ICC. Thus, the Prosecutor is always tasked with the responsibility to 
determine whether a situation meets the legal criteria established by the 
Rome Statute to warrant an investigation by the Court, pursuant to Article 
53(1). Such an analysis is carried out according to the four phases that 
                                                   
24 Carsten Stahn, “Damned if you do, Damned if you don’t: Challenges and Critiques of 
Preliminary Examinations at the ICC”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2017, 
vol. 15, no. 3, p. 413.  
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have been outlined by the OTP in its successive policy documents and 
seem now to have been crystallized in its yearly reports published so far.25 
The Prosecutor also clarified from the outset that: “the Office’s pre-
liminary examination activities will be conducted in the same manner 
irrespective of whether the Office receives a referral from a State Party or 
by the Security Council or acts on the basis of information of crimes ob-
tained pursuant to article 15”.26 Thus, in theory, the analysis is the same 
regardless of the source of the information received, but in practice, the 
chances of the examination moving into the investigative phase are much 
greater for situations referred to the Court.27 If one examines the various 
situations currently under investigation as well as under preliminary ex-
amination at the ICC, it is apparent that most of the investigations were in 
fact opened upon referral either by the UNSC (for example, Sudan and 
Libya) or by a State (for example, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Central African Republic (‘CAR’), and Mali) – or at least with 
tacit agreement of the State involved, for instance, via ad hoc acceptance 
of ICC jurisdiction under Article 12(3) (for example, Ivory Coast),28 or 
otherwise (as it was the case with Kenya, where the former Prosecutor 
had engaged in an exercise of ‘positive complementarity’).29 
Thus, it appears that ‘pure’ proprio motu investigations are very rare; 
and (at least for now) they do not get very far. Moreover, with just the one 
exception illustrated below, all situations which have been referred to the 
                                                   
25 See, for instance, the already mentioned most recent Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities, see supra note 18. The Prosecutor shall consider in particular: jurisdiction; ad-
missibility (complementarity and gravity); and the interests of justice. 
26 OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2010, para. 12, see supra note 14. 
27 Ibid. “In all circumstances, the office will analyse the seriousness of the information re-
ceived and may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, in-
tergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and other reliable sources that are 
deemed appropriate. The Office may also receive oral testimony at the seat of the Court.” 
28 “The procedural mechanism under Article 12(3) is based on the general idea of reciprocity 
referring to a structural balance of rights and obligations of states parties and third states 
under the ICC as a treaty system”. Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M. El Zeidy and Hector 
Olasolo, “The International Criminal Court’s Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revisited”, in American 
Journal of International Law, 2005, vol. 99, no. 2, p. 422. 
29 Chantal Meloni, “Kenya and the ICC: A Boomerang Effect?”, in ISPI Analysis, no. 245, 
May 2014; ICC, Situation in Kenya, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant 
to Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3, para 9–11, 20–22 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/c63dcc/). 
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Court (either by a State or by the UNSC) have triggered an investigation. 
Indeed, the ‘Flotilla situation’30 represented the first time the ICC Prose-
cutor decided not to open an investigation after having received a referral 
by a State Party. Significantly, this gave, for the first time, the opportunity 
for the judges to review the decision not to open an investigation pursuant 
to Article 53(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. Notably, this also appears to be 
the only case so far where the referral by the State was not a pure ‘self-
referral’ – concerning crimes committed by nationals on its own territo-
ry – but it did concern alleged crimes committed by foreigners (members 
of the Israeli army) on the territory of the referring State (the vessel flying 
the Comoros’ flag) and on third States’ territory (the vessels flying the 
Cambodian and the Greek flags). It is an open question whether the latter 
element played a role in the assessment of the situation by the Prosecutor, 
who could have applied restraint given the critical circumstances.31 
Conversely, a UNSC referral not only exponentially increases the 
likelihood of an investigation, but also appears to influence the expedi-
tiousness of the (positive) decision: upon receipt of a UNSC resolution, 
the decision to open an investigation into the Libya situation was made in 
a matter of days.32 
It would be naïve to think it is mere coincidence that most investi-
gations – and open cases – so far have emerged from referrals. One of the 
reasons for this state of affairs could be that the procedure envisaged by 
the Rome Statute for the opening of an investigation proprio motu is more 
complex than in the case of a State or UNSC referral: only in the first case, 
in fact, does the Prosecutor need to request an authorization by the Pre-
Trial Chamber (‘PTC’), and thus the decision is subjected to judicial scru-
tiny, which could complicate matters. At the same time, it should be noted 
                                                   
30 The Situation of the Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia was under 
reconsideration by the OTP at the time of writing, OTP, Report on Preliminary Examina-
tion Activities, pp. 69 ff., see supra note 18. 
31 Please see on this Chantal Meloni, “The ICC preliminary examination of the Flotilla situa-
tion: an opportunity to contextualise gravity”, in Questions of International Law, 30 No-
vember 2016. 
32 For the whole ICC documentation, including the decision of 2 March 2011 to open the 
investigation in Libya upon referral received on the 26 February 2011 by the United Na-
tions Security Council (‘UNSC’), see ICC, “Situation in Libya”, ICC-01/11 (available on 
the Court’s web site). 
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that, so far, every request by the Prosecutor for authorization to open an 
investigation has been granted swiftly by the PTC.  
Despite what the Prosecutor argued in the 2010 draft policy paper, 
there is a difference in the analysis of the information received depending 
on its source.33 Notably, such a difference would have a statutory basis: 
with regard to a situation which has been referred to the Court, either by a 
State or the UNSC, the Prosecutor is obliged to initiate an investigation 
unless: “he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed 
under this Statute”, pursuant to Article 53(1);34 whereas in case of proprio 
motu preliminary examinations, the Prosecutor is obliged to proceed with 
a full-fledged investigation only if he or she concludes that: “there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed, according to Article 15(3) of the Statute”.35 
Thus, “as regard the threshold to initiate an investigation the policy of the 
OTP differentiates between referrals (by a State Party of the Security 
Council) and the Prosecutor’s proprio motu authority”.36 
Such a preliminary observation, as outlined above, is telling of the 
difficult role played by CSOs and victims, whose communications are 
                                                   
33 See also Matthew Cross, “The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations”, in Morten 
Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2, 
Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018, chap. 22. 
34 An interesting recent interpretation of this can be found in the Pre Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) 
decision that reviewed the OTP Comoros decision closing the preliminary examination: 
“The presumption of Article 53(1) of the Statute, as reflected by the use of the word 
“shall” in the chapeau of that article, and of common sense, is that the Prosecutor investi-
gates in order to be able to properly assess the relevant facts”. The judges also affirmed 
that, “[m]aking the commencement of an investigation contingent on the information 
available at the pre-investigative stage being already clear, univocal and not contradictory 
creates a short circuit and deprives the exercise of any purpose”. Thus: “[i]f the infor-
mation available to the Prosecutor at the pre-investigative stage allows for reasonable in-
ferences that at least one crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed and 
that the case would be admissible, the Prosecutor shall open an investigation, as only by 
investigating could doubts be overcome”, ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Un-
ion of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, PTC I, Deci-
sion on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015, ICC-01/03-34, para. 13 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/2f876c/). 
35 Pavel Caban, “Preliminary Examinations by the Office of the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, in Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law, 2011, 
vol. 2, p. 203. 
36 Ibid. 
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generally the source of the information for the Prosecutor to act proprio 
motu and who have an interest in the prompt opening of the investigation 
by the ICC. Thus, the question is: how can such actors participate, influ-
ence and counter-balance the broad prosecutorial discretion in this early 
phase of proceedings? Moreover, what are the tools (if any) at the disposal 
of victims and CSOs to undertake quality control of the activities carried 
out by the Prosecutor before the opening of an investigation? 
29.2.2. Can CSOs and Victims Effectively Participate and Counter-
balance Prosecutorial Discretion before the Opening of an 
Investigation? 
The participation of victims and CSOs in preliminary examinations is 
very restricted. Nevertheless, there are some ways in which the victims 
and the organizations representing their interests can attempt to influence 
how preliminary examinations are conducted and, in particular, the ensu-
ing decisions of the Prosecutor. In the first place, victims and CSOs can of 
course submit communications and observations to the OTP to trigger a 
proprio motu investigation or to provide information to the OTP. In this 
sense, victims can participate in a request by the Prosecutor for authoriza-
tion to initiate an investigation. Moreover, both victims and CSOs can 
make requests to the PTC in relation to Article 53(3)(b) reviews, pursuant 
to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute and Rule 103 of the RPE and seek 
leave from the PTC to submit their observations. 
However, perhaps the thorniest issue with regard to victims and 
CSO participation at the pre-investigation stage concerns the lack of 
means for them to challenge a decision of the Prosecutor not to initiate 
investigations under Article 15(6). In fact, the Rome Statute provides very 
limited means to push the Prosecutor to undertake an action he or she is 
not willing to undertake. Indeed, as the preparatory works of the Rome 
Statute show, most of the attention back then was focused on (limiting) 
the powers of the Prosecutor when deciding to open an investigation. At 
Rome, the debate over the Prosecutor’s powers was essentially a fight 
over the proper scope of the Prosecutor’s discretion: in particular, whether 
it should extend to the decision to initiate an investigation.37 Maybe less 
                                                   
37 The initial draft prepared by the International Law Commission in fact did not include the 
proprio motu power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation; for the negotiating histo-
ry of the provision: see Allison Marston Danner, “Enhancing the Legitimacy and Account-
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attention was devoted to the opposite scenario, that is, to the limits of dis-
cretion permitted with regard to a decision of the Prosecutor not to open 
an investigation. However, during these first years of activity of the ICC, 
the issue has already surfaced several times and it appears to be one of the 
most controversial ones facing the Court.38 
As will be shown, in answering to what extent it is possible to push 
the Prosecutor to pursue an investigation into a situation or case, one 
needs to differentiate whether the preliminary examination was triggered 
by a referral, or was a proprio motu one. Once more, it is especially with 
regard to this latter scenario that victims and CSOs face major problems 
given the lack of remedies at their disposal.  
29.2.2.1. The Submission of Communications 
Victims and CSOs play a crucial role at the preliminary examination 
phase. In fact, when the OTP decides to pursue an investigation proprio 
motu, it must rely on information provided by victims and CSOs, who are 
the main actors and stakeholders that can submit communications to the 
OTP. It is important for victims to be able to participate, including 
through CSOs, in the preliminary examination phase, as it is in their inter-
est that an official investigation be pursued.39 In the first place it is thus 
necessary that CSOs and victims be properly informed on the progress of 
the analysis. However, it has been noted that there was a lack of infor-
mation on the progress of the analysis by the Prosecutor.40 The situation 
improved after the decision to periodically publish the OTP report on pre-
liminary examination activities. However, such reports of course are fo-
cused on the scope of the examination as it has been determined and lim-
ited by the OTP itself, which does not necessarily include the whole pic-
                                                                                                                        
ability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court”, in American Jour-
nal of International Law, 2003, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 510–52, 513 ff. 
38 See, for instance, the attempts done both by CSO and victims as well as by the judges, to 
have information on OTP pre-investigation activities and have certain crimes included in 
the situations under investigation, in Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo just to 
mention two. 
39 Cécile Aptel, “Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC and Victims’ Right to Remedy: Narrow-
ing the Impunity Gap”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2012, vol. 10, no. 5, 
pp. 1367–68.  
40 FIDH, Victims’ Rights before the ICC: A Guide for Victims, their Legal Representatives 
and NGOs, 2007, at p. 20. 
28. Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of Civil Society Submissions 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 543 
ture as communicated by the CSOs and victims; thus not all who have 
submitted communications are necessarily informed on whether these are 
being analysed, what the progress of the investigations is, whether further 
information is required, and what the results of the analysis are.41 There is 
no provision in the Rome Statute, the RPE or Regulations of the OTP that 
obliges the Prosecutor to respond to communications he or she receives. 
Due to this shortage of information, those who have submitted communi-
cations have fewer possibilities to challenge the Prosecutor’s analysis and 
any eventual decision not to investigate.42 In addition, less transparency 
by the Prosecutor in preliminary examinations could also lead to the Pros-
ecutor not considering certain crimes, or certain areas, or dismissing those 
as he or she does not possess sufficient information on. More transparency 
would enable victims and CSOs to provide substantial and better tailored 
information to the Prosecutor. Furthermore, it would provide victims and 
CSOs with the opportunity to shed light on other crimes that have oc-
curred, but that might be overlooked by the Prosecutor.  
29.2.2.2. Representations during Authorization to Open an 
Investigation 
As already noted, a decision of the PTC is needed in order for the Prose-
cutor to initiate an investigation into those situations where no referral – 
either by the UNSC or by a State Party – has been received. The judicial 
authorization to open proprio motu investigations was introduced to pro-
vide a check on the Prosecutor’s discretion at a very early stage, in the 
absence of other ‘legitimacy tools’ (the aforementioned referrals).43 The 
requirement to get the authorization by the PTC puts an additional burden 
on the OTP’s shoulders, in order to establish before the judges in a very 
early phase of the proceedings that there is a “reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation” pursuant to Article 15. 
Interestingly, such a need for an authorization provides victims with 
an initial opportunity to make representations before the PTC.44 Accord-
                                                   
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Thoroughly on this point, see Allison Marston Danner, 2003, p. 515, see supra note 37. 
44 On the contrary, in the event of preliminary examinations based on a state referral or a 
referral by the UNSC, the Prosecutor does not need to seek authorization from the PTC to 
proceed and thus there is also no stage for the victims to make representations. 
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ing to the Rome Statute, when the Prosecutor requests authorization from 
the PTC to initiate an investigation, he or she must also inform the victims 
of his or her intention to seek authorisation;45 in accordance with Article 
15(3) of the Rome Statute and Rule 50(1) of the RPE, victims may then 
make representations to the PTC.46 It shall be noted that the first quality 
control of a preliminary examination can be done by those who personally 
experienced the alleged crimes and brought them to the attention of the 
Prosecutor. 
29.2.2.3. Intervention during the Judicial Review of the Decision Not 
to Open an Investigation 
If, upon completion of the preliminary examination, the Prosecutor de-
termines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, 
the Rome Statute provides for some limited possibility of judicial review. 
Interestingly, the mechanism of review differs depending on whether the 
Prosecutor acted proprio motu or upon referral.47 
1. Where the preliminary examination was opened upon a referral, Ar-
ticle 53(3)(a) provides that the PTC may review a decision of the 
Prosecutor ‘not to proceed’ at the request of the State making the re-
ferral or the UNSC.48 However, there is no express right for victims 
or CSOs to make such a request to the PTC.49 Notably, the judges 
can never oblige the Prosecutor to pursue a specific investigation: at 
most they can “request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision” 
                                                   
45 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Article 15(3) (‘ICC Stat-
ute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
46 Ibid., William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 322.  
47 Hector Olasolo, “The Prosecutor of the ICC before the Initiation of Investigations: A Qua-
si-Judicial or a Political Body”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2003, vol. 3, no. 
87, 2003, pp. 101–04.  
48 In the Gaza situation referred by the State of Comoros, the PTC requested the Prosecutor 
to reconsider her decision not to initiate an investigation, based on her assessment of gravi-
ty, ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Repub-
lic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, PTC I, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015, 
ICC-01/03-34, see supra note 34. 
49 Susana SaCouto and Katherine Cleary, “Victims’ Participation in the Investigations of the 
International Criminal Court”, in Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 2008, 
vol. 17, no. 73, p. 94. 
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(not to open an investigation).50 Moreover, as the PTC noted: “the 
Chamber’s competence under Article 53(3)(a) of the Statute […] is 
triggered only by the existence of a disagreement between the Pros-
ecutor (who decides not to open an investigation) and the referring 
entity (which wishes that such an investigation be opened), and is 
limited by the parameters of this disagreement”.51 
2. In the event that, when acting proprio motu, the Prosecutor decides 
not to initiate an investigation, the PTC may, on its own initiative, 
only review such a decision if based solely on the “interests of jus-
tice” pursuant to Article 53(3)(b).52 Article 53 of the Rome Statute 
does not provide for a right of victims or other stakeholders to par-
ticipate in the review of the decision of the Prosecutor not to pro-
ceed. However, Article 68(3) could be interpreted to allow victims 
to present their views and concerns with regard to the decision of 
the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation (also taking into 
account Rules 89, 92(2), and 93 of the RPE).53 Furthermore, it shall 
be noted that victims, their legal representatives and CSOs can seek 
leave from the PTC in accordance with Rule 103 of the RPE to 
submit their observations on any issue; CSOs, for instance, could 
request leave from the PTC to submit an amicus curiae brief.54 
                                                   
50 However, it shall be noted that according to the wording of Article 53(3)(b), when the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate/prosecute is based solely on the interests of justice 
and the PTC reviews it on its own initiative, “the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effec-
tive only if confirmed by the Pre-trial Chamber”. 
51 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, PTC I, Decision on the request of the Union of the Como-
ros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015, ICC-
01/03-34, para. 9, see supra note 34. 
52 ICC Statute, Article 53(3)(b), see supra note 45. 
53 Rule 93 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’) sets out that the Chamber may seek the 
views of the victims or their legal representatives at any time in relation to issues referred 
to in Pules 107, 109, 125, 128, 136, 139 and 191. Subsequently, Rule 107 RPE provides 
for a possibility to make a request for a review of a decision by the Prosecutor not to initi-
ate an investigation or not to prosecute in writing, supported with reasons.  
54 Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Crim-
inal Proceedings, Intersentia, 2011, at p. 237. With regard to CSO participation see ICC, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, PTC I, Decision on the Request sub-
mitted pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the RPE, 17 August 2007, ICC-01/04-373, para. 5 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b9775f/). 
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3. In the other cases, namely if the decision of the Prosecutor is not 
based solely on the interests of justice,55 and there is no request by 
the referring State or by the UNSC, there is no mechanism for the 
victims, CSOs or other stakeholders that provided information to 
the OTP.56 It must be noted that in the event that the PTC decides 
not review the Prosecutor’s decision, or does not order the Prosecu-
tor to reconsider her decision not to proceed, there are no provisions 
through which victims, CSOs or other stakeholders can challenge 
these decisions. 
29.2.2.4. Lack of Powers with Regard to a Decision Not to Open an 
Investigation Based on Article 15(6) 
Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is no reasonable basis to pro-
ceed with the investigation, based on Article 15(6) of the Rome Statute 
and Rule 49(1) of the RPE, the Prosecutor needs to inform those who 
provided information in relation to the preliminary examinations.57 How-
ever, different than the situation under Article 15(3) (where there is a rea-
sonable basis to proceed), victims may not make representations to the 
PTC to challenge the decision of the Prosecutor not to prosecute since the 
Rome Statute does not provide victims with an express right to do so.58 
For example, the first preliminary examination of the Iraq situation 
was opened on the basis of a number of communications pointing to the 
                                                   
55 “In absence of a definition of the expression ‘interests of justice’ in the Statute and the 
RPE, Article 53 practically gives the prosecutor the broadest possible scope of political 
discretion in order to decide whether or not to proceed with an investigation”, see Olasolo, 
2003, p. 111, see supra note 47 (also differentiates between inherent discretion arising 
from the principle of legality and political discretion). 
56 See in this sense also the ICC, PTC II, Decision on the request for review of the Prosecu-
tor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a preliminary examination concerning alleged 
crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 
2014, 12 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-3 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
bfbb8f/). 
57 To allow victims to apply for participation in the proceedings in accordance with Rule 89, 
the Court notifies victims concerning the decision of the Prosecutor not to initiate an inves-
tigation or not to prosecute pursuant to Article 53 of the ICC Statute. Such a notification 
shall be given to victims or their legal representatives who have already participated in the 
proceedings or, as far as possible, to those who have communicated with the Court in re-
spect of the situation or case in question. The Chamber may order the measures outlined in 
sub-rule 8 if it considers it appropriate in the particular circumstances. 
58 SaCouto, Cleary, 2008, p. 94, see supra note 49. 
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commission of grave crimes by UK armed forces. On 9 February 2006, 
the OTP informed those who submitted communications of the fact that it 
would not pursue investigations.59 There was, however, no possibility for 
victims and CSOs to challenge this decision before the PTC, as the Rome 
Statute does not foresee such a right for victims to challenge an Article 
15(6) decision of the Prosecutor when acting proprio motu. 
The fact that, under the Rome Statute, there is no review mecha-
nism that can be triggered in such circumstances by those who provided 
the information deserves strong criticism. In fact, the issue was debated 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute, as in many domestic systems, it is 
possible to challenge a decision of a Prosecutor not to initiate investiga-
tions. During the negotiations of the Rome Statute, delegates from France 
argued that victims have the right to review a decision from the Prosecu-
tor not to initiate an investigation.60 Other delegates disagreed, stating that 
this as well as review possibilities by the Court, would affect the Prosecu-
tor’s independence.61 The current system reflects a compromise, as the 
Court has been granted the possibility to review on certain occasions and 
victim participation has been restricted.62 
29.2.3. Challenging the Prosecutor’s Failure to Open Investigations 
in the absence of a Decision Not to Open an Investigation 
With regard to the possibility of CSOs, victims and other stakeholders 
carrying out quality control on preliminary examination, the thorniest 
issue is that the Prosecutor, instead of taking a formal decision not to in-
vestigate (or not to proceed), often simply leaves the preliminary exami-
nation (or the investigation) open indefinitely. As a consequence, the 
Prosecutor’s (non-)decisions cannot be challenged.63 
                                                   
59 ICC, OTP response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/5b8996/). 
60 Leyh, 2011, p. 265, see supra note 54. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Based on Article 53(3)(a) and 53(3)(b) of the Rome Statute, the Court may review certain 
decision of the Prosecutor not to initiate an investigation or to prosecute. 
63 Redress, The Participation of Victims in International Criminal Court Proceedings, a 
Review of the Practice and Considerations for the Future, October 2012, p. 46. This policy 
of suspension or indecisiveness by the Prosecutor is also illustrated by a request lodged by 
victims in 2010 in relation to the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2010 
in respect of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, based on Article 68(3) of 
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An interesting case in this regard is what happened in the situation 
of the CAR, which could also perhaps be relied on by CSOs and victims 
to obtain information and challenge the (non-)decisions of the OTP.  
In 2006, the CAR Government attempted to obtain information on 
the status of the preliminary examination in respect of the situation that 
the Government itself had referred to the OTP in December 2004.64 The 
Government filed a request to the PTC requesting: “that the Prosecutor 
provide information on the alleged failure to decide, within a reasonable 
time, whether or not to initiate an investigation pursuant to Rules 105(1) 
and 105(4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”.65 The OTP submit-
ted that it is under no obligation to submit information to the PTC absent 
decisions pursuant to Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, the 
request was followed by a decision of the PTC requesting the Prosecutor 
to provide the Chamber with an update on the status of the preliminary 
examination, as: “the State which referred the situation has the right to be 
informed by the Prosecutor and therefore to ask the Chamber to request 
that the Prosecutor provide the said information”.66 Eventually, the OTP 
                                                                                                                        
the Rome Statute victims requested the PTC to review the alleged decision of the Prosecu-
tor not to proceed against Bemba in relation to certain crimes. However, the PTC declared 
that “to date no decision on ‘interest of justice’ grounds not to proceed against Mr Bemba 
with respect to crimes allegedly committed in Ituri has been taken” and thus that there is 
“[…] no decision for the Chamber to review and there is, accordingly, no basis for it to ex-
ercise its powers under article 53(3)(b) of the Statute”, see ICC, Situation in the Democrat-
ic Republic of Congo, PTC I, Decision on the designation of a Single Judge of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 25 October 2010, ICC-01/04-583, paras. 4–5 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c84b80/). This decision does imply that in a case where the Prosecutor has decided not to 
proceed with the investigation or to prosecute based on Article 53(1)(c) or 53(2)(c), vic-
tims can request the PTC to review the decision by the Prosecutor, Leyh, 2011, p. 267, see 
supra note 54 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c84b80/). 
64 The Government of the Central African Republic (‘CAR’) submitted its referral of the 
situation in the CAR to the OTP pursuant to Article 13 and 14 of the Rome Statute on 22 
December 2004.  
65 Schabas, 2010, p. 668, see supra note 46, referring to Situation in the Central African 
Republic (ICC-01/05), Transmission par le Greffier d’une Requête aux Fins de Saisine de 
la Chambre Préliminaire de la Coeur Pénale Internationale et Annexes Jointes, 27 Septem-
ber 2006, ICC-01/05-5-Anx2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/cdd070/).  
66 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, PTC III, Prosecution’s report pursuant to 
Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006, Decision Requesting Information on the Sta-
tus of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, 15 
December 2006, ICC-01/05-07 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dd66a/). The Court also 
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provided the PTC with the report, though explicitly stating that it was 
under no obligation to do so, as no decision under Article 53(1) had been 
made, and thus there was no exercise of prosecutorial discretion subjected 
to judicial review by the Chamber.67 Nowadays, 10 years after the facts in 
question, the OTP is of course much more transparent with regard to the 
activities undertaken in the course of its preliminary examinations, as 
reflected in the OTP Policy Paper. Nevertheless, as already noted before, 
the OTP’s yearly reports on preliminary examinations do not necessarily 
cover the whole spectrum of communications received and do not neces-
sarily address all the requests raised by victims and CSOs. 
Thus, even though the OTP’s preliminary examinations into the Sit-
uation in the CAR were based on a State Party referral, the case might be 
significant in order to argue that in the case of proprio motu preliminary 
examinations by the OTP, victims and CSOs that provided information on 
the alleged crimes can request that the PTC order the OTP to provide in-
formation on its activities. In other words, it could be argued that similar 
to a State Party that has referred a situation, those victims and CSOs who 
have ‘referred’ a situation to the OTP by way of communications also 
have “the right to be informed by the Prosecutor and therefore to ask the 
Chamber to request that the Prosecutor provide the said information”. 
29.2.4. Conclusions on Preliminary Examinations before the ICC 
The preliminary examination of the situation in Colombia has been ongo-
ing for over a decade: the OTP acknowledges receipt of 181 communica-
tions pursuant to Article 15.68 However, since CSOs and victims’ partici-
patory rights are limited in the preliminary examination phase, there seem 
to be few methods available for victims or CSOs to influence these pre-
investigations or to obtain information on the proceedings. ICC practice 
and the OTP’s Policy Paper indicate that the Prosecutor is not bound to 
time limits in respect of the preliminary examinations. Furthermore, even 
though the OTP has a transparency policy in relation to preliminary exam-
inations, the Prosecutor is not obliged to respond to communications by 
victims or CSOs or to inform them of the status of the investigations. In-
                                                                                                                        
requested the Prosecutor to provide an estimate of when the preliminary examination of 
the CAR situation would be concluded.  
67 Ibid., para. 1; Schabas, 2010, p. 668, see supra note 46. 
68 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, para. 52, see supra note 18. 
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deed, until the Prosecutor has made a decision whether or not to seek au-
thorization from the PTC in accordance with Article 15(3), there are few 
if any means for victims or CSOs to further this process. Moreover, no 
means are available for victims or CSOs to challenge a decision of the 
Prosecutor not to initiate investigations based on Article 15(6) of the 
Rome Statute.  
Moreover, it shall be noted that even if the preliminary examination 
of the situation in Colombia has been ongoing for more than 10 years, 
without investigation powers, it is difficult for the OTP to receive the nec-
essary information, for example, about policies at highest governmental 
level and their connection to sets of crimes that fall under crimes against 
humanity. The case of Colombia shows that the OTP granting too much 
time to allow for legislative and judicial developments in a country – 
while crimes continue – undermines the objectives of Rome Statute. This 
is because while there may be positive domestic legislative and judicial 
developments, the policies potentially linked to international crimes re-
main in place. 
Similarly, the (new) preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq, 
which focuses on the responsibility of UK military personnel, strongly 
points to the need for the opening of an investigation at this stage of the 
proceedings. In the face of grave crimes committed in that context, which 
have been confirmed by several sources,69 the preliminary examination 
proves to be ineffective and causes grave delays in the administration of 
justice. 
In this regard, for the OTP to establish subject-matter jurisdiction 
under the Rome Statute, and confirm the credibility of witness statements 
received, conducting its own investigations and witness interviews would 
be more effective in order to make its own assessment of the allegations 
presented. Examining the methodology behind some witness statements 
taken by lawyers and CSOs is of course necessary to assess their credibil-
ity, but the focus must remain on the content of the information provided, 
which can be corroborated by different sources, such as official docu-
ments, including domestic decisions confirming the allegations, as well as 
evidence presented in individual cases through videos and photographs. 
                                                   
69 Nicholas Mercer, “The truth about British army abuses in Iraq must come out”, in Guardi-
an, 3 October 2016. 
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The “reasonable grounds to believe” requirement should not be interpret-
ed as setting an overly high standard of proof at this stage. This would 
shift the burden of conducting fact-finding investigations – with all the 
resources required for this – from the OTP to CSOs. Beyond this, it also 
exposes those CSOs to intense scrutiny by the State under examination. 
Such organizations may end up becoming subject to extreme domestic 
political, legal and economic backlash, potentially leading to a chilling 
effect for other organizations that would not serve the interests of justice. 
In this sense, a full-fledged investigation by the ICC, thus giving the OTP 
investigative powers – rather than a mere preliminary examination which 
is based on open source materials and information provided by third par-
ties – would be much more effective to overcome obstacles within situa-
tions such as Iraq/UK or Colombia and avoid arbitrariness and double 
standards. 
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The role of civil society in the negotiations for the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’) is a significant illustration 
of the increasing civil society influence on the development of interna-
tional law and the design of international institutions.1 Civil society actors, 
under the umbrella organization of the Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, assisted States to prepare for negotiations for the first 
permanent international criminal court and played a vital role in develop-
ing the Court’s institutional, procedural and substantive framework.2 Civil 
society also argued for broader rights of participation in the new Interna-
tional Criminal Court (‘ICC’) compared to other international institutions, 
including previous international criminal tribunals. The inclusion of both 
victim participation in proceedings and a framework for delivering repara-
tions to victims of ICC crimes was an important victory for civil society 
actors, albeit an outcome also supported by many State delegations partic-
ipating in the negotiations.  
A more controversial, and harder won, victory was the inclusion of 
an independent prosecutor capable of initiating an investigation proprio 
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University Press, 2008; Michael Struett, The Politics of Building the International Crimi-
nal Court: NGOs, Discourse and Agency, Palgrave, 2008. 
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motu in the absence of a referral from a State or the UN Security Council. 
The possibility of independent action by the Prosecutor is linked to an 
important avenue for civil society participation in the ICC, namely, the 
ability under Article 15 of the Rome Statute for the Prosecutor to receive 
information from various actors, including individuals and non-
governmental organizations, as to whether ICC crimes have occurred 
within a situation country. This provides a novel avenue for civil society 
to influence future ICC investigations as, by providing information to the 
Prosecutor, civil society may draw the Prosecutor’s attention to a particu-
lar situation and may ultimately prompt the Prosecutor to initiate an inves-
tigation. The potential influence of civil party ‘communications’ to the 
Prosecutor under Article 15 through the preliminary examination phase is 
clear. Broader engagement with civil society is supported by notions of 
enhanced transparency and representativeness in decision-making, which 
ultimately contributes to the legitimacy of the Office of the Prosecutor 
(‘OTP’) and the ICC. 
As the resources of the Prosecutor are limited, and the number of 
situations demanding attention increases, civil society are increasingly 
seeking ways to influence the Prosecutor to act. However, this chapter 
will demonstrate that the Article 15 communication mechanism is not best 
suited to this role. Despite the volume of communications received by the 
Prosecutor pursuant to Article 15, it is not clear how, if at all, such com-
munications have actually influenced the Prosecutor’s decision to proceed 
to an investigation or to close a preliminary examination. Nor is it evident 
that the ability to file a communication provides civil society with suffi-
cient means to participate in key decisions during the preliminary exami-
nation phase, in particular those decisions concerning the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in this essential phase. While there is a system for 
judicial review of prosecutorial decisions concerning the initiation of in-
vestigations, it is designed to protect the Court (and ultimately States) 
from an overly political or overreaching prosecutor, not to prompt a reluc-
tant prosecutor to act.  
Another mechanism of civil society participation in ICC proceed-
ings and potential avenue of influence is the amicus curiae brief, dis-
cussed in Rome and incorporated in the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence. Unlike Article 15 communications, amicus curiae is not a novel 
mechanism invented for the ICC, but is found in the rules of other interna-
tional criminal tribunals and international institutions, as well as in many 
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national legal systems. It too is justified by the need for transparency and 
broader participation in judicial decision-making, as enabling amici sub-
missions allows judges to reach better decisions and thus enhances the 
legitimacy of the institution. A study of ICC amici practice reveals that 
civil society actors do use the mechanism to participate in ICC proceed-
ings; moreover, there is some evidence that submissions have influenced 
judicial decision-making and legal outcomes.3 It thus appears to be a suc-
cessful mechanism for civil society influence. Yet its application to the 
preliminary examination phase and its influence on prosecutorial (as op-
posed to judicial) decision-making is limited. This chapter suggests that if 
civil society desires greater influence in preliminary examinations, actors 
must look for other methods of influence instead. 
This chapter first provides an overview of civil society participation 
in the preliminary examination phase. It then details the limited influence 
of civil society on key prosecutorial decisions during preliminary exami-
nations and highlights the potential for manipulation of the Article 15 
process by civil society actors. It concludes that Article 15 does not sup-
port general rights of participation for civil society actors, nor does it 
overcome the absence of a right to trigger judicial review of prosecutorial 
decisions in the preliminary examination phase. However, the chapter 
argues that introducing legal standing for civil society actors is not feasi-
ble or necessarily desirable.  
Next, the chapter briefly outlines the practice of the ICC regarding 
civil society amici before considering whether the amicus curiae mecha-
nism has any potential to enhance civil society influence at the prelimi-
nary examination stage or whether alternative mechanisms are required. 
The chapter concludes by suggesting two possible measures for enhancing 
civil society participation during preliminary examinations: (1) a call for 
focused submissions by the OTP at key stages of a preliminary examina-
tion – a ‘friend of the prosecutor’ type model; and (2) a staged approach 
to Article 15 communications, with an initial communication format, fol-
lowed by more detailed information after the OTP has determined the 
information to be credible and that the situation may fall within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the chapter argues that the OTP should provide 
                                                   
3 Sarah Williams and Emma Palmer, “Civil Society and Amicus Curiae Interventions in the 
International Criminal Court”, in Sarah Williams and Hannah Woolaver (eds.), Acta Jurid-
ica, 2016, p. 40. 
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greater information and transparency concerning: the communications it 
receives (even if limited to the nature of submitter and the type of infor-
mation provided due to confidentiality concerns); the manner in which it 
assesses such information; and the need to manage so-called strategic 
communications. 
30.2. Civil Society, Preliminary Examinations and Article 15 
Communications 
30.2.1. The Nature of Preliminary Examinations and the Role of 
Article 15 Communications 
The preliminary examination phase is unique to the ICC. Its purpose is to 
decide whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation 
into a situation.4 Pre-Trial Chamber II has interpreted this as requiring that 
“there exists a sensible or reasonable justification for a belief that a crime 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court ‘has been or is being commit-
ted’”.5 This test requires consideration of whether the legal criteria set out 
in the Rome Statute have been satisfied, namely: jurisdiction (temporal, 
territorial or personal, and substantive); admissibility (complementarity 
and gravity); and the interests of justice.6 The Prosecutor may initiate a 
preliminary examination process on the basis of: (a) a referral from a State 
Party or the United Nations Security Council; (b) a declaration by a State 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute; or (c) information provided by individuals or groups, States, in-
tergovernmental or non-governmental organizations (‘NGOs’) pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute.7 Regardless of the basis for a preliminary 
examination, prosecution activities during the preliminary examination 
phase are conducted in the same manner. The OTP has no independent 
investigative powers during the preliminary examinations process; rather 
the OTP may receive and request additional information on the situation 
                                                   
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 
July 2002, Article 53 (‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
5 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01/09-19, para. 35 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/338a6f/). 
6 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 1 November 2013 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
7 Ibid., para. 73. 
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from States, UN organs, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and 
“other reliable sources that are deemed appropriate”.8 The OTP’s decision 
is therefore based on the facts and information made available to it and is, 
in this sense, preliminary and subject to revision where new facts or evi-
dence are presented. The OTP has indicated that it adopts a filtering pro-
cess involving four phases (an initial assessment; jurisdiction; admissibil-
ity and interests of justice; and final recommendation).9  
The preliminary examination phase is thus an essential one that de-
termines the situations, and ultimately the cases, that will be investigated 
and prosecuted before the Court. It is also a phase that endows the Prose-
cutor with considerable discretion; even though the Rome Statute sets out 
clear legal criteria for the initiation of an investigation, there is much 
scope in how these criteria are interpreted and applied within a given con-
text. This chapter addresses the important issue as to whether Article 15 
enables civil society sufficient influence in respect of decisions to proceed 
or not to proceed to an investigation. 
There is limited judicial review of prosecutorial decisions taken in 
the preliminary examination phase: the Pre-Trial Chamber is only re-
quired to review a decision to initiate an investigation where the Prosecu-
tor exercises her proprio motu power under Article 15.10 Further, the Pre-
Trial Chamber is only required to review a decision not to proceed to an 
investigation in two circumstances. First, regardless of how the situation 
came before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber must review a decision not 
to proceed where the Prosecutor has declined to proceed on the basis of 
the interests of justice criterion.11 Second, where the decision not to pro-
ceed to an investigation is based on other criteria in the Statute (that is, 
jurisdiction, gravity and complementarity), the UN Security Council or 
the State that referred the situation to the Court may request a review by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.12 There is no right of review where the preliminary 
examination was triggered by communications received under Article 15 
and the decision not to proceed is based on criteria other than the interests 
                                                   
8 Ibid., para. 85. 
9 Ibid.; Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Pros-
ecutor, 5 September 2003 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f53870/). 
10 ICC Statute, Article 15(3), see supra note 4. 
11 Ibid., Article 53(3)(b). 
12 Ibid., Article 53(3)(a). 
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of justice. Those submitting a communication will be informed about the 
decision not to proceed, but have no standing to seek a review of that de-
cision.  
Similarly, victims have limited procedural standing in a preliminary 
examination. While the regulations applicable to the Prosecutor require 
the OTP to address the interests of the victims at all stages of proceedings, 
and victims can pass on information to the Prosecutor during the prelimi-
nary examination phase,13 the only express right victims have is to make 
representations where the Prosecutor requires authorization to initiate an 
investigation under Article 15(3) and where jurisdiction or admissibility is 
challenged under Article 19(3). Therefore, victims do not have standing to 
request a review of any decision taken by the Prosecutor during the pre-
liminary examination phase. In addition, ICC judges have to date refused 
to recognize an inherent jurisdiction of the Court to conduct a proprio 
motu judicial review of the Prosecutor’s decisions during the preliminary 
examination and investigation stages, outside the limited avenues for re-
view expressly indicated in the Rome Statute.14 
30.2.2. Do Article 15 Communications Influence the Prosecutor? 
As noted above, the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations 
based on information provided by civil society without necessarily having 
the support of relevant States was a major victory for those at Rome in 
favour of an independent and responsive Prosecutor. The ability of civil 
society, including victims, to submit information to the OTP in the form 
of communications under Article 15 is a novel form of civil society partic-
ipation, at least in the context of international judicial institutions. Moreo-
ver, the Article 15 process is also available for situations referred by a 
                                                   
13 OTP, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09, Regu-
lation 16 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97226/). 
14 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the ‘Request for Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision 
of 23 April 2014 Not to Open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged Crimes 
Committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, 
12 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-3 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bfbb8f/); ICC, 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on a Request for Reconsideration or Leave to Appeal the 
“Decision on the ‘Request for a Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 23 April 2014 Not 
to Open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged Crimes Committed in the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’”, 22 September 2014, 
ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-5 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ced5a/). 
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State or the Security Council, so it is potentially a valuable route to place 
information before the OTP, including materials which may not be in the 
interest of the referring State to provide. Article 15 may thus be said to 
enhance the legitimacy of OTP decision-making by making the process 
more representative as various views and sources of information can be 
considered. Yet it appears that civil society does not desire merely to pro-
vide information, but also to have a say in the decision whether or not to 
proceed to an investigation, as will be discussed below. 
Submitting an Article 15 communication has certainly proven to be 
a popular mechanism. As at September 2016, the OTP had received a total 
of 12,022 communications made pursuant to Article 15 since July 2002.15 
Yet, filing a communication under Article 15 is not a right of formal par-
ticipation, even in the limited sense in which amici participate (see Sec-
tion 30.3. below). It also appears to be mostly ineffective in bringing 
about an investigation, as the Prosecutor has only initiated four investiga-
tions under Article 15, namely the situations in Kenya, Georgia, Burundi 
and Côte d’Ivoire. In Kenya, the investigation was only initiated follow-
ing the failure of domestic authorities to agree to proceed at the national 
level and the main sources of information came from the preceding inves-
tigative commission. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire was arguably more 
like a referral by the Government, which accepted jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 12(3) as a non-State Party at the time. The investigation into the situa-
tion in Georgia appears to be the first genuine ‘proprio motu’ exercise of 
power; however, it was also preceded by an investigation commission that 
provided the evidence and impetus to move to an investigation. In the 
Prosecutor’s requests to the Pre-Trial Chamber for approval to initiate an 
investigation in these three situations, it is striking that the Prosecutor 
does not appear to rely on information contained in Article 15 communi-
cations; rather, the evidentiary basis for the request is in each case infor-
mation obtained from previous non-judicial investigations, media sources 
and public source documents.16 The decision concerning Burundi, which 
                                                   
15 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Activities 2016, 14 November 2016 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/f30a53/). 
16 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request for Authorisation of 
an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009, ICC-01/09-3 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c63dcc/); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, 23 June 
2011, ICC-02/11-3 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1b1939/); ICC, Situation in Georgia, 
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was linked to the entry into force of Burundi’s withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute, is the second. 
There is an extensive role for civil society actors in this sense. In 
the request under Article 15 concerning the situation in Georgia, for ex-
ample, the Prosecutor’s request relies largely on reports by NGOs such as 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.17 This information was 
not provided as formal communications but rather information contained 
in ordinary fact-finding and context analysis activities performed by such 
organizations. The decision not to rely expressly on Article 15 communi-
cations may be due to the OTP’s policy concerning the confidentiality of 
communications, but the practice suggests that individual communica-
tions are perhaps less influential than public source reports by credible, 
large and international NGOs. 
Of the twelve situations currently in the preliminary examination 
phase (as at March 2018), eight arise from Article 15 communications.18 
Whether to open an investigation in these situations will depend on the 
exercise of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers and is subject to ap-
proval by the Pre-Trial Chamber. In two further situations, although the 
jurisdiction is based on Article 12(3) declarations, the opening of an in-
vestigation will require the Prosecutor to exercise her discretion under 
Article 15 (as Article 12(3) declarations are not considered to be the 
equivalent of State referrals).19 Thus, the current preliminary examina-
tions, if they lead to investigations, may change the perception of some 
civil society actors and commentators that the Article 15 mechanism has 
little impact.  
Perhaps the clearest example of the potential influence of Article 15 
communications we have seen to date is the reopening of the preliminary 
                                                                                                                        
Pre-Trial Chamber, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, 13 
October 2015, ICC-01/15-4 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/460e78/). 
17 See, for example, ibid., paras. 32, 63. 
18 These are the situations in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Guinea, Iraq, and Nigeria, 
OTP, 2016, see supra note 15. Note that the Prosecutor announced in February 2018 that 
her office would open preliminary examinations in respect of the Philippines and Venezue-
la. A decision on the Prosecutor’s Article 15 request to open an investigation concerning 
the situation in Afghanistan was pending at the time this chapter was finalised (early 
March 2018). 
19 These are the situations in Ukraine and Palestine. Ibid. 
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examination into Iraq. Former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo received sev-
eral communications concerning alleged war crimes committed by UK 
forces in Iraq. However, in 2006 he declined to proceed to an investiga-
tion, stating that, while there was some evidence crimes within the juris-
diction of the ICC had been committed, these crimes did not appear to be 
of sufficient gravity to be admissible before the ICC.20 In 2014, Prosecu-
tor Bensouda reopened the preliminary examination based on a communi-
cation received from two civil society actors – the European Center for 
Constitutional and Human Rights together with the Public Interest Law-
yers. That communication, which was made publicly available by the or-
ganizations themselves, comprised both factual evidence and legal analy-
sis.21 The Prosecutor expressly based her decision to reopen the prelimi-
nary examination on the information provided in the communication.22 
Thus the Iraq preliminary examination demonstrates the potential of civil 
society communications to influence prosecutorial decisions. It also em-
phasizes that preliminary examination is a process and that a decision not 
to proceed is not necessarily final and can be revisited if fresh information 
becomes available.  
The Iraq preliminary examination also illustrates the potential risk 
for the Prosecutor (and the ICC) in basing key prosecutorial decisions on 
information obtained from civil society. In 2017, the Law Society of Eng-
land and Wales removed Phil Shiner, the main lawyer for Public Interest 
Lawyers, from the roll of solicitors after finding him responsible for mul-
tiple professional misconduct offences, including dishonesty concerning 
false witness accounts tendered to a national inquiry into allegations 
committed by UK personnel in Iraq.23 While the charge was related to 
                                                   
20 Office of the Prosecutor, OTP Response to Communications Received Concerning Iraq, 9 
February 2006 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5b8996/). 
21 See European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights and Public Interest Lawyers, 
Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: The 
Responsibility of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic De-
tainee Abuse in Iraq from 2003-2008, 10 January 2014, (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
8d151d/). 
22 OTP, “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Re-opens the 
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Iraq”, 13 May 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/d9d9c5/). 
23 
Solicitors’ Regulation Authority, “Professor Phil Shiner and the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal”, 2 February 2017 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c95b3a/); Owen Bowcott, 
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domestic proceedings, this same evidence might well have been incorpo-
rated into the Article 15 communication and thus might have directly in-
fluenced the Prosecutor’s decision to reopen the preliminary examination. 
The implications of this national disciplinary action for the current ICC 
preliminary examination are not clear, with the Prosecutor having made 
no reference to the incident. 
There are also signs that the Prosecutor has become more respon-
sive to certain communications by highlighting the preventative role of 
the OTP in responding to alleged ICC crimes. A number of communica-
tions or prospective communications have appeared to trigger a direct 
response from the Prosecutor. For example, the Prosecutor issued a state-
ment concerning alleged crimes in the Philippines,24 in a climate where 
various actors were preparing and at least one eventually did file an exten-
sive communication.25 Yet many other communications have not triggered 
a response from the Prosecutor, including those submitted in relation to 
Australia’s asylum and detention policy. This may suggest that in certain 
circumstances the OTP was already looking at a situation and would have 
acted independently of Article 15 communications, which appears to be 
the case with the Philippines. It is also possible that the Prosecutor re-
serves her strong public statements for ‘serious’ situations where there are 
on-going violations and which appear to fall clearly within the purview of 
the ICC.  
Dugard suggests that other factors may also influence the Prosecu-
tor’s reliance on Article 15 communications as a basis for opening an in-
vestigation, in particular the preference both Prosecutors have given to 
securing referrals from States so that co-operation is more likely – alt-
hough not guaranteed – to eventuate. 26  This means that civil society 
communications concerning alleged crimes committed by a government 
                                                                                                                        
“Phil Shiner: Iraq Human Rights Lawyer Struck Off Over Misconduct”, in The Guardian, 
3 February 2017 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4f6a4d/). 
24 OPT, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda 
Concerning the Situation in the Republic of the Philippines”, 13 October 2016 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/bbc78e/). 
25 Clare Baldwin and Stephanie van den Berg, “Lawyer for Philippines Hit-man Files Com-
plaint Against Duterte at ICC”, in Reuters, 24 April 2017. 
26 John Dugard, “International Criminal Law, the International Criminal Court, and Civil 
Society”, in Linda van de Vijver and Hugh Corder (eds.), Acta Juridica, 2006, p. 3. 
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still in power are unlikely to result in an investigation, unless the Prosecu-
tor believes the authorities will co-operate. Moreover, Dugard refers to the 
significance the OTP places on effective control of the affected territory 
where authority for the territory is disputed. Where an authority is not in 
effective control of the territory, then that authority is unlikely to be able 
to co-operate and an investigation may not be feasible.  
In current practice, it therefore appears that, while Article 15 com-
munications allow some influence to civil society actors, that influence is 
not extensive and will generally not lead directly to a request to open an 
investigation. This is particularly so where there are concerns regarding 
co-operation with any investigation, such as where the communication 
concerns an incumbent government or a situation where authorities lack 
effective control over territory. However, if the current situations under 
preliminary examination are considered, the number of investigations that 
follow from the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power and which are based on 
Article 15 communications may increase. Existing practice also highlights 
the challenges for the Prosecutor in relying on evidence provided by third 
parties, both in terms of quantity and quality. 
30.2.3. Quality of Article 15 Communications and Standard of 
Review 
Is there any explanation as to the current low rate of Article 15 communi-
cations leading to investigations? For instance, does it suggest that Article 
15 communications are not of a high standard? There is no information as 
to the type or standard of information that should or can be submitted to 
the OTP. The OTP has no formal filter mechanism, initially accepting all 
communications filed. There is no guidance as to the content, focus, 
length, quantity or quality of the communications, nor is there any indica-
tion as to how the OTP will deal with the information, other than that it 
will be verified. The Prosecutor generally does not make communications 
public, although as noted above there have been instances where she has 
issued a statement based on information submitted in a communication. 
However, the information provider is not precluded from making public 
both the fact of its submission and the content of that communication. The 
confidential nature of the process makes collating data on information 
submitted to the OTP challenging and means that researchers must rely on 
an information provider making public the communication and at least a 
summary of its contents, usually through a press release. This skews anal-
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ysis of the practice in this area, but without access to full OTP database of 
communications, it is impossible to map the communications, their pro-
vider, content and eventual impact.  
It is clear from those communications that have been publicized that 
the information provided ranges from vague allegations and assertions 
with little proof or analysis to detailed factual and evidentiary material 
supported by extensive legal analysis. The fact that the vast majority of 
communications are dismissed as “manifestly outside of the Court’s juris-
diction” suggests that they fall within the former extreme, and probably 
include unreliable information or display a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the basic jurisdictional and other limits of the Court.27 This is in con-
trast to the amicus curiae mechanism (discussed below), where accepting 
submissions is within the discretion of the Chamber and the amici are 
limited to certain questions or issues, and face strict page limits. Moreover, 
the fact that many amicus briefs are submitted by organizations that en-
gage lawyers to draft submissions or have experience in submitting ami-
cus submissions in the ICC and other courts, or by experienced academics, 
means that the submissions are generally of good quality. This is not to 
say that Article 15 communications should be subject to the same tight 
levels of control as amici, as this would be inconsistent with the aim of 
enabling broader access to the Court. Many civil society organizations do 
employ lawyers with experience in international criminal law or engage 
their own in-house legal teams to prepare Article 15 communications. The 
practice on amici, where ‘repeat players’ appear to have greater influence, 
suggests that such an approach may well explain the ‘success’ of those 
communications that are not rejected outright and may then influence the 
Prosecutor. For example, local actors in Cambodia engaged Richard Rog-
ers, a legal consultant and defence counsel at the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia, to draft communications submitted to the 
Prosecutor.28 The OTP should perhaps look for ways to encourage com-
munications filed by qualified and experienced organizations, using legal 
advisors familiar with the ICC’s jurisdictional framework. However, the 
                                                   
27 For figures on how many communications are categorised as being “manifestly outside of 
the Court’s jurisdiction”, see, for example, OTP, 2016, see supra note 15. 
28 International Federation for Human Rights, “Cambodia: ICC Preliminary Examination 
Requested into Crimes Stemming from Mass Land Grabbing”, 7 October 2014 (available 
on its web site). 
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large proportion of rejected communications does suggest that the ‘image’ 
of Article 15 enabling wider participation in or influence on OTP deci-
sions is a false one for many of those submitting communications. Such 
‘failed’ communications raise concerns about the wasted resources of the 
OTP and the submitting actors, as well as the prospect of creating false 
expectations of the OTP and the Court amongst victim groups.  
Another suggestion as to why Article 15 communications are not as 
effective as civil society actors might hope is that they may be held to a 
higher standard than evidence obtained from other sources.29 The non-
public nature of decisions as to what weight is given to Article 15 com-
munications contributes to a lack of transparency around the preliminary 
examination process. While this has been partially addressed by the annu-
al preliminary examination report and situation specific reports, as well as 
specific policy papers, there is still insufficient information as to what 
happens to communications, the verification process and the standard(s) 
against which they are assessed. The OTP indicates that it evaluates 
sources of information according to a consistent methodology, based on 
criteria such as relevance, reliability, credibility, and completeness. It also 
endeavours to corroborate information provided to it against information 
obtained from open and other reliable sources.30 In its request for approval 
to open an investigation in the situation in Georgia, for example, the Pros-
ecutor highlighted the treatment of information that may be subject to 
“possible bias and interests from parties to the conflict” and how it “fo-
cused its examination on allegations corroborated by credible third par-
ties”.31  
Thus there is no suggestion that the OTP assesses information pro-
vided by civil society differently to that received from States or interna-
tional organizations, at least not as reflected in its stated policy. The OTP 
seems to be aware that those submitting Article 15 communications may 
have other motives, be biased and have their own interests to advance and 
thus the information must be verified and corroborated. This may lead to 
certain civil society communications being treated more favourably than 
                                                   
29 Dugard, 2006, see supra note 26. 
30 OTP, 2013, paras. 30–31, see supra note 6. 
31 ICC, Situation in Georgia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request for Authorisation of an Investiga-
tion Pursuant to Article 15, 13 October 2015, ICC-01/15-4, para. 46 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/460e78/). 
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others, for example, those from organizations that have a ‘repeat’ history 
of submitting communications in one or more situations and large interna-
tional NGOs with established reputations. It also partly explains why the 
sources used to support Article 15 requests tend to be public source re-
ports from reputable, large NGOs or investigative commissions. However, 
these risks also arise in relation to information provided by States and 
other actors with an interest in the outcome of the preliminary examina-
tion. 
30.2.4. What is the Aim of Article 15 Communications? 
The large proportion of rejected communications may suggest that the 
Article 15 process is being used for instrumental reasons, rather than to 
make a genuine contribution to the preliminary examination process. Fair-
lie labels such communications as “strategic communications”.32 There 
have certainly been several examples of ‘strategic communications’ that 
have been submitted to the OTP and widely publicized, with perhaps no 
real prospect of ‘success’. These include the communication filed by the 
Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of the Survivors Network of 
those Abused by Priests (’sNAP’) concerning alleged crimes against hu-
manity perpetrated by members of the Catholic Church,33 and the com-
munication filed concerning US President G.W. Bush and senior members 
of his administration.34 Both were accepted to have no chance of trigger-
ing an OTP investigation, but were widely publicized and used as a part of 
publicity and litigation strategies intended to draw attention to the alleged 
crimes. 
There is, generally speaking, a closer and more evident link be-
tween certain Article 15 communications and domestic politics than is 
seen in amici submissions. Civil society actors often submit communica-
tions to achieve broader policy goals of the organizations concerned. 
While an amicus submission may also be part of a broader long-term 
                                                   
32 Megan A Fairlie, “The Hidden Costs of Strategic Communications for the International 
Criminal Court”, in Texas International Law Journal, 2016, vol. 51, no. 3, p. 281. 
33 Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests and Centre for Constitutional Rights, “Cler-
gy Sex Victims File International Criminal Court Complaint: Case Charges Vatican Offi-
cials with ‘Crimes Against Humanity’”, 13 September 2011. 
34 Francis A. Boyle, “International Criminal Court Complaint Filed Against Bush, Cheney, 
Rumsfeld, Tenet, Rice, Gonzales”, in Global Research, 20 January 2010. 
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strategy for many organizations, there is greater judicial control and guid-
ance. Submissions are limited to specific, mainly legal, issues, thus mini-
mizing the waste of judicial and party resources. Amicus briefs are public 
and, if accepted, form part of the case file. It is thus easier to measure the 
content and quality of submissions and to identify any other interests or 
goals served by filing the brief.  
This is where a more detailed breakdown of the identity and type of 
those submitting Article 15 communications would be useful, as would 
information of what motivates actors to submit communications. It ap-
pears that the range of actors submitting communications is far broader 
than those seeking to participate as amici, which tends to be dominated by 
larger, international NGOs, or actors that pursue a specific legal or policy 
objective rather than objectives focused on a particular situation. For ex-
ample, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (‘WIGJ’) has used the ami-
cus brief to advocate for advances on women issues35 and REDRESS 
aims its interventions largely at reparations and victim participation.36 The 
participation of such international NGOs can be assumed to involve a 
range of strategic considerations, including: an assessment of their ability 
to contribute important expertise; whether they were invited; internal pol-
icy requirements; time, resource considerations and other priorities; the 
availability of alternative avenues for influencing proceedings; and the 
potential to co-ordinate the submissions of a range of internal agencies. 
However, both actors have a long-term commitment to the ICC and the 
project of international criminal justice generally, thus are less likely to 
risk damaging the ICC by making politically motivated communications 
with no chance of success.37 
The approach of such actors, who are all ‘engaged’ in the ICC sys-
tem, can be contrasted with communications that aim to publicize crimes 
beyond the Court’s jurisdiction, to push for accountability (either in the 
                                                   
35 For discussion of the role of WIGJ on such issues, see Louise Chappell, The Politics of 
Gender Justice at the International Criminal Court: Legacies and Legitimacy, Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
36 See, for example, the filings by REDRESS in the Katanga reparations phase: ICC, Situa-
tion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Trial 
Chamber, Redress Trust Observations Pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 15 May 2015, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3554 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/de6097/). 
37 Fairlie, 2016, see supra note 32. 
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ICC or other fora) or to shift national or international public opinion.38 A 
much greater risk of ‘lawfare’ type concerns arises with Article 15 com-
munications than in the context of amici submissions, thus increasing the 
risk of undermining the legitimacy of the process and wasting OTP re-
sources. Many credible civil society actors thus eschew the Article 15 
process entirely, in favour of detailed reports or statements, or other forms 
of influence. This is evidenced in the interviews conducted with civil so-
ciety for our project on civil society and international criminal justice, 
where NGO representatives have revealed that they did send reports and 
analysis to the OTP.39 One explained that “we do have a role in research-
ing human rights violations and we do, in a number of contexts, call for 
the ICC to step in and investigate or to open preliminary examinations on 
those issues”.40 However, at least one NGO drew a distinction between 
general advocacy and making Article 15 submissions, suggesting that 
“basically I feel like Article 15 [is] saying, ‘You should open this investi-
gation’” whereas “we, actually, don’t call for that many investigations for 
a variety of reasons. It has to be a really extreme […] because we’re also 
aware that this court is already very overloaded so we have a very high 
threshold”.41 This actor explained that “we’d be more likely to call on a 
government to refer” a situation to the ICC because “you don’t see a lot of 
action on Article 15 whereas […] if a state refers, [the ICC Prosecutor has] 
been pretty quick” to respond.42  
A representative of another international NGO explained that “we 
haven’t done any Article 15s to date but I don’t think we would rule it out 
in some circumstances […] we realize it’s really important that we’re not 
criminal investigators […] and we don’t want to be perceived as such 
because that raises risk issues”, especially in terms of protecting the secu-
rity of sources.43 Indeed, a lack of clarity about the OTP’s use of Article 
15 information has been a barrier to making use of this avenue, since it is 
recognized that “this information […] will, eventually, be handed over to 
                                                   
38 Ibid. 
39 “We send all of our reports to them. Not every report but […] we send reports”, and “We 
do a lot to try to influence the prosecutor”, Interview CT2 (on file with the author). 
40 Interview SY7 (on file with the author). 
41 Interview CT2 (on file with the author). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Interview SY7 (on file with the author). 
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investigators if there’s an investigation”. 44  Article 15 communications 
thus represent only one available, but relatively narrow, option for interna-
tional criminal justice advocacy that many credible organizations choose 
not to use.  
30.2.5. The Absence of Standing for Judicial Review in Preliminary 
Examinations 
Civil society organizations do raise a fundamental concern with the pre-
liminary examination process, and what they argue is an unfortunate 
omission in the Article 15 procedure. That is, the need for judicial review 
of all decisions to proceed or not to proceed to an investigation, with 
standing for civil society actors, in particular those who have submitted an 
Article 15 communication, to trigger a review in the same way as a refer-
ring State or the Security Council. Instead, as is evident from Rome Stat-
ute negotiations, the judicial review process is designed to stop a rouge 
prosecutor (a State concern) and not to encourage a reticent prosecutor to 
proceed with an investigation (a victims’ and civil society concern).  
As the number of situations before the Court has increased, and the 
OTP’s budget has been reduced, the issue of reviewing decisions not to 
proceed has taken on greater importance. A decision not to investigate has 
serious consequences: it will preclude international criminal accountabil-
ity at the international level and possibly also the national level; it denies 
a level of recognition to those victims affected, and also their potential to 
participate or be represented in proceedings; and it precludes access to 
reparations under the Rome Statute and assistance pursuant to the Trust 
Fund’s assistance mandate. Yet, while the significance of decisions taken 
by the OTP in the preliminary examination stage is clear, the ability of 
civil society to influence such decisions is less certain and there is little 
scope for formal participation in decision-making processes. This in turn 
may be said to contribute to a lack of participation, transparency and ac-
countability, thus raising concerns for the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the OTP and the Court itself.  
As at August 2017, three preliminary examinations based on Article 
15 communications had been closed without proceeding to an investiga-
                                                   
44 Ibid.; “We’ve had some disclosure challenges… there’s supposed to be this provision that, 
basically, allows you to provide information that leads to investigation, confidentially, but 
it doesn’t really work that way”, Interview CT2 (on file with the author). 
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tion (Honduras, Republic of Korea and Venezuela). In each situation, the 
decision not to proceed to an investigation was based on jurisdictional 
criteria so there was no prospect of Pre-Trial Chamber review. The initial 
preliminary examination into Iraq, which was also based on Article 15 
communications, was closed in 2006 due to the finding that the alleged 
crimes were of insufficient gravity, thus providing no prospect of review 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber. As at March 2018, the Prosecutor had not de-
clined to proceed to an investigation based on the interests of justice, so 
there has been no review by a Pre-Trial Chamber of a decision not to pro-
ceed on this basis. Thus, judicial review of decisions not to investigate has 
been limited to two situations. 
The first concerned the situation referred to the ICC by the Gov-
ernment of the Union of the Comoros, concerning an incident on a hu-
manitarian aid flotilla bound for the Gaza Strip. The incident occurred 
against and on vessels registered to Comoros, Greece and Cambodia (all 
party to the Rome Statute), and thus the referral triggered the Court’s ju-
risdiction based on Articles 12(2)(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute. The 
Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination, but in November 2014 
announced that the preliminary examination had been closed based on her 
finding that there was insufficient gravity.45  Comoros, as the referring 
State, requested a review by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the decision not to 
open an investigation.46 The Pre-Trial Chamber revealed different views 
as to the role of the Chamber and the scope and standard of review of the 
Prosecutor’s decision. A majority determined that the Prosecutor had erred 
in her assessment of gravity.47 The Appeals Chamber declined to hear the 
Prosecutor’s appeal, leaving unresolved the issue as to how the Pre-Trial 
                                                   
45 OTP, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on 
Concluding the Preliminary Examination of the Situation Referred by the Union of the 
Comoros: ‘Rome Statute Legal Requirements Have Not Been Met’”, 6 November 2014 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e745a0/). 
46 ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Repub-
lic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Application for Review Pursuant to 
Article 53(3)(a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014 not to Initiate an Inves-
tigation in the Situation, 29 January 2015, ICC-01/13-3-Red (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/b60981/). 
47 ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Repub-
lic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Request of the Un-
ion of the Comoros to Review the Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Initiate an Investigation, 
16 July 2015, ICC-01/13-34 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/). 
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Chamber should approach its role. 48  Thus, even where the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is involved in a review of a decision made during the prelimi-
nary examination process, the standard and scope of such a review is not 
clear. In any event, the outcome of a successful judicial review is to remit 
the situation back to the Prosecutor to reach a further decision, a further 
exercise of her discretion. 
The second situation concerned the attempted referral of the situa-
tion in Egypt (a State not party to the Rome Statute) to the ICC. This ex-
ample aptly illustrates the limits of the Article 15 communication and the 
lack of standing. In December 2013, lawyers acting on behalf of the Free-
dom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
sought to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC by filing an instrument with 
the Registry that purported to be a declaration under Article 12(3) of the 
Rome Statute.49 The instrument included evidence of alleged crimes in-
cluding murder, unlawful imprisonment, torture, persecution, and en-
forced disappearances. In a statement issued in May 2014, the Prosecutor 
determined that the communication was not submitted by a person pos-
sessing the requisite authority to make an Article 12(3) declaration and 
thus did not constitute consent by Egypt to the exercise of ICC jurisdic-
tion.50 The complaint was thus considered as a communication under Arti-
cle 15 and, as the allegations fell outside the Court’s territorial and per-
sonal jurisdiction, the Prosecutor would not proceed to open a preliminary 
examination.  
Lawyers on behalf of the ousted President Morsi and the Freedom 
and Justice Party then requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to appoint a 
Chamber specifically to review the decision by the Prosecutor not to open 
                                                   
48 ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Repub-
lic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Admissibility of the 
Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the “Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros to 
Review the Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Initiate an Investigation”, 6 November 2015, 
ICC-01/13-51 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a43856/). 
49 ICC, “Communication Seeking to Accept the ICC’s Jurisdiction over Egypt”, 13 December 
2013. For further discussion see Hossam El Deeb, “An Attempt to Prosecute: The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Communication to the International Criminal Court Relating to the Alleged 
Crimes in Egypt”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2015, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 733. 
50 OTP, “The Determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the Communication Received 
in Relation to Egypt”, 8 May 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2945cd/). 
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a preliminary examination.51 The request was based on Regulation 46(2) 
or in the alternative Regulation 46(3), which enables matters arising out of 
a situation to be directed to a Pre-Trial Chamber. It is the first attempt by 
an actor that has submitted an Article 15 communication to trigger a re-
view of a decision by the Prosecutor not to conduct a preliminary exami-
nation. The original request was rejected by the Presidency, but was re-
filed before the President of the Pre-Trial Division, who assigned the mat-
ter to Pre-Trial Chamber II.52 However, that Chamber then dismissed the 
request for review in limine, finding that Regulation 46(3) was a purely 
administrative provision and did not create substantive rights. Moreover, 
consideration of the request should not be viewed as recognizing any right 
of standing on the part of the applicant.53 A subsequent attempt to seek 
reconsideration of this decision, or alternatively a request to appeal the 
decision,54 was denied.55 The application(s) argued that the judges should 
exercise an inherent right of review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
open an examination, as review was essential to promote the integrity and 
                                                   
51 ICC, Situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Pre-Trial Division, Re-Filing Before the 
President of the Pre-Trial Division of the ‘Request for Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision 
of 23 April 2014 Not to open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged Crimes 
Committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2015’, 
1 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ce712/). 
52 ICC, Pre-Trial Division, Decision Assigning the ‘Request for Review of the Prosecutor’s 
Decision of 23 April 2014 Not to Open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged 
Crimes Committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 
2014’ to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 10 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-1 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/51f209/). 
53 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the ‘Request for Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision 
of 23 April 2014 Not to Open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged Crimes 
Committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, 
12 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-3, see supra note 14. 
54 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request for Reconsideration of, and Alternatively, Leave to Ap-
peal Against the “Decision on the ‘Request for Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 23 
April 2014 Not to Open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged Crimes Commit-
ted in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’” of 12 
September 2014, 18 September 2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-4 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/cd87ac/). 
55 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on a Request for Reconsideration or Leave to Appeal 
the “Decision on the ‘Request for a Review of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 23 April 2014 
Not to Open a Preliminary Examination Concerning Alleged Crimes Committed in the Ar-
ab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’”, 22 September 
2014, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-5, see supra note 14. 
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transparency of the ICC. The Chamber did not enter into the substance of 
these arguments, finding instead that the procedural framework of the ICC 
does not permit a broad motion for reconsideration. Further, as the appli-
cant was not a party to proceedings, it was not entitled to appeal. These 
proceedings show the difficulty in obtaining review of decisions taken by 
the Prosecutor where no right of review is set out in the Rome Statute. 
Another issue is where the OTP does not take a decision whether to 
open or not to open an investigation. The OTP may keep examinations 
open without taking a formal decision to end a preliminary examination 
and not to move to an investigation, meaning there is no decision that 
could then be reviewed. Here, it is very difficult to force the OTP to make 
a decision. The Central African Republic, as the referring State, attempted 
to do so by filing a request with the Pre-Trial Chamber asking for infor-
mation on the alleged failure to decide, within a reasonable time, whether 
or not to open an investigation. This application was successful, with the 
Pre-Trial Chamber requesting the Prosecutor to provide information.56 
The OTP complied “in the interests of transparency” but has consistently 
refused to acknowledge any legal obligation to do so or a time limit on the 
exercise of its discretion in the preliminary examination stage.57 Instead, 
its practice has been to suspend, rather than close, the preliminary exami-
nation or investigation. For example, in Lubanga, the OTP suspended 
investigation of charges other than those concerning child soldiers, thus 
limiting the availability of judicial review. In relation to the Kenya cases, 
where investigations remain suspended, Ferstman suggests that this is one 
tactic used by the OTP to avoid judicial review of prosecutorial discre-
tion.58 There, the Common Legal Representative for Victims sought judi-
                                                   
56 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Requesting 
Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central 
African Republic, 30 November 2006, ICC-01/05-6 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
76e607/). 
57 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecution’s Report 
Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting Information 
on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Re-
public, 13 December 2006, ICC-01/05-7, para. 11 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dd66a/
). 
58 Carla Ferstman, “Prosecutorial Discretion and Victims’ Rights at the International Criminal 
Court: Demarcating the Battle Lines”, in Sarah Williams and Hannah Woolaver (eds.), Ac-
ta Juridica, 2016, p. 17. 
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cial review, arguing that the lack of action should be construed as a deci-
sion by the Prosecutor not to proceed “because it has concluded that fur-
ther investigation or prosecution would be futile, and therefore would not 
be in the interests of justice”.59 The OTP opposed the application, arguing 
that the victims lacked standing. The PTC confirmed that victims did have 
standing to file the application, stating that it “considers that one of the 
valid forms of victims’ participation in the proceedings of a situation is to 
prompt the Chamber to consider exercising its proprio motu powers with 
respect to a specific issue affecting the victims’ personal interests”.60 De-
spite allowing the application, the Pre-Trial Chamber declined the request 
on the merits, finding that there had been no decision not to investigate on 
the basis of the interests of justice. Moreover, the Chamber was clear that 
its right to review decisions of the Prosecutor is set out in Article 53, “as 
well as the boundaries of the exercise of any such competence”.61  
This chapter does not suggest that civil society actors should be 
given standing to trigger judicial review of a decision not to open a pre-
liminary examination or to proceed to an investigation, even for those 
actors who have submitted an Article 15 communication. Given the evi-
dence of strategic communications, and the volume of communications 
received, to do so would likely cripple the OTP and further increase the 
strategic use of Article 15 communications, ultimately undermining the 
legitimacy of the ICC itself. States would certainly not condone amend-
ments to the Rome Statute to accommodate such rights of standing. In-
stead, the next section explores the amicus curiae mechanism as a possi-
ble option to prompt the Prosecutor to act or to call for judicial review, a 
mechanism that falls short of recognizing such broad rights of standing. 
                                                   
59 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Victims’ Request for Review 
of Prosecution’s Decision to Cease Active Investigation, 3 August 2015, ICC-01/09-154, 
para. 10 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aa057e/). 
60 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the “Victims’ 
Request for Review of Prosecutions’ Decision to Cease Active Investigation”, 5 November 
2015, ICC-01/09-159, para. 7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/18b367/). 
61 Ibid., para. 18. 
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30.3. The Amicus Curiae and the Potential to Influence and Regulate 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
30.3.1. The Amicus Curiae 
The traditional notion of the amicus curiae is a friend of the court, an im-
partial actor with knowledge or expertise relevant to the proceedings 
who – at the discretion of the court – is given permission to participate in 
a limited form in proceedings. The amicus was thus a highly flexible, and 
relatively undefined, legal mechanism that allowed judges to overcome 
some of the disadvantages of the adversarial process that does not easily 
allow for the participation of third parties. In various national jurisdictions, 
this role has now expanded – in some situations renamed – and allows 
broad rights of third party or public interest intervention, with amici or 
interveners frequently providing legal analysis of factual evidence to sup-
port a particular legal outcome. The rationale is that such participation 
will lead to better judicial decision making by permitting additional 
sources of information to be placed before the court and, in some circum-
stances, to ensure fair proceedings by allowing the representation of inter-
ests affected by proceedings that are not otherwise represented. With the 
exception of the International Court of Justice, which remains primarily 
linked to the participation of States, and not other interest groups, many 
other judicial institutions have enthusiastically endorsed intervention by 
expert or interest groups (for example, the European Court of Human 
Rights) or are experimenting with the benefits and limitations of interven-
tion (such as the World Trade Organization and in investment arbitration). 
What is clear is that amicus or third-party participation is equated with 
broader theories concerning the need for representation, transparency and 
other ‘democratic values’ in the judicial decision-making process.62 
International criminal tribunals have not been immune to the pres-
sure to enable broader participation. The amicus curiae mechanism was 
found in the rules of procedure and evidence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) and other internationalized and hybrid 
tribunals. It is also found in Rule 103 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
                                                   
62 The discussion in this section is based on material included in Sarah Williams, Hannah 
Woolaver and Emma Palmer, The Amicus Curiae in International Criminal Justice, Hart 
Publishing, forthcoming 2018. 
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Evidence. Although the decisions on applications can be brief, it is clear 
that amicus intervention is a discretionary measure. Chambers have rec-
ognized the necessarily limited role of the mechanism, particularly in a 
criminal trial, where the Court must respect the rights of the defence to a 
fair and expeditious trial. The practice shows civil society contributors, 
including large international NGOs, international organizations, smaller 
national NGOs, academics and associations have been permitted to inter-
vene.63 What is clear from the practice is that there is not a particularly 
permissive judicial approach to allowing amicus intervention and that the 
amicus curiae mechanism has not been used to generate a flood of public 
interest type interventions in ICC proceedings, as has been seen in some 
national jurisdictions. Moreover, ICC judges are less likely to accept ami-
ci submissions addressing, or engaging in arguments concerning, the 
broader political or social implications of their decisions than some of 
their national counterparts. Victim participation in proceedings may also 
remove the need for amici submissions on social impact of decisions. 
Therefore, within the ICC, the amicus is a constrained mechanism.  
30.3.2. Using the Amicus Curiae Mechanism to Influence the 
Prosecutor? 
As outlined above, civil society actors, including those who have submit-
ted an Article 15 communication to the Prosecutor, do not have standing 
to seek review of decisions to proceed to an investigation. Nor do they 
have standing to participate in the hearings concerning a request by the 
Prosecutor to open an investigation under Article 15. Thus formal avenues 
for participation in, and possibly influence, these key decisions do not 
appear to exist. Does the amicus curiae mechanism offer an alternative 
way to influence the Prosecutor? 
The greatest restriction on the use of the amicus curiae to address 
decisions concerning the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is that an 
                                                   
63 Williams and Palmer, 2016, see supra note 3. See also Mark Ellis, “NGO Intervention in 
Court Proceedings Through Amicus Curiae Briefs”, in Linda E Carter, Mark S Ellis and 
Charles Chernor Jalloh (eds.), The International Criminal Court in an Effective Global 
Justice System, Edward Elgar, 2016, p. 264; Avidan Kent and Jamie Trinidad, “The Man-
agement of Third-party Amicus Participation before International Criminal Tribunals: Jug-
gling Efficiency and Legitimacy”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2017, vol. 17, 
no. 4, p. 728; Chatham House, “Shaping the Law: Civil Society Influence at International 
Criminal Courts”, 25 January 2016 (available on its web site). 
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amicus is a friend of the Court, not of the Prosecutor. Under Rule 103 of 
the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it is the Chamber that authoriz-
es an amicus submission, which can occur “at any stage in proceedings”, 
thus suggesting that judicial proceedings must have been initiated. This 
then raises the question as to when judicial proceedings start. In the con-
text of victims’ participation, the Appeals Chamber has held that: 
What emerges from the case law of the Appeals Chamber is 
that participation can take place only within the context of 
judicial proceedings. Article 68 (3) of the Statute correlates 
victim participation to "proceedings", a term denoting a judi-
cial cause pending before a Chamber. In contrast, an investi-
gation is not a judicial proceeding but an inquiry conducted 
by the Prosecutor into the commission of a crime with a 
view to bringing to justice those deemed responsible. […] 
The initial appraisal of a referral of a situation by a State Par-
ty, in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court appear to have been committed as well as the assess-
ment of information reaching the Prosecutor and in relation 
to that the initiation by the Prosecutor of investigations pro-
prio motu are the exclusive province of the Prosecutor.64 
Thus, other than the specific rights to make representations regard-
ing Article 15 requests or on jurisdiction or admissibility challenges, vic-
tims have no general standing to make submissions during the investiga-
tion phase as there are no judicial proceedings. This would apply by ex-
tension to the preliminary examination phase. Instead, the Appeals Cham-
ber indicated: 
there is ample scope within the statutory scheme of the Stat-
ute for victims and anyone else with relevant information to 
pass it on to the Prosecutor without first being formally ac-
corded "a general right to participate". For example under 
Article 15 (2) the Prosecutor is authorised to receive infor-
mation from, inter alia, any "reliable source" - including vic-
tims. He is similarly authorised under article 42 (1) to re-
                                                   
64 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on 
Victim Participation in the Investigation Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the 
OPCD Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the Ap-
peals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 
December 2007, 19 December 2008, ICC-01/04-556, paras. 45, 51 (http://www.legal-tools.
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ceive and consider “any substantiated information on crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court”. Victims may thus make 
representations to the Prosecutor on any matter pertaining to 
the investigations and to their interests.65 
The same approach would likely be applied to civil society actors 
seeking to make amici submissions concerning a preliminary examination 
or investigation in the absence of judicial proceedings. That is, amici 
submissions could not be accepted where there is no ‘judicial proceeding’ 
on foot, which would preclude attempts to file a submission concerning 
the preliminary examination phase. 
However, amici have occasionally been permitted – or even invit-
ed – to make submissions during the pre-trial phases. For example, Pre-
Trial Chamber I invited Louise Arbour and Antonio Cassese to provide 
information to the ICC about their investigations into events in Darfur in 
Sudan,66 in their capacities as High Commissioner of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chairperson of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, respectively. In doing 
so, the Chamber recalled that the UN Security Council had referred the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor, but that the Prosecutor’s inves-
tigation had apparently been inhibited by the security situation within 
Darfur. The Chamber therefore sought further information about “the pro-
tection of victims and the preservation of evidence”. 67  Although the 
Chamber did not mention this in the invitation, Arbour was a former 
ICTY Prosecutor and Cassese the first President of the ICTY Chambers. 
The amici were arguably invited to make submissions in the hope that 
they would propose actions that would progress the Prosecutor’s stalled 
investigations.68 The stated reasons for inviting (or proposing) civil socie-
ty amicus curiae submissions may not always be apparent from the call or 
decision allowing their observations, but in this case allowed UN officials 
with prosecutorial experience to share that expertise with the ICC and 
                                                   
65  Ibid., para. 53. 
66 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision Inviting Observations in Applica-
tion of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 24 July 2006, ICC-02/05-10 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/657682/). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Lyal S Sunga, “How Can UN Human Rights Special Procedures Sharpen ICC Fact-
Finding?”, in International Journal of Human Rights, 2011, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 187. 
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appeared to be a direct or indirect attempt by the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
influence the Prosecutor’s investigation via an amicus submission. 
There seems to be no reason why amici would be precluded from 
seeking to make submissions in proceedings where the Prosecutor has 
requested authorization to open an investigation. Two academics did seek 
to participate as amici in the Article 15 proceedings in the Kenyan situa-
tion, arguing that the novel nature of the issues to be determined and the 
effectively ex parte nature of the proceedings warranted the Chamber 
hearing from amici.69 The Chamber rejected the application on the basis 
that the proposed submissions would not help it to “reach a proper deter-
mination on the Prosecutor’s Request”.70 One of the suspects ultimately 
charged by the Prosecutor, William Ruto, also sought to appear as amicus 
via his legal counsel after the Pre-Trial Chamber had authorized the Pros-
ecutor to open the investigation, arguing that he could provide a different 
perspective on the investigation and that he had been misrepresented in 
key sources relied upon by the Prosecutor in the Article 15 request.71 The 
Chamber rejected the request, arguing that a suspect under investigation is 
not a category of person able to submit observations as amicus curiae, as 
Rule 103 refers to the right of the defence to respond to any observa-
tions.72  No requests to participate as amicus curiae were formally re-
ceived in connection with the Article 15 proceedings concerning the situa-
tions in Georgia, Côte d’Ivoire or Burundi.  
Similarly, civil society actors should in principle be able to seek 
leave to participate as amici in proceedings for review by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber of a decision not to open an investigation. There was no applica-
                                                   
69 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Request by Professors Max 
Hilaire and William A. Cohn to Appear as Amicus Curiae, 11 January 2010, ICC-01/09-8 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8329d7/). 
70 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on Application to 
Appear as Amicus Curiae and Related Requests, 3 February 2010, ICC-01/09-14, para. 8 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/af0e44/). 
71 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Transmission by the Registry 
of an Application Communicated by Katwa & Kemboy Advocates, Commissioners for 
Oaths on Behalf of Applicant, William Ruto, 21 December 2010, ICC-01/09-32 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/91e729/). 
72 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on Application for 
Leave to Submit Amicus Curiae Observations, 18 January 2011, ICC-01/09-35 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/773abe/). 
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tion to submit an amicus brief in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s review of the 
Prosecutor’s decision in the Comoros situation. However, one civil socie-
ty organization, the European Centre for Law and Justice, sought leave to 
submit submissions as amicus curiae in the appellate proceedings, in sup-
port of the Prosecutor’s request to appeal.73 The proposed submissions, 
which were appended to the request for leave, concerned the issue of ju-
risdiction in respect of a nationals of a State that is not a party to the 
Rome Statute, the basis of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s review of the Prosecu-
tor’s evidence, and the proper role of review under Article 53 of the Rome 
Statute. As the Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected the Prosecutor’s ap-
peal, the request to participate as amicus was never determined.74 This 
shows that there is potential for amicus curiae to participate in proceed-
ings under Article 15 and reviews under Article 53, although it may be a 
challenge to convince the Chamber that the submissions will assist it to 
make a proper determination. 
Yet, amicus curiae submissions will not assist where there is no 
right to call for a review under Article 53 or the referring State or Security 
Council does not use this option. Arguably, a civil society actor, particu-
larly one who had filed a communication with the Prosecutor under Arti-
cle 15, could seek leave to make submissions under Rule 103 as part of 
the situation. However, it is unlikely to be granted, as ICC judges have 
appeared to be reluctant in expanding the rights of review (and the partic-
ipation in the review) of prosecutorial decisions. This was demonstrated 
clearly by the decisions concerning the Egypt situation, where an amicus 
curiae request would have been unlikely to result in a different outcome. 
Thus, given there would be no standing to trigger judicial proceedings, an 
amicus submission, as an attempt to trigger and participate in judicial 
proceedings, would also fail. 
                                                   
73 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic 
of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, Request for Leave to Submit 
Amicus Curiae Observations Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
7 August 2015, ICC-01/13-44 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d13172/). 
74 ICC, Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic 
of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Appeals Chamber, Decision in Relation to Re-
quest for Leave to Submit Rule 103 Observations, 14 August 2015, ICC-01/13-46 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/2da258/). 
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However, it may sometimes be possible for amicus curiae to ad-
dress pre-trial issues once proceedings commence. One of the most fre-
quently mentioned cases of civil society amicus curiae influence con-
cerned the sexual violence charges prosecuted by the ICTR in Akayesu. A 
group of women’s organizations – the Coalition for Women’s Human 
Rights in Conflict – submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing that the 
ICTR Trial Chamber could and should correct the Prosecutor’s failure to 
charge rape in the Akayesu case. It thus addressed an issue of charging 
that generally arises at the pre-trial or prosecutorial investigation stage of 
a trial,75 which in turn impacted on the proceedings.76  
Yet similar attempts in the ICC have failed, and in practice civil so-
ciety actors cannot submit an ‘amicus’ brief to the ICC Prosecutor when 
she is exercising her discretion to lay charges (as there are not yet ‘pro-
ceedings’). For example, in August 2006, WIGJ attempted to expand the 
charges brought at the ICC against Lubanga to include sexual violence by 
writing to the ICC Prosecutor, in vain. The next effort by WIGJ was to 
apply to appear as amicus curiae in Lubanga’s Article 61 confirmation of 
charges hearing, seeking to make submissions on the proper role of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the determination of charges. WIGJ argued that 
there was a broad supervisory duty on the part of the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which could ask the Prosecutor to include other crimes. The organization 
also argued for broader definition of victim and thus participation at Arti-
cle 61 proceedings (not just linked to those crimes on the arrest warrant), 
and wanted the Prosecutor to investigate sexual and gender-based vio-
lence and include it in the charges. The Prosecutor and defence counsel 
for Lubanga opposed the request.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber declined WIGJ’s application because, by 
this stage, the case against Lubanga was “confined to the alleged enlist-
                                                   
75 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor Versus Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
Trial Chamber, Amicus Brief Respecting Amendment of the Indictment and Supplementa-
tion of the Evidence to Ensure the Prosecution of Rape and Other Sexual Violence within 
the Competence of the Tribunal, 17 June 1997 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/9017af/). 
For a discussion of the probable influence of this brief, see Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Su-
pranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the 
ICTY and the ICTR, Intersentia, 2005, pp. 294–95; Rhonda Copelon, “Gender Crimes as 
War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law”, in 
McGill Law Journal, 2000, vol. 46, no. 1, p. 217. 
76 de Brouwer, 2005, see supra note 74; Copelon, 2000, p. 225, see supra note 74. 
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ment, conscription and active use in military operations of children under 
the age of fifteen; and […] therefore, the Request has no link with the 
present case”.77 Instead, the Pre-Trial Chamber invited WIGJ “to re-file 
their request for leave to submit observations in the record of the DRC 
situation”.78 In other words, the Chamber suggested that WIGJ apply to 
act as amicus curiae within the broader pre-trial process, rather than in the 
Lubanga case specifically, where charges had already been laid. WIGJ 
obliged, but this request was also opposed by the OTP and ultimately re-
jected. 79  On the relevant point concerning the “role of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in supervising prosecutorial discretion when the Prosecutor de-
cides ‘not to prosecute a particular person or not to prosecute a person for 
particular crimes’”, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that “investigations in 
the Situation in the DRC are ongoing and the Prosecutor has not taken any 
decision not to investigate or prosecute”.80 Thus it was not an appropriate 
time to file amicus submissions. 
A similar situation arose in 2015 when Uganda Victims Foundation 
attempted to provide amicus curiae submissions regarding victim partici-
pation and the scope of the charges in the Ongwen case. As noted above, 
the Appeals Chamber has held that victims generally cannot participate in 
an investigation; rather, they can participate in judicial proceedings only 
where their personal interests are affected. Otherwise, victims do not have 
standing before the Court to seek the Prosecution to take any action. Giv-
en the lack of standing, the applicant amicus in Ongwen attempted to file 
submissions seeking to widen the rights of participation and concerning 
the charges. However, Pre-Trial Chamber II noted that since there were 
not yet victims participating in the case and “prosecution, including the 
identification of which crimes to charge, is exclusively in the hands of the 
Prosecutor, […] the issues raised by the applicant are not live issues in the 
                                                   
77 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on Request Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the 
Statute, 26 September 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-480 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
826ac5/). 
78 Ibid. 
79 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on 
the Request Submitted Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 17 
August 2007, ICC-01/04-373 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b9775f/). 
80 Ibid., para. 5. 
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case”.81 Thus it remains unclear as to when might be the appropriate time 
to make amicus submissions concerning charges.82  
This discussion shows that there are no – or very limited – opportu-
nities for victims and civil society to use the amicus brief to trigger or 
participate in reviews of key decisions made by the Prosecutor as part of 
the preliminary examination phase. There are opportunities to participate 
as an amicus concerning the outcomes of the preliminary process only, 
namely where there are requests to authorize an investigation or decisions 
not to open an investigation, but only where other actors – referring States 
or the Security Council – trigger the review mechanism under Article 53 
or where the decision is based on the interests of justice criterion. In other 
circumstances, the amicus mechanism does not offer an alternative ap-
proach to seek judicial review of decisions not to open a preliminary ex-
amination in the first place or to not proceed to an investigation at the end 
of the process. While a civil society actor and victims can submit commu-
nications to the OTP in these situations under Article 15, their interests 
may well be different from those of the OTP, yet there will never be a 
formal judicial proceeding that may allow them to present their views to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.  
Even where the amicus mechanism may be available, it is discre-
tionary and ICC judges will not grant leave unless the submissions would 
assist them to make their decision. Moreover, under Rule 103, the parties 
to proceedings are permitted to respond to both an application for leave to 
make submissions as amicus curiae and to the submissions themselves. 
Thus, the Prosecutor will always have the opportunity to object to any 
attempts to use the amicus mechanism to step outside the formal re-
strictions on review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It should 
be expected that the Prosecutor would strongly oppose any attempt to 
expand standing via the amicus curiae brief. As indicated in the Prosecu-
tion brief in the Kenya case, the Prosecutor’s firm view is that  
                                                   
81 ICC, Situation in Uganda, The Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trial Chamber, Deci-
sion on an Application by the Uganda Victims Foundation to Submit Amicus Curiae Ob-
servations, 15 April 2015, ICC-02/04-01/15-221, para. 2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
b38fcf/). 
82 For further discussion regarding Lubanga, see Emily Haslam, “Subjects and Objects: 
International Criminal Law and the Institutionalization of Civil Society”, in International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 2011, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 221, 236. 
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participants should not be permitted to circumvent the rules 
on standing by asserting a general right to request a Chamber 
to take action proprio motu. This would generally allow vic-
tims an open-ended right to make legal submissions on any 
topic in the absence of a judicial proceeding, provided those 
submissions are couched as a request for a Chamber to inter-
vene.  
Participants here would certainly also include amici. Thus, efforts to se-
cure greater rights of participation and ultimately review of prosecutorial 
decisions in preliminary examinations must be sourced elsewhere. 
30.4. Conclusions 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that options for triggering reviews 
of prosecutorial decisions during the preliminary examination phase and 
then for formal participation in review proceedings are limited. Civil soci-
ety actors may call for judges to recognize standing for civil society actors 
to trigger a review of decisions not to proceed to an examination or inves-
tigation. This could – but need not be – limited to those actors who have 
submitted a communication. However, this development is unlikely to 
occur without a change to the Statute, as negotiators in Rome expressly 
excluded broader rights of standing for civil society and rights of review 
for other Prosecutorial decisions. The Prosecutor would also likely (and 
correctly) object strongly to any such proposals. The ICC Prosecutor is in 
a very different position to prosecutors in national systems where rights of 
judicial review of prosecutorial decisions are more extensive. The practice 
on Article 15 communications shows that many address crimes that are 
manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the ICC or are not substantiated or 
credible. Given the volume of such communications, and the implication 
on quality, allowing any actor who has filed a communication standing to 
trigger or participate in a review would be unmanageable. This is particu-
larly so if we accept that many of the communications filed are for strate-
gic reasons, with no real expectation that the ICC would act. Extending 
standing to trigger a review would perpetuate such strategic and politi-
cized use of Article 15. 
Nor is there a need for a mechanism that would enable civil society 
actors to submit information during a preliminary examination – this is 
exactly what Article 15 is intended to do. There is already a considerable 
amount of information flowing to the Prosecutor, although there are con-
cerns about the volume and the quality of that information. What may 
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offer a useful development would be a more targeted strategy to obtain 
good quality and relevant legal or factual material that may be more likely 
to assist the Prosecutor in her decisions and would also improve transpar-
ency and representation. In the same way as a Chamber may issue a call 
for amicus submissions, the Prosecutor could issue a call for specific 
submissions focusing on particular issues that will influence the decision 
to open or not to open an investigation – a limited ‘friend of the Prosecu-
tor’ model. This would have the benefit of attracting submissions from a 
range of civil society actors, including those who do not generally file 
Article 15 communications but may have considerable expertise on the 
legal issues in question and experience in drafting amicus and other legal 
submissions. Submissions could also be limited by a page or word count 
to minimize the impact on resources, both of the OTP and the civil society 
actor. The timing of such calls could be linked to key phases of the exam-
ination, for example, shortly before issuing a report on jurisdiction or ad-
missibility.  
There is precedent for this type of action. The former Prosecutor 
adopted a similar approach in relation to the first attempt to trigger the 
ICC’s jurisdiction in relation to Palestine. In 2009, the Palestinian Author-
ity had attempted to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC by filing an Article 
12(3) declaration. The legal issue for the OTP was whether Palestine con-
stituted a “State” that could make such a declaration. Before making its 
decision, the Prosecutor sought the views of several actors (including the 
representatives of Palestine), considered a number of reports and received 
submissions from experts, academics and NGOs.83 The submissions were 
made public, a summary of the submissions was released,84 and the OTP 
sought supplementary submissions to address specific issues or to respond 
to arguments raised. Although the OTP ultimately decided not to proceed 
and closed the preliminary examination after the jurisdiction phase,85 this 
shows that the OTP can seek and accept more focused expert submissions, 
in much the same way a Chamber can using the amicus curiae mechanism. 
                                                   
83 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, 22 November 2012, para. 199 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0b1cfc/). 
84 OTP, Situation in Palestine: Summary of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged 
by the Palestinian National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements, 3 May 2010 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/af5abf/). 
85 OTP, “Situation in Palestine”, 3 April 2012 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f5d6d7/). 
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This process, which has not been repeated in any other preliminary exam-
ination, was more transparent and allowed the Prosecutor to make a deci-
sion fully informed by arguments from various perspectives. It is suggest-
ed here that the OTP should consider formalizing such a mechanism. 
Separate to this proposed mechanism, there is also a need to restrain 
the strategic use of Article 15 communications by organizations not nec-
essarily committed to the ICC and the aims of international criminal jus-
tice process. As outlined above, strategic communications have the poten-
tial to drain vital prosecutorial resources, raise false expectations for vic-
tims and undermine confidence in and the legitimacy of the OTP and the 
ICC. One issue that has not been canvassed and may offer some promise 
is the role of ethics in the filing of communications. Civil society actors 
often hold professional ethical or disclosure obligations in their respective 
fields. For instance, academics need to comply with university or national 
research ethics policies, lawyers are members of bar associations, and 
NGOs may have reporting obligations for donors or under domestic (in-
cluding charity) legislations. However, amicus curiae before the ICC hold 
additional ethical obligations under the Code of Conduct although many 
amici may not be aware of its potential application to them. It may be 
worth considering what ethical responsibilities should attach to those ac-
tors submitting information to the OTP – an issue raised directly by the 
domestic proceedings concerning Phil Shiner. 
The Article 15 communication process may also be able to learn 
something from the experience with the amicus curiae. The OTP could 
provide greater guidance as to what might be useful, the types of infor-
mation sought and the quality of information requested. It may also be 
possible to introduce a staged information process, whereby a civil society 
actor submits a limited initial overview of the material they intend to 
submit under Article 15, with the OTP then able to request a fuller sub-
mission if the situation in question is within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
and further material (both factual or legal) may be useful. Here, again, the 
OTP could ask for specific issues to be addressed. This appears to be what 
the OTP is already doing in its field visits and other interactions. It would 
also be useful, and consistent with the policy on confidentiality, to publish 
a breakdown of the type of actors submitting material to the OTP under 
Article 15. Of course, any attempt to tighten the Article 15 process must 
not unduly restrict the mechanism, which is still important to allowing 
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31. Quality Control in Preliminary Examination of 
Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in 
International Criminal Law: 
A Feminist Analysis 
Usha Tandon, Pratibha Tandon and Shreeyash U. Lalit* 
31.1. Introduction 
Though the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) is currently facing huge 
criticism,1 preliminary examinations of the ICC have become one of the 
most significant instruments of Court practice2 and have been acquiring 
growing importance for the last few years.3 However, in the context of 
sexual and gender-based crimes, it is disheartening that many allegations 
of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women do not make it 
beyond preliminary examination; hence the effective investigation and 
prosecution of such offences against women simply do not take place.  
More disturbingly, though the practice of mass rapes is well estab-
lished in certain situations, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) has 
failed to charge the accused like Thomas Dyilo Lubanga4 with sexual and 
                                                   
* Usha Tandon is Professor and Head, Campus Law Centre, University of Delhi; Pratibha 
Tandon is Research Associate, National Law University, Delhi; and Shreeyash U. Lalit is 
LL.M. student, University of Cambridge. 
1 Valerie V. Suhr, “Feminism and the International Criminal Court – Still an Issue?”, in 
Völkerrechtsblog, 19 April 2017. “It is, facing its biggest crisis with member states with-
drawing, from it. Recently, some African states have publicly declared their intended with-
drawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the past month. The court has re-
peatedly been criticized by African states as an inefficient, neo-colonial institution of the 
Western powers to try African countries”. 
2 Carsten Stahn, “How Fair Are Criticisms of the ICC?”, in OUPblog, 23 November 2015. 
3 Lieneke Louman, “Report: Preliminary Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit: Re-
viewing Policies and Practices – Part 1”, in Post-Conflict Justice, 26 October 2015. 
4 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Trial-Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 142 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/677866/) (‘Lubanga 
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gender-based violence. From a feminist perspective,5 this 2012 judgment 
of the ICC was a great disappointment.6 The acquittal of Germain Katan-
ga7 is a glaring instance that illustrates the failure of the OTP to secure a 
conviction for sexual crimes. The first-instance conviction of Jean-Pierre 
Bemba for rape and sexual violence was the first and the only conviction 
so far at the ICC, before it was overturned on appeal.8 Furthermore, Guin-
ea and Colombia have proven to be negative examples depicting the defi-
ciency in the quality of the OTP’s preliminary examinations in so far as 
                                                                                                                        
Judgment’); see also Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo against his conviction, 1 December 2014, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, para. 447 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/585c75/.) 
5 Feminist legal theory is one of the most dynamic fields in the law. Feminism is based on 
two premises: one, women’s and men’s position in society is the result of social and not 
natural factors. Two, women’s perspectives and interest are not inferior to those of men. 
Feminist Jurisprudence or the feminist analysis of law examines and challenges the laws 
that have excluded or restricted women from enjoying the benefits of law. It explores the 
understanding of the complex interrelationship between gender and law and highlights the 
issue of gender discrimination in law. Feminist scholars believe that law has been a potent 
weapon for women subordination and oppression. The law is formulated by men for men 
and the point of view of women, who have been silenced and misrepresented has been ig-
nored. The feminist scholars seek a reinterpretation of legal theory from a new perspective, 
which involves rejection of a theory in which the subordination of women to men is taken 
to be a part of an unalterable scheme of things. Through various approaches, legal femi-
nists have identified gender components and gender complications of seemingly neutral 
laws and practices See generally Hillaire Barnett, Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence, 
Cavendish Publishing, London, 1997; Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory 
of the State, Harvard University Press, 1989; Nancy Levit and Robert R.M. Verchick, Fem-
inist Legal Theory, NYU Press, 2016; Maxine Molyneux, “Analysing Women’s Move-
ment”, in Development and Change, April 1998, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 219–45; Cynthia Grant 
Bowman and Elizabeth M. Schneider, “Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and 
the Legal Profession”, in Fordham Law Review, 1998, vol. 67, no. 2, p. 249. 
6 Suhr, 2017, see supra note 1. 
7 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the 
Admissibility of the Case, 25 September 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497 (‘Katanga Judg-
ment’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ba82b5/). 
8 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Trial Chamber, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-3343 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/edb0cf/); Appeals Chamber, Judg-
ment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's “Judg-
ment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/40d35b/). 
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they have failed to accurately apply the principle of complementarity, or 
even understand and challenge the gender biases against women in the 
domestic legal systems. 
The feminist critics argue that the failure of the ICC to respond to 
women’s experiences, both in responding to the past and in installing 
peace and stability, has made it ineffective.9 Although the Rome Statute 
establishes the substantive law regarding sexual and gender-based crimes, 
the ICC is far from achieving true gender justice and serving as a deter-
rent for sexual and gender-based crimes against women.10 Hence, feminist 
critique is more important than ever in the current political situation to 
ensure further progress and prevent regression in the prosecution of sex 
crimes in international law.11  
Xabier Agirre Aranburu, an experienced practitioner, recounts how 
officials have refused to deal with allegations of sexual violence in several 
occasions. When drafting an indictment for an international tribunal in the 
late 1990s, his attempt to include a reference to sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity was stopped by two senior attorneys. Later, when he 
discussed the issue with one of them, they explained that prosecutors in 
their country always avoided sexual violence because it was annoyingly 
difficult to prove. He also mentions that while lecturing a group of experi-
enced judges and prosecutors visiting The Hague, the reference to sexual 
offences was met with laughter and mocking signs.12 
This chapter argues that the proper processing and analyses of facts, 
communication and situations of the rape and other forms of sexual vio-
lence require a feminist approach to enhance their quality. It is also neces-
sary to conduct a thorough evaluation of the reliability of the sources and 
                                                   
9 Martha L. Minow, “Taking Up the Challenge of Gender and International Criminal Justice: 
In Honor of Judge Patricia Wald”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2011, vol. 11, no. 
3, p. 366. 
10 Laurie Green, “First-Class Crimes, Second-Class Justice: Cumulative Charges for Gender-
Based Crimes at the International Criminal Court”, in International Criminal Law Review, 
2011, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 529. 
11 Suhr, 2017, see supra note 1. 
12 Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “Beyond Dogma and Taboo, Criteria for the Effective Investiga-
tion of Sexual Violence”, in Morten Bergsmo, Alf Butenschøn Skre and Elisabeth J. Wood 
(eds.), Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, p. 269 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/12-bergsmo-skre-wood). 
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the credibility of the information received, to determine whether there is a 
reasonable basis to initiate investigation.  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The second section 
seeks to thematise the offences of sexual violence from a feminist per-
spective, whereas Section 31.3. provides a brief overview of the feminist 
struggle in incorporating gender-sensitive provisions into the Rome Stat-
ute. The fourth section deals with various aspects of quality control in 
preliminary examinations from a feminist perspective, including the prin-
ciples of complementarity, gravity and interests of justice. Next, the OTP 
Policy Papers on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (2014) and on Prelim-
inary Examinations (2013) will be examined. Section 31.5. will highlight 
the positive steps undertaken by the OTP under these two Policy Papers 
and suggest areas of further development. After the current status of pre-
liminary examinations has been briefly dealt with in Section 31.6., the 
Conclusion paves the way for future academic inquiries arguing for ‘fem-
inization’ of the ICC by invoking the principle of ‘shared complementari-
ty’.  
31.2. Understanding the Feminist Perspective in Sexual Violence 
31.2.1. Reasons for Targeting Women 
Women are more likely to be subjected to sexual violence than men in 
armed conflicts. Traditional attitudes to women’s subordinate position in 
society augment their vulnerability to sexual crimes during armed con-
flict.13 The gender biases as well as violence against women in peacetime 
provides the context for targeted violence against women in armed con-
flict and war. Sexual violence against women is inflicted during armed 
conflict to humiliate,14 dominate,15 or terrorize16 the members of a com-
                                                   
13 Brigid Inder, Gender in Practice: Guidelines and Methods to Address Gender based 
Crimes in Armed Conflicts, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Hague, 2005, p. 5. 
14 “During the war army men made my father sleep with me and when he refused they tied 
him up with ropes and put a pistol to his head and made him lie down on me. He tried to 
penetrate me but he could not as the army men pierced me down below with a pistol and 
he saw the blood and lost desire. They took my father aside and shot him with a bullet in 
his chest and he died.” Cited in Ruth Ojiambo Ochieng, “The Consequence of Armed Con-
flicts to Women’s Health; The Case of Africa”, p. 5 (on file with the author). 
15 “They brought her fourteen-year-old son and forced him to rape her […] On [another] 
occasion, I was raped with a gun by one of the three men […] in the room […] Others 
stood watching. Some spat on us. They were raping me, the mother and her daughter at the 
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munity or ethnic group. Such sexual violence is either expressly author-
ized by military policy or impliedly condoned by superiors to reward or 
re-energize exhausted fighters. Violence against women thus remains in-
herent to situations of lawlessness as a cruel extension of the pervasive 
gender subordination already endemic worldwide in times of relative 
peace and security. 
From a feminist perspective, the victim suffers from double dis-
crimination of not only the conflict but the pre-existing gender inequality 
in society. Thus, patriarchal norms play an important role in explaining 
why women become the victims of heinous crimes in times of conflict. In 
societies where gender biases against women are deep-rooted and women 
are identified by association to their male counterparts, sexual violence 
against women is perpetrated as acts of dishonour to the family, especially 
male members of family.17 Thus, sexual crimes against women are not 
                                                                                                                        
same time. Sometimes you had to accept ten men, sometimes three […] I felt I wanted to 
die […] The Serbs said to us, “Why aren’t you pregnant?” […] I think they wanted to 
know who was pregnant in case anyone was hiding it. They wanted women to have chil-
dren to stigmatize us forever. The child is a reminder of what happened”. Cited in Barbara 
Bedont and Katherine Hall Martinez, “Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the In-
ternational Criminal Court”, in Brown Journal of World Affairs, 1999, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 65. 
16 “Under-age children and elderly women were not spared. Other testimonies mention cases 
of girls aged between 10 and 12. Pregnant women were not spared. Women about to give 
birth or who had just given birth were also the victims of rape in hospitals. Their situation 
was all the more alarming in that they were raped by members of the militias some of 
whom were AIDS virus carriers. Women who had just given birth developed fulminating 
infections and died. Women who were “untouchable” according to custom (e.g. nuns) were 
also involved and even corpses, in the case of women who were raped just after being 
killed”. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by René Degni-
Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/68, 29 January 1996, para. 17 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fa034c/), cited 
in United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Division for the Advance-
ment of Women, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response, 1998, pp. 
16–17. 
17 Meger, in her exploration of sexual violence in the Congolese society, points out that “the 
aim of this is twofold: firstly, it is regarded ‘as a direct attack on an individual woman as a 
representative of her gender or her community’; and, secondly, it should be treated as a 
‘symbolic gesture, sending a message to a second target, be it the woman’s husband, father, 
or other men of her community’”. See Sara Meger, “Rape of the Congo: Understanding 
Sexual Violence in the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, in Journal of Con-
temporary African Studies, 2010, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 130. 
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committed in a vacuum, and the pre-existing patriarchal norms provides 
the basis for these crimes.  
Then, the social and cultural constructs of sexual violence to wom-
en’s bodies augment the trauma that women suffer during conflicts. The 
cultural constructs of sexual violence to women’s bodies have differing 
social meanings in the context of war. Understanding this core dimension 
to sex-based abuse helps in appreciating the prevalence and forms of sex-
based violence. It also helps explain the public and ritualised experiences 
of rape for many victims. Perpetrators understand that public sexual vio-
lence is a form of communication of power, and not only a sexual act. 
Hyper-masculinity plays out in graphic form in these settings, where men 
communicate to other men their relative positions of power and helpless-
ness.18 
It also demonstrates the continual hold that the notion of female pu-
rity and the value it exudes in communal setting and confirms the double 
victimization that many women experience once the violence ends.19 
31.2.2. Health Impairments of Sexualized Violence 
Women are not only targeted for reasons different than men, but also suf-
fer in health in a different manner. After the commission of rape, for a 
woman, there is the added risk of pregnancy. The permanent damage to 
the reproductive system, which often results from sexual violence, has 
different implications for women than for men.20 Survivors of sexualized 
violence in war suffer from numerous health impairments.21 Many women 
                                                   
18 See generally Barnett, 1997, see supra note 5; MacKinnon, 1989, see supra note 5. 
19 See generally Naomi Cahn, Fionnuala Ni Aoláin and Dina Haynes, “Masculinities and 
Child Soldiers in Post-Conflict Societies”, in Frank Cooper and Ann C. McGinley (eds.), 
Masculinities and Law: A Multidimensional Approach, New York University Press, 2011. 
20 “Although the militia had burnt my house and took away all the property, I did not become 
sad as I felt when I witnessed the militia when they were attacking and raping our people 
[…] we hid among the trees and watched what was going on with three women all preg-
nant […] they were first badly beaten […] then all of them raped […] until one of them 
aborted […] then they were left. We went to save them […] then another aborted […] by 
afternoon all of them passed away, so we buried them […] it was a very hard experience 
[…] I will never forget”, cited in Ochieng, “The Consequence of Armed Conflicts to 
Women’s Health; The Case of Africa”, pp. 6–7, see supra note 14. 
21 Ingeborg Joachim, “Stress and Risk Factors Resulting from Confrontation with the Trauma 
of War-related Sexualized Violence in a Professional Context”, in Medica Mondiale (ed.), 
Violence Against Women in War: Handbook for Professionals Working with Traumatised 
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suffer severe physical injuries with irreversible secondary injuries and 
functional losses. Furthermore, numerous functional disturbances occur in 
the hormonal and vegetative systems. The women’s physical and psycho-
logical exhaustion makes them more vulnerable to infectious diseases.22 
In addition, during rape women may be infected with venereal diseases or 
HIV/AIDS. Injuries and functional impairment of the genital organs may 
also lead to complications later during pregnancy and childbirth, and may 
also cause infertility. 
31.2.3. Effects of Gendered Stigma 
Female victims of sexual violence occupy very different positions in soci-
ety than that of men, and are treated differently as a result of sex crimes. 
In 2002, Human Rights Watch published a report that detailed the stigma 
experienced by women and girls who had experienced rape and sexual 
violence in Eastern Congo. The report explains that such women are fre-
quently shunned and ostracized by wider community for loss of virginity 
or chastity. Married women are abandoned by their own husbands on the 
presumption of their consent to rape. If rape victims are tolerated to stay 
home, their husbands take other wives, reducing those victims to a subor-
dinate and oppressive position. Widows who have been raped are rejected 
by family of their husbands and are often accused of being accomplices in 
their husband’s deaths because they have survived. Further, if rape victims 
become pregnant, husbands and families are reluctant to take responsibili-
ties that would be involved in raising the child. Carrying on with their 
pregnancy, they are often compelled to take whatever job is available to 
them, however dangerous and low-paying. The unmarried woman who 
became pregnant as a result of rape loses the chance of getting a husband 
in the future.23 Rejection by husbands and families of rape victims often 
leads to homelessness and delinquency for such women. 
                                                                                                                        
Women, Medica Mondiale, Koln, 2005, pp. 72–78, cited in Inder, 2005, p. 53, see supra 
note 13. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “One doctor estimated that a woman who gave birth to a child of rape had only a 20% 
chance of becoming married. Despite the stigma attached to having a child while unmar-
ried, young women usually gave birth, as abortion is illegal in the predominantly Catholic 
DRC and not condoned culturally, even in the case of rape. Those who did decide to end 
pregnancies often sought abortions from unqualified practitioners, rather than doctors.” 
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31.3. Feminist Engagements with the Rome Statute  
Although the 1990s were a time of hope and achievement for international 
women’s movements, the feminists’ issues could not attract much atten-
tion during the early stages of the drafting of the Rome Statute.24 In 1997, 
a group of women’s rights activists founded the Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice in the ICC with the objective of ensuring a gendered per-
spective throughout the Statute. In many ways, it was the ripe time to 
campaign for a ‘gendered’ statute for the ICC.25 States Parties’ obligations 
to address violence against women had already been taken up by interna-
tional human rights treaties.26 Human rights at the international level had 
travelled from general to specific areas of attention.27 The Convention on 
                                                                                                                        
See Human Rights Watch, The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and 
Girls in Eastern Congo, New York, 2002. 
24 “Feminist engagements with international criminal law can be traced back to the 1990s 
when activists and practitioners worked to ensure sexual violence crimes were included in 
the statutes of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals. This early phase of feminist engage-
ment with international criminal law in the 1990s, appeared focused on four main objec-
tives, many of which remain of current concern. First, there was and still is a need to estab-
lish the gendered and sexualized forms of to denote how conflict has gendered impacts. 
The fact that women experience wartime violence in ways particular to them as women 
was largely disregarded in the post-1945 period. Feminist activists thus needed to address 
an immediate gap in knowledge about, and political commitment to addressing, sexual vio-
lence in conflict situations. This objective was closely linked to a second one: making the 
connection between gendered and sexualized harm and the definition of crimes under in-
ternational law, particularly genocide. The decisions in Akayesu and Kunarac, were early 
steps in achieving this objective. Third, feminists identified at the outset the importance of 
situating wartime rape within a broad socio-political context to recognize that violence 
against women in wartime is shaped and made possible in large measure by violence and 
inequality in so-called ‘peacetime’. A fourth objective was to ensure that rape remains vis-
ible as a gendered crime, not just or only a crime against an ethnic/racial/religious commu-
nity. The task then was and is to ensure the ongoing visibility of the gendered nature of the 
harm women face in conflict, while maintaining recognition of the political, social and 
economic complexity of violence and conflict.” Doris Buss, “Performing Legal Order: 
Some Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal Law”, in International Criminal Law 
Review, 2011, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 412–13. 
25 Bedont and Martinez, 1999, pp. 65–85, see supra note 15. 
26 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advance-
ment of Women, Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women, New York, 2010, 
p. 5. 
27 See United Nations Development Fund for Women, South Asia Regional Office, CEDAW: 
Restoring Rights to Women, Partners for Law in Development, New Delhi, 2004, chap. 1. 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 197928 had 
established that discrimination is at the core of and encompassed any form 
of violence against women.29 The Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women, in its general recommendation no. 19 (1992) 
had confirmed that “under general international law and specific human 
rights covenants, States may be responsible for private acts, if they fail to 
act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation”.30 The condem-
nation of gender-based violence against women in war situations at the 
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993,31 and the 
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995,32 provided 
legitimacy to the Women’s Caucus to Gender Justice33 for continuing its 
struggle for integrating gender issues in Rome Statute. Furthermore, the 
two ad hoc tribunals – the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) – took cognizance of mass 
rapes committed during those conflicts.34 The issue of sexual violence 
                                                   
28 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
18 December 1979, entry into force 3 September 1981 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6dc4e4/). 
29 Fausto Pocar, “Foreword”, in Morten Bergsmo, Alf Butenschøn Skre and Elisabeth J. 
Wood (eds.), Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Aca-
demic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, p. iii (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/12-bergsmo-skre-
wood). 
30 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommenda-
tion No. 19: Violence against Women, 1992, para. 9 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
f8d998/). 
31 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted 25 June 1993, part I, paras. 18 and 
28; part II, para. 37 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5fdaa4/). 
32 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted 15 September 1995, para. 142(b) 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/098c5d/). 
33 “Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice” is now the successor of “Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice”. 
34 The International Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) in the landmark case of Prosecutor v. 
Jean Paul Akayesu, (Chamber I, Judgment, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/b8d7bd/)) recognized rape and sexual violence as constituting acts of 
genocide and of rape as a form of torture. Askin describes its significance, in terms of the 
law developed, as “unparalleled”. Kelly Dawn Askin, “Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the 
ICTR: Positive Developments”, in Journal of International Crime Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 
4, p. 1012. Copelon observes that the International Criminal Tribunals were an “important 
foundation for the codification of sexual violence in the Statute”. Rhonda Copelon, “Gen-
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against women in war had therefore received much attention by the time 
the Statute was negotiated and going to be adopted in July 199835 at the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries at Rome.36 
Though most States at the Rome Conference supported the integra-
tion of gender provisions in the Statute,37 some delegations considered 
gender issues as a threat to their religious beliefs. The resistance to gender 
justice was mainly on two issues. Firstly, those States were determined on 
undermining the inclusion of the crime of forced pregnancy due to mis-
leading linkages to the issue of the legalization of abortion. Secondly, 
those States opposed the use of the term ‘gender’ anywhere in the stat-
ute.38 The Women’s Caucus preferred the term ‘gender’ as opposed to 
‘sex’ because the latter is restricted to the biological differences between 
men and women, whereas gender includes differences between men and 
women because of their socially constructed roles. Similarly, ‘gender 
                                                                                                                        
der Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into International Criminal 
Law”, in McGill Law Journal, 2001, vol. 46, p. 231. 
35 “On 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted by a vote of 120 to 7, with 21 countries 
abstaining. Because the way each delegation voted was officially unrecorded, there is some 
dispute over the identity of the seven countries that voted against the treaty. It is certain 
that the People’s Republic of China, Israel, and the United States were three of the seven 
because they have publicly confirmed their negative votes; India, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen have been identified by various observers 
and commentators as possible sources for the other four negative votes, with Iraq, Libya, 
Qatar, and Yemen being the four most commonly identified.” Stephen Eliot Smith, “Defi-
nitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations with the International Criminal Court Dur-
ing the Obama Administration”, in Florida Journal of International Law, 2010, vol. 22, no. 
2, p. 160. 
36 Though it was adopted on 17 July 1998, it entered into force on 1 July 2002. See Rome 
Stature of the International Criminal Court (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7132fd/). 
37 “The States that indicated their support during the Opening Plenary for including provi-
sions in the Statute to enable the Court to prosecute sexual (and where indicated gender) 
violence crimes included: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bot-
swana, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, European Union (gender crimes), Finland, 
Georgia, Ghana, Israel (gender crimes), Korea (gender-related violence), Kuwait, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federa-
tion, Samoa, Slovenia (gender-related crimes), South Africa (for SADC), Spain, Sweden 
(gender-related crimes), Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, USA, and Zambia.” See Bedont 
and Martinez, 1999, fn. 5, see supra note 15. 
38 “The states that made statements opposing the term “gender” included: Qatar, Libya, 
Egypt, Venezuela, Guatemala (but flexible), United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Syria, Turkey, Sudan, Bahrain, Iran, Yemen, Brunei, and Oman. The delegates who led the 
negotiations for this group were from Syria and Qatar.” See ibid., fn. 7. 
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crimes’ were preferred to ‘sexual violence’, because it included crimes 
which are targeted because of the gender roles which may or may not 
have a sexual element. Ultimately, the following provision was negotiated: 
“it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and 
female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate 
any meaning different from the above”.39 Accordingly, the term ‘gender’ 
was used at many places in Rome Statute instead of the narrower terms 
‘sex’ and ‘sexual violence’. The scholars opine that though this definition 
is far from clear, it provides space for broader interpretation for including 
the sociological and cultural differences between men and women.40 
The inclusion of ‘gendered’ provisions in Rome Statute was a great 
victory for the women activists. The Women’s Caucus proved to be an 
essential catalyst in ensuring the integration of a gendered perspective 
throughout the Rome Statute. The merit of the Rome Statute lies in the 
fact that it is a treaty that creates a permanent international court, whereas 
other international instruments, including the Vienna Conference’s Pro-
gramme of Action and the Beijing Conference’s Platform for Action, are 
non-binding human rights instruments. 
Thus, although sexual violence and gender-based crimes were 
largely overlooked in the initial drafts of the Rome Statute, most delega-
tions accepted the necessity of including certain ‘gendered’ aspects of 
crimes in the Statute by the time the final version of the Statute was being 
debated.41 The drafting history of the Statute also reveals that, while there 
were serious differences over certain aspects of the provisions relating to 
gender and sexual violence, there was general consensus among delega-
tions on the recognition of these crimes as serious international crimes in 
the Statute. 
From a feminist perspective, the notable provisions of Rome Stature 
are contained in Part 2,42 which deals with crimes falling within the juris-
                                                   
39 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, Article 7(3) 
(‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
40 Suhr, 2017, see supra note 1. 
41 Susana Sacouto and Katherine Cleary, “The Importance of Effective Investigation of Sex-
ual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes at the International Criminal Court”, in American 
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 2009, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 3–4. 
42 ICC Statute, Part 2 (“Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law”) runs into 17 arti-
cles, from Article 5 to Article 21, see supra note 39. 
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diction of the ICC. Gender-specific crimes are mentioned in Articles 7 and 
8 dealing with crimes against humanity and war crimes. Among 11 of-
fences listed in the former and 26 crimes listed in the latter, one relates 
to:43 “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, en-
forced sterilization and any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity”.44 It also includes within its ambit “any other sexual violence 
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions regarding war 
crimes”.45 The sexual violence crimes are included under the definition of 
war crimes for both “international and non-international armed conflict”. 
Two other gender-specific crimes have been enumerated under crimes 
against humanity, that is, “persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity” on various grounds including gender,46 and the crime of en-
slavement defined as “the exercise of any power attaching to the right of 
                                                   
43 Ibid., Article 7(1)(g). 
44 “While rape had previously been included in three of five international war crime statutes, 
additional forms of sexual violence had never been explicitly defined. The statutes of the 
international tribunals for Rwanda and SFRY did not list crimes of sexual violence other 
than rape. In direct contrast, the Rome Statute specifies gender-based crimes including 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any oth-
er form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. This is an important recognition of the 
varied forms that gender-based crimes may take; their specific enumeration highlights 
them as among the most serious. With regard to war crimes the definition stems from the 
Geneva Conventions, where serious crimes are listed as ‘grave breaches’, however, rape 
and sexual violence are not included. The improvement on this position witnessed in the 
Rome Statute is that it specifically enumerates both rape and different forms of sexual vio-
lence as war crimes.” Sophie O’Connell, “Gender Based Crimes at the International Crim-
inal Court”, in Plymouth Law Review, 2010, vol. 3, pp. 69, 70. 
 “Another important difference is that the Rome Statute, unlike the Geneva Conven-
tions, does not link sexual violence to an attack on a woman’s honor. The Geneva Conven-
tions refer to rape and sexual violence in terms of ‘family honor and rights’, which is a 
characterization that has reinforced the secondary importance as well as the shame and 
stigma of victimized women. By characterizing rape and sexual violence in this way, the 
crime becomes an offence against male dignity and an attack on their property. The Rome 
Statute cites rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes in their own right, thereby 
emphasizing the serious and egregious nature of the crimes, rather than reinforcing stereo-
types of shame and honor.” See Copelon, 2001, see supra note 34; see Bedont and Mar-
tinez, 1999, p. 70, see supra note 15. 
45 ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(xxii), see supra note 39. 
46 Ibid., Article 7(1)(h). 
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ownership over a person, including in the course of trafficking in persons, 
in particular women and children”.47 
Other significant provisions of the Statute, from a feminist angle, 
relate to the composition of the Court that provides for the inclusion of 
women with special emphasis of appointing women and men with specif-
ic expertise in dealing with sexual and gender violence.48 It also incorpo-
rates provisions safeguarding the right of victims of sexual violence.49 The 
Gender and Children’s Unit was established to provide advice and assis-
tance to the OTP activities, including sexual and gender-based crimes, 
during all phases, right from the pre-analysis phase. It is worth mention-
ing that the OTP has appointed Professor Catharine MacKinnon, who is 
seen as a radical feminist, as a Special Gender Adviser.50 
Though the Rome Statute was applauded as a progressive interna-
tional instrument from the point of view of women, it is regretful that, 
there are either no charges for sexual crimes against women (as in Luban-
ga), or the charges are not comprehensive to include sexual crimes.51 
Some feminists lament that “despite the extensive provision in the Rome 
Statute, the ICC is failing to advance the prosecution of gender-based 
crimes”.52 
31.4. Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations  
A preliminary examination is a process of examining the information on 
the alleged crimes available to the OTP, in order to arrive at a fully in-
formed decision on whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation. During preliminary examinations, the main task of the 
OTP53 is to determine whether to open an investigation by analysing the 
                                                   
47 Ibid., Article 7(2)(c). 
48 Ibid., see Articles 36, 42, 43 and 44. 
49 Ibid., see Article 68. 
50 See ICC-OTP, “The ICC Prosecutor Appoints Prof. Catharine A. MacKinnon as Special 
Advisor on Gender Crimes”, 26 November 2008, ICC-OTP-20081126-PR377 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/866eda/). 
51 Lubanga Judgment, see supra note 4. 
52 For a detailed criticism of these cases, see O’Connell, 2010, see supra note 44. 
53 “The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is an independent organ of the Court. It is responsible 
for examining situations under the jurisdiction of the Court where genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes appear to have been committed, and carrying out investigations 
and prosecutions against the individuals who are allegedly most responsible for those 
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available information before it.54 The findings of the OTP are preliminary 
in nature and may be reconsidered in the light of new facts or evidence.55 
It should be recalled that the OTP does not enjoy investigative powers at 
this stage. In the conduct of its preliminary examination activities, the 
OTP seeks to contribute to its two main goals of the Rome Statute, that is, 
“ending of impunity”, and the “prevention of crimes”. 
Thus, to pass from the stage of documentation to criminal investiga-
tion one must cross the bridge of preliminary examinations which involve 
some of the hardest questions and choices facing the ICC.56 Preliminary 
examination activities also constitute one of the most cost-effective ways 
for the OTP to fulfil the ICC’s mission.57 Though, it is a moot point, 
whether preliminary examinations are mainly a gateway to investigations, 
or whether they have objectives and functions of their own, irrespective of 
ICC investigations, several scholars believe that preliminary examinations 
have a certain intrinsic value that goes beyond investigations. They argue 
that preliminary examinations could be used to facilitate choices in rela-
tion to peace and justice. It facilitates several goals, like prevention of 
atrocity crimes, shaping the agenda of peace negotiations, or serving as 
catalyst for complementarity or transitional justice. Preliminary examina-
tions could also have a certain deterrent effect due to their element of sur-
prise, their ‘watchdog function’ and the structural relationship between the 
                                                                                                                        
crimes. Like the judges of the Court, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor are elected by 
the ASP for a non-renewable mandate of nine years. The OTP is composed of three main 
Divisions: 1. the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division conducts pre-
liminary examinations, provides advice on issues of jurisdiction, admissibility and cooper-
ation, and coordinates judicial cooperation and external relations for the OTP; 2. the Inves-
tigation Division is in charge of providing investigative expertise and support, coordinating 
field deployment of staff and security plans and protection policies, and providing crime 
analysis and analysis of information and evidence; 3. the Prosecution Division prepares the 
litigation strategies and conducts prosecutions, including through written and oral submis-
sions to the judges.” The current Prosecutor is Ms. Fatou Bensouda from The Gambia 
(since 15 June 2012). Before that she served as a Deputy Prosecutor in charge of the Pros-
ecutions Division of the ICC since 2004. See ICC, “Office of Prosecutor” (available on its 
web site). 
54 ICC Statute, see Part 5 “Investigation and Prosecution”, see supra note 39. 
55 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, p. 3 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/f30a53/). 
56 Louman, “Report: Preliminary Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit: Reviewing 
Policies and Practices – Part 1”, 2015, see supra note 3. 
57 Ibid., p. 5. 
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OTP and the State concerned that is, monitoring, putting pressure, provid-
ing reward for behaviour, hence make preliminary examinations a power-
ful instrument of the ICC.58 
Be that as it may, the very purpose to conduct a preliminary exami-
nation is to decide whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an inves-
tigation. In doing so, the OTP is required to assess and verify a number of 
legal criteria as set in the Rome Statute for jurisdiction, admissibility, 
complementarity, and gravity.  
31.4.1. Initiation of Preliminary Examinations 
Where crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction appear to have been commit-
ted, preliminary examinations may be initiated by the OTP by receiving 
information from: 1. individuals; 2. group of individuals; 3. States; 4. in-
ter-governmental organizations; 5. non-governmental organizations; and 6. 
other reliable sources.59 The information to the OTP may include referrals 
from States Parties60 or the United Nations Security Council,61 or declara-
tions accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by ICC lodged by a State 
which is not a party to the Statute.62 After the authorization of the judges, 
the OTP may open an investigation on her own initiative.63 The Prosecu-
tor, however, cannot, on her own motion, initiate investigations with re-
spect to non-States Parties, unless the matter involves nationals of States 
Parties involved in the alleged crimes, on the territory of the non-State 
Party in question.  
                                                   
58 Ibid. 
59 ICC-OTP, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09, 
chap. 3, Subsection 3, Regulation 25(1)(a) (‘Regulations, 2009’) (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/a97226/). “To date, the OTP has received more that 10,000 of such communica-
tions, which can form the initial basis of the Office’s preliminary examinations”. ICC, “Of-
fice of Prosecutor”, see supra note 53. 
60 Regulations, 2009, Regulation 25(1)(b), see supra note 59; ICC Statute, Article 13(a) and 
Article 14, see supra note 39. “This was the case for the Democratic Republic of the Con-
go, Uganda, Central African Republic on two occasions, and Mali”. See ICC, “Office of 
the Prosecutor”, see supra note 53. 
61 Regulations, 2009, Regulation 25(1)(b), see supra note 59; ICC Statute, Article 13(b), see 
supra note 39. “To date, this possibility has materialized with respect to the situations of 
Darfur and Libya”, see ICC, “Office of the Prosecutor”, see supra note 53. 
62 Regulations, 2009, Regulation 25(1)(c), see supra note 59. 
63 “This was the case for Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Georgia”. ICC, “Office of the Prosecut-
or”, see supra note 53. 
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The receipt of the information, referral or a declaration by the OTP 
will not automatically lead to the opening of preliminary examinations. 
The OTP will open a preliminary examination, only on the basis of Article 
15, when the alleged crimes appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.  
31.4.2. Jurisdiction 
The first principle in conducting preliminary examinations ensures that 
the Court has jurisdiction and the case is admissible. The Prosecutor must 
ascertain if there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been committed.64 There are three jurisdic-
tional requirements65 namely, ‘temporal jurisdiction’, ‘subject-matter ju-
risdiction’, and ‘territorial or personal jurisdiction’. As per the require-
ments of ‘temporal jurisdiction’, the purported crime must have taken 
place after coming into force of the Rome Statute for the nation under 
consideration.66 Accordingly, the ICC has no jurisdiction with respect to 
events which occurred before the coming into force of the Statute on 1 
July 2002.67 If a State becomes a party to the Statute after 1 July 2002, the 
ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction retroactively, unless that State has 
made a declaration accepting retroactive ICC jurisdiction.68 However, the 
ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction with respect to events which occurred 
before 1 July 2002. For a new State Party, the Statute enters into force on 
the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the de-
posit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or 
personal jurisdiction. 
The ‘subject-matter jurisdiction’ of the Court 69  extends to the 
“crime of genocide”,70 “crimes against humanity”,71 “war crimes”72 and 
                                                   
64 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(a), see supra note 39. In accordance with Article 15(4), the Pre-
Trial Chamber must also consider whether “the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court”. Ibid., Article 15(4). 
65 Ibid., Articles 12 and 13(b). 
66 Ibid., Articles 11 and 24. 
67 Ibid., Article 11(1). 
68 Ibid., Article 11(2). 
69 Ibid., Article 5. 
70 Ibid., Article 6. 
71 Ibid., Article 7. 
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the “crime of aggression”.73 To satisfy the ‘territorial or personal jurisdic-
tion’ of the ICC, “the accused must be a national of a country that has 
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, or the crime must have taken place within 
the borders of a country that accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction”.74 A State not 
party to the Statute may decide to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC by 
lodging a declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.75 
Further, the conditions of ‘territorial or personal’ jurisdiction do not apply 
when the Security Council refers a situation to the OTP.76 
As mentioned above, the Rome Statute comprehensively deals with 
the list of sexual violence crimes that are considered “crimes against hu-
manity” and “war crimes”, including “sexual slavery”, “enforced prostitu-
tion”, “enforced sterilization” and “forced pregnancy”. Further, unlike the 
ICTR and the ICTY, which merely prohibited persecution on the basis of 
“religion, politics or race”, the ICC also prohibits persecution based on 
“gender”.77 In addition, the ICC has recognized that rape can constitute 
genocide by causing “serious bodily or mental harm” committed with the 
intent to “destroy” a particular population, thus, codifying the holding in 
Akayesu.78 
Further, the Rome Statute explicitly declares that military com-
manders and other superiors can be held responsible for the acts of the 
subordinates under their authority and control under certain circumstanc-
es.79 This is important, from a feminist perspective, as those who physi-
cally commit rape and other sexual offences are often relatively low in the 
hierarchy of command and thus fall outside the ICC’s mission to ensure 
accountability at the highest levels. Furthermore, the liability for military 
                                                                                                                        
72 Ibid., Article 8. 
73 Ibid., Article 5(2). 
74 Ibid., Article 12(2). 
75 Ibid., Article 12(3). 
76 Ibid., Article 13. 
77 Ibid., Article 7(1)(h). 
78 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Chamber I, Judgment, 2 September 1998, 
ICTR-96-4-T, see supra note 34. See also ICC Statute, Article 6(b), see supra note 39. See 
also Alexa Koenig, Ryan Lincoln and Lauren Groth, The Jurisprudence of Sexual Violence, 
Human Rights Centre, University of California, Berkeley, 2011, p. 19. 
79 ICC Statute, Article 28(a), see supra note 39. 
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chiefs also correct the patriarchal notion of recognizing sexual violence as 
a tool of warfare, encouraged directly or indirectly by leaders.  
31.4.3. Admissibility 
The second requirement, that the OTP has to satisfy in the process of pre-
liminary examinations, is regarding the principle of ‘admissibility’. As set 
out in Article 17(1) of the Statute, ‘admissibility’ requires an assessment 
of “complementarity and gravity”. Domestic jurisdictions bear the prima-
ry responsibility to investigate and prosecute the alleged offenders under 
Rome Statute. The OTP will initiate the situation for investigation only 
when the domestic authorities fail to uphold this primary responsibility 
and there is absence of genuine domestic proceedings.80 The Court’s Ap-
peals Chamber has elucidated this requirement, explaining that there is a 
twofold test to establish ‘complementarity’: “[T]he initial questions to ask 
are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2) 
whether there have been investigations in the past and the state having 
jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned”.81 If the 
answer to these two questions is in affirmative and the State under consid-
eration is unwilling or unable to prosecute the accused, then the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction.  
31.4.3.1. Complementarity 
In contradistinction to the UN’s ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and the 
ICTR, which were given primacy over domestic jurisdiction, the Rome 
Statute does not preclude States from prosecuting international crimes. 
The rationale behind this is said to be, that “the ICC’s success would not 
only be determined by the number of cases reaching the ICC, but also the 
number of effective and efficient disposals by the national courts”.82 
Since, the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be complementary to nation-
al criminal jurisdictions, this implies that domestic jurisdictions have an 
                                                   
80 Ibid., Article 17(1)(a). 
81 Katanga Judgment, see supra note 7. 
82 Mark Drumbl, “Policy through Complementarity: The Atrocity Trial as Justice”, in Carsten 
Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Comple-
mentarity: From Theory to Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. 
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important role to play in punishing atrocities within their jurisdiction,83 
and the function of the ICC is to act as a Court of last resort.84 The princi-
ple of “complementarity” is implemented by the Court through Articles 
17 and 53, which deal with the conditions for a specific case to be admis-
sible at the ICC. This principle is perceived to be the foundation of the 
Rome Statute.85  The justification of the principle seeks to balance the 
competing considerations of international justice vis-à-vis State sover-
eignty. The idea of complementarity has vastly evolved with time. Schol-
ars have identified the “big idea of complementarity”86 wherein the ICC’s 
function is primarily associated with galvanizing efforts at the domestic 
jurisdictional level.87 This big idea has the ultimate objective to incentiv-
                                                   
83 As far as India’s position is concerned, it has not signed the ICC Statute. It has, however 
enacted Geneva Convention Act, 1960, as it had ratified it in 1950. India’s legal regime to 
tackle international crimes lacks vitality. The process of pre-investigation and investigation 
for prosecution of rape and sexual offences under Indian criminal justice system differs 
from that of ICC. Under the domestic criminal justice system, though the registration of 
First Information Report (FIR) is compulsory, however, after registration, the officer in 
charge of the concerned police station is allowed to file a closure report to the Magistrate, 
if she or he feels that the evidence is deficient. However, even if the police attempt to file a 
closure report, the Magistrate may demand further investigation, after taking cognizance 
under Criminal Procedure Code. The role of prosecutor in India differs from that of the 
OTP at ICC primarily due to the reason that in India, investigation and prosecution of of-
fences are performed by different institutions. Prior to 1973, public prosecutors were at-
tached to the police department. However, after the new Code of Criminal Procedure came 
into force in 1973, the prosecution wing has been totally detached from the police depart-
ment. Fact finding, pre-investigation and investigation of offences are the prerogative of 
police. The prosecution wing in the State is headed by an officer designated as Director of 
Prosecution that is responsible for prosecution of cases in the Magisterial Courts. Further-
more, India follows common law system, whereas ICC follows predominantly civil law. 
84 ICC Statute, paragraph 10 of the Preamble, reads as follows: “Emphasizing that the Inter-
national Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction”, see supra note 39. 
85 Ben Bathos, “The Evolution of the ICC Jurisprudence on Admissibility”, in Carsten Stahn 
and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: 
From Theory to Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. 
86 Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2013. 
87 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 2011; Jann K. Kleffner, “Complementarity and Auto Referrals”, in 
Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Crimi-
nal Court, Brill, Leiden, 2009; Carsten Stahn, “Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions”, 
in Criminal Law Forum, 2008, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 87–113. 
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ize States to reciprocally adopt the Rome Statute crimes into penal provi-
sions at the domestic level, thereby catalysing the prosecution of such 
crimes at the domestic jurisdictional level.88 Then there is a “narrow idea” 
of complementarity,89 which is concerned with the jurisdictional conflict 
surrounding States and the ICC and the provision relating thereto. Article 
17 lays down the criteria for assessing the admissibility of a case to the 
ICC, namely “inaction”, “unwillingness” and “inability” on behalf of the 
State supposed to prosecute the alleged offenders. 
The first test which is undertaken to determine, by the OTP, admis-
sibility is the ‘action’ test. This test entails an assessment of the action 
undertaken by a State to investigate or prosecute a case over which the 
domestic courts have jurisdiction. Upon inaction of the State, the ‘case’ 
may be rendered admissible to the ICC. Over the years, the ICC has ap-
plied the ‘same-person, same-conduct’ rule in construing the definition of 
‘case’, which includes proceedings against the same person with whom 
the OTP is concerned and for the ‘same conduct’ the OTP is charging. The 
ICC, however, has confirmed through cases that the State is not mandated 
to investigate or prosecute the perpetrator in relation to any specific inter-
national crimes so long as a contemporaneous provision governing the 
‘same conduct’ is existent in the domestic penal code.90 Even if the ‘ac-
tion’ test is satisfied, the case may still be inadmissible to the ICC if it 
does not fulfil the ‘unwilling or unable’ test. This test requires that the 
cases must be proceeded with genuinely, with the ‘willingness’ coupled 
with the ‘ability’ of the State. Since these tests are disjunctive, therefore 
either test needs to be satisfied to attract admissibility of the case con-
cerned. Further guidance is available in the Statute in so far as the con-
struction of ‘unwillingness’ is concerned, including whether the national 
proceedings are being machinated to protect the perpetrator from liability, 
or whether the proceedings have been deliberately protracted to prejudice 
                                                   
88 Frédéric Mégret, “Too Much of a Good Thing? ICC Implementation and the Uses of Com-
plementarity”, in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Crim-
inal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011. 
89 See Stahn, 2008, see supra note 87; Nouwen, 2013, see supra note 86. 
90 Louise Chappell, Rosemary Grey and Emily Waller, “The Gender Justice Shadow of Com-
plementarity: Lessons from the International Criminal Court’s Preliminary Examinations 
in Guinea and Colombia”, in International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2013, vol. 7, no. 
3, p. 460. 
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the case, or whether independence or impartiality is severely wanting 
within the proceedings.91 The definition of ‘unwillingness’ is not exhaus-
tive,92 which advances the likelihood of alternative constructions of ‘un-
willingness’, while not precluding an interpretation which is ‘gendered’. 
If there is a substantial degradation in the judicial system or if the 
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence or testimo-
ny, then the same would attract the ‘inability’ test.93 This test may refer to 
considerations which are completely pragmatic, such as “a lack of judicial 
personnel, an insecure environment or a lack of essential cooperation by 
other states”, or legal factors, including “amnesty or immunity laws, the 
lack of the necessary extradition treaties, or the absence of jurisdiction 
under domestic law”.94 
At the stage of preliminary examinations, the OTP is first confront-
ed with the application of these tests to the information collected, that 
may help to assess if there is a “reasonable basis” to open an investigation 
after considering the principle of complementarity. Preliminary examina-
tions such as the ones in Guinea and Colombia offer a lot of insight into 
the application of these tests. During this stage, the OTP has made it clear 
that while its primary objective may be to make this assessment, it also 
considers this stage as an opportunity wherein domestic authorities can be 
incentivized and persuaded to investigate and prosecute perpetrators do-
mestically.95 
31.4.3.1.1. Feminist Shadow of Complementarity 
From a feminist perspective, the principle of ‘complementarity’ provides a 
strict limitation on the fulfilment of the goal of the ICC to end impunity to 
sexual crimes. The provisions in the Rome Statute relating to complemen-
tarity have been found to have no nexus with feminist principles. Given 
the protection of victims and appointment of Court personnel, this ab-
                                                   
91 ICC Statute, Article 17(2), see supra note 39. 
92 Chappell, Grey and Waller, 2013, see supra note 90. 
93 ICC Statute, Article 17(3), see supra note 39. 
94 Sarah M.H. Nouwen, “Fine-tuning Complementarity”, in Bartram S. Brown (ed.), Re-
search Handbook on International Criminal Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011, p. 214. 
95 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2 November 2013 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
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sence of a link is baffling.96 The OTP’s initial inquiry to assess State’s 
willingness and ability to prosecute sexual crimes should include an ex-
amination of gender biases against women in domestic legal systems. The 
case of Kosovo is in hand, where its judicial system failed to investigate 
and prosecute sexual violence crimes, despite extensive documentation by 
women’s groups, nongovernmental organizations and NATO of rape and 
other crimes of sexual violence committed on a large scale during the 
conflict in Kosovo.97 
The critics have analysed the preliminary examinations in Guinea 
and Colombia to argue that the OTP’s apparent inattention to gender bias-
es underpinning domestic legal systems has left impunity for perpetrators 
of sexual violence intact and the victims of these crimes unrecognized.98 
The ‘action’ test using the ‘same person same conduct’ rule pre-
cludes any opportunity to address gender biases in domestic jurisdiction. 
For example, if there were a situation where mass rape would have been 
inflicted on several sections of the women population, it would not be 
necessary for States to reflect the Rome Statute crimes into their domestic 
penal code. All that would be necessary to see would be whether the same 
conduct could be brought under the umbrella of the domestic penal code. 
Thus, if an individual concerned were to be prosecuted, all that this test 
would require is to ascertain if the State can prosecute the said individual 
under a domestic penal provision, albeit the said domestic provision may 
not necessarily rectify the patriarchal connection between sexual violence 
against women and armed conflict which is considered to be inherent in a 
war crime or armed conflict. 
31.4.3.2. Gravity 
The second criterion, that the OTP has to apply in ‘admissibility’ while 
conducting Preliminary Examinations, is whether the case is of “sufficient 
gravity” to justify the ICC’s involvement.99 The ‘gravity’ of the offence is 
measured both in terms of ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’. For instance, the quan-
titative scale of ‘gravity’ can be established by a huge number of victims 
                                                   
96 Chappell, Grey and Waller, 2013, see supra note 90. 
97 Amnesty International, Kosovo (Serbia): The Challenge to Fix a Failed UN Justice Miss-
ion, 2008, pp. 23 and 63 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0dccb4/). 
98 Chappell Grey and Waller, 2013, see supra note 90. 
99 ICC Statute, Article 17(1), see supra note 39. 
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of war crimes. However, it is not just the number of victims that matters, 
but the existence of aggravating or qualitative factors attached to the 
commission of crime that make it a grave crime.100 Various factors that 
can be used to consider whether a crime is sufficiently grave from a quali-
tative perspective include the geographical and temporal intensity of the 
alleged crimes, the nature of the alleged crimes, manner of committing the 
crimes, and the impact on victims and their families.101 Before initiating 
the investigation, the OTP considers the seriousness of the crimes includ-
ing sexual and gender-based crimes; the factual context and the groups 
and individuals that appear most responsible for those crimes. 
31.4.3.2.1. The Patriarchal Mindset of the OTP 
The patriarchal mindset of the OTP had considered rape and other forms 
of sexual violence less serious than crimes resulting in death. History is a 
witness to the fact, that there is an almost inevitable tendency for treating 
rape and sexual violence against women to be treated of secondary im-
portance.102 For centuries, the rape and sexual abuse of women associated 
with the enemy were considered an inevitable by-product of war and thus 
dismissed as a natural consequence of war.103 Where gender violence was 
condemned, humanitarian law, which primarily reflected the male experi-
ence with armed conflict, conceptualized such conduct as an offense 
against a woman’s dignity or a family’s honour.104 Women were consid-
ered the property of men, and accordingly, rape was condemned as a 
property crime and a crime against dignity and honour, not a crime of 
violence. 105  Such classifications reinforced traditional stereotypes that 
rape was solely a woman’s crime, masked the violent nature of rape, and 
                                                   
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Copelon, 2001, pp. 217, 220, see supra note 34. 
103 See Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will, Men, Women and Rape, Ballantine Books,  
1975, p. 2. 
104 See Beth Van Schaack, “Obstacle on the Road to Gender Justice: The International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda as Object Lesson”, in American University Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy & the Law, 2009, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 364. 
105 Ibid. 
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perpetuated the view that rape was a secondary crime in relation to other 
offences.106 
The decisions not to charge perpetrators with the full range of 
crimes available for acts of sexual and gender-based violence, despite 
sufficient evidence, runs the risk of marginalizing and systematically ex-
cluding such charges as too difficult to prove or non-essential.107 Post-
World War II trials failed to charge a single defendant with sex crimes 
despite abundant evidence that such crimes had occurred.108 The trial be-
fore the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, though 
included some prosecutions for sexual violence, the crimes were not ap-
propriately labelled, but rather prosecuted under such euphemistic rubrics 
as “inhumane treatment” and “failure to respect family honour and 
rights”.109 Before the 1990s, gender crimes were largely invisible or trivi-
alised. 110  In the early 1990s, when international criminal prosecutions 
were resumed, there was again initial resistance to investigation and pros-
ecution of sex crimes. Investigators of the ICTY and the ICTR were in-
structed to consider sex crimes as less serious than crimes involving kill-
ing, that should not be pursued.111 Defence counsel questioned the appro-
priateness of international jurisdiction over sex crimes, contending that 
they are insufficiently serious.112 
Scholars have examined primary philosophical bases advanced for 
international prosecutions – retribution, deterrence, expressivism, and 
                                                   
106 See Catherine N. Niarchos, “Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the International 
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109 Ibid. 
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111 See Peggy Kuo, “Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International Tribunal”, in 
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restorative justice – to determine how they inform decisions whether to 
give priority to sex crime prosecutions and argue that ‘retribution’ and 
‘deterrence’ support such selections at least some of the time, and ‘expres-
sivist’ and ‘restorative justice’ provide an even stronger foundation for 
giving priority to sex crimes.113 
31.4.3.2.2. Feminist Advocacy 
Feminist scholars have worked hard to change such attitudes, urging that 
sex crimes should be selected for prosecution even at the expense of pros-
ecuting other serious crimes, including crimes resulting in death. As a 
result of feminist advocacy work, there is now widespread agreement that 
international criminal courts should give higher priority on prosecuting 
sex crimes than they have in the past. This agreement is manifested in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC and in policy statements of the OTP. Unlike prior 
international court statutes, the Rome Statute mandates that in exercising 
the Prosecutor’s duties, he or she must consider “the nature of the crime, 
in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence or vio-
lence against children”. The Statute further requires that hiring decisions 
at the court take into account the need to include personnel with expertise 
in sexual and gender violence.114 Moreover, as a policy matter, the OTP 
has pledged that in selecting cases it will pay particular attention to sexual 
and gender-based crimes. Other international prosecutors have also begun 
to emphasise the particular need to prosecute sex crimes. In 2010, a num-
ber of current and former international prosecutors issued a declaration 
urging States to ensure the appropriate investigation and prosecution of 
gender crimes.115 
Despite all these efforts, the impetus to address sexual and gender-
based violence envisioned in the Rome Statute does not appear to have 
completely transferred to the practice of the ICC. The historical tendency 
of international criminal tribunals to treat rape and sexual violence as sec-
ondary crimes has led to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s recent mis-
application of “cumulative charging practices” in Prosecutor v. Jean-
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114 Ibid., p. 518. 
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Pierre Bemba Gombo (‘Bemba’).116 This decision reflects the failure of 
the ICC to recognize the distinctive nature of rape versus other crimes and 
leads to discriminatory and marginalizing treatment of sexual and gender-
based violence victims.117 
31.4.4. Interests of Justice 
The criteria of “interests of justice” is considered by the OTP during pre-
liminary examinations, only where the requirements of ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘admissibility’ are fulfilled. While the requirements for ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘admissibility’ are positive requirements, the “interests of justice” is a 
negative requirement that may furnish a reason for not proceeding fur-
ther.118 As such, the OTP is not required to establish that an investigation 
serves the “interests of justice”. On the other hand, the OTP will have to 
prove that, having fulfilled the ‘jurisdiction and admissibility’ criteria, it 
still must be in the “interests of justice” to initiate an investigation. 
It deals with those circumstances in which a situation otherwise 
qualified for initiation for investigation by the OTP is not pursued on the 
ground that the investigation would not serve the “interests of justice”.119 
The issue of the “interests of justice”, as it appears in Article 53 of 
the Rome Statute, represents one of the most complex aspects of the Stat-
ute.120 However, it is safe to state that the concept of “interests of justice” 
                                                   
116 ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
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cannot be referred to include issues relating to international peace and 
security, as Article 16 of the Rome Statute recognizes a specific role for 
the United Nations Security Council in matters affecting international 
peace and security. The OTP Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice clari-
fies that “in particular, the ‘interests of justice’ provision should not be 
considered a conflict management tool requiring the Prosecutor to assume 
the role of a mediator in political negotiations: such an outcome would 
run contrary to the explicit judicial functions of the Office and the Court 
as a whole. In terms of whether effective investigations are operationally 
feasible, the Office notes that feasibility is not a separate factor under the 
Statute when determining whether to open an investigation. Weighing 
feasibility as a separate self-standing factor, moreover, could prejudice the 
consistent application of the Statute and might encourage obstructionism 
to dissuade the ICC from intervention”.121 
The Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice tries to explain the un-
derstanding of this concept by stating that the criteria for the “interests of 
justice” is determined by taking into consideration circumstances such as 
gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims, the age or infirmity of the 
accused, and his or her role in the alleged crimes.122 It cautions, however, 
that it is possible, that an individual deemed by the OTP to be most re-
sponsible person for the alleged crimes may not be prosecuted in the “in-
terests of justice”. The rationale of this principle seeks to command re-
spect for the ICC in considering the interests of alleged accused. For ex-
ample, international justice may not be served by the prosecution of a 
terminally ill defendant or a suspect who has been the subject of abuse 
amounting to serious human rights violations, as is the practice in many 
national legal systems.123 The OTP Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 
emphasizes that the “exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 
53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) is exceptional in its nature and there is a presump-
tion in favour of investigation or prosecution”.124 Similarly, the OTP Poli-
cy Paper on Preliminary Examinations clarifies that the decision not to 
proceed on the grounds of the interests of justice would be highly excep-
tional. It emphasizes that considering the mandate of the OTP and the 
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122 Ibid., p. 6. 
123 Ibid., p. 7. 
124 Ibid., p. 1. 
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object and purpose of the Statute, “there is a strong presumption that in-
vestigations and prosecutions will be in the interests of justice, wherever 
the criteria established in Article 53(1)(a) and (b) or Article 53(2)(a) and 
(b) have been met”.125 
31.4.5. The Lack of Concrete Time Frame 
The Rome Statute as well as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not 
prescribe any definitive time period126 during which the preliminary ex-
amination has to be completed by OTP. The time and length for conduct-
ing preliminary examination is entirely left on the facts and circumstances 
of different situations before the OTP. The Prosecutor is obliged to con-
tinue with the examination until such time as the information shows that 
there is, or is not, a reasonable basis for an investigation. An examination 
of various situations reveals that there is absolutely no principle for regu-
lating the duration of preliminary examinations with the result that in 
some situations, it took many years to initiate the investigation by the OTP. 
In the case of exercising proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, the dura-
tion of a preliminary examination is even longer, for instance, in the case 
of Colombia, the lack of progress in the situation referred to the OTP was 
challenged by the Central African Republic in 2005 before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. The Chamber said127 that the “preliminary examination of a 
situation must be completed within a reasonable time from the reception 
of a referral by a State Party, and requested the Prosecutor to submit a 
report on the status of the preliminary examination, including an estimate 
of when the preliminary examination will be concluded”. The OTP react-
ed by challenging the authority of the Pre-Trial Chamber to request this 
information, arguing that “the Pre-Trial Chamber is, under Art. 53(3), 
entitled only to review a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed with an 
investigation […]”.128 The OTP submitted the requested report, but ex-
                                                   
125 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, p. 17, see supra note 95. 
126 Ibid., p. 3. 
127 See ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Decision Re-
questing Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the 
Central African Republic, 30 November 2006, ICC-01/05-6 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/76e607/). 
128 See ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Prosecution’s 
Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting In-
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pressly reserved its interpretation of Article 53(1) and the prerogatives of 
the Prosecutor in this respect that is, saying that “it is hoped that a deci-
sion can be made in the near future”.129 
From a feminist angle, a wide discretion with the OTP whether to 
initiate investigation, or continues to assess relevant national proceedings, 
or to gather more information to establish a sufficient basis for a decision 
on further steps without any timeline results in slow justice for victims of 
sexual crimes and this way justice delayed results in justice denied for the 
victims of sexual violence. 
31.5. OTP Policy Papers  
This section will briefly summarize the Policy Paper on Preliminary Ex-
aminations and the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes 
before analysing their feminist dimensions. 
31.5.1. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013 
With the objective of ensuring transparency and objectivity in applying 
the legal criteria to assess whether a situation warrants investigation, the 
OTP released, in November, 2013, the Policy Paper on Preliminary Exam-
inations, dealing with various aspects of policy and practice in the conduct 
of preliminary examinations.130 It describes various principles, factors and 
procedures applied by the OTP in the conduct of its preliminary examina-
tions. It draws special attention to the two overarching goals of Rome 
Statute that is, ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine national pro-
ceedings, and the prevention of crimes. 131  Thus, while describing the 
Rome Statute System, it highlights the primary responsibility of national 
jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute the crimes listed in the Rome 
                                                                                                                        
formation on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central Af-
rican Republic, 15 December 2006, ICC-01/05-7 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1dd66a/). 
129 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Stat-
ute, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 659, at pp. 667–68. 
130 ICC, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, p. 5, see supra note 95. “The paper 
is based on the Rome Statute (“Statute”), the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”), 
the Regulations of the Court (“RoC”), the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, the 
Office’s prosecutorial strategy and policy documents, and its experience over the first 
years of its activities.” 
131 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Statute.132 The Policy Paper outlines the General Principles of “independ-
ence”, “impartiality” and “objectivity” to be applied by the OTP while 
conducting the preliminary examination on the basis of available facts and 
information.133 The legal framework and various statutory factors, as pre-
scribed in Article 53(1), that are applied by OTP at the stage of prelimi-
nary examination to determine reasonable basis to proceed with an inves-
tigation are also examined in the Policy Paper. While examining the ob-
stacles of jurisdiction, admissibility and interests of justice, to reach in-
vestigation, it clarifies that these factors, are applied to all situations, irre-
spective of whether the preliminary examination was initiated on the basis 
of information received by a referral, or by a declaration lodged pursuant 
to Article 12(3),134 or on the basis of information obtained pursuant to 
Article 15.135 The Policy Paper further makes it clear that there are no 
other statutory criteria for conducting the preliminary examinations by 
OTP. It particularly emphasizes, that factors like geographical or regional 
balance are not statutory criteria for determining investigated by the 
ICC.136  The Policy Paper very nicely described the ‘phased approach’ 
followed by the OTP while conducting the preliminary examinations. It 
details four phases of filtering process to distinguish those situations that 
warrant investigation from those that do not require any investigation. It 
acknowledges that no timelines are provided in the Statute for bringing a 
preliminary examination to a close. Huge discretion is invested with OTP 
to initiate an investigation or to continue to collect information on crimes 
and relevant national proceedings in order to establish a sufficient factual 
and legal basis to render a determination.137 One of the laudable objec-
tives of the Policy Paper is to promote transparency of the preliminary 
examination process, for which the OTP will provide public information 
on reasoned decisions either to proceed or not to proceed with investiga-
                                                   
132 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 
133 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
134 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 
135 Ibid., p. 3. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., p. 21. 
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tions, and will issue regular reports on its activities including annual re-
ports on its preliminary examination activities.138 
31.5.2. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 2014  
The OTP faced a considerable “gendered criticism”,139 in March 2014, 
when it failed to secure conviction at the ICC against Germain Katanga140 
for rape and other sexual violence as crimes against humanity and as war 
crimes.141 Taking serious cognizance of this criticism, three months there-
after, in June 2014, OTP released the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, affirming its commitment to the prosecution of sexual and 
gender-based crimes.142 The Policy Paper declares that the issue of sexual 
and gender-based crimes, is recognized in its Strategic Plan 2012-2015, as 
one of its key strategic goals. It expresses its commitment to integrate a 
gender perspective and analysis into all of its work, right from preliminary 
examinations to investigation and from investigation to prosecution of 
these crimes. The Policy Paper also promises gender sensitive training for 
its staff, a victim-centric approach for victims, witnesses, families and 
communities.143 
One of the sections144 of the Policy Paper exclusively devoted to 
preliminary examinations emphasizes that, at the stage of analysing in-
formation, OTP will examine the general context within which the alleged 
sexual and gender-based crimes have been committed within its jurisdic-
                                                   
138 Ibid., p. 22. 
139 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, “Statement: Appeals Withdrawn by Prosecution 
and Defence: The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga”, 26 June 2014 (available on its web 
site). 
140 Katanga Judgment, see supra note 7. See also ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case Information Sheet, 20 March 
2018, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-03-014/18_Eng (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7649d0/). 
141 Katanga was convicted by a majority of the Trial Chamber as an accessory to the war 
crimes of directing an attack against a civilian population, pillaging, and destruction of 
property, as well as murder as a war crime and a crime against humanity, however the 
Chamber unanimously acquitted Katanga as an accessory to rape and sexual slavery as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
142 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7ede6c/). 
143 Ibid., p. 5. 
144 Ibid., sect. IV running into paras. 38–47. 
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tion.145 Since the principle of “admissibility”, consisting of “complemen-
tarity” and “gravity”, is an important criteria to be considered by OTP to 
reach a determination whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an 
investigation, the Policy Paper explains that where sexual and gender-
based crimes have been identified, the OTP will seek to encourage genu-
ine national investigations and prosecutions by the State. In this context, it 
will pay special attention to the discriminatory attitudes and gender ste-
reotypes in domestic substantive law as well as procedural law. It also 
depicts its commitment, while examining the absence of genuine national 
proceedings by seriously taking into consideration the “lack of political 
will which may be reflected in official attitudes of trivialization or denial 
of these crimes, and the deliberate focus of national proceedings on low-
level perpetrators, despite evidence against those who may bear greater 
responsibility”.146 
As explained earlier, one of the criteria of “admissibility” determi-
nation relates to the “sufficient gravity” of crimes to justify initiation of 
investigation. In assessing the “gravity” of the crimes, factors such as 
scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact are considered. It is 
heartening to mention that the Policy Paper recognizes that sexual and 
gender-based crimes are amongst the gravest under the Statute and the 
OTP will pay due attention to the multi-faced character of such crimes 
including the impact of such crimes, in assessing the gravity of these 
crimes.147 
31.5.3. Feminist Dimensions of the Policy Papers 
The OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, 2013, while describ-
ing the relevant Rome Statute principles, factors and procedures applied 
by the OTP in its conduct during preliminary examination is completely 
silent on the feminist sensitivity that is required to handle the sexual of-
fences against women resulting in poor execution by the OTP in dealing 
with such offences. The overarching principles, regulating the preliminary 
examination process, talking about independence, impartiality and objec-
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tivity, do not include ‘gender feminist sensitivity’ with which sexual 
crimes against women need to be analysed to improve its quality control.  
The Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes appears to 
respond, fairly, to the criticism raised by feminist scholars and NGOs on 
the acquittal of Germain Katanga of rape and sexual slavery. It depicts the 
broad commitment of OTP for gender-conscious analysis of crime by 
outlining relevant policies and providing victims with safety and support 
measures.148 
While the OTP released the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes in 2014, the interaction between the complementarity pro-
visions in the Rome Statute and gender biases is in a fairly grey area. Thus, 
there is plenty of scope and opportunity for the OTP to determine the level 
of gender discrimination against women in a domestic legal system while 
it applies the complementarity tests at the stage of preliminary examina-
tions. 
It is interesting to note that the 2014 Policy Paper begins with the 
definition of certain key terms such as ‘gender’, 149  ‘gender-based 
crimes’,150 ‘gender perspective’151 and ‘gender analysis’.152 However, the 
definitions only manifest the gendered understanding of the OTP in this 
                                                   
148 “The Office of The Prosecutor of the ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender Based 
Crimes”, in Harvard Law Review, 2014, vol. 128, no. 2, p. 797. 
149 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, 2014, p. 2, see supra note 
142. ““Gender”, in accordance with Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute, refers to males and 
females, within the context of society. This definition acknowledges the social construction 
of gender, and the accompanying roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes assigned to 
women and men, and to girls and boys.” 
150 Ibid. ““Gender-based crimes” are those committed against persons, whether male or fe-
male, because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles. Gender-based crimes 
are not always manifested as a form of sexual violence. They may include non-sexual at-
tacks on women and girls, and men and boys, because of their gender.” 
151 Ibid. ““Gender perspective” requires an understanding of differences in status, power, roles, 
and needs between males and females, and the impact of gender on people’s opportunities 
and interactions. This will enable the Office to gain a better understanding of the crimes, as 
well as the experiences of individuals and communities in a particular society.” 
152 Ibid. ““Gender analysis” examines the underlying differences and inequalities between 
women and men, and girls and boys, and the power relationships and other dynamics 
which determine and shape gender roles in a society, and give rise to assumptions and ste-
reotypes. In the context of the work of the Office, this involves a consideration of whether, 
and in what ways, crimes, including sexual and gender-based crimes, are related to gender 
norms and inequalities.” 
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Policy Paper which lacks feminist sensitivity. The Policy Paper simply 
acknowledges the differences in status, power, roles, needs between men 
and women to better understand the experiences of victims, families and 
communities, but do not challenge these differences. The principles of the 
text of this Policy Paper are based on ‘gender’ perspective and lacks the 
‘feminist’ perspective. 
While the success of both Policy Papers remains to be seen and will 
certainly depend on the extent to which the OTP is able to implement 
these policies, the Paper’s endeavours that address the structural and soci-
etal aspects of its prosecutions may be significant in terms of ‘gender’ 
perspective, but certainly lacks the focused feminist angle. 
Thus, it is important to juxtapose the Policy Papers of 2013 and 
2014 to feminist issues to determine the true policy objective of the OTP 
against sexual crimes at the stage of preliminary examinations. This has to 
be viewed in light of the lack of timelines that are established as well as 
the complementarity principle which enables or disables international 
prosecution of the sexual crimes.  
31.6. Current Status of Preliminary Examinations vis-à-vis Sexual 
Offences 
This section briefly deals with the status of preliminary examinations fo-
cusing on rape and other sexual offences under the alleged ‘war crimes’ or 
‘crimes against humanity’. As on 31 May 2017, the OTP has made public 
its preliminary examination of 23 situations. While three situations 153 
have been closed with decision not to investigate; ten situations have been 
completed with decision to investigate154  and in another ten situations 
preliminary examinations are still ongoing.155 
                                                   
153 Honduras, Republic of Korea, Venezuela, see ICC, “Preliminary Examinations” (available 
on the Court’s web site). 
154 Central African Republic, Central African Republic II, Côte d’lvoire, Darfur, Sudan, Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Uganda, ibid. 
155 Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq/UK, Nigeria, Palestine, Registered 
Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Ukraine, ibid. 
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31.6.1. Ongoing Preliminary Examinations 
During the conduct of preliminary examinations, the OTP examines vari-
ous situations in three phases.156 In Phase 1, OTP analyses the seriousness 
of the information received and eliminates that information on offences 
that are outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. In Phase 2, it officially starts the 
examination to assess the pre-conditions to the subject matter of the ICC 
over the alleged crimes as required under Article 12 of Rome Statute. 
Phase 3 assesses the ‘admissibility’ criteria in terms of ‘complementarity’ 
and ‘gravity’. Five of the situations are in the second phase; four are in the 
last stage of preliminary examinations while one situation, previously 
dismissed, is now under consideration.157 
Among ongoing preliminary examinations, the communications on 
alleged crimes of rape and other forms of sexual violence are received by 
OTP, for the situations in Burundi, Ukraine, Colombia, Guinea and Nige-
ria. In the situation of Burundi, where political crisis between ruling party 
and opponents began with the announcement on 25 April, 2015, of Mr. 
Pierre for a third presidential term, the OHCHR found 18 cases of sexual 
violence against women allegedly committed by the security forces, in the 
areas perceived as supportive of the opposition. The women who fled the 
country were sexually abused during their flight by armed men and border 
guards. Many women related to men perceived as political dissidents, 
became the targets of sexual violence including sexual mutilation, by the 
security forces, border guards and unidentified armed men.158 The situa-
tion in Ukraine that has been under preliminary examination since April 
2014, the gender sensitivity of OTP is reflected in acknowledging the 
underreporting of sexual crimes against women due to the social and cul-
tural stigma.159 In the situation of Colombia that has long been experienc-
ing an armed conflict, between government forces and rebel armed groups, 
the preliminary examination is in Phase 3. In the on-going ‘admissibility’ 
analysis, the OTP has observed that the national criminal proceedings 
relating to sexual and gender-based crimes are little and only one convic-
                                                   
156 See ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, pp. 4–5, see supra note 
55. 
157 Ibid., parts II–IV. 
158 Ibid., p. 11. 
159 Ibid., p. 40. 
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tion of a low-level army member has been rendered.160 In the situation in 
Guinea, that witnessed widespread and systematic attacks by the ruling 
power against civilian population, the OTP has concluded that the infor-
mation available provides a reasonable basis to believe that the crimes of 
rape and sexual violence including sexual mutilations and sexual slavery 
were committed in the national stadium where people had gathered to 
celebrate the Independence day of Guinea on 28 September, 2009 and its 
aftermath.161 Though, the OTP is hopeful that Guinean authorities will set 
the stage of trial soon, to provide justice to the victims, however, no spe-
cific mention of sexual violence has been made in its report. A critical 
analysis of the gender biases in domestic legal system of Guinea and Co-
lombia has already been made in Section 31.4. of this chapter. 
Further, though, in pursuance to its Policy Paper on Sexual and 
Gender Based Crimes, the OTP has conducted analysis of rapes, sexual 
slavery and other sexual offences in the situation of Nigeria, but, sadly, 
the result of such analysis, has been missing in its report on preliminary 
examinations.162 
31.6.2. Completed with Decision to Investigate 
Coming to the situations that have been completed by the OTP, with the 
decision to investigate, in the situation in Central African Republic II, in 
opening the investigation in September 2014, the OTP stated that the in-
formation available furnished a reasonable basis to believe that ‘war 
crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ including rape have been commit-
ted. In the post-election violence in Kenya, noting the gravity and scale of 
violence, the OTP stated that over 900 acts of rape and sexual violence, 
several acts of gang rape forcing family members to watch, genital mutila-
tion have been committed. Similarly, in the situations of Côte d’Ivoire,163 
Democratic Republic of Congo,164 Mali165 and Uganda,166 the OTP, in-
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161 Ibid., pp. 60, 61. 
162 Ibid., p. 65. 
163 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11. 
164 ICC, Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04. 
165 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, ICC-01/12. 
166 ICC, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04. 
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cluded rape, sexual slavery, genital mutilation and so on under the alleged 
‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. 
31.6.3. Closed with Decision Not to Investigate 
As stated above, three situations have been closed by OTP with the deci-
sion not to investigate. Out of those three situations, the situation in Hon-
duras is quite relevant. In 2010, the OTP announced preliminary examina-
tion in the situation of Honduras after having received communications on 
the crimes committed following the 2009 coup and during post-2010 elec-
tion period,167 till 2014.168 In March 2009, when José Manuel Zelaya, the 
elected President of Honduras adopted a controversial decree, it was heav-
ily criticized as beyond constitutional limits by opposition as well as na-
tional authorities. In June 2009, when Zelaya was arrested following an 
arrest warrant issued by the Supreme Court of Justice, the National Con-
gress passed a resolution removing Zelaya from Presidency and appoint-
ing Roberto Micheletti Baín, as President of Honduras. In July 2009, a 
‘crisis room’ was established on the premises of the presidential palace for 
coordinating police and military operations and many times curfews were 
imposed through executive decrees, which were denounced by the inter-
national community as an illegal coup d’état. In opposition to this coup 
frequent demonstrations were held by the supporters of former President, 
which were met with resistance and violence by State security forces.  
Since there was no armed conflict in this situation, the legal analy-
sis of subject matter of OTP focused on alleged ‘crimes against humanity’ 
including rape and other acts of sexual violence. In the course of explor-
ing contextual elements of ‘crimes against humanity’, the OTP noted that 
the chapeau of Article 7(1) of Rome Statute prescribes that “for the pur-
pose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” Article 
7(2)(a) stipulates that “‘attack directed against any civilian population’ 
means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack” 
                                                   
167 ICC-OTP, Situations in Honduras: Article 5 Report, October 2015, p. 14 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/54755a/). 
168 Ibid., p. 5. 
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(emphasis added). In the situation of Honduras, the OTP found that 
though it may be said that the de facto regime has formed a plan to take 
over power and assume control over the country, it cannot be said, that the 
design of the plan contained a policy to attack the civilian population in a 
systematic manner, hence the information available does not provide a 
reasonable basis to believe that acts were committed as part of an attack 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State policy to commit such attack, and 
therefore these acts do not constitute crimes against humanity within the 
scope of Article 7 of the Statute. The OTP further noted that there was no 
evidence that the alleged attacks were either widespread or systematic; the 
scale of victims of alleged crimes was relatively small.169 The alleged 
crimes were not committed in the context of an attack that can be consid-
ered to be “massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable 
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims”.170 It also noted 
that though, violence in Honduras escalated sharply following the 2009 
coup, but it was also a result of the proliferation of drug trafficking and 
organized crimes, the massive growth of weapons, and the armed forces’ 
involvement in matters of citizen security.171 
31.7. Conclusion 
In the context of the preliminary examination of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence against women, the quality control in the assessment and 
admissibility of such offences involve many challenges peculiar to these 
crimes. After the adoption of the Rome Statute, many envisioned the ICC 
as almost ‘feminist’ due to its statutory emphasis on ‘gender’. Now, al-
most 20 years later, it is time to consider whether this has been proved 
right.172 This chapter has revealed that the Rome Statute in recognizing 
sexual and gender-based crimes, as acts of ‘crimes against humanity’ as 
well as ‘war crimes’, incorporates and integrates ‘gender’ perspective 
with ‘feminist’ perspective. The OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Exami-
nations of 2013, while describing the relevant Rome Statute principles, 
factors and procedures applied by the OTP in its conduct during prelimi-
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23)”. Ibid., p. 7. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., p. 8. 
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nary examination, is completely silent on the feminist sensitivity that is 
required to handle the sexual offences against women resulting in poor 
quality in dealing with such offences. The overarching principles, regulat-
ing the preliminary examination process, independence, impartiality and 
objectivity, do not include ‘gender feminist sensitivity’ with which sexual 
crimes against women need to be analysed to improve its quality control.  
The chapter explains that the proper processing and analyses of 
facts, communication and situations of the rape and other forms of sexual 
violence require a feminist approach to enhance quality control, while 
conducting a thorough evaluation of the reliability of the sources and the 
credibility of the information received, to determine whether there is a 
reasonable basis to initiate investigation. The information received and 
collected on sexual offences against women should be, legally and factu-
ally, analysed from the point of view of women’s norms and experience to 
bring in it better quality control.  
Gender-based crimes may be sexual or non-sexual crimes and sexu-
al crimes may be committed against women as well as against men. This 
chapter argues that for higher quality control in prosecution and investiga-
tion of rape and other forms of sexual crimes, such offences cannot be 
lumped into one category using ‘gender’ without a ‘feminist’ perspective. 
Thus, to augment quality control, in dealing with such situations, it is per-
tinent to understand their different experiences, especially at the stage of 
preliminary examination, when the OTP decides whether to proceed a 
with full investigation. 
However, it is heartening to note that in the wake of heavy criticism 
of Katanga, the OTP came out with the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gen-
der-Based Crimes, however, this Policy Paper is also based on ‘gender’ 
perspective and lacks the ‘feminist’ perspective. This chapter stresses that 
the ‘gender’ analysis considers and explains discrimination and differ-
ences in male and female behaviour but does not challenge existing social, 
economic, political or cultural inequalities. A ‘feminist’ analysis on the 
other hand challenges the inequalities and the power dynamics that pro-
duce them. In the context of preliminary examination of rape and other 
forms of sexual offences, the gender analysis, for instance, may take into 
account under-reporting or non-reporting of such crimes and the stigma 
attached to the victims, but the feminist analysis, will question as to why 
there is under reporting or non-reporting of sexual crimes against women. 
Similarly, a feminist perspective and analysis in preliminary examination 
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confronts the stigma attached to the female victims of sexual crimes; the 
social, cultural and religious norms that govern the gender roles of men 
and women in society. To prove rape, the emphasis on lack of consent on 
the part of victim may be shifted to the lack of coercion on the part of 
perpetrator. Thus, the Policy Paper of June 2014 incorporates gender 
analysis without ‘feminist’ perspective in considering lack of readily 
available evidence; lack of forensic or other documentary evidence; and 
inadequate or limited support services at national level in such cases. A 
feminist perspective will surely improve the quality control in preliminary 
examination to help the OTP office to assess the gravity of the offence 
qualitatively and quantitatively and the interests of victims. The poor 
quality in preliminary examination of rape and the sexual offences direct-
ly affects the legitimate expectations of justice, particularly from the point 
of view of victims. Further the ‘feminist’ argument would make the deci-
sion of OTP not to proceed on the grounds of “interests of justice” highly 
improbable, further enriching the quality control in preliminary examina-
tion of such cases. 
High hopes are being raised from the current female Chief Prosecu-
tor, Fatou Bensouda,173 who believes that such crimes should no longer be 
accepted as inevitable consequences of war and conflict. Her commitment 
in seriously dealing with these crimes is manifested in her efforts in re-
leasing the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes in 2014 and 
elevating these crimes in the strategic goals. 174  Despite a progressive 
Chief Prosecutor, however, the ICC record with respect to the investiga-
tion of sexual violence and gender-based crimes has not been encouraging 
in the last few years. The conviction in Bemba in July 2016 for sexual 
crimes may a notable achievement for feminists, but the October 2016, 
judgment in Al Mahdi175 for not charging him for sexual and gender-based 
crimes, even though credible reports suggest these crimes occurred, is 
another setback for feminists. To conclude, two things may be stated. First, 
                                                   
173 See ICC, “Office of Prosecutor”, see supra note 53. 
174 Fatou Bensouda, “The Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes by International 
Courts”, 16 July 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fe0045/). 
175 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Mali, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-
01/12-01/15. 
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it is the right time to re-examine the ICC from a feminist perspective,176 
moving beyond the ‘gender’ perspective. Second, the principle of ‘com-
plementarity’ in preliminary examinations, though applicable for other 
alleged crimes, should be inapplicable for the crimes of rape and sexual 
violence, as it is proving to be defeating the main objective of the ICC to 
end impunity to sex crimes in armed conflicts. In this context, a new con-
cept of ‘shared complementarity’ may be invoked by OTP to end impunity 
to sexual crimes against women, to improve the quality in preliminary 
examination of such offences. 
 
                                                   
176 Valerie V. Suhr, “The ICC’s Al Mahdi Verdict on the Destruction of Cultural Heritage: Two 
Steps Forward, one Step Back?”, in Völkerrechtsblog, 3 October 2016. 
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32. Preliminary Examinations and Children: 
Beyond Child Recruitment Cases and 
Towards a Children’s Rights Approach 
Cynthia Chamberlain* 
32.1. Introduction  
On November 2016, as the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) advanced 
into adolescence, the OTP (‘OTP’) adopted its Policy on Children.1 After 
a difficult childhood (during its first cases), the OTP recognised that it 
could reclaim the ICC’s objective to work “for the sake of present and 
future generations”.2 With the adoption of the Policy on Children, the 
OTP showed a strong commitment to go beyond child recruitment cases, 
in order to include a child-sensitive approach in all its current and future 
work.  
However, a policy is just that: a set of ideas or a plan of what to do 
in particular situations that has been agreed to officially.3 It is therefore 
crucial to determine how the OTP will use and employ the ideas and plans 
adopted in its Policy on Children.  
This chapter will focus on how the Policy on Children can be inter-
preted and applied as regards preliminary examinations. Preliminary ex-
                                                   
*  Cynthia Chamberlain is a Costa Rican lawyer who has worked as a Legal Officer in the 
Chambers of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) since 2006. She has a Ph.D. from 
Leiden University and a Master (DEA) from Universidad Autónoma and Universidad 
Complutense, Madrid. She obtained her law degree from the University of Costa Rica, 
where she also worked as an assistant lecturer. The opinions expressed in this chapter re-
flect the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of the International 
Criminal Court. 
1 OTP (‘OTP’), Policy on Children, November 2016 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c2652b/). 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, preamble (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/) (‘Rome Statute’). Quoted in paragraph 1 of the Policy on 
Children.  
3 “Policy”, in Cambridge Dictionary (available on its web site). 
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aminations are the gateway to trials at the ICC, as they trigger investiga-
tions and lead to selection of cases against individuals for specific crimes. 
Ultimately, they may result in convictions, sentences and reparations. If 
the initial steps exclude children from the equation, they will most likely 
not benefit from judicial redress.  
32.2. The Prosecutor’s Policy on Children  
The Policy on Children follows the OTP’s previous thematic policies on 
Interests of Justice, Victims’ Participation, Preliminary Examinations, 
Case Selection and Prioritisation and Sexual and Gender Based-Crimes.4 
During the first years of its work, the OTP focused mainly on the crime of 
enlistment, conscription and use of children to actively participate in 
armed forces or groups. Thus, early policies referred to children mainly as 
victims and witnesses of crimes.5 Hence, albeit having focused on child-
specific crimes at the outset,6 and referring to the protection of child vic-
tims and witnesses in these cases,7 the OTP still lacked a general approach 
to mainstream children’s rights in its mandate. The Policy on Children is 
both a remedial strategy given the lessons learnt from these first trials, but 
also an undertaking to comprehensively integrate children’s rights per-
spective in the OTP’s work.  
                                                   
4 OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bb02e5/); 
idem, Policy Paper on Victim’s Participation (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3c204f/); 
idem, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/); 
idem, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
182205/); and idem, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7ede6c/). 
5 OTP, “Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003-June 
2006)” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c7a850/); OTP, “Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012” 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6ed914/). 
6 The first three cases included charges of child recruitment. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of Arrest, 10 February 2006 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/59846f/); ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07, Warrant of Arrest, 2 July 2007 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/53f65c/); ICC, Situa-
tion in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 
2005 as amended on 27 September 2005, 27 September 2005 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/b1010a/). 
7 OTP, “Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003-June 
2006)”, pp. 12, 24, see supra note 5. See idem, “Strategic Plan June 2012-2015”, para. 60 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/954beb/). 
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The adoption of the Policy on Children is the first palpable step of a 
plan that started in 2013, when the OTP turned its attention to child vic-
tims and witnesses beyond child recruitment cases.8 The adoption of a 
Policy on Children was hence long overdue and its absence became more 
evident with the Lubanga judgment, where the Trial Chamber reproached 
the Prosecution’s approach towards child witnesses and its use of inter-
mediaries.9 
Already in its Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, the OTP identified 
crimes against children as one of the main issues to be addressed,10 in 
respect of its own investigations, but also with reference to the positive 
complementarity principle and the duty for States Parties to investigate 
and prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed against children.11  
As with all other previous policies, the Policy on Children is aimed 
at providing greater clarity and transparency to the work of the OTP. In 
the case of preliminary examinations, the Rome Statute has left consider-
able room for prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the OTP adopted a Poli-
cy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,12 to promote clarity and predicta-
bility in the manner in which it applies the Rome Statute’s sometimes-
nebulous legal criteria. As regards children, the Rome Statute’s provisions 
are also quite general,13 hence the pressing need to adopt a more specific 
work plan. In light of this, the Policy on Children should be read together 
with the OTP’s other previously adopted policies. For the purpose of this 
chapter, and in relation to preliminary examinations, it is evident that the 
Policy on Children must be interpreted and applied consistently with the 
policy on preliminary examinations. 
                                                   
8 OTP, “Strategic Plan June 2012-2015”, para. 63, see supra note 7. See OTP, Policy Paper 
on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, para. 8, see supra note 4.  
9 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, paras. 479–484 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
677866/). 
10 OTP, “Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012”, p. 8, see supra note 5.  
11 Ibid., p. 14.  
12 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, see supra note 4.  
13 See, for example, Rome Statute, Article 68, see supra note 2; Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Court, 9 September 2002, rule 86 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/8bcf6f/) (‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’). 
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32.3. The Relevant Legal Framework  
At the outset, it is significant to note that the Policy on Children adopts a 
child-sensitive approach, which should be distinguished from a children’s 
rights or child-centred approach.14 In fact, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child is referred to as one of the “applicable treaties”,15 in apparent 
reference to Article 21(1)(b) of the Statute. Accordingly, the OTP inter-
prets the Convention, including its core principles, as subsidiary and op-
tional sources of law, instead of “international recognised human rights” 
of compulsory application pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Statute. 
Nonetheless, as will be explained below, the present chapter is 
based on the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, interpreted and applied pursuant to international-
ly recognised children’s rights.16  
Regardless of whether the applicable law is internal (Article 21(1)(a) 
and 21(2)) or external and subsidiary (Article 21(1)(b) and (c)), Article 
21(3) of the Rome Statute establishes two interpretative principles that 
must be involved throughout all proceedings before the ICC. That is, in-
terpretation and application of the law must be (a) non-discriminatory and 
(b) in accordance with internationally recognised human rights:17  
                                                   
14 Cynthia Chamberlain, Children and the International Criminal Court: Analysis of the 
Rome Statute Through a Children’s Rights Perspective, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2015, pp. 39–
40. 
15 OTP, Policy on Children, para. 11, see supra note 1. In fact, the Policy includes other 
international human rights instruments of quasi-universal application within this same nar-
row definition of ‘applicable treaties’. See, for example, Convention No. 182 concerning 
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child La-
bour, 17 June 1999 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4a7509/) (‘Convention No. 182’); and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 De-
cember 1979 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6dc4e4/) (‘Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women’).  
16  Gerhard Werle, Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional, Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 2005, 
pp. 98–100. 
17  ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
ICC pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 December 2006, 
ICC-01/04-01/06, paras. 37–38 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1505f7/); Mikaela Heik-
kilä, “Article 21”, in Mark Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the International 
Criminal Court, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2015, fn. 255 (http://www.
toaep.org/ps-pdf/29-klamberg). 
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The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this ar-
ticle must be consistent with internationally recognized hu-
man rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded 
on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 
3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth 
or other status. [emphasis added] 
Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence also provides a 
general interpretation and application principle that is binding to all or-
gans of the Court, and refers specifically to the needs of children:  
A Chamber in making any direction or order, and other or-
gans of the Court in performing their functions under the 
Statute or the Rules, shall take into account the needs of all 
victims and witnesses in accordance with article 68, in par-
ticular, children, elderly persons, persons with disabilities 
and victims of sexual or gender violence. [emphasis added]  
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, these interpretative principles are 
general (including children within a broad category of victims and wit-
nesses requiring special consideration) and should be analysed in view of 
specific “internationally recognised human rights” – in the instant case, 
children’s rights, and more specifically those protected in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.18 Although the ICC is not bound by the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (not being a party thereto), it must ap-
ply norms of similar or identical content of customary international law or 
general principles of law as enshrined in Article 21(3) of the Rome Stat-
ute.19 Moreover, considering that children may also be part of other pro-
tected groups (for example, persons with disabilities and/or girls), other 
international human rights treaties that crystallise these other internation-
ally recognised human rights are also applicable.  
For the purpose of this chapter, the core principles of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child are considered as “internationally recog-
nised human rights” pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. The 
                                                   
18  Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/f48f9e/) (‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’). 
19 Chamberlain, 2015, p. 43, see supra note 14; Rebecca Young, “Internationally recognised 
human rights before the International Criminal Court”, in International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 2011, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 190, 199, 204–205.  
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Convention on the Rights of the Child enjoys nearly universal ratifica-
tion20 and its core principles have been recognised as the general require-
ments for children to enjoy all other rights contained in the Convention.21 
Article 2 [Non-Discrimination]  
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth 
in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdic-
tion without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the 
child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other sta-
tus.  
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure 
that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination 
or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed 
opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or 
family members.  
Article 3 [Best Interests of the Child]  
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best in-
terests of the child shall be a primary consideration.  
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection 
and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into 
account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal 
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or 
her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures.  
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services 
and facilities responsible for the care or protection of chil-
                                                   
20 To date, 140 ratifications. Likewise, very few reservations refer to the articles of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child containing these four core principles, and in fact do not 
question the principles themselves. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, entry into 
force  2 September 1990 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f48f9e/); Susanna Greijer, “The-
matic Prosecution of Crimes Against Children”, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Thematic Pros-
ecution of International Sex Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, p. 
140 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/13-bergsmo). 
21 Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’), “General Comment No. 5 (2003): General 
measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 
44, para. 6)”, 2013, para. 12 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/69c527/) (‘GC No. 5’).  
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dren shall conform with the standards established by compe-
tent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in 
the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent 
supervision.  
Article 6 [Right to Life, Survival and Development]  
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent 
right to life.  
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible 
the survival and development of the child.  
Article 12 [Right to be Heard]  
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of 
the child being given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child.  
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided 
the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law.  
As regards preliminary examinations at the ICC, these are mainly 
regulated by Article 15 and Article 53 of the Rome Statute. While Article 
15 provides the jurisdictional trigger mechanism allowing proprio motu 
investigations, Article 53 provides the criteria that must be evaluated by 
the Prosecutor when taking her discretionary prosecutorial decision.  
Article 15  
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu 
on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the infor-
mation received. For this purpose, he or she may seek addi-
tional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or 
other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and 
may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court. 
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investi-
gation, together with any supporting material collected. Vic-
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tims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
[…]  
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in para-
graphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information 
provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an inves-
tigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the in-
formation. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from con-
sidering further information submitted to him or her regard-
ing the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence. 
Article 53  
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information 
made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless 
he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to pro-
ceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an in-
vestigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: 
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court has been or is being committed; 
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the inter-
ests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice. 
[…]  
2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there 
is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because: 
[…] 
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the 
crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the 
alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; 
[…].[emphasis added]  
On the basis of the above legal framework, the Prosecutor must en-
deavour to conduct preliminary examinations in accordance with interna-
tionally recognised children’s rights. For the purpose of this chapter, par-
ticular attention will be given to how the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child should be taken into consideration in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the concepts of “gravity”, “interests of victims” and “interests of 
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justice”. Although preliminary examinations are, in essence, within the 
discretionary realm of the Prosecutor, this power has intrinsic responsi-
bilities and boundaries. As stated above, in respect of internationally rec-
ognised human rights there is no room for discretion. This was determined 
by the Appeals Chamber of the ICC at the outset of the Court’s first trial: 
“[h]uman rights underpin the Rome Statute; every aspect of it, including 
the exercise of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court”.22 These 
human rights include the rights of the accused person, but also the rights 
of victims and witnesses of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
32.4. Quality of Communications  
Pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may initiate 
investigations on the basis of information received. This information can 
be provided by victims themselves, but also by human rights and other 
organisations. Unless communications relate specifically to children (that 
is, child recruitment cases), it is foreseeable that in the more ‘general’ 
communications, children – as an often ‘misinformed and misrepresented’ 
group in an adult-centred system – will not be automatically included in 
the information received by the Prosecutor pursuant to Article 15 (for 
example, communications related to a situation of post-election violence). 
The same stands as regards State or UN Security Council referrals, which 
will most likely focus on what happened or is happening ‘in general’ with-
in the territory of a State, and may exclude specific reference to children 
within the affected population. Children as a group have less ability than 
adults to present Article 15 communications in their own interests. Thus, 
if the interests of children are not highlighted in general information sub-
mitted to the Prosecutor, they will be overlooked.  
However, children represent almost half of the refugee population 
worldwide,23 and it is well documented that armed conflict has a destruc-
tive impact on education, which ultimately affects children’s development 
                                                   
22 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal 
of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Juris-
diction of the ICC pursuant to Article 19(2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 14 De-
cember 2006, para. 37 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1505f7/).  
23 UNICEF, “Protecting against abuse, exploitation and violence: children affected by armed 
conflict” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f44dd4/). 
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and future.24 Hence, excluding the children’s perspective is not an option. 
If information received pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute 
lacks the children’s perspective, the analysis of the OTP pursuant to Arti-
cle 53 of the Rome Statute may result in an incomplete and partial appli-
cation of its mandate.  
It is therefore important to maintain the highest children’s rights 
standards as undertaken in the Policy Paper. To achieve this, the OTP 
must create a network with children’s rights organisations already in-
volved in States where the OTP is carrying out preliminary examinations, 
but also with other international organisations dealing with children’s 
rights (for instance, United Nations Children’s Fund). Only if such a net-
work is created, will the OTP be able to receive communications that duly 
inform about the crimes committed against children or affecting their in-
terests as part of multi-generational communities.25  
Moreover, in creating this network with children’s rights organisa-
tions, the OTP’s interaction with them should be two-fold. First, the OTP 
should receive from organisations and other information providers views 
on a given situation that is child-sensitive. Second, it would be useful if 
these organisations would have appropriate tools and training so that 
communications are relevant for potential international criminal proceed-
ings. Although this is not necessarily the mandate of the OTP or even the 
ICC, the Prosecutor has continuously referred to ‘positive complementari-
ty’ as one of its main strategies. Within this concept of positive comple-
mentarity, the OTP has mentioned the need for capacity building at a na-
tional level, even if it has referred to it only indirectly.26  
Just like OTP must endeavour to receive information that sees all 
sides of a conflict or situation, it should also endeavour to include all 
members of the affected communities, and among them, children. Infor-
mation provided under Article 15 should also include different groups 
within children (for instance, minority groups, young children and youth, 
and girls).  
                                                   
24 UNICEF, “The State of the World’s Children 2016: A fair chance for every child”, p. 53 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7cf2c6/). 
25 OTP, Policy on Children, para. 3, see supra note 1. See also OTP, “Strategic Plan 2016-
2018”, pp. 11, 44 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ae957/). 
26 OTP, “Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012”, para. 17, see supra note 5.  
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In other words, it is not only about receiving Article 15 communica-
tions or information about crimes affecting children (quantity of infor-
mation), but these communications should also meet minimum standards 
so that they are useful to the work of the OTP (quality of the information).  
Partial information under Article 15(1) that is not further comple-
mented by impartial and inclusive information pursuant to Article 15(2) 
may result in incomplete and unfair decisions by the OTP in the context of 
preliminary examinations.  
To achieve this impartiality and non-discrimination pursuant to Ar-
ticle 21(3) of the Statute, the OTP’s interaction with NGOs must also be 
organised and duly regulated, and most importantly, kept under careful 
and continuous scrutiny.  
The analysis under Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute pertaining to 
the “seriousness of the information”, does not only refer to the truthful-
ness of the material received, but should also evaluate whether the infor-
mation encompasses information that may ultimately result in a determi-
nation of the truth (not a partial determination that excludes a certain 
group of the population, that is, children). The OTP should therefore re-
quire from these organisations complete and impartial information. None-
theless, in order to achieve this ‘quality control’ in the information re-
ceived, organisations co-operating with the ICC must be knowledgeable 
of the statutory provisions, not only vis-à-vis child victims, but also the 
rights of the accused and to a fair trial. Therefore, training of information 
providers in the field is essential.  
Moreover, from the receiving point of view, the OTP should have 
specialised and trained staff that will be able to adequately process infor-
mation received so that the children’s perspective is not ‘lost’ in the pro-
cess.27 Moreover, if the OTP’s staff is duly trained, they will also seek 
                                                   
27 Staff should also be well-trained in order to make the assessment under the OTP Policy on 
Children, particularly vis-à-vis the best interests of the child. In this regard, the CRC has 
stated the following: “Facts and information relevant to a particular case must be obtained 
by well-trained professionals in order to draw up all the elements necessary for the best-
interests assessment” (CRC, “General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to 
have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1)”, 2013, p. 10 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/18a4c1/) (‘GC No. 14’). See Comisión Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, El derecho del niño y la niña a la familia: Cuidado alternativo ponien-
do fin a la institucionalización en las Américas, 2013, para. 158. 
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further information when children’s rights views are absent. Pursuant to 
Articles 15(2) and 21(3) of the Rome Statute, discriminatory or biased 
information should be considered as not ‘serious’ and should be supple-
mented with additional information.  
Otherwise, this biased and partial information sometimes may reach 
the investigation and pre-trial phase and exclude children. For example, as 
regards communications transmitted to the Pre-Trial Chambers in both the 
Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire situations, victims’ representations were in their 
majority from middle-aged men. Although these communications were 
made for purposes of Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute (request for au-
thorisation to open an investigation), it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Prosecutor could have had similar information for the purpose of its Arti-
cle 15(2) analysis (information received on crimes). For example, in the 
Kenya situation, there were no victims’ representations of children (the 
youngest was a 19-year-old person). The average age of the persons who 
made individual representations was 44 years old and 60% of the victims 
were men. In the Côte d’Ivoire situation, out of 655 individual representa-
tions received, a limited number (20) were from persons aged below 20 
years old, while the majority (232) were 31-50 years old. Of these repre-
sentations (655), 423 were men and 179 were women, while 53 did not 
specify gender.28 One could think that perhaps the views of children were 
transmitted to the Court via adult persons. However, this has not been the 
case.  
Such numbers are not positive vis-à-vis children’s rights (nor as re-
gards gender). Ultimately, children are being excluded or restricted, on the 
basis of their age and sex (girls). Although this is clearly not the purpose 
of the OTP, the Registry (who transmits Article 15 communications to 
Pre-Trial Chambers) or of organisations co-operating with the ICC, this is 
the result (which impairs or nullifies the recognition, enjoyment and exer-
cise of children’s rights to judicial redress).29 Consequently, this is mani-
                                                   
28 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Public Redacted Version Of Corri-
gendum to the Report on Victims’ Representations (ICC-01/09-17-Conf-ExpCorr), 29 
March 2010, paras. 40–45 and annexes 1 and 5 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b9ce79/); 
ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11, Report on Victims’ Represen-
tations, 29 August 2011, paras. 35–36 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5dd52b/).  
29 The right to non-discrimination is not a passive obligation, prohibiting all forms of dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of rights under the Convention, but also requires appropriate 
proactive measures taken by the State to ensure effective equal opportunities for all chil-
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festly contrary to the principle of non-discrimination, enshrined in Article 
21(3) of the Rome Statute.30  
With the adoption of the Policy on Children, these numbers should 
shift and more reference should be made to the plight of children living in 
the current and future situations under scrutiny by the OTP. Otherwise, the 
OTP would be failing to meet its pledge that “any information received is 
subject to critical analysis and evaluation”. It is not only, as stated in its 
Policy on Children, to pay “particular attention to information received on 
crimes against or affecting children”,31 but to proactively seek additional 
information when these are missing from information received. 
32.5. Analysing the Article 53 Test from a Children’s Rights 
Perspective  
Although the OTP’s Policy on Children adopted a child-sensitive ap-
proach (that is where children’s best interests are taken into consideration 
but not necessarily prevail over other interests),32 it should apply and in-
terpret the law pursuant to internationally recognised children’s rights 
(Article 21(3)).  
Therefore, as noted above, in its application and interpretation of 
the statutory texts, including Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the OTP shall 
respect, at a minimum, the four guiding principles of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child: (a) the best interests of the child; (b) the right to 
life, survival and development; (c) respect for the views of children ac-
cording to their age and maturity; and (d) the right to non-
                                                                                                                        
dren to enjoy the rights under the Convention. This may require positive measures aimed 
at redressing a situation of real inequality (GC No. 14, p. 6, see supra note 27). See also, 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Article 1, 
see supra note 15, which defines what is meant as ‘discrimination’: “For the purposes of 
the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of 
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”.  
30 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 28, see supra note 4.  
31 OTP, Policy on Children, para. 53, see supra note 1.  
32 Ibid., para. 22.  
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discrimination.33 However, on a case-by-case basis, the OTP may also be 
guided by other internationally recognised human rights contained in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, the right to education, 
freedom of religion, prohibition of sexual abuse and ill-treatment, among 
others.34 Moreover, the OTP should also bear in mind other general or 
specific internationally recognised human rights and the impact that the 
Prosecutor’s actions could have on children’s enjoyment of these rights. 
For example, the right to reparations,35 gender equality,36 and the rights of 
children with disabilities.37 
                                                   
33 CRC, “General Comment No. 12 (2009): The Right of the Child to be Heard”, 2009, para. 
2 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8c2532/). 
34 Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 14, 19, 28, see supra note 18. 
35 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v. Poland), Judg-
ment, 13 September 1928, Series A, No. 17, p. 47 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b2ff98/); 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 
1986, General List No. 70, p. 114 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/046698/); ICJ, Corfu 
Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, 9 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, 
General List No. 1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/861864/); ICJ, Reparations for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 1949, I.C.J. Re-
ports 1949, General List No. 4, p. 184 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f263d7/); ICJ, In-
terprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Romanie 
(deuxième phase), Avis Consultatif, 18 July 1950, I.C.J. Report 1950, General List No. 8, p. 
228 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/5a4014/). See also International Law Commission, 
“Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, Article 1 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/10e324/) (“Every internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State”). 
36 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, see supra 
note 15, Article 1 defines discrimination against women (this is applicable to interpret the 
principle of non-discrimination in the CRC and ultimately in the Rome Statute): “the term 
‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made 
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. 
37 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 6 December 2006, Article 7 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/06e036/) (‘Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties’): “States Parties shall ensure that children with disabilities have the right to express 
their views freely on all matters affecting them, their views being given due weight in ac-
cordance with their age and maturity, on an equal basis with other children, and to be pro-
vided with disability and age-appropriate assistance to realize that right”. This article al-
lows for a specialised, cross-sector interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Article 12, see supra note 18. 
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The following criteria of Article 53 of the Statute will now be ana-
lysed pursuant to the children’s rights framework previously mentioned. 
32.5.1. Gravity  
As regards gravity, the Policy on Children states that in general, crimes 
committed against or affecting children are particularly grave. In fact, it is 
stated that the OTP will ensure that an assessment of the impact of the 
alleged crimes on children is incorporated into its analysis of the gravity 
of potential cases.38 This affirmation and assurance of the OTP is in ac-
cordance with the guiding principle of children’s right to life, survival and 
development. Most (if not all) crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
will infringe this core principle of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. The fact that information received by the OTP refers to crimes 
against or affecting children is relevant for the gravity analysis. For ex-
ample, scale of the crime (number of children that directly or indirectly 
suffered harm), nature (crimes committed against children),39 and manner 
(cruelty standards are different in respect of children and adults)40 are all 
relevant for the gravity analysis under Article 53 of the Statute.  
Gravity also examines the impact of crimes on victims and commu-
nities.41 Thus, analysing the impact of crimes vis-à-vis children in a com-
munity will most likely shift the balance in favour of gravity (and thus 
                                                   
38 OTP, Policy on Children, paras. 57–58, see supra note 1.  
39 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 63, see supra note 4. The nature of 
the crimes refers to the specific factual elements of each offence, including crimes commit-
ted against of affecting children (OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 
para. 39, see supra note 4).  
40 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 64, see supra note 4. See OTP, 
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, para. 40, see supra note 4: “The man-
ner of the commission of the crimes may be assessed in light of, inter alia, the means em-
ployed to execute the crime, the extent to which the crimes were systematic or resulted 
from a plan or organised policy or otherwise resulted from the abuse of power or official 
capacity, the existence of elements of particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the 
victims, any motives involving discrimination held by the direct perpetrators of the crimes, 
the use of rape and other sexual or gender-based violence or crimes committed by means 
of, or resulting in, the destruction of the environment or of protected objects”.  
41 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, para. 65, see supra note 4; Roisin Burke, 
“UN Military Peacekeeper Complicity in Sexual Abuse: The ICC or a Tri-Hybrid Court”, 
in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes, Torkel Op-
sahl Academic EPublisher, Beijing, 2012, p. 354 (http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/13-
bergsmo). 
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opening an investigation), as harm caused to children has long-lasting 
effects in their lives and may be easily passed down to entire generations. 
For example, the Policy on Children refers to the notion of a child’s life 
plan,42 which is not only relevant for the analysis of the impact of the 
crime for gravity purposes, but also for future reparations.  
32.5.2. Interests of Victims  
When analysing the element of “interests of victims”, Articles 3 and 12 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child are essential. While Article 3 
enshrines the principle of “best interests of the child”, Article 12 contains 
the complementary principle of the right of children to be heard.43 
A preliminary examination is without a doubt an action that will 
concern children of the affected communities,44 and as such, the “best 
interests of the child” shall be a primary consideration. As explained by 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child, this concept, far from being 
abstract and general, is a “dynamic concept that requires an assessment 
appropriate to the specific context”.45 This guiding principle requires all 
actors to engage in securing the holistic integrity of the child and promote 
his or her human dignity.46 Thus, in assessing a situation under Article 53 
of the Rome Statute, the OTP should consider the three-fold nature of this 
principle. Firstly, the OTP must assess and give primary consideration to 
                                                   
42 OTP, Policy on Children, fn. 78, see supra note 1. OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection 
and Prioritisation, para. 41, see supra note 4: “The impact of the crimes may be assessed 
in light of, inter alia, the increased vulnerability of victims, the terror subsequently instilled, 
or the social, economic and environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities. 
In this context, the Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute 
crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the 
environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of 
land”. See Elisabeth Schauer, “The Psychological impact of child soldiering” (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/ccb0d2/). 
43 The CRC has noted that articles 3 and 12 have an inextricable link. Article 12 provides the 
methodology for hearings the views of children, including the child’s best interests (GC 
No. 14, 2013, p. 6, see supra note 27). See Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Hu-
manos, 2013, para. 249, see supra note 27. 
44 The CRC has stated that the principle applies to situations directly concerning children, but 
also other measures that have an effect on children, even if they are not the direct targets of 
the measure (GC No. 14, 2013, p. 4, see supra note 27).  
45 Ibid., pp. 2, 5. The CRC has stated that the concept is flexible and adaptable, and should be 
adjusted and defined according to specific circumstances. 
46 Ibid., p. 2. 
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the interests of children of the situation at hand.47 Secondly, if two or 
more interpretations of a legal provision are possible (for example, re-
garding the principle of complementarity in Article 17 or the threshold in 
the context of crimes against humanity under Article 7), the OTP should 
favour the interpretation which most effectively serves children’s best 
interests. Thirdly, in its decision-making process in general pursuant to 
Article 53 (including the Prosecutor’s discretion), an evaluation of the 
possible impact (positive or negative) of the decision on children con-
cerned must be included.48  
As regards this last point, the adoption of the Policy on Children is 
not enough, and general reference to it in a decision under Article 53 will 
be insufficient. The OTP must show in its decision under Article 53 that 
the right has been explicitly taken into account and explain how the right 
has been respected in its decision (which criteria it is based on and how 
the interests of children were weighed against other competing inter-
ests).49  
                                                   
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. This may be difficult to achieve as the Policy (OTP, Policy on Children, para. 32, see 
supra note 1) establishes an approach which foresees decisions that are contrary to the best 
interests of the child. However, the CRC also foresees this, although exceptionally, and 
provides some further guidance that could be useful in situations where the OTP has to 
choose other competing interests. The CRC has stated: “In order to demonstrate that the 
right of the child to have his or her best interests assessed and taken as a primary consider-
ation has been respected, any decision concerning the child or children must be motivated, 
justified and explained. The motivation should state explicitly all the factual circumstances 
regarding the child, what elements have been found relevant in the best-interests assess-
ment, the content of the elements in the individual case, and how they have been weighted 
to determine the child’s best interests. If the decision differs from the views of the child, 
the reason for that should be clearly stated. If, exceptionally, the solution chosen is not in 
the best interests of the child, the grounds for this must be set out in order to show that the 
child’s best interests were a primary consideration despite the result. It is not sufficient to 
state in general terms that other considerations override the best interests of the child; all 
considerations must be explicitly specified in relation to the case at hand, and the reason 
why they carry greater weight in the particular case must be explained. The reasoning must 
also demonstrate, in a credible way, why the best interests of the child were not strong 
enough to be outweigh the other considerations. Account must be taken of those circum-
stances in which the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration” (GC 
No. 14, 2003, p. 11, see supra note 27). See Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Hu-
manos, 2013, para. 157, see supra note 27.  
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But how can the OTP determine what the best interests of children 
in a specific ICC situation are? One of the methods is self-evidently to 
seek the children’s views, which is where Article 12 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child becomes imperative. However, one could think, on 
the other hand, that given the initial stages of the proceedings, it would be 
counterproductive to expose children to international criminal proceed-
ings. Thus, the OTP must apply Articles 3 and 12 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child in a manner that is also consistent with its obliga-
tion to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity 
and privacy of victims and witnesses as provided for in Article 68(1) of 
the Rome Statute. Children’s direct participation with the OTP at this ear-
ly stage of the proceedings may not be opportune. However, interaction 
with local children’s rights organisations or youth groups could enable the 
OTP to gather the views of children, while at the same time preserving 
their security, safety and well-being.  
In relation to Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has established that 
views should be weighed in accordance with the child’s age and maturity 
(evolving capacities); and taking into consideration the diversity among 
children (including their social and cultural differences and needs).50 It 
must be noted that as regards these cultural or religious values, when 
these are incompatible with other rights (for instance, non-discrimination 
or sexual and reproductive rights) they should never be regarded as ‘in the 
best interests’ of children.51  
Just as the “best interests of the child” should be interpreted broadly 
(direct and indirect), the term ‘matters affecting the child’ pursuant to Ar-
ticle 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child should also be de-
fined as involving all ICC situations, as these all relate to traumatic social 
processes in a community (genocide, crimes against humanity, armed 
conflict) that will certainly deeply affect children’s lives.  
                                                   
50 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2013, paras. 252, 258, see supra note 27; 
GC No. 12, 2009, paras. 21, 74, see supra note 33; GC No. 14, 2013, para. 43, see supra 
note 27. 
51 For example, the fact that sexual violence against girls is considered as taboo or stigma-
tised in a given society is not a reason not to investigate these crimes (to prevent the vic-
tims from being embarrassed, harassed or ostracized). 
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And how does the OTP seek the views of children (that is, children 
of a situation under scrutiny) according to Article 12 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child? Article 12 applies to one child but also to a group 
of children in general,52 which will most likely be the case of preliminary 
examinations.  
Article 12 is not a ‘momentary act’ (that is, one consultation meet-
ing), but a process, and should be the “starting point for an intense ex-
change” between children of a situation and the OTP.53 Moreover, the 
OTP needs to be active (“shall assure”) to ensure the right of children to 
express their interests/views.54 The OTP cannot presume that children or 
persons acting on their behalf will present their views in the context of 
preliminary examinations. Thus, measures must be taken so that prelimi-
nary examinations are child-friendly (accessible and age appropriate), but 
also appropriate to the particular characteristics of children within a given 
situation.  
As stated above, children’s views should be sought for the purpose 
of preliminary examinations, but in a manner that is consistent with Arti-
cle 68(1) of the Rome Statute. Children must be informed about the right 
to be heard, but most importantly, their right to live free of violence (as 
some of them may have been born into violence already).55 Likewise, 
participation of children in preliminary examinations should avoid putting 
them at risk and therefore a child-protection strategy is necessary.56 The 
Policy on Children already gives some indications that the OTP already 
has, at least, a general strategy. However, the Policy refers more to the 
stages after the start of an investigation, and not to the preliminary exami-
nation stage.57 This is logical, since individual children will most likely 
not participate at this early stage of the proceedings. However, this does 
                                                   
52 GC No. 12, 2009, paras. 87–88, see supra note 33; Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, 2013, paras. 151–153, see supra note 27. 
53 GC No. 12, 2009, para. 13, see supra note 33.  
54 GC No. 14, 2013, p. 19, see supra note 27; Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Hu-
manos, 2013, para. 251, see supra note 27. 
55 GC No. 12, 2009, para. 120, see supra note 33.  
56 The Policy on Children already gives some indications that the OTP already has some 
strategy set-out, but these refer more to the stages after the start of an investigation, and 
not to the Preliminary Examination stage.  
57 OTP, Policy on Children, paras. 62 ff., see supra note 1.  
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not mean that the OTP will not be able to consider their views. It can al-
ways do so indirectly, as noted above, through organisations working with 
affected children.  
The creation of some kind of ombudsperson within the OTP, that 
monitors children’s legal rights but also maintains communications be-
tween children from a situation and the OTP could be a possible mecha-
nism to guarantee that a children’s rights policy is correctly implemented 
at all stages, including the preliminary examinations. Another solution 
could be that of creating a monitoring mechanism (for example, with the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Children’s Fund or 
another specialised agency). Such a joint venture could provide needed 
feedback and expertise to the OTP but also to organisations in the field 
that work with affected communities. As regards preliminary examina-
tions, this ombudsperson or the specialised agency/organisation could 
make child-rights impact assessments on how a certain investigation by 
the OTP could affect children and their enjoyment of rights.58 Although 
the Gender and Children Unit within the OTP already fulfils some these 
duties, it may not necessarily have the autonomy to carry out such impact 
assessments, 59  which may sometimes clash with broader prosecutorial 
strategy.  
32.5.3. The Interests of Justice  
In its analysis under Article 53 of the Statute, the Prosecutor must also 
evaluate the “interests of justice”. However, this concept must also be 
understood from the perspective of the best interests of the child and the 
interests of child victims, as members of affected communities.  
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that children 
shall be heard in any judicial and administrative proceeding affecting the 
child.60 The preliminary examinations carried out by the OTP are the eve 
of judicial proceedings before the ICC, but they also will inevitably have 
an impact on both judicial and administrative procedures, including do-
mestic and international non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms.  
                                                   
58 GC No. 14, 2013, p. 11, see supra note 27.  
59 GC No. 12, 2009, paras. 129–131, see supra note 33. The CRC has encouraged networking 
among organisations working with children to increase opportunities for shared learning 
and collective advocacy.  
60 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12, see supra note 18.  
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Thus, an analysis of Article 53(1)(c) from a human rights perspec-
tive (something required pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute), 
obliges the Prosecutor to balance competing interests. In the case at hand, 
the Prosecutor must take into consideration recognised human rights of 
child victims of an alleged crime but also children of a situation country 
in general. Such analysis, depending on each situation, could lead the 
OTP to consider a wider approach to the concept “interests of justice”,61 
for example, in favour of non-judicial or traditional justice mechanisms 
that could address some of the previously mentioned human rights in the 
“best interests of children”. For example, a non-judicial justice mecha-
nism that will address the crimes more expeditiously or in a more child-
friendly manner could have an impact on the analysis of “interests of jus-
tice”. However, this would have to be assessed carefully and on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account all the other elements addressed above, as 
well as other competing obligations of the Prosecutor, such as its primary 
obligation to avoid impunity.  
Another important consideration is that of time. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has established that the passing of time is not the 
same for children and adults and has affirmed that delays in or prolonged 
decision-making have particularly adverse effects on children as they 
evolve.62 Hence, a non-decision or delayed decisions under Article 53 of 
the Statute (that is, situations that are still under analysis for years) may be 
contrary to the best interests affected children. Thus, effects on children 
should be considered when the OTP extends a preliminary examination 
for a prolonged period of time.  
The Policy on Children affirms that there is a strong presumption 
that investigations and prosecutions of crimes affecting children are in the 
interests of justice.63 This commitment of the OTP to give serious consid-
eration to crimes committed against children not only entails the investi-
gation and prosecution of such crimes, but also the prompt determination 
of preliminary examinations, and eventual investigations and prosecutions. 
When the OTP receives information about crimes affecting children, pre-
                                                   
61 Talita de Souza Dias, “‘Interests of justice’: Defining the scope of Prosecutorial discretion 
in Article 53(I)(C) and (2)(C) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 2017, p. 3.  
62 GC No. 14, 2013, p. 10, see supra note 27.  
63 OTP, Policy on Children, para. 59, see supra note 1.  
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liminary examinations should be dealt with expeditiously. From a prose-
cutorial point of view, this is necessary in order to preserve the relevant 
evidence. As proven in Lubanga,64 with the passing of time all evidence 
depreciates, but particularly if it relates to children. Also, from an “inter-
ests of victims” perspective, the passing of time is also of essence, as rep-
arations for child victims should be granted in a timely manner, preferably 
when they are still children and measures such as rehabilitation can still 
be meaningful.65 Given their age and vulnerability, the adage “justice de-
layed is justice denied” is strikingly applicable. 
Finally, as part of this broader system of protection of human rights 
(because although criminal in nature, the ICC was established to protect 
human beings from heinous crimes), if and when the OTP decides not to 
open an investigation, it could still transmit that the information received 
to other appropriate mechanisms that could still address victims. For ex-
ample, as regards information received on children’s rights violations, the 
Prosecutor could still transmit the information to other relevant fora, such 
as the Committee on the Rights of the Child or regional human rights 
courts. This is important, as the OTP may receive information about hu-
man rights violations that although not within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
they could be within the jurisdiction of other mechanisms.66 Such actions 
are within the general mandate and the objects and purpose of the Court to 
combat impunity against the most heinous crimes (even if, for example, 
these crimes are outside the Court’s material, temporal or territorial juris-
diction). 
32.6. Conclusions  
The Policy on Children is a welcome development, but now the OTP has 
to put in place a formal process, with procedural safeguards, designed to 
assess and determine whether it is following its undertaking consistently 
with internationally recognised children’s rights.67  
                                                   
64 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, paras. 479–484 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
677866/).  
65 In Lubanga, the victims that were aged 10–14 at the time of the events (2002–2003) are 
currently 25–30 years old. To date, reparations for these victims are still pending.  
66 Gerhard Werle, 2005, pp. 99–101, see supra note 16. 
67 GC No. 14, 2013, p. 10, see supra note 27. 
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Although there is ample prosecutorial discretion in preliminary ex-
aminations, internationally recognised human rights underpin the entirety 
of proceedings before the ICC and are of compulsory application. Hence, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and its core principles must 
guide all prosecutorial actions, including preliminary examinations. The 
OTP equally needs to create a network with children’s rights organisations 
and children rights experts, so that a child-centred perspective can be truly 
mainstreamed in the Court’s prosecutorial mandate.  
With the adoption of the Policy on Children the OTP should not on-
ly pay particular attention to information received regarding children, but 
also seek this information when it is missing in adult-centred communica-
tions. An analysis of victims’ interests and interests of justice that ex-
cludes the child population is partial and discriminatory. Accordingly, the 
views of children must be taken into consideration, balancing between the 
often-conflicting rights of children to express their views and the eminent 
security risks that may arise when they interact with the Court. Measures 
should be taken to guarantee that their views are considered in a manner 
that safeguards children well-being. However, excluding them due to their 
vulnerability alone is not a valid reason.  
The adoption of the Policy on Children cannot be seen as a goal. It 
is only the first step in a process that requires careful and co-ordinated 
implementation on all those involved in the OTP, beginning at the first 
stages of the preliminary examinations and until the conclusion of judicial 
proceedings. If child victims, survivors of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court are excluded from the preliminary examinations, they will be 
excluded from the ‘determination of the truth’ after trial proceedings, and 
ultimately be excluded from eventual reparations in case of conviction.  
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33. Casting a Larger Shadow: 
Premeditated Madness, 
the International Criminal Court, 
and Preliminary Examinations 
Mark Kersten* 
33.1. Introduction: Shadow Politics and the International Criminal 
Court  
It has been repeatedly put forward that that the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’) has a ‘shadow’. This notion has been regularly and increas-
ingly invoked in scholarship on the ICC. In their 2012 article entitled 
Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC, Chandra Lekha Sriram and Stephen 
Brown ponders “whether the shadow of the ICC is likely to deter future 
atrocities”.1 Kevin Jon Heller has offered an analysis of the “shadow side 
of complementarity” – the effects of the Court “on the likelihood that de-
fendants will receive due process in national proceedings”.2 Louise Chap-
pell and others have described what they see as the institution’s “gender 
justice complementarity shadow”, an effect they argue results from the 
lack of linkage between the gender justice provisions under the Rome 
                                                   
*  Mark Kersten is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs, 
University of Toronto. This chapter draws on a presentation given by the author on the oc-
casion of the conference, The Peripheries of Justice Intervention: Preliminary Examina-
tion and Legacy/Sustainable Exit, which took place at the Peace Palace in The Hague, on 
29 September 2015. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the inestimable Carsten 
Stahn for the generous opportunity to present at the conference and write this chapter. He 
would also like to thank Alex Whiting for his generous and helpful comments during the 
early stages of planning this chapter. 
1 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Stephen Brown, “Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Comple-
mentarity, Gravity, and Impact”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2012, vol. 12, no. 
2, pp. 219–44. 
2 Kevin Jon Heller, “The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute on National Due Process”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2006, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 
255–80, p. 255. 
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Statute and the Court’s foundational principle of complementarity.3 Even 
ICC Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has spoken of the Court’s shadow, 
which she describes as its “capacity to set precedents that would meet the 
global challenges of our times” and something that “should be considered 
as the most important impact of the court”.4 
This chapter is likewise concerned with the shadow cast by the 
ICC – but from an altogether different angle. The focus of this chapter is 
on identifying and exploring novel strategies at the preliminary examina-
tion stage of ICC interventions, strategies that could enlarge the ICC’s 
shadow.5 Above all, it is argued that the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) 
should consider deploying more intrepid strategies at the preliminary ex-
amination phase in order to positively influence the behaviour of the 
Court’s potential targets. But what is meant by the ICC’s ‘shadow’? 
Given the diverse use of the term ‘shadow’ in international criminal 
law and justice scholarship, it is worthwhile briefly outlining what this 
chapter means by it. ‘Shadow’ here is taken to entail the indirect impres-
sion and impact that the ICC has on various actors and, in particular, on 
those whose behaviour the Court seeks to affect through its actions and 
decisions. These effects and impressions can exist at any time and at any 
stage of the Court’s interventions – including prior to the opening of an 
official investigation.  
There are two related reasons reason that likely explain the growing 
interest in the ICC’s shadow rather than a myopic focus on its direct ef-
fects. First, the limits of the Court’s effects on key issues such as deterring 
mass atrocities, successfully concluding cases, and ending impunity, are 
increasingly evident.6 The ICC’s ‘bite’ has not been as threatening or ef-
                                                   
3 Louise Chappel, Rosemary Grey and Emily Waller, “The Gender Justice Shadow of Com-
plementarity: Lessons from the International Criminal Court’s Preliminary Examinations 
in Guinea and Colombia”, in International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2013, vol. 7, no. 
3, pp. 455–75. 
4 See remarks by Fatou Bensouda, Council on Foreign Relations, “The International Crimi-
nal Court: A New Approach to International Relations”, 21 September 2012 (http://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/100ce0-1/). 
5 This chapter employs a broad conception of intervention, wherein the OTP’s decision to 
open a preliminary examination into a given situation already constitutes an intervention 
on the part of the ICC. 
6 See, for example, Nick Grono, “Justice in Conflict: The ICC and Peace Processes”, in 
Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in 
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fective as some had originally hoped and others had feared.7 Instead, con-
cern seems to be focused on whether the Court bit off more than it could 
chew and thus created an expectations gap in what justice and accounta-
bility the institution can deliver. Second, there has been something of a 
‘complementarity turn’ in the field of international criminal justice, with 
scholars and practitioners focusing on how the ICC can galvanize and 
stimulate domestic and regional accountability processes as a primary 
motivation of the Court’s mandate.8 As a result, there is a palpable focus 
on how to increase the shadow of the ICC.  
Of course, and as we know from famous childhood stories such as 
Peter Pan, shadows are real but can neither be caught nor physically 
grasped. They are impressions of light upon surfaces. Importantly, the size 
and shape of a shadow changes with the angle of the light upon the object 
casting it. If one were to take a flashlight and point it at a toy-house from 
a small angle above, the house’s shadow will appear diminutive. Increase 
the angle, and the edifice’s impression upon the floor becomes elongated 
and increasingly striking. At the core of this chapter is an assertion that 
the ICC’s strategies are the light that determines how long and striking the 
Court’s shadow is and can be. Changing the focus of those strategies can 
have an impact on how effective the Court is at casting its shadow and, 
ultimately, in achieving desired outcomes.  
                                                                                                                        
Africa, Royal African Society, 2008, pp. 13–20; Human Rights Watch, Unfinished Busi-
ness: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, 15 September 2011 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/738f10/); Mark Kersten, “The ICC and its Impact: More Known Unknowns”, 
in Open Global Rights, 5 November 2014; Mark Kersten, Justice in Conflict: The Effects 
of the International Criminal Court’s Interventions on Ending Wars and Building Peace, 
Oxford University Press, 2016. 
7 See discussion of US antagonism to the ICC below, see infra Section 33.4.2. 
8 See, among others, Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Cambridge University 
Press, 2011; Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Ef-
fect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014; Mark Kersten, “The Complementarity Turn in International Criminal Justice”, 
in Justice in Conflict, 30 September 2014; Kirsten Ainley, “The Responsibility to Protect 
and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis”, in International Affairs, 
2015, vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 37–54. 
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33.1.1. Overview 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section of the chapter out-
lines the orthodox view of preliminary examinations that sees this stage of 
an ICC intervention as a ‘legal checklist’. It is posited that this classical 
understanding has neglected to view the preliminary examination phase as 
a unique stage during which the OTP can deploy strategies to affect and 
influence actors in the contexts under examination – namely to induce 
domestic judicial activity and to deter and prevent mass atrocities. In the 
second section, the chapter explores four key assumptions that should 
constitute the foundation for thinking through how to deploy preliminary 
examinations effectively: 1) that the ICC is predisposed to intervening in 
ongoing and active conflicts; 2) that the Court is a political, as well as 
legal, institution; 3) that, generally, the ICC’s preference is to have domes-
tic authorities – and not the Court – prosecute international crimes; and 4) 
that the strategic imperatives and incentives of warring actors and poten-
tial targets of ICC interventions are unique at the preliminary examination 
stage. Together, these assumptions should inform how the OTP deploys 
preliminary examination strategies as a means to expand the shadow of 
the Court.  
In the third section that follows, the chapter draws on recent histori-
cal revelations pertaining to strategies developed by Richard Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger as an analogy for one particular strategy that should be 
considered in the OTP’s preliminary examination ‘toolbox’: the ‘madman 
theory’ of preliminary examinations, wherein the OTP deploys a brazen 
communication strategy in order to give the impression that all actors 
alleged to have committed mass atrocities may be targeted for indictment. 
It is argued that the ‘madman theory’ should be employed in the most 
politically sensitive and precarious contexts. It is further demonstrated 
that the embers of such a policy can already be seen in how the OTP’s 
2014 and 2015 preliminary examination reports covered allegations of 
torture perpetrated by US officials in Afghanistan.  
How the ICC can leverage preliminary examinations to affect State 
behaviour is discussed in the penultimate section of the chapter. Section 
33.4. subsequently outlines and discusses relevant weaknesses and draw-
backs to the madman approach to preliminary examinations. The chapter 
concludes by arguing for the need to think creatively about how the pre-
liminary examination stage can be strategically deployed in order to have 
intended and desired effects on the behaviour of warring parties and the 
33. Casting a Larger Shadow 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 659 
pursuit of accountability. Doing so might not only increase the likelihood 
of the Court incurring positive outcomes but also bolster the independ-
ence and legitimacy of the institution. 
33.2. An Orthodox Understanding of Preliminary Examinations  
As a distinctive strategic stage of an ICC intervention, the preliminary 
examination phase has not received sufficient or sustained scholarly scru-
tiny.9 Research on the Court has generally been focused on the institu-
tion’s impacts. These are typically identified and measured following the 
opening of an official investigation, once a preliminary examination has 
already been terminated.10 Compounding the lack of scholarship on pre-
liminary examinations, the OTP has only begun releasing detailed infor-
mation regarding its preliminary examinations since 2011.11 In addition, 
insofar as it has described them, its orthodox understanding of a prelimi-
nary examination presents it as a generally unremarkable ‘legal checklist’. 
According to the OTP itself:  
The preliminary examination process is conducted on the ba-
sis of the facts and information available. The goal of this 
process is to reach a fully informed determination of whether 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.12 
Scholars have tended to view the preliminary examination similarly. 
Pavel Caban, for example, describes preliminary examinations as “the 
activities of the OTP carried out in order to determine whether a situation, 
brought to the attention of the OTP, meets the legal criteria established by 
                                                   
9 By way of example, a recently published, impressive and authoritative volume on the ICC 
includes only three mentions, and no sustained analysis of, the preliminary examination 
stage. See Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, 
Oxford University Press, 2015. 
10 There are notable and increasingly common exceptions to this general rule, including the 
decision on the part of Palestine to join the ICC and the OTP’s subsequent to open a pre-
liminary examination into alleged crimes perpetrated in Gaza since June 2014. Another ex-
ample is the preliminary examination in Colombia. 
11 See David Bosco, “The Preliminary Examination Procedure of the ICC Prosecutor”, in 
American Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 109, no. 4. 
12 International Criminal Court OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, 2 
December 2014, para. 11 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3594b3/). 
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the Rome Statute to warrant investigation by the ICC”.13 Carsten Stahn 
has described this conceptualization of preliminary examinations as a 
“narrow functional/institutional view” which singularly and exclusively 
sets out “to serve as a means to decide whether or not to open an ICC 
investigation… that is, the conception of [preliminary examinations] as 
gateway[s] to investigations”.14 
This legal checklist can be summarized as follows. Prior to preced-
ing to an official investigation, the OTP must ascertain during the prelim-
inary examination stage whether or not three criteria are met: 1) whether 
the Court has temporal, material, territorial and personal jurisdiction in the 
situation under examination; 2) whether an official investigation and any 
consequent prosecutions would be admissible before the Court, based on 
the principles of complementarity and gravity; and 3) whether the opening 
of an official investigation is in the “interests of justice”.15  
In addition, the preliminary examination stage is itself divided into 
four phases used as a “filtering process” to determine which situations 
should proceed to official investigation. These sub-phases correspond, 
roughly, to the criteria outlined above. In Phase 1, the OTP must ascertain 
whether the alleged crimes fall within its jurisdiction. In the second phase, 
the OTP must consider the evidence provided by relevant actors and “de-
termine whether the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction under 
article 12 [of the Rome Statute] are satisfied and whether there is a rea-
sonable basis to believe that the alleged crimes fall under the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the Court”. In Phase 3, the OTP assesses complementa-
rity and gravity relating to the situation under preliminary examination. 
Finally, in Phase 4, the OTP must make a determination as to whether 
proceeding to an official investigation would serve the “interests of jus-
tice”. As of writing, the OTP currently has seven ongoing preliminary 
examinations. These are divided amongst Phase 2 (Iraq, Palestine, and 
Ukraine) and Phase 3 (Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, and Nigeria). 
                                                   
13 Pavel Caban, “Preliminary Examinations by the Office of the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, in Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law, 2011, 
vol. 2, pp. 199–216, p. 199. 
14 Concept Note for Expert Meeting, “The Peripheries of Justice Intervention: Preliminary 
Examination and Legacy/Sustainable Exit”, 29 September 2015 (on file with the author). 
15 International Criminal Court, “Preliminary Examinations” (available on the Court’s web 
site). 
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Based on this checklist approach, the OTP has, in essence, three op-
tions with regards to preliminary examinations: 1) to proceed to opening 
an official investigation, which it has done, most recently, in the case of 
the 2008 war in Georgia; 2) close a preliminary examination, which was 
the decision made in Comoros (2014),16 Honduras (2015)17 and Venezuela 
(2006), and the Republic of Korea (2014);18 or 3) leave a preliminary ex-
amination in some ‘half-way house’, long-term ‘purgatory’, which the 
OTP appears to have done in the case with Afghanistan, under preliminary 
examination since 2007 (see below). 
The approach outlined above also represents a highly legalistic con-
ception of what a preliminary examination is. It is a simplistic outlook 
neglecting, as Christopher Stone observes, that “a preliminary examina-
tion is a complex, carefully structured stage of activity”.19 However, pre-
liminary examinations are heavily imbued with politics – and political 
potential. Indeed, there is an increasing recognition that the legal vocabu-
lary upon which preliminary examinations are based permits the OTP to 
deploy legal terminology as a means to justify political decision-making. 
Unpacking these terms unveils the political and un-immutable elements of 
preliminary examinations. Examples include how the OTP determines 
admissibility across situations, how it imagines the gravity principle 
across contexts and through time,20 and what, precisely, counts as or is 
meant by, the “interests of justice”.21 For some scholars, such as William 
                                                   
16 See International Criminal Court, “Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambod-
ia” (available on the Court’s web site). 
17 See International Criminal Court, “Honduras” (available on the Court’s web site). 
18 See International Criminal Court, “Republic of Korea” (available on the Court’s web site). 
19 Christopher Stone, “Widening the Impact of the International Criminal Court: The Prose-
cutor’s Preliminary Examinations in the Larger System of International Criminal Justice”, 
in Martha Minow, C. Cora True-Frost and Alex Whiting (eds.), The First Global Prosecu-
tor: Promise and Constraints, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2015, pp. 297–
308, p. 290. 
20 Alana Tiemessen, “Defying Gravity: Seeking Political Balance in ICC Prosecutions”, 
Justice in Conflict, 22 April 2013. 
21 See, among others, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Policy Paper: The Mean-
ing of “the Interests of Justice” in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, 1 June 2005; Linda M. 
Keller, “Comparing the “Interests of Justice”: What the International Criminal Court Can 
Learn from New York Law”, in Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2013, 
vol. 12, no. 1, p. 1–40; Priscilla Hayner, “Does the ICC Advance the Interests of Justice?”, 
in Open Global Rights, 4 November 2014. 
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Schabas, the lack of definitional clarity of these legal concepts provides a 
veneer for the OTP to act politically. For Schabas, the language of gravity, 
for example, “strikes the observer as little more than obfuscation, a la-
boured attempt to make the determinations look more judicial than they 
really are […] to take a political decision while making it look judicial”.22 
Stahn concurs, observing that the lack of clarity of such terms “has pro-
vided an opportunity to the Prosecutor to shape the meaning of the con-
cepts and to develop prosecutorial discretion outside the realm of legal 
thresholds”.23  
Moreover, a restricted view of preliminary examinations denies 
what Stahn sees as “the broader analytical features of assessment and the 
link between [preliminary examinations] and goals of the Statute”. 24 
These goals, according to the OTP, are two-fold:  
In the course of its preliminary examination activities, the 
Office will seek to contribute to the two overarching goals of 
the Rome Statute: the ending of impunity, by encouraging 
genuine national proceedings, and the prevention of 
crimes.25 
Crucially, these are not legal but political goals, insofar as they re-
flect an aim to shape the decision-making of political actors to both initi-
ate “genuine national proceedings” as well as deterring and preventing 
crimes. Thus, from this brief analysis, we can conclude that the OTP seeks 
to use preliminary examinations as a means to influence the behaviour of 
its potential targets. Doing so effectively requires smart – and political – 
strategies that can expand the reach of the ICC’s shadow. But before delv-
ing into how this can be achieved, it is worth outlining key assumptions 
regarding the Court’s interventions, interests, and desired impacts that 
should inform any strategy brought to bear in a preliminary examination.  
                                                   
22 William A. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War 
Crimes Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 89. 
23 Carsten Stahn, “Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On”, in Carsten 
Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009, pp. 247–80, p. 267. 
24 See Concept Note for Expert Meeting, supra note 15. 
25 International Criminal Court OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 
2013 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/). 
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33.3. Preliminary Examinations and Assumptions about the ICC’s 
Desired Impact and Interests 
In order to fully appreciate and understand how the ICC can achieve de-
sirable effects through preliminary examinations, it is important to outline 
key assumptions about the Court’s intended impacts and interests. This 
section delineates four assumptions to consider. 
The first assumption is that the ICC is predisposed to intervening in 
ongoing and active conflicts.26 The vast majority of situations in which 
the ICC intervenes in are active wars or very recently concluded conflicts. 
Moreover, the institution is increasingly expected to act as a ‘first re-
sponder’ in conflicts characterized by atrocities and human rights abuses. 
In line with its own identified aims noted above, the Court thus has an 
interest in affecting the behaviour of actors engaged in political violence 
to refrain from the perpetration of international crimes (that is, prevention 
and deterrence) as well as taking the prosecution of international crimes 
seriously – either as an element of conflict resolution itself or as part of its 
post-conflict transitional justice measures.  
A second assumption is that the ICC is a political body. This has al-
ready been made clear in the above analysis. Going further, it should be 
assumed that that the Court must make political decisions that reflect its 
institutional interests.27 In particular, the OTP has an interest in taking 
decisions that are likely to result in: 1) effective co-operation from rele-
vant political actors that allow the OTP to build cases based on strong 
evidence; 2) the enforcement of any arrest warrants it subsequently issues; 
and 3) a contribution to its standing in international relations and politics. 
However, the OTP must negotiate these institutional interests with the 
political actors upon which it depends for co-operation and relevance. 
How it negotiates its interests with those actors will determine how it pro-
ceeds with its mandate and, importantly, whom it targets for prosecution 
in any given context.28 The Court’s record to date indicates a clear pattern 
as a consequence of this negotiation: self-referrals by States have solely 
                                                   
26 See Mark Kersten, 2014, see supra note 6. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See also Kenneth A. Rodman, “Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics Embed-
ding the International Criminal Court within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding”, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2014, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 437–69. 
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resulted in non-State actors and government adversaries being targeted by 
the ICC, whilst UN Security Council referrals have almost exclusively led 
to the targeting of State/government actors.29 
The third assumption is that, in general, the ICC would prefer to 
prosecute as seldom as possible and that this is particularly true in situa-
tions where major political powers are involved. As the Court’s first Chief 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, regularly insisted during his tenure, an 
ideal outcome for the ICC would be to have no case before its judges be-
cause States were able and willing to mete justice for international crimes 
themselves. In addition to this long-term ideal, a more recent issue con-
tributes to the institution’s recalcitrance to expand its prosecutorial work-
load, namely the scarcity of resources offered to the institution. Financing 
the ICC has become a permanent feature at the yearly Assembly of States 
Parties’ conferences. 30  Moreover, as the OTP’s recent report on the 
Court’s ‘basic size’ suggests, the Office simply does not have sufficient 
resources to match the worldwide demands and expectations for interna-
tional criminal justice. The goal of avoiding prosecutions wherever possi-
ble is further evidenced in the ICC’s apparent turn to positive complemen-
tarity as a central objective of the Court’s interventions. This is apparent 
the OTP’s reports on preliminary examinations which refer explicitly to 
effective examinations “obviating the need for the Court’s intervention”.31 
In short, in both principle and practice, the institution’s predilection is to 
prosecute as seldom as possible by galvanizing States to conduct prosecu-
tions themselves.  
The fourth assumption guiding this analysis is that the strategic im-
peratives and incentives of actors during the preliminary examination 
stage are substantially different from those that exist once the OTP pro-
ceeds to the official investigation stage. This final assumption is worth 
unpacking.  
                                                   
29 Alana Tiemessen, “The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions”, in 
International Journal of Human Rights, 2014, vol. 18, no. 4–5, pp. 444–61; see also Mark 
Kersten, 2014, see supra note 6. 
30 See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Briefing Note for the Fourteenth Session 
of the International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, November 2015 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/001993/); Elizabeth Evenson and Jonathan O’Donohue, “The In-
ternational Criminal Court at Risk”, in Open Global Rights, 6 May 2015. 
31 International Criminal Court OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2015), 
12 November 2015, para. 16 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac0ed2/). 
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The lack of clarity regarding whom, if anyone, the ICC will target is 
most pronounced in the preliminary examination stage. In contrast, once 
an official investigation is open, the Chief Prosecutor is likely to become 
locked into a particular prosecutorial strategy and, in some cases, even 
make clear his or her intentions to prosecute particular sides of a con-
flict.32 During the preliminary examination stage, warring parties cannot 
know with certainty whom the ICC will target. It is a stage where any-
thing – and nothing – can happen. States and relevant actors may surmise 
that the ICC’s record of targeting non-State actors following self-referrals 
and government actors following Security Council referrals will continue 
to hold true. Crucially, however, they cannot establish beyond doubt 
whether or not the Court will receive effective co-operation, effective 
access to relevant territories and evidence, and whether or not they them-
selves are in danger of being targeted by the ICC. In other words, uncer-
tainty is elevated in the preliminary examination stage. Paradoxically, 
then, the most likely phase in which the Court could have a significant 
effect on the behaviour of warring actors may be the preliminary exami-
nation stage. 
Consider the example of deterrence, an oft-stated aim of the ICC 
during the preliminary examination stage as well as more broadly.33 There 
are poignant critiques of whether deterrence is a logical and possible out-
come of ICC decision-making. But let us assume that specific deter-
rence – the deterrence of potential targets of the ICC – is a worthy aspira-
tion and feasible by-product of ICC action.34 If there is to be any deterrent 
effect, it seems likely that it will be heightened during a preliminary ex-
amination because of the inherent phase’s unpredictability and the OTP’s 
concomitant flexibility in whom to ultimately target. Warring actors and 
perpetrators cannot know whether or not they will be targeted for prosecu-
tion. As a result, they can respond to the signal sent, or the ‘shadow’ cast, 
                                                   
32 In the case of Libya, for example, Moreno-Ocampo announced his intended and primary 
targets – Gaddafi regime officials – almost immediately following his opening of an inves-
tigation. This was raised as an issue by defence counsel at the ICC. 
33 See Kate Cronin-Furman, “Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the 
Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity”, in International Journal of Transitional Jus-
tice, 2013, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 434–54. 
34 On specific deterrence versus general deterrence, see Payam Akhavan, “Justice in The 
Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War 
Crimes Tribunal”, in Human Rights Quarterly, 1998, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 737–816, p. 746. 
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by the ICC in the preliminary examination stage by ceasing the perpetra-
tion of international crimes. If they do so, it is within the Prosecutor’s 
discretion via, for example, an argument relating to the “interests of jus-
tice”, not to proceed to the official investigation stage and/or not target 
those actors who responded ‘positively’ to the impetuses of the OTP’s 
preliminary examination. This is in sharp contrast to the incentives that 
exist once an arrest warrant has been issued for a particular target. At this 
point, there is no logical means by which ICC targets can be deterred be-
cause the warrants cannot be revoked as a reward for improved behaviour. 
As David Mendeloff argues, “for coercive threats to be effective they 
must be accompanied by credible assurances that the threat will be re-
moved in the face of compliance”.35 The judicial sanctions issued via ICC 
arrest warrants, however, cannot be revoked in exchange for positive 
changes in the behaviour of targeted actors. The Court’s warrants can only 
expire with the acquittal, conviction or death of the accused. 
The potential for a preliminary examination to induce ‘positive 
complementarity’, that is, instigating relevant and genuine judicial pro-
cesses domestically, is less clear.36 Some suggest that the shadow of the 
ICC has been effective in galvanizing domestic accountability in situa-
tions such as Colombia.37 In other instances, like Georgia, authorities have 
been clear that, despite having a functioning judiciary, they will not inves-
tigate or prosecute crimes relevant to the Court’s jurisdiction, leaving the 
OTP with little choice but to proceed with an official investigation. In yet 
other instances, States appear to be interested in outsourcing some of their 
ICC targets to The Hague whilst prosecuting others domestically. This has 
been the case in Ivory Coast where the current government of Alassane 
Ouattara approved the surrender of ousted former President Laurent 
                                                   
35 David Mendeloff, “Punish or Persuade? The ICC and the Limits to Coercion in Cases of 
Ongoing Violence”, 2014 (draft paper on file with the author). 
36 See William W. Burke-White, “Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the 
Rome System of Justice”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2008, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 59–85; 
Nouwen, 2014, see supra note 8; see also International Criminal Court OTP, ICC Prosecu-
torial Strategy 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, para. 17 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
6ed914/). 
37 See, for example, Amanda Lyons and Michael Reed-Hurtado, “Colombia: Impact of the 
Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court”, May 2010 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/17ec15/). 
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Gbagbo but has fought to ensure that former First Lady Simone Gbagbo is 
prosecuted and incarcerated domestically. 
Still, it should be noted that there is no evidence that the Court is 
better at galvanizing genuine domestic judicial processes during official 
investigations than it is in the preliminary examination stage. Even in 
relatively stable situations where the Court has intervened, judicial actions 
are beset by serious problems. In Kenya, despite promises to investigate 
and prosecute allegations of crimes against humanity perpetrated during 
the 2007-2008 post-election violence via the established of an Interna-
tional and Organized Crimes Division, it has become clear that such 
crimes will not be investigated.38 In Uganda, the government of Yoweri 
Museveni created an International Crimes Division which has prosecuted 
one (non-ICC indicted) senior commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army, 
Thomas Kwoyelo. The trial has faced serious allegations of unfairness 
and impropriety.39 When Caesar Achellam, an Lord’s Resistance Army 
commander of similar seniority, came into the custody of Ugandan offi-
cials, he was amnestied and given residence in the military’s Gulu-based 
barracks. 40  Moreover, the government decided that Dominic Ongwen, 
who had been indicted by the ICC, would not be prosecuted in the Inter-
national Crimes Division and instead approved his transfer to The 
Hague.41  
Based on the above assumptions, it is evident that the preliminary 
examination stage presents a unique, if under-theorized, opportunity to 
potentially affect the behaviour of conflict and post-conflict actors. Con-
sequently, there is a need to dedicate more scrutiny as to what strategies 
the OTP can employ to help to ensure that preliminary examinations are 
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more effective in affecting potentially positive behavioural responses 
from warring actors. This is particularly important with regards to strate-
gies that can be deployed in the most politically contentious ICC situa-
tions – those in which major power interests are involved. One such case, 
as described below, is Afghanistan. 
33.4. A ‘Madman Theory’ of Preliminary Examinations  
33.4.1. Nixon, Kissinger and ICC Preliminary Examination 
Strategies 
The lack of clarity in what the OTP will do, if anything, as well as whom, 
if anyone, the Court will target is most pronounced in the preliminary 
examination stage of an ICC intervention. Yet the classical approach to 
preliminary examinations views the examination phase as a ‘waiting 
room’ wherein the OTP performs a legalistic diagnosis and then, after 
some indeterminate period of time that could range from days to decades, 
decides between doing nothing and issuing arrest warrants. Instead of this 
narrow interpretation of preliminary examinations, it would be useful to 
think through how the OTP can capture and capitalize on the unpredicta-
ble nature of preliminary examinations in order increase the likelihood of 
it having a positive impact on the situations under its purview. One such 
approach, which this section elaborates and proffers, is an adaptation of 
the ‘madman theory’ of former US President Richard Nixon and his na-
tional security advisor Henry Kissinger. 
In 1969, Nixon was failing in his election promise of ending the 
US’ engagement in Vietnam – either via military means or through peace 
negotiations. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger began crafting a policy of 
‘premeditated madness’. As Jeremy Suri writes: 
Frustrated, Nixon decided to try something new: threaten the 
Soviet Union with a massive nuclear strike and make its 
leaders think he was crazy enough to go through with it. His 
hope was that the Soviets would be so frightened of events 
spinning out of control that they would strong-arm Hanoi, 
telling the North Vietnamese to start making concessions at 
the negotiating table or risk losing Soviet military support. 
Codenamed ‘Giant Lance’, Nixon’s plan was the culmination of a 
strategy of premeditated madness he had developed with national security 
adviser Henry Kissinger. The details of this episode remained secret for 
35 years and have never been fully told. Now, thanks to documents re-
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leased through the Freedom of Information Act, it is clear that Giant 
Lance was the leading example of what historians came to call the ‘mad-
man theory’: Nixon’s notion that faked, finger-on-the-button rage could 
bring the Soviets to heel.42 
Nixon and Kissinger’s plan was ‘mad’ because in threatening the 
communist bloc with a nuclear attack, the US putting its own existence at 
risk. The policy flew directly in the face of Mutually Assured Destruction, 
the principle whereby the capacity of two or more States to obliterate each 
other creates a high-tension equilibrium wherein none attacks the other for 
fear of certain annihilation. James Rosen and Luke A. Nichter usefully 
summarize the US President’s position: “Nixon wanted to impress upon 
the Soviets that the president of the United States was, in a word, mad: 
unstable, erratic in his decision-making, and capable of anything”.43 
The OTP can and should consider adapting and bringing to bear 
such a madman strategy in its preliminary examinations. This would re-
quire the OTP to convincingly demonstrate that it was willing to target 
any and all relevant actors in a conflict: even those with significant politi-
cal power, even those who are patrons of Western States, and even those 
who referred the situation to the ICC in the first place. It would also re-
quire a willingness on the part of the OTP to convincingly demonstrate it 
was mad enough to target these actors even if doing so would, on its face, 
undermine the Court’s institutional interests.  
As suggested above, the outcomes of referrals, from the opening of 
preliminary examinations to the issuance of arrest warrants, currently 
follow predictable trends. Self-referrals translate into the ICC targeting 
non-State actors and government enemies; Security Council referrals re-
sult in government figures being targeted. This leads to the danger of 
States and the Security Council manipulating the ICC to target only their 
adversaries, a risk that has received increasing scrutiny as well as con-
demnation.44 A madman approach would disrupt this predictability. By 
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David Kaye, “The Council and the Court: Improving Security Council Support of the In-
 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 670 
demonstrating a sincere willingness to target any and all warring parties, it 
would also give the Court the impression a being more independent insti-
tution. 
While the OTP should consider invoking a ‘madman strategy’ in 
some situations, attention needs also to be paid to how it could do so. 
Such a policy would have to be carefully planned and executed through 
the yearly preliminary examination reports in combination with timely 
and well-placed communications to the media, to embassies, civil society, 
and other relevant actors. Notably, there are growing signs that the OTP is 
willing to embrace a bolder approach to preliminary examinations.  
33.4.2. Growing Older, Growing Bolder: 
The ICC and Preliminary Examinations 
Beginning in 2014, the OTP began to “shed new light on a process that 
has been opaque for much of the court’s existence and that has attracted 
relatively limited scholarly and specialist attention”.45 Indeed, the OTP’s 
2014 and 2015 preliminary examination reports indicate an increasing 
willingness on the part of prosecutors to confront an especially thorny 
issue: allegations of international crimes perpetrated by Western States 
and, in particular, alleged abuses by US forces, in Afghanistan. This rep-
resents a marked change on the part of the ICC in its approach to the US, 
which has tended to be cautious, if not deferential.46 This section briefly 
outlines the historical relationship between the ICC and Washington be-
fore demonstrating how the most recent preliminary examination reports 
signal an increasingly brazen strategy on the part of the OTP towards al-
legations of US war crimes in Afghanistan.  
The issue that dominated the Court’s first years of existence was its 
tumultuous relationship with the United States. While former US Presi-
dent Bill Clinton decided to sign the Rome Statute as one of his last acts 
in office, the administration of George W. Bush pursued policies to active-
                                                                                                                        
ternational Criminal Court”, 2013, University of California, Irvine, School of Law Re-
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45 Bosco, 2015, see supra note 11. 
46 David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Poli-
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ly undermine and isolate the Court.47 The amount of attention and legisla-
tion that focused on the ICC during the Bush administration’s first tenure 
is illustrative of just how actively the administration sought to undercut 
the Court’s prospects. The American Service-Members’ Protection Act 
(2002), pejoratively referred to as the “Hague Invasion Act”, provided the 
US President with the ability to deploy “any necessary measures” to free 
any American citizen detained and surrendered to The Hague.48 The US 
also threatened approximately 100 States that it would rescind provisions 
of aid if they did not sign so-called Bilateral Immunity Agreements.49 
Those agreements drew on Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which prohib-
its the ICC from issuing “a request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity 
of a person or property of a third State”. The most dramatic act of antago-
nism towards the Court, however, came in May 2002 when John R. Bol-
ton, an American diplomat, later National Security Advisor, delivered a 
notice to the UN Secretary General, ‘un-signing’ the Rome Statute. Bolton 
later called it his “happiest moment” at the US State Department.50 
These antagonistic policies were often justified by invoking fear 
that the Court would unfairly target American officials and troops who 
were disproportionally engaged militarily in contexts where other States 
either refused to or were unable to intervene. In other words, the Court 
was painted as an unfair and unnecessary threat to American political in-
terests. In response, there appears to have been some consensus within the 
Court that if the institution was to survive, it would need to demonstrate 
that it did not pose a direct threat to the US and that a co-operative rela-
tionship with the Court was in Washington’s interests. 
                                                   
47 See William A. Schabas, “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s 
All About the Security Council”, in European Journal of International Law, 2004, vol. 15, 
no. 4, pp. 701–20; Jason Ralph, Defending the Society of States: Why America Opposes the 
International Criminal Court and its Vision of World Society, Oxford University Press, 
2007. 
48 US, American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 30 July 2003 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/b48688/). 
49 See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials, Stanford 
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In its first years, the ICC demonstrated a policy of ‘accommodation’ 
to the US, evidenced, if not by admission of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo than in his decision-making as well as the Court’s record.51 This 
could be achieved by honing in on situations where US interests were few 
and by refraining from opening investigations independent of the explicit 
request of States or the United Nations Security Council. As part of this 
policy of accommodation towards the US, the ICC initially focused pri-
marily on receiving self-referrals from its States Parties. Such self-
referrals were useful for the new Court. In order to encourage self-
referrals, “the OTP shifted emphasis from a legalistic approach to a 
somewhat more political-diplomatic one”.52  Pursuing self-referrals had 
certain key advantages. At the Rome Conference, many States, including 
the US, had been wary of establishing a Court with a Prosecutor that was 
too independent and who would run roughshod in the pursuit of justice. 
The Prosecutor and his staff were not oblivious to these fears and sought 
to assuage them. This was achieved, according to former senior ICC staff, 
by not flexing the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers but instead working 
to receive invitations to intervene from ICC States Parties.53 In accepting 
self-referrals from States, the Court could demonstrate that it was sensi-
tive to US interests as well as have a small footprint on the relatively nov-
el conceptualization of the relationship between sovereignty and interna-
tional criminal justice. After all, a self-referral requires the State in ques-
tion to voluntarily cede at least partial sovereignty over its jurisdiction for 
atrocity crimes to the Court.  
In many respects, the ICC was successful in tempering Washing-
ton’s antagonism towards the Court. In sharp contrast to the Bush admin-
istration’s concerns, “the ICC appeared to be working in ways broadly 
consistent with American interests”.54 In its first two years, the OTP ac-
cepted three such self-referrals: Uganda (2003), the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (2004) and the Central African Republic (2004). None was 
in States where major powers have vested interests and that all were 
States where the UN had been deeply involved prior to the ICC’s inter-
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vention. One aim in selecting these situations appears to be to improve 
relations between the US and the Court. If the more co-operative and 
closer relationship that the ICC has enjoyed with the United States since 
Bush’s second term is any indication, the Prosecutor was certainly able to 
achieve just that.55 
But the improvement of the Court’s relationship with the US coin-
cided with deteriorating relations with other States. At precisely the same 
time as relations between Washington and the ICC began to improve, al-
legations arose that the Court was biased against African States.56 Until 
the OTP opened an official investigation into Georgia in late 2015, no 
State outside the African continent had been investigated by the Court. 
While assessing the validity of the criticism of the ICC as a biased institu-
tion is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that there 
has been increased pressure on the ICC in recent years to investigate not 
only situations outside of Africa but situations in which citizens of West-
ern States have allegedly perpetrated war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. A number of public international groups have, for example, pre-
pared what they see as a ‘devastating dossier’ implicating senior British 
officials in human rights abuses and international crimes in Iraq.57 In re-
sponse, the OTP re-opened a preliminary examination in 2014.58 In addi-
tion, after more than eight years, the OTP has been under pressure to fi-
nally decide whether its ongoing preliminary examination in Afghanistan, 
which includes assessing whether abuses perpetrated by US forces 
amount to war crimes prosecutable by the Court, should proceed to an 
official investigation.  
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Perhaps responding to this pressure, for the first time in 2014, the 
OTP’s preliminary examination report included a reference to the alleged 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” waged by US officials in Afghani-
stan against anti-government forces (who are also under examination by 
the Court).59 Indicative of the interests and politics at play, according to a 
former OTP staff member, the inclusion of the reference to enhanced in-
terrogation techniques was negotiated over a period of several weeks.60 
US diplomats reacted coolly in response to the inclusion of the ICC exam-
ining torture allegations, insisting that the Court could not prosecute citi-
zens of States that had not assented to the Rome Statute.61  
In its 2015 report, the Prosecutor went even further. There, the OTP 
essentially challenged US officials to open genuine investigations and 
prosecutions into allegations of torture – those being examined by the ICC 
as well as those outlined in the so-called ‘Torture Memos’. While the re-
port took note of the judicial activity taking place against US citizens al-
legedly responsible for perpetrating torture in Afghanistan, it also sig-
nalled that those efforts have been wholly insufficient and would thus 
leave the allegations admissible before the Court. Specifically, the report 
points out that two cases that involved the deaths of detainees in CIA cus-
tody “did not result in any indictments or prosecutions” and that 13 De-
partment of Defence investigations “were administrative enquiries rather 
than criminal proceedings”.62 The message was clear: American officials 
were not taking accountability for alleged abuses in Afghanistan suffi-
ciently seriously and, if this continues to be the case, the OTP will eventu-
ally have little choice but to proceed to an official investigation.  
However, in perhaps its most bold and most terse paragraph, the re-
port suggested that it was no longer questioning whether war crimes had 
been committed by US forces but was focusing on how systematic those 
crimes were: 
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The Office is assessing information relevant to determine the 
scale of the alleged abuse, as well as whether the identified 
war crimes were committed as part of a plan or policy. The 
information available suggests that victims were deliberately 
subjected to physical and psychological violence, and that 
crimes were allegedly committed with particular cruelty and 
in a manner that debased the basic human dignity of the vic-
tims. The infliction of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” 
applied cumulatively and in combination with each other 
over a prolonged period of time, would have caused serious 
physical and psychological injury to the victims. Some vic-
tims reportedly exhibited psychological and behavioural is-
sues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and at-
tempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.63 
In short, the OTP has reprimanded the US for not doing enough in 
pursuing accountability for alleged abuses committed by its citizens in 
Afghanistan and, taking a step further, has suggested that the perpetration 
of torture in Afghanistan may not have been the work of ‘bad apples’ but a 
plan or policy orchestrated at senior levels of the Bush administration.  
The 2014 and 2015 reports indicate a growing maturity on the part 
of the OTP and an evident willingness to challenge major powers via the 
medium of preliminary examinations. This may not yet reach the level of 
a strategy of ‘premeditated madness’ but it is certainly inching in that di-
rection.  
33.5. Strategies in the Preliminary Examination ‘Toolbox’: 
Thinking through Drawbacks  
The above analysis raises important questions: Can the ICC truly leverage 
preliminary examinations in order to positively influence State behaviour? 
If so, where does this influence come from and how can it be harnessed? 
More specifically, can the OTP’s bolder strategy with regards to allega-
tions of abuses by US troops in Afghanistan have the intended effect of 
galvanizing domestic judicial action? If not, how long can the OTP invoke 
a strategy of premeditated madness without actually pursuing all sides to a 
conflict before its bluff is called? When should such a policy apply – and 
when should it be avoided?  
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The argument set out in this chapter should not be read as being ap-
plicable across cases or, in and of itself, a full-proof strategy. Whatever 
form they take, preliminary examination strategies need to be carefully 
managed and calibrated to through time and to specific cases. This penul-
timate section first outlines how the ICC might leverage preliminary ex-
aminations to shape State behaviour. It subsequently and briefly explores 
three limitations or shortcomings that need to be considered when deploy-
ing the madman strategy, or indeed any sophisticated strategy to prelimi-
nary examinations. 
It is increasingly evident that States have a diverse diaspora of posi-
tions concerning their engagement with the ICC. Some choose to become 
States Parties whilst other remain outside of the Rome Statute system. 
Within those subsets, some are more proactively engaged than others. 
Moreover, as the relationship between the US and the ICC, as well as that 
of many African States with Court, clearly demonstrate, the engagement 
of States with the institution is dynamic and changes with time. Conse-
quently, identifying which States that are potentially receptive to pressures 
exerted by the ICC via its preliminary examinations would be a useful and 
necessary endeavour prior to deploying the madman, or any other prelim-
inary examination, strategy.  
The ICC is most likely to be able to achieve leverage in the prelimi-
nary examination over States that are concerned with the reputational 
costs of coming under the Court’s microscope. Many States, including 
Western States such as the US and the UK, would likely seek to avoid 
such judicial scrutiny and political labelling from the Court – what 
Mahmood Mamdani might call “a perverse version of the Nobel Prize”.64 
Importantly, and as demonstrated by the defence of Israel by the US, Can-
ada, and the UK against an ICC intervention into alleged crimes perpe-
trated in Gaza, States are not only concerned about their own reputations, 
but those of their allies.  
This, of course, still does not mean that the attention placed on 
States during the preliminary examination stage, even if it does affect 
their reputation, will necessarily encourage them to act. Alone, the ICC is 
unlikely to be able to instigate judicial activity or a cessation of atrocities. 
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What is needed is the development and entrenchment of strategic partner-
ships and engagements between the ICC and international and domestic 
civil society groups, widely respected diplomats and political leaders, 
human rights advocates, journalists, as well as other bodies such as the 
United Nations, in order to establish modalities of indirect leverage. To 
some degree, this is already part of the ICC’s embryonic strategies for 
preliminary examinations. As Stone observes: “By terming these ‘prelim-
inary examinations,’ disclosing many of them publicly, and publishing 
updates about them weekly, the prosecutor is inviting others to leverage 
the OTP’s attention to these situations into broader pressure for domestic 
action”. 65  Crucially, pressure should be exerted from multiple outlets: 
from the OTP towards States under preliminary examination; by external, 
non-States Parties towards the ICC to ensure that preliminary examina-
tions progress; and from those eternal actors towards States under exami-
nation. Fostering such a system of pressure would increase the probability 
of States under preliminary examination responding to the ICC with genu-
ine investigations. It would also, potentially, lessen the possibility of those 
States responding by attempting to isolate or undermine the institution.  
Nevertheless, even with such a system of pressures, at least three 
possible issues that a madman approach to preliminary examination raises 
need to be considered. First and foremost, it is worth repeating: the mad-
man strategy should not be applied to all situations. Some situations will 
require more restraint while others may instigate a need for the OTP to act 
hastily. An example of the former is Colombia, where the Court’s patient 
policy appears to have been fruitful in bringing about at least some signif-
icant positive outcomes regarding justice and accountability. In other cas-
es, such as Libya, a fast-developing crisis and a clear and looming threat 
to civilian life, led the OTP to judge it necessary to speedily conduct and 
conclude its preliminary examination so that it could quickly open an of-
ficial investigation, capture global attention, and attempt to have an im-
pact ‘on the ground’.66 
Secondly, the more brazen approach encompassed in the madman 
theory of preliminary examinations should only be applied in those situa-
tions that meet two key criteria: 1) there is strong evidence of crimes per-
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petrated by major powers, and 2) these powers are likely to take the 
Court’s examinations seriously and potentially respond to them by taking 
judicial action or changing the behaviour of their personnel engaged in 
warfare. Moreover, the OTP should not go from ‘zero-to-sixty’, deploying 
the premeditated madness approach immediately when it opens a prelimi-
nary examination. Rather, as indicated by the 2014 and 2015 reports vis-à-
vis allegations of enhanced interrogation techniques in Afghanistan, the 
OTP should begin with implicit warnings and only become increasingly 
intrepid if its signals are ignored. 
This second condition also highlights an important limitation, 
namely that some belligerents and actors will not care about what the ICC 
does or does not do – at any stage of an ICC intervention. A feasible re-
sponse by States as well as non-State actors to coming under ICC scrutiny 
is to simply ignore the Court altogether. More broadly, there is an ever-
present danger in viewing the ICC as more potent than it actually is. Pre-
liminary examination strategies should be tailored not only to specific 
situations, but also to the types of actors the Court is attempting to affect 
or influence.  
Finally, there is at least some risk of crying wolf and having the 
OTP’s bluff called if the madman theory is deployed but States fail to 
respond positively to ICC signals and the Court never actually targets 
those it has threatened. This is the most significant potential drawback of 
this approach to preliminary examinations and would have to be managed 
by the OTP from the very outset of the preliminary examination.  
These issues and potential limitations can and should be taken into 
account as part of a broader toolkit for preliminary examinations, one that 
would be managed and applied contextually with the aim of positively 
affecting conflicts and the behaviour of belligerents rather than just acting 
as a legal checklist. In other words, strategies should be developed to en-
hance the shadow cast by the ICC. The analysis and recommendations 
within this chapter may inspire more questions than answers. But, at the 
very least, the OTP should consider the madman approach as a viable 
strategy against which it can measure the merits of other types of ap-
proaches. This would help increase the sophistication of strategies em-
ployed in the preliminary examination phase in and across various con-
texts.  
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33.6. Conclusion: An Opportunity to Think of Preliminary 
Examinations Creatively 
Limiting our understanding of preliminary examinations to a legal check-
list whereby the OTP simply determines whether or not to open an official 
investigation is unsatisfactory. There is a need to think more strategically 
about how preliminary examinations can help to induce positive effects in 
the situations where the ICC intervenes. Thinking through how this might 
be done requires examining key assumptions regarding the Court’s im-
pacts and interests. This chapter has outlined four: 1) that the ICC is pre-
disposed to intervening in ongoing or very recently concluded conflicts; 2) 
that the Court is a political body with its own institutional interests deter-
mining the situations in which it intervenes and whom the ICC targets; 3) 
that, for a diversity of reasons, the institution would prefer that States take 
the responsibility for prosecuting international crimes; and 4) that the 
unpredictable nature of the preliminary examination stage of an ICC in-
tervention creates unique incentives for warring parties and potential ICC 
targets. These assumptions should be considered when crafting strategies 
to promote what the OTP sees as its two primary (and political) objectives 
in the preliminary examination stage: galvanizing genuine domestic judi-
cial action and preventing/deterring mass atrocities. One such strategy that 
should, at the very least, receive greater consideration is the madman the-
ory whereby the OTP makes clear, via its yearly reports as well as com-
munications to relevant actors, that it is willing to investigate and prose-
cute any and all parties to a conflict, irrespective of whether doing so 
undermines its own institutional interests. The OTP has already shown 
signs of doing so with regards to allegations of US torture in Afghanistan. 
This holds some promise in alleviating the widespread perceptions of the 
ICC is anything but an impartial and independent institution.  
Much has been written about the bias of the ICC in favour of the 
powerful over the weak. Whether this is a perception, a reality, or some 
combination of the two, the Court’s seeming selection bias against African 
States affects the institution’s legitimacy as a criminal court as well as an 
independent international institution. If the ICC is to retain its standing 
within the broader international community, it seems increasingly clear 
that the Court will need to take on the alleged crimes perpetrated by offi-
cials of powerful States. To this end, Schabas has written of the Court’s 
need for what he calls a “Pinochet moment”: 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 680 
One of the great and defining moments of international jus-
tice in recent times was the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in 
London in October 1998. Occurring only a few months after 
the adoption of the Rome Statute, it sent a message that even 
the friends of the most powerful could be brought to book if 
a genuinely independent and impartial justice system was in 
operation […] Fifteen years later, international criminal jus-
tice is focussed on global pariahs like Charles Taylor, Saif 
Gaddafi and Hissene Habre. The friends of the rich and pow-
erful are nowhere to be seen. There are no more Pinochets in 
the dock […] 
[T]he ICC has now become far too deferential to the es-
tablished order. Mostly it does not operate under a direct 
mandate from the Security Council, but that may be more il-
lusory than real, because it never strays from the comfort 
zone of the permanent members […] 
Right now international justice needs more Augusto Pi-
nochets […]67 
But what if the Court could both avoid the inevitable political con-
frontation of issuing arrest warrants for high level, powerful actors and 
receive the benefits of affecting accountability for crimes perpetrated by 
great powers and their allies? If this is indeed a possibility, expanding the 
size and veracity of the ICC’s shadow by formulating creative, smart, and 
proactive preliminary examination strategies should be a priority of the 
OTP.  
 
                                                   
67 William A. Schabas, “The Banality of International Justice”, in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2013, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 550–51 
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34. Open Source Fact-Finding in 
Preliminary Examinations 
Alexa Koenig, Felim McMahon, Nikita Mehandru 
and Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee* 
34.1. Introduction 
In national and international criminal jurisdictions, preliminary examina-
tion refers to a pre-investigative stage of prosecution during which availa-
ble information is examined to determine whether a threshold for further 
engagement is met. In the context of the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’), the Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) makes an informed determi-
nation about whether there is enough information to proceed to a full in-
vestigation.  
Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute sets the threshold for determining 
whether the available evidence is sufficient, requiring a “reasonable basis” 
to advance to investigation.1 In making this determination, the OTP must 
grapple with all of the information at its disposal, including both tradi-
                                                   
*  Alexa Koenig (J.D., Ph.D.) is the Executive Director of the Human Rights Center and 
Lecturer-in-Residence at the UC Berkeley School of Law; Felim McMahon (M.A.) is the 
Technology and Human Rights Program Director at the UC Berkeley School of Law; Ni-
kita Mehandru (B.A., Claremont McKenna College) and Shikha Silliman Bhattachar-
jee (J.D., Ph.D. candidate) are researchers affiliated with the Human Rights Center. The 
authors thank Caitlin Hoover and Michelle Lee for their research support and Lindsay 
Freeman for her feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
1 Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations, 2013 (‘OTP 2013’), para. 24 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
acb906/). As explained in the introductory remarks, the Paper “describes the OTP’s policy 
and practice in the conduct of preliminary examinations, that is, how the Office applies the 
statutory criteria to assess whether a situation warrants investigation. The paper is based on 
the Rome Statute […], the Rules of Procedure and Evidence […], the Regulations of the 
Court […], the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Office’s prosecutorial strat-
egy and policy documents, and its experience over the first years of its activities. [The Pa-
per reflects] an internal policy of the OTP. As such, it does not give rise to legal rights, and 
is subject to revision based on experience and in light of legal determinations by the 
Chambers of the Court” (paras. 19, 20). 
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tional and newer forms of evidence. Such data streams include a wide 
range of digital sources that can be accessed through open source investi-
gations – that is, online investigations that involve combing through pub-
licly accessible resources for information related to potential crimes.2 
Since the OTP does not have full investigative powers at the prelim-
inary examination phase,3 rigorous collection and analysis of open source 
information can play a significant role in shaping preliminary examination 
outcomes. Open source investigation and analysis can be used to authenti-
cate existing information and discover new materials and sources.4  
According to the OTP, preliminary examinations are governed by 
established internal standards, including standard formats for analytical 
reports, specific methods of source evaluation, consistent practices for 
measuring internal and external coherence, and a commitment to using 
information from diverse and independent sources as a means of bias con-
trol.5 As information ecologies evolve, these standards must continuously 
adapt to the range and scale of available open source materials. 
The OTP routinely uses open source information in preliminary ex-
aminations and, accordingly, has taken steps to grapple with a rapidly 
evolving context. These measures include engaging in meetings, work-
shops, and bilateral conversations with human rights organizations to dis-
cuss the range of scientific and digital technologies that can assist the 
Office in its use of open source materials. Among other considerations, 
these conversations have focused on harnessing data via remote sensing 
and satellite imaging, as well as how to manage the ‘coming storm’ of 
potential evidence from social media – a storm that has arguably arrived.6  
                                                   
2 For the purposes of this chapter, ‘open sources’ include news media, academic publicat-
ions, public reports, social media as well as online video and image sharing services. Clive 
Best, “Open source intelligence”, in Françoise Fogelman-Soulié (ed.), Mining massive da-
ta sets for security: advances in data mining, search, social networks and text mining, and 
their applications to security, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 331-344. 
3 OTP 2013, para. 12, see supra note 1. 
4 Alexa Koenig, The New Forensics: Using Open Source Information to Investigate Grave 
Crimes, Human Rights Center, 2018 (forthcoming).  
5 OTP 2013, para. 32, see supra note 1. 
6 Human Rights Centre, UC Berkeley School of Law, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using 
Scientific Evidence to Advance Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court” (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/a95842/). Idem, “Digital Fingerprints: Using Electronic Evidence 
to Advance Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court” (http://www.legal-tools.org/
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The ICC is far from alone in these conversations. In this digital age, 
methodologies for discovering, verifying and analysing information from 
open sources have changed rapidly, including in the context of journalism, 
policing, and government intelligence. Investigative journalists are exper-
imenting with more efficient ways of using social media and embracing 
new technologies to monitor global events. Human rights organizations 
like WITNESS are training activists in how to document atrocities with an 
eye to maximizing court admissibility and the weight of any videos they 
produce.7  
Reflecting these recent developments, the question at the heart of 
this chapter is: “how can evolving practices around the use of online open 
source information be harnessed to improve the quality of preliminary 
examinations at the ICC?”. This issue, which resides at the intersection of 
international criminal justice, human rights, and law and technology 
scholarship, has yet to be adequately addressed in legal and academic 
analysis. Finding an answer, we argue, is particularly important in the 
context of our rapidly expanding digital information ecosystem, in which 
information sources and transmission practices are continuously evolving.  
Bringing together international criminal justice and human rights 
scholarship and practice, this chapter raises critical issues, including 
quality control, related to the use of open source information in prelimi-
nary examinations. Section 34.2. of this chapter outlines the historic use 
of open source information to show how the comparatively recent use of 
such data by the OTP fits into the larger context of information gathering 
for effective prosecution. This section describes shifts in available types 
of open source information and maps the transition from military, political, 
and diplomatic uses of open source intelligence – with governments as the 
primary agents of retrieval, extraction, and analysis – to our contemporary 
context. This context is driven by the relatively recent proliferation of 
smartphones, social media, and other networked public repositories as 
civil society has increasingly emerged as an agent in both intelligence 
gathering and information generation.  
                                                                                                                        
doc/84e097/). Idem, “First Responders: An International Workshop on Collecting and Ana-
lyzing Evidence of International Crimes” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bf0b24/). Idem, 
“The New Forensics: Using Open Source Information to Investigate Grave Crimes” 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/e7b0b9/). 
7 WITNESS, “Video as Evidence Field Guide” (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/a1c088-1/). 
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Section 34.3. discusses the factors the OTP weighs when using in-
formation derived from open sources to support preliminary examinations 
and explains how open source material can strengthen the preliminary 
examination process. It opens by discussing three core principles that are 
supposed to guide that process: (1) independence, (2) impartiality, and (3) 
objectivity.8 Next, consistent with the Policy Paper on Preliminary Exam-
inations released by the OTP in 2013, the section considers three statutory 
factors that guide preliminary examination processes: (1) jurisdiction, (2) 
admissibility, and (3) the interests of justice. Finally, this section address-
es the implications of open source information for three policy objectives 
at the preliminary examination phase: (1) transparency, (2) ending impu-
nity through positive complementarity, and (3) the prevention of crimes. 
In the context of each of these factors, this chapter discusses the implica-
tions of open source information gathering for quality control standards in 
preliminary examination. We argue that effective methods for gathering 
and rigorously analysing open source information are essential to the pre-
liminary examination process and, if optimally conducted, present signifi-
cant opportunities to improve associated outcomes. 
34.2. The Rise of Open Source Investigations for Intelligence 
Gathering and Human Rights Monitoring 
Governments have long utilized open source information in military, po-
litical, and diplomatic contexts to shed light on events happening at a dis-
tance. Significant shifts in the types of open source information collected 
by governments have occurred with the proliferation of new information 
technologies, often motivated by and thus concurrent with periods of po-
litical unrest and war. Three distinct eras in the evolution of open source 
intelligence include: (1) newspaper-based intelligence gathering during 
the Crimean War (1853–1856); (2) the use of journals and foreign broad-
casts during World War II (1939–1945); and (3) the mining of print, radio, 
television and telephonic communication during the Cold War, and later 
for human rights monitoring.  
A fourth and more recent stage in the evolution of open source in-
formation gathering has been driven by the relatively recent proliferation 
of smartphones, social media, and other networked public repositories – 
                                                   
8 OTP 2013, p. 7, see supra note 1. 
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including academic and legal communities on portals such as Academ-
ia.edu and LinkedIn, as well as social media sites such as Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter. This stage is distinct from the first three because 
private actors, rather than governments, have emerged as dynamic players 
in both information generation and intelligence gathering. This expansion 
of access to the production, dissemination, and collection of open source 
information has disaggregated and arguably democratized information 
production and usage. 
This history is instructive for at least two reasons. First, the evolv-
ing nature of open source information calls for similarly evolving strate-
gies for information collection and verification. Thus, developing rigid 
policies that cannot accommodate new forms of media will be counter-
productive. Second, this history suggests that existing practices governing 
authentication of open source information that were developed in relation 
to government-dominated phases of open source intelligence may need 
rethinking. 
34.2.1. Brief History of Open Source Intelligence: 1853 to Present 
The Crimean War (1853–1856) – provoked by Russian expansion into the 
Danube principalities then under Turkish control – positioned Russia 
against Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia. Historians of 
the Crimean War have marked the legacies that this conflict left for future 
international conflicts. They note the role of nationalism in driving such 
conflicts, the forming of alliances between world powers, the widespread 
use of railways as supply lines, and the use of modern warfare, including 
trench warfare and machine guns.9  
Equally important, the Crimean War was also the first major global 
conflict to be covered by wartime correspondents and photojournalists.10 
Thus, this period witnessed the birth of the modern military-media rela-
tionship, a distinction largely attributed to the work of British journalist 
William Howard Russell from The Times. Prior to the Crimean War, jun-
ior army officers filtered information about wartime activities from battle-
fronts through letters to newspaper editors. Conversely, Russell, a civilian 
reporter, unleashed unbridled criticism of the war directly from his posi-
                                                   
9 “The Crimean War”, in BBC News, 29 March 2011. 
10 Ibid. 
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tion on the frontlines, revealing the awful living conditions of soldiers and 
the occasional incompetency of army leadership. Coverage of sinking 
troop morale and experiences by embedded journalists like Russell pro-
vided an early source of open intelligence. With Russian and British spies 
using newspapers to track what was happening around the world, Rus-
sell’s war coverage became a valuable source of information. This shift in 
the military-media relationship and the stream of information it produced 
led then-Russian Emperor Nicholas I to remark: “I have no need of spies, 
I have the Times of London”.11 
A second significant moment in the evolution of open source infor-
mation occurred during World War II when the United States government 
systematically invested in developing open source intelligence capacity. 
As early as 1939, the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs 
developed the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, which was brought 
under the ambit of the Federal Communications Commission. On 25 Feb-
ruary 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt designated $150,000 
from his emergency fund to monitor foreign broadcasts for intelligence 
purposes.12 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the 
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service was renamed the Foreign Broad-
cast Intelligence Service, responsible for tracking foreign short-wave ra-
dio signals to extract intelligence.13  
Meanwhile, the Roosevelt administration had also established the 
Office of the Coordination of Information, tasked with analysing infor-
mation collected abroad.14 In June 1942, the Office of the Coordination of 
Information became the Office of Strategic Services, directed to conduct 
both espionage against the Axis powers and in-depth research and analysis 
on designated national enemies and their capabilities.15 The Office’s Re-
search and Analysis Branch collected newspaper clippings, journals, and 
radio broadcast reports from around the world that could provide valuable 
                                                   
11 David Murphy, Ireland and the Crimean War, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2014, p. 174. 
12 Central Intelligence Agency, “Early Beginnings” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0c9562/). 
13 Central Intelligence Agency, “Impact of Pearl Harbor Attack” (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/669689/).  
14 Central Intelligence Agency, “A Look Back … Gen. William J. Donovan Heads Office of 
Strategic Services”, 31 December 2009 (available on the Agency’s web site).  
15 Central Intelligence Agency, “A Look Back … Gen. William J. Donovan Heads Office of 
Strategic Services”, see supra note 16. 
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intelligence.16 Obituaries of soldiers or navy officers in German newspa-
pers, for instance, could include images of battleships and bomb craters 
that facilitated an understanding of German technologies, some of which 
were reverse engineered for American use.17  
In 1946, following the war’s conclusion, first the Office of Strategic 
Services and then the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service were dis-
solved. Their respective roles were concentrated in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (‘CIA’), established under President Truman by the Nation-
al Security Act.18  
During this period, the Soviet Union gained parity with intelligence 
operations in the United States. The Ministry of State Security (MGB) 
was one of the USSR’s many iterations of intelligence agencies, and 
played a prominent role during World War II. It was succeeded by the 
Committee for State Security (KCG), which served as the Community 
Party’s watchdog, with the added objective of monitoring domestic coun-
terintelligence efforts.19 
In addition to the expanded number of organizations collecting open 
source information, the Cold War era witnessed an explosion of new 
means for intelligence gathering, specifically radio, television, and real 
time phone communication. It was towards the end of this third era, in the 
late 1980s, that the US military first coined the term ‘OSINT’ to reference 
open source intelligence. 20  Scrutiny of foreign press, propaganda, and 
radio initiated during World War II was extended and expanded, not only 
by the United States but by all other major national government players.21 
One inside source at the time remarked in response to this enormous 
growth that, “in aggregate, open sources probably furnish the greater part 
                                                   
16 Cameron Colquhoun, “A Brief History of Open Source Intelligence”, in Bellingcat, 14 July 
2016. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Central Intelligence Agency, “A Look Back … Gen. William J. Donovan Heads Office of 
Strategic Services”, see supra note 16.  
19 Encyclopedia Britannica, “KGB” (available on its web site).  
20 Florian Schaurer and Jan Störger, “The Evolution of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)”, 
in Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter/Spring 2013 
(available on AFIO’s web site).  
21 Stephen Mercado, “Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age”, in CSI Studies, vol. 
48, no. 3, 14 April 2007 (available on the Agency’s web site).  
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of all information used in the production of military intelligence on the 
Soviet Union”.22  
These public information sources provided near real time access to 
sites of conflict and other remote events. In the United States, the CIA 
developed innovative approaches to intelligence gathering, including the 
use of overhead surveillance systems to collect images of weapons and 
operational sites.23 Signal intelligence (’sIGINT’) collectors eavesdropped 
on military exercises, and were deployed covertly in the air, under sea, 
and within the USSR.24 The Council of Ministers of East Germany for 
State Security mined 1,000 Western magazines, hundreds of books, and 
twelve hours of West German daily radio and television programming.25 
The US publication Aviation Week served as a particularly valuable source, 
fueling East German intelligence gatherings of recent US developments in 
aerospace.26 New media forms not only expanded government use of open 
source intelligence during the Cold War era but facilitated the creation, 
collection, and use of visual documentation by a variety of stakeholders 
seeking accountability for government misconduct – including ever-
increasing numbers of human rights advocates. 
Reflecting on US-North Korea relations at the time, Donald P. 
Gregg explained, “it is a well-known phenomenon in the field of intelli-
gence that there often comes a time when public political activity pro-
ceeds at such a rapid and fulminating pace that secret intelligence, the 
work of agents, is overtaken by events publicly recorded”.27 Gregg’s as-
sessment of the immediacy of press coverage anticipated the next stage in 
the evolution of open source intelligence, when nongovernmental actors 
emerged as participants in both information generation and intelligence 
gathering.  
                                                   
22 Ibid. 
23 Clarence E. Smith, Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA’s Analysis of Soviet Science and 
Technology”, in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett (eds), Watching the Bear: Essays 
on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 2003, chap. 4 (available on the CIA’s web site).  
24 Ibid. 
25 Schaurer and Störger, see supra note 23. 
26 Mercado, see supra note 24.  
27 Donald P. Gregg, “A Long Road to P’yongyang”, in Korea Society Quarterly, Spring 2002, 
vol. 3, no. 1, p. 7. 
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This third era is marked by the accelerated creation of visual and 
print- based documentation of human rights abuses by organizations such 
as the New York Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union 
(‘ACLU’), Amnesty International, and Helsinki Watch – a precursor to 
Human Rights Watch. For instance, in order to document police violence, 
ACLU staff, armed with movie cameras, posted themselves in buildings 
overlooking protest sites during the Vietnam war. Aryeh Neier, former 
director of the ACLU and founder of Human Rights Watch, recalled that 
when he began working at the ACLU in the mid-1960s, protestors “could 
not produce witnesses or evidence other than their bruises to support [po-
lice brutality] complaints”. Addressing this evidentiary gap, lead attorney 
for the New York Civil Liberties Union, Police Practices Project, Paul 
Chevigny, used a ‘moviola’ film editing tool to comb through footage, 
frame by frame, and capture police abuses. In one instance, Chevigny 
used segments from a film to clear charges against approximately 600 
demonstrators, establishing that police who claimed to have arrested ac-
tivists were, in fact, providing false testimony against those activists. 
These practices, developed at the New York Civil Liberties Union, were 
embraced by the ACLU in the early 1970s. In a landmark case, the ACLU 
used activist footage to clear charges against 13,000 demonstrators and to 
secure damages.28 
Amnesty International similarly used open source information to 
support their investigations and produce publicly accessible data for use 
by others. Established in Britain in 1961 to provide amnesty for prisoners 
of conscience, by 1963, Amnesty International had founded an interna-
tional secretariat and expanded its mandate to include global engage-
ment.29 The Amnesty staff, comprised almost entirely of volunteers, “reg-
ularly scanned [foreign newspapers] for information about those impris-
oned”, developed detailed reports, and filed prisoner-specific information 
on index cards. During their first year in operation, Amnesty volunteers, 
many housed in universities, produced approximately 1,200 prisoner his-
tories. These histories were made available to the press and other interest-
                                                   
28 Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties: Four Decades In The Struggle For Rights, Public Affairs, 
New York, 2003, p. 19. 
29 For a brief overview of the transition from the domestic orientation of the United States 
based civil rights movement into an international human rights endeavour, see ibid.  
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ed bodies,30 a practice that facilitated frequent partnerships between Am-
nesty and news outlets, including the BBC.31 Amnesty International also 
published research in journals and newsletters.32 Now operating in around 
70 countries, Amnesty International both consumes and produces public-
ly-accessible data for use in a range of human rights campaigns and initia-
tives.33 
By 1978, production of publicly accessible data was directed at 
monitoring compliance with international agreements and legal standards. 
Helsinki Watch was established in 1978 to support citizen groups formed 
throughout the Soviet bloc to monitor government compliance with the 
1975 Helsinki Accords.34 Helsinki Watch later morphed into a series of 
regional ‘Watches’ to monitor abusive governments in disparate parts of 
the world, eventually collectivizing into Human Rights Watch. The Hu-
man Rights Watch mandate, to monitor and document abuse, expanded in 
the 1990s to tracking violations of humanitarian law.35 Today, the Human 
Rights Watch International Justice programme works closely with the ICC, 
other international and hybrid tribunals, and national courts to bring jus-
tice to perpetrators who have committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.36 
By the late 1980s, in concert with the rise of these large non-
governmental organizations, smaller civil society organizations had also 
begun using still and video cameras to document human rights abuses. In 
1988, while on a humanitarian tour with a group from Amnesty Interna-
tional, activist and musician Peter Gabriel used his Sony Handycam to 
record survivor stories. A few years later, in 1991, a bystander captured 
the brutal beating of Rodney King, an African-American male, by Los 
Angeles police. The footage hit television and sparked condemnation and 
riots that lasted days. In 1992, inspired by these two events, Gabriel estab-
lished the non-governmental organization WITNESS to train activists 
                                                   
30 Amnesty International, First Annual Report 1961-1962, Temple, London, 1962, p. 5.  
31 Ibid., p. 11. 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
33 Amnesty International, “Who We Are” (available on its web site).  
34 Human Rights Watch, “History” (available on its web site). 
35 Ibid.  
36 Human Rights Watch, “International Justice” (available on its web site). 
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around the world in the effective use of video documentation for human 
rights purposes.37 
By this time, the Internet had dramatically changed the accessibility 
of a wide range of public information. In military information gathering 
contexts, an emergent pool of information online necessitated a fresh look 
at the use of non-classified information for military purposes. Increasingly, 
videos, photographs and satellite imagery, including images collected 
through remote sensing by drone, were being used not only for military, 
political and foreign policy purposes,38 but to support legal accountability. 
One particularly notable example is the use of perpetrator footage in the 
now-infamous Skorpions case at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’).39 The footage was passed along from 
activists to ICTY prosecutors, and ultimately used to help establish the 
killings that were alleged to have occurred, who committed them, and 
how.40 Increasingly, video content generated in conflict zones began to be 
used as evidence in war crimes cases around the world. As that content 
began to flood the internet, new opportunities emerged for both accessing 
and analysing such resources. 
34.2.2. The Shifting Nature of the Internet: Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 
The fourth era in the evolution and use of open source information  –  the 
one we are in today  –  is meaningfully distinct from the first three stages 
in part because individual (as opposed to organizational) actors have 
emerged as central participants in both the process of information genera-
tion and intelligence gathering. This is largely due to the availability of 
open source information on the Internet. This evolution can be described 
as a transition from exploiting the first generation of Internet-based re-
                                                   
37 Peter Gabriel, “WITNESS”, available at PeterGabriel.com.  
38 Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According 
to Type of Military Intervention, Joan Shorenstein Centre on the Press, Politics and Public 
Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1997.  
39 Alexa Koenig, Keith Hiatt, and Khaled Alrabe, “Access Denied? The International Crimi-
nal Court, Transnational Discovery, and The American Servicemembers Protection Act”, in 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2018 (forthcoming) (discussing the use of video as 
evidence in international courts). 
40 Ibid.  
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sources on Web 1.0 (the ‘readable’ phase of the Internet) to discovering 
materials available during its next, ‘writable’ stage: Web 2.0.41 
During the early years of the Internet, Web version ‘1.0’ was a rela-
tively static place from which users could access information from a lim-
ited number of sources. While version 1.0 facilitated access to news re-
ports, public statements and official websites, academic articles, and hu-
man rights reports, these sources – available at a comparatively limited 
scale – tended to be relatively stable and attributable to particular national 
or international sources, and therefore more easily authenticated. While 
Web 1.0 made it quicker and easier to find information related to an inves-
tigation when compared with analogue sources, the type of information 
available online was not radically different from what could otherwise be 
found in a physical library. The ways in which Web 1.0 data and resources 
were used were also similar to engaging with traditional information 
sources.  
The Internet has since evolved to become a more dynamic envi-
ronment, one that permits significant interaction between users and sites, 
and features a greater diversity of resources, including citizen journalism, 
social media, and data derived from social science to hacktivism to leaks. 
Referred to as ‘Web 2.0’, this writable world of expanded online open 
source information presents new opportunities and challenges. Web 2.0 is 
marked by an exponential expansion of online content that includes “pro-
file pages, public messages, digital photographs, video, chat transcripts, 
[and] private messages”42 and the enabling of two-way communication 
between user and platform, and between user and user.  
This next generation of the Internet was driven in part by the prolif-
eration of smartphones, social media, and networked public repositories, 
such as digital archives, during the first two decades of the twenty-first 
century. Today, Web 2.0 open sources are increasing exponentially. For 
instance, as of early 2017, there were reportedly more hours of citizen 
footage documenting the Syrian war than had taken place during the war 
                                                   
41 Riaan Rudman and Rikus Bruwer, “Defining Web 3.0: opportunities and challenges”, in 
The Electronic Library, 2016, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 132–154 (discussing the evolution of Web 
1.0 to 2.0 as well as the emergence of later versions). 
42 Christopher Boehning and Daniel Toal, “Authenticating Social Media Evidence”, in New 
York Law Journal, 2002, vol. 248, no. 65, p. 2.  
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itself.43 In addition to volume challenges, this next generation requires 
new approaches to assessing veracity, since sources may be transitory, 
manipulated and/or lack attribution. Importantly, the repeat sharing of 
content hinders the potential to identify an incident’s veracity by poten-
tially obscuring its source. Since metadata – information about the con-
tent – can be stripped away, it may be difficult to corroborate critical in-
formation about the videographer, uploader, time, date and place. These 
features of Web 2.0 sources require new modes of retrieval, extraction and 
analysis – including new methods for source verification and credibility 
assessment.  
Importantly for legal accountability, version 2.0 has also facilitated 
access to information about human rights abuses and alleged war crimes. 
For example, in 2007, rising fuel prices in Myanmar combined with dec-
ades of political oppression and human rights abuses by the Burmese gov-
ernment triggered massive demonstrations.44 Termed the ‘Saffron Revolu-
tion’, civilian video footage documented daily protests despite govern-
ment attempts to suppress Internet access.45 In 2009, the Green Revolu-
tion in Iran was marked by millions of young Iranians sharing real-time 
videos from Tehran.46 Twitter and Facebook served as platforms to docu-
ment the revolution and encourage international observers to stand in sol-
idarity. The movement helped instigate the advent of citizen journalism, 
with news from civilians reaching the masses before many, if not most, 
traditional media outlets. 47  While citizen journalism and mobilization 
through networked public repositories was perhaps most visible during 
this Arab Spring period of democracy building,48 around the same time 
                                                   
43 Andy Greenberg, “Google’s New YouTube Analysis App Crowdsources War Reporting”, 
in Wired, 20 April 2016. 
44 Human Rights Watch, “Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma” 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/058507/).  
45  “Burmese Government Clamps Down on Internet”, in New York Times, 28 September 2007.  
46 Cameron Colquhoun, “A Brief History of Open Source Intelligence”, see supra note 19.  
47 Jared Keller, “Evaluating Iran’s Twitter Revolution”, in The Atlantic, 18 June 2010.  
48 Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media 
and the Arab Spring, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad 
Segev, and Tamir Sheafer, “Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First”, in In-
ternational Journal of Press/Politics, 2013, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 115-137 (finding that social 
media activity tends not to lead political protest activity but to follow it). 
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‘user generated content’ was also streaming out of South and Central 
America, Africa and Asia.  
A rise in citizen journalism has been evident even in countries that 
lag in access to technology. Midia Ninja in Brazil, for example, has been 
challenging traditional media outlets that have historically been monopo-
lized by powerful Latin American families. Promoting independent jour-
nalism, in June 2013 Midia Ninja’s citizen journalists were on the ground 
with citizens protesting Brazilian government spending and education 
policies. 49  YouTube quickly became one of the primary platforms for 
sharing relevant video and providing a counter narrative to that dissemi-
nated by major broadcasting corporations. 
Compared with Web 1.0 open sources, which are relatively static, 
Web 2.0 sources are dynamic, may be transitory, lack attribution, and/or 
may increase or spread quickly. By August 2017, as many as 300 hours of 
video footage were being uploaded to YouTube every minute, a number 
that continues to rise.50 Thus, the challenge for activists has become less 
about how to get information about what is happening in various regions 
of the world, than to find relevant data – to separate the ‘signal’ from the 
‘noise.’51  
By the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, video 
footage was not only being increasingly uploaded, but sent from human 
rights activists directly to courts with the objective of strengthening pros-
ecutions, including at the ICC.52 Simultaneously, OTP investigators began 
meeting with human rights organizations to discuss the range of scientific 
and digital technologies that could assist the court in generating the criti-
cal lead, linkage and corroborative evidence needed to identify witnesses, 
strengthen witness testimony, and pursue successful prosecutions. These 
conversations focused on harnessing data via remote sensing and satellite 
                                                   
49 Hivos, “Ninja, the rise of citizen journalism in Brazil”, 13 August 2013.  
50 Danny Donchev, “37 Mind Blowing YouTube Facts, Figures and Statistics – 2017”, For-
tunelord.  
51 For a discussion of source verification and spatial relevance of YouTube footage on the 
Syrian war, see Michael Storm, Nadine Fattaleh, and Violet Whitney, “Conflict Urbanism: 
Aleppo Seminar Case Study, Spatializing Syria’s YouTube War” (available on the web site 
of Columbia University). 
52 For an overview of the various kinds of evidence that video footage can provide, see 
WITNESS, “Video as Evidence Field Guide”, see supra note 10.  
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imagery, as well as how to manage vast quantities of potential evidence 
derived from smartphones and social media.53  
Responding to challenges associated with source verification and 
credibility assessment, groups like WITNESS and Videre est Credere be-
gan training activists in how to document atrocities with an eye to maxim-
izing the court admissibility and weight of any video they produced.54 
Investigative journalists also began experimenting with how to use new 
technologies, including social media, to monitor global events. For exam-
ple, the founders of Storyful in Ireland figured out how to scoop major 
media outlets by collecting open source information from Twitter, Face-
book, and other social media platforms, and then systematically verifying 
and authenticating the information they harvested to maximize its reliabil-
ity. Human rights activists and legal investigators have since adopted 
many of these methods to more effectively search publicly accessible re-
sources,55 sometimes using crowdsourcing to conduct the labor intensive 
work of digital discovery, verification, and authentication of online open 
sources.56 
34.3. The Use of Open Source Information to Advance Preliminary 
Examinations at the ICC 
The preliminary examination process at the ICC is rooted in Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute, which describes the powers of the Prosecutor. A prelim-
inary examination can be initiated in three ways: (1) on the basis of in-
formation sent to the court about crimes within its jurisdiction;57 (2) via a 
declaration lodged by a State accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
                                                   
53 Human Rights Centre, UC Berkeley School of Law, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using 
Scientific Evidence to Advance Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court”, “Digital 
Fingerprints: Using Electronic Evidence to Advance Prosecutions at the International 
Criminal Court”, “First Responders: An International Workshop on Collecting and Analyz-
ing Evidence of International Crimes”, and “The New Forensics: Using Open Source In-
formation to Investigate Grave Crimes”, see supra note 9.  
54 WITNESS, “Video as Evidence Field Guide”, see supra note 10.  
55 Bellingcat, “About” (available on its web site). Amnesty International, “Digital Verifica-
tion Corps-Citizen Evidence Lab”, available at https://citizenevidence.org. 
56 In this context, verification refers to investigating the accuracy of the information while 
authentication refers to verifying whether the item is what it claims to be.  
57  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, 
Article 14 (‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
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Court;58 or (3) based on a referral from a State Party59 or the United Na-
tions Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter.60 In the case of a declaration or a referral, the preliminary exami-
nation process begins immediately. Otherwise, the Prosecutor is acting 
proprio motu, or on her own initiative based on information about crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the court.61  
The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, released by the 
OTP in 2013, details how a preliminary examination may be initiated, 
describes its phased approach, and outlines the activities that the Office 
may carry out during the process. It sets out general principles that are 
required of the Office in the conduct of its preliminary examination: inde-
pendence, impartiality and objectivity. It also addresses jurisdiction, ad-
missibility, and the interests of justice – three statutory factors that guide 
the preliminary examination process.62 Finally, the Paper identifies three 
policy objectives for the Office in conducting its preliminary examina-
tions: enhancing transparency, ending impunity, and preventing crimes.63 
The ultimate objective of the preliminary investigation is to deter-
mine whether there is a basis to proceed to a full investigation. ICC judg-
es have interpreted the standard of proof required to open an investigation 
as a “sensible or reasonable justification” to believe that a crime falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court “has been or is being committed”.64 
Judges have furthermore indicated that not all of the information available 
to the Prosecutor must “point towards only one conclusion”, adding that 
such information cannot be expected to be comprehensive or conclusive 
during a preliminary examination.65 




61 OTP 2013, para. 4, see supra note 1 (laying out the various ways in which a preliminary 
examination can be initiated). 
62 ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(a)–(c), see supra note 62. 
63 OTP 2013, paras. 93–106, see supra note 1.  
64 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Corrigendum of the Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 31 March 2010, paras. 34, 35 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/f0caaf/). 
65 OTP 2013, para. 11, see supra note 1.  
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Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute leaves open the types of data that 
can be relied upon during the preliminary examination phase, noting 
simply that such data should comprise “information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court”. The 2013 Policy Paper reiterates the breadth of 
information upon which the Office may rely, stating that it may initiate a 
preliminary examination “taking into account any information on crimes 
within [its] jurisdiction”.66 
Similarly, the Statute does not limit the sources from which infor-
mation can be received or solicited. Such information can come “from 
States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, or other reliable sources”.67 While the 2013 
Policy Paper does not specifically mention individuals, unaffiliated per-
sons could also be relied upon by the OTP insofar as they are reliable 
sources. Additionally, the Prosecutor “may receive written or oral testi-
mony at the seat of the Court” in assessing the “seriousness” of infor-
mation already in her possession. The OTP can therefore receive, gather 
or solicit information from almost any source during the preliminary ex-
amination phase. This provides the Office with a wide scope and strong 
incentive to use open source information. 
Regardless of how a preliminary examination is initiated, the effec-
tive gathering and rigorous analysis of open source information is essen-
tial to the process. Since the Office does not “enjoy full investigative 
powers”68 during preliminary examination, it is limited in the methods it 
can employ. The Office may send requests for information to reliable 
sources and may conduct field missions with the aim of analysing infor-
mation, but these visits must be limited to collecting further information.69 
Accordingly, the value of open source information in the overall infor-
mation-seeking context is at its apex at this point in the proceedings. Fur-
thermore, optimum gathering and processing of open source information 
                                                   
66 Ibid., para. 73 (emphasis added).  
67 ICC Statute, Article 15(2), see supra note 62. 
68 OTP 2013, paras. 12–13, see supra note 1. 
69 For instance, field missions were conducted in Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, and elsewhere. 
See Ignaz Stegmiller, “Article 15(2)-Additional information”, in Commentary on the Law 
of the International Criminal Court, available at https://cilrap-lexsitus.org/clicc/content/
15-2-additional-information (citing ICC, Report of the Activities of the Court, 21 October 
2013, ICC-ASP/12/28, paras. 72, 74, 77 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b22709/)). 
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has a greater relative impact during the preliminary examination phase 
than during the investigation phase, when the full spectrum of State co-
operation measures can be activated.  
The Office’s policy and practice is therefore especially well devel-
oped with regard to the use of open source information during preliminary 
examination, during which open-source approaches are used to gather 
information about possible crimes, assess information in the Office’s pos-
session, and identify further sources of information. The degree to which 
the Office can rely on open source information does not seem to be lim-
ited by either the Rome Statute or Court policy or practice. This wide am-
bit reinforces the idea that open source information can play a positive 
role in both triggering and determining the outcome of a preliminary ex-
amination.70  
34.3.1. Guiding principles 
The use of open source information in preliminary examination is bound 
only by the necessity to analyse the information in line with the principles 
of independence, impartiality and objectivity. These general principles,71 
derived respectively from articles 42, 21(3), and 54(1) of the Rome Stat-
ute, define how such information is to be assessed. 
34.3.1.1. Independence 
Article 42 of the Statute states that the Office shall “act independently of 
instructions from any external source” and “shall not be influenced or 
altered by the presumed or known wishes of any party”.72 In the case of a 
State Party or United Nations Security Council referral, and in relation to 
                                                   
70 Although not explicitly stated in the Policy Paper, it seems theoretically possible for a 
preliminary examination to be initiated entirely on the basis of information collected from 
open sources by the Office of the Prosecutor. In practice, it would be extremely rare for a 
situation to become the subject of an investigation, a preliminary examination, or a preven-
tive statement without the office receiving any related communications or interacting with 
an external actor. However, the Rome Statute and Policy Paper do not rule out the possibil-
ity that the Office might open a preliminary examination, or even a full examination, on 
the basis of information derived entirely from its own open source collection and analysis, 
nor does it limit the degree to which the Office may rely on such information in issuing 
preventive statements. 
71 OTP 2013, para. 25, see supra note 1.  
72 Ibid., para. 26.  
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Article 15 communications, the Office “is not bound or constrained by the 
information” it receives. It may seek further information from “reliable 
sources” and all information is “subject to critical analysis and evalua-
tion”.73  
In practice, Article 42 not only permits but reinforces the im-
portance of effectively using open source information to corroborate ex-
isting information and to identify further sources. The principle of inde-
pendence also requires the Office to develop and apply consistent and 
defensible standards in analysing and evaluating information received 
from outsiders, supplementary information received at the request of the 
Office, and information gathered from open sources. 
34.3.1.2. Impartiality 
The principle of impartiality is rooted in Article 21(3) of the Statute, 
which states that the Court shall interpret and apply the law “without any 
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, age, race, colour, 
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, wealth, birth, or other status”.74 According to the Policy 
Paper, this requires the Office to “apply consistent methods and criteria, 
irrespective of the states or parties involved or the person(s) or group(s) 
concerned”.75  The principle of impartiality thus reinforces the need to 
develop and apply a methodology around open source information and 
information collection more generally that does not unfairly disadvantage 
persons or groups based on unequal access to modern information and 
communication technologies.  
In developing preliminary examination methodologies in relation-
ship to a wide range of open source information, impartiality as a govern-
ing principle requires continued attention to ensuring that the use of open 
source information does not disadvantage persons on the basis of their 
being on the wrong side of the digital divide or otherwise poorly repre-
sented. The Policy Paper states that the OTP “seeks to ensure that […] all 
relevant parties are given the opportunity to provide information”.76 The 
                                                   
73 Ibid., para. 27. 
74 Ibid., p. 7, fn. 15. 
75 Ibid., para. 28. 
76 Ibid., para. 33. 
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principle of impartiality and the wider requirements of Article 21(3) there-
fore stand as a corrective to an over-reliance on digitally derived open 
source information. 
The principle of impartiality also points to the importance of gov-
ernmental organizations, the UN system, non-governmental organizations, 
civil society, and other ‘first responders’ in rendering situations and their 
complexities visible to criminal jurisdictions. Further, it reinforces the 
importance of systematically accessing mass communication platforms 
associated with modern information communication technologies that are 
increasingly being used by underrepresented groups in order to identify 
and integrate their experiences and perspectives.  
34.3.1.3. Objectivity 
The 2013 policy paper derives the principle of objectivity from Article 
54(1), which provides that the Office will “investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally”. The Paper notes that, because the 
information assessed in preliminary examinations is mainly from external 
sources, the OTP will pay “particular attention to the assessment of the 
reliability of the source and the credibility of the information”.77 
Today, organizations seeking to make objective use of all available 
resources must assess information from a diverse range of sources includ-
ing information from State organs, political and military actors, profes-
sional news organizations, media activists, hacktivists, citizen journalists, 
ordinary citizens and untrained eyewitnesses. A far richer and more di-
verse stream of information is available than ever before, including de-
tailed real-time information. This presents a challenge not just in terms of 
source evaluation, but also in terms of source identification and the cor-
roboration and verification of available data. 
The Policy Paper notes that “the Office uses standard formats for 
analytical reports, standard methods of source evaluation, and consistent 
rules of measurement”, checking “internal and external coherence” and 
“drawing information from diverse and independent sources as a means of 
bias control”. 78  As discussed in the previous section, methodologies 
around the discovery, verification and analysis of relevant information 
                                                   
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid. 
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from open sources have changed rapidly in the context of journalism, 
policing and in the world of intelligence. As the information ecosystem 
evolves, the formats, methods, and rules of the Office will need to adapt 
to respond to those changes. It is thus incumbent upon the Office to equip 
itself with the latest skillsets in terms of handling data streams from open 
sources. 
In service of the principle of objectivity, the Office is also presented 
with an opportunity and a challenge in relation to the volume, variety, and 
relatively unstable nature of open source information. Online investiga-
tions require fact gatherers to grapple with ever larger quantities of infor-
mation, while valuable information often appears, disappears, or is repli-
cated in real time, with varying degrees of fidelity. In ensuring that the use 
of open source information is in line with the principle of objectivity, the 
OTP can draw on the experience and activities of a range of actors outside 
the Court, including from the fields of journalism, human rights, and law 
enforcement. 
34.3.2. Statutory Factors 
The OTP analyses three statutory factors when determining whether to 
proceed with an investigation: jurisdiction, admissibility, and the interests 
of justice.79 Each analysis can benefit from open source information to 
varying degrees. The 2013 Policy Paper examines each of the factors in 
turn and situates them within a four-phase filtering process. For analytical 
purposes, each stage focuses on a distinct statutory factor. Following this 
framework, the remainder of this section explores how open source in-
formation can inform an assessment of whether statutory factors are met. 
34.3.2.1. Phases 1 and 2: Jurisdiction 
Phase 1 – the “pre-preliminary examination phase”80 – consists of an as-
sessment of information received via Article 15 communications whereby 
outsiders send information to the court for consideration.81 This sifting of 
material during the Article 15 process distinguishes between communica-
tions related to matters manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court, 
                                                   
79 Each factor is set out in ICC Statute, Article 53(1)(a)–(c), see supra note 62. 
80 Amitis Khojasteh, “ICC Statute Article 15”, Centre for International Law Research and 
Policy (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/15-khojasteh/).  
81 In 2016, the OTP received nearly 600 Article 15 submissions. Ibid. 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination: Volume 2 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 702 
which are dismissed, and those pertaining to matters already under pre-
liminary examination, under full investigation, or forming the basis of an 
existing prosecution, which are forwarded to the relevant team.82 Those 
that do not fit in these two categories are then subject to an “independent 
and objective” two-step analysis, the first step being factual and the sec-
ond legal, to see if the alleged crimes potentially fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court and thus whether further engagement is warranted. Ac-
cording to the 2013 Policy Paper, “[those situations] deemed to require 
further analysis will be the subject of a dedicated analytical report which 
will assess whether the alleged crimes appear to fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court and therefore warrant proceeding to the next phase. Such 
communications shall be analysed in combination with open source in-
formation such as reports from the United Nations, non-governmental 
organisations and other reliable sources for corroboration purposes”.83  
Between mid-2012 and mid-2017, situation analysts produced near-
ly 40 such reports, each of which relied on information derived from open 
sources. Of them, two resulted in investigations, including allegations 
against United Kingdom forces in Iraq and an inquiry into the situation in 
Burundi. As of summer 2017, analysts were considering Article 15 sub-
missions that focused on allegations as varied as forceful evictions in 
Cambodia, the ill treatment of asylum seekers in Australia, and extrajudi-
cial killings in the Philippines.84 
The reports ultimately provide the basis for moving to phase 2, “the 
formal commencement of a preliminary examination”. Phase 2 includes 
those Article 15 submissions that survive phase 1 analysis, as well as any 
referrals from a State Party, referrals from the United Nations Security 
Council, or declarations by non-State Parties. In addition to any infor-
                                                   
82 The final category is for matters that are not manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court or subject to ongoing examination, investigation or prosecution and which therefore 
warrant further analysis and thus may provide the basis for a preliminary examination. 
Communications deemed to be manifestly outside the Court’s jurisdiction may be revisited 
in light of new information or circumstances, such as a change in the jurisdictional situa-
tion, so these are retained. Amitis Khojasteh, ibid. 
83 OTP 2013, para. 79, see supra note 1. This third category of submissions that ‘warrant 
further analysis’ are known as ‘WFA communications’. They are not subject to the “rea-
sonable basis” standard; instead, the applied standard is whether any alleged crimes “ap-
pear to fall within the jurisdiction of the court”. Khojasteh, see supra note 80. 
84 Khojasteh, ibid. 
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mation provided by these external actors, the phase 2 process can be sup-
ported by testimony received at the seat of the Court and open source in-
formation.85 Like phase 1, phase 2 aims to identify whether potential cas-
es fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.  
Findings from phase 2 are documented in an ‘Article 5 report’ to the 
Prosecutor that clarifies the Court’s jurisdiction. When considering 
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Office must consider temporal, 
territorial or personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes that have 
been or are being committed. In accordance with Article 53(1), the re-
quired standard of proof during phase 2 is a “reasonable basis” to believe 
that such crimes have occurred.86 Open source information, as touched on 
below, can be helpful in analysing whether the requisite standard can be 
met. 
34.3.2.1.1. Temporal Jurisdiction  
The temporal jurisdiction of the Court applies from the date of the Rome 
Statute’s entry into force (1 July 2002); the date of entry into force for a 
particular State Party (when ratified later); the date specified in a United 
Nations Security Council referral; or a declaration by a State pursuant to 
Article 12(3) accepting the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.  
Given the clarity of these options, it is difficult to imagine a situa-
tion where the Office might have to rely on open-source information to 
make an assessment of its temporal jurisdiction. Summaries of the appli-
cation of this statutory factor tend to be short and refer only to legal facts 
such as the date a State deposited its instrument of ratification of the 
Rome Statute, or the dates specified in a United Nations Security Council 
referral or State declaration. 
34.3.2.1.2. Territorial or Personal Jurisdiction  
Territorial or personal jurisdiction is determined by whether a crime speci-
fied in Article 5 has been committed “on the territory or by a national of a 
state party”.87 In most instances, establishing a person’s nationality and 
analysing the statutory factor of personal jurisdiction can be done with 
                                                   
85 OTP 2013, paras. 79–80, see supra note 1. 
86 Ibid., para. 36. 
87 Ibid., para. 40. 
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reference to official records and will not require the Office to rely on open 
sources.  
However, the role of foreign fighters acting as combatants can 
complicate this assessment. In such instances, open source information 
may play a role. For example, social media sources were specifically 
mentioned by the Prosecutor in her 2015 statement on alleged crimes 
committed by ISIS, which focused on the question of the Court’s personal 
jurisdiction over foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria who were nationals of 
State Parties. In her statement on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS, 
the Prosecutor noted that: “A few [foreign fighters] have publicised their 
heinous acts through social media”.88 In this particular assessment, there 
was a wealth of open source information on the role of foreign fighters 
from States Parties in Iraq and Syria, including videos of French nationals 
who joined ISIS in burning their passports and videos of atrocities.  
In this particular situation, since ISIS was primarily led by nationals 
of Iraq and Syria, which are not States Parties, the Office concluded that 
the jurisdictional basis for prosecuting those most responsible was too 
narrow to proceed. However, in other instances, it is entirely possible for 
open source research to indicate that State Party nationals are in fact those 
most responsible for atrocity crimes in a situation not covered by territori-
al jurisdiction. For instance, it may be possible to use open source infor-
mation to establish the facts around the involvement of foreign fighters in 
specific incidents and perhaps even their place within command structures. 
In other words, it is conceivable that open source information could, in the 
future, be instrumental not only in gathering information about the crime 
base but also in throwing light on leadership structures in complex organ-
izations for purposes of ascertaining personal jurisdiction. 
In addition to the type of investigation described above, there are 
other instances where open source information collection and analysis 
could inform determinations of territorial jurisdiction. For example, geo-
location techniques can be used to anchor and verify the locations depict-
ed in videos that show troop movements or alleged criminal activity. Geo-
location is now a standard means to corroborate a video obtained from 
                                                   
88 ICC, “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on 
the alleged crimes committed by ISIS”, 8 April 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
b1d672/). 
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open sources and can contribute heavily towards both source and content 
evaluation.89  
34.3.2.1.3. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction  
With regard to subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court is limited to assessing 
the crimes set out in Article 5: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression. An analysis of whether there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that such crimes have been committed will 
consider “underlying facts and factors”, “contextual circumstances”, “pat-
terns of similar conduct […] aimed at a protected group”, alleged perpe-
trators, the “role of the individual, group or institution” and their “link 
with the alleged crime”, as well as the mental element of any alleged 
crime(s).90 While a detailed assessment is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
the potential for open sources to support each of these factors is worth 
exploring in further research.91  
34.3.2.2. Phase 3: Admissibility 
Phase 3 of the preliminary examination process focuses on admissibility, 
and whether discovered data supports the necessary gravity and comple-
mentarity assessments.92 At this stage, the Office will continue to collect 
information relating to its subject-matter jurisdiction, in particular where 
new or ongoing crimes are alleged to be taking place.  
                                                   
89 Craig Silverman, Verification Handbook: A definitive guide to verifying digital content for 
emergency coverage, European Journalism Centre, Maastricht, 2014, p. 39 (discussing use 
of satellite imagery for verification). Sam Dubberley, “In the Firing Line: How Amnesty’s 
Digital Verification Corps changed official narratives through open source investigation”, 
in Medium, 18 May 2017.  
90 OTP 2013, paras. 38–39, see supra note 1.  
91 In a June 2017 presentation in The Hague, a situation analyst from the OTP suggested the 
value of information provided by external actors, such as survivors and non-governmental 
organizations, to the second phase of the preliminary examination process. She noted how 
helpful it would be for those actors, when sending information to the ICC or posting online, 
to provide the “who, what, when, where, and how” underlying a particular atrocity, as op-
posed to focusing on the impact of any alleged crimes. In addition, she stressed that those 
external actors could improve the quality of information for ICC purposes by using and 
declaring a clear and consistent method of information collection and analysis, as well as 
preserving and providing primary sources. Matilde Gawronski, “ICC Statute Article 15”, 
Centre for International Law Research and Policy (https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/15-
gawronski/).  
92 OTP 2013, para. 42, see supra note 1.  
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In determining admissibility, the Office must consider three things: 
gravity, complementarity, and the interests of justice in the context of spe-
cific cases that might be pursued.93  
Two questions for defining potential cases have been identified by 
the Pre-Trial Chambers: (1) What groups or persons involved in a situa-
tion; and (2) What alleged crimes are likely to become the focus of a fu-
ture investigation? In practice, the Office has made its admissibility as-
sessment based on an assessment of which persons or organizations bear 
the “greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes”94 related to a situ-
ation. As discussed below, open source data can inform an analysis of the 
crimes that may have been perpetrated, who was involved, and whether 
the national system – under the complementarity process – has jurisdic-
tion instead of the ICC. 
34.3.2.2.1. Complementarity 
A complementarity assessment is concerned with determining whether the 
relevant national system is willing and/or able to investigate and prosecute 
the potential cases identified by the OTP in its preliminary examination, 
in which case the ICC does not have jurisdiction. First, the Office looks at 
whether national proceedings are taking place in relation to the potential 
cases it has identified. If they are, the Office asks whether “the focus is on 
those most responsible for the most serious crimes committed” 95  and 
whether the proceedings are “vitiated by an unwillingness or an inability 
to genuinely carry out the proceedings”. In assessing any potential unwill-
ingness to conduct genuine national proceedings, the Court asks whether 
the investigation or prosecution is being undertaken to shield somebody 
from ICC jurisdiction; whether there has been an unjustified delay; and 
whether national proceedings are being conducted independently and im-
partially.  
Much of this information may be obtained through a careful review 
of online, public sources. For example, the OTP can obtain useful infor-
mation via open sources about the ability of a national justice system to 
carry out proceedings, including whether a “substantial collapse or una-
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94 Ibid., para. 45. 
95 Ibid., para. 49. 
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vailability” means it is incable of being successful.96 In making such an 
assessment, the 2013 Policy Paper indicates that the Office will consider 
evidence of a lack of adequate protection systems for victims; the absence 
of a legislative framework; and a general paucity of resources. 
34.3.2.2.1.1. National Investigations that Shield Alleged Perpetrators 
Even when a national investigation has commenced, complementarity is 
not satisfied if the Office concludes that the investigation is a sham, for 
example, if it was commenced to shield one or more alleged perpetrators. 
The OTP’s 2013 Policy Paper lists indicators that suggest a person at the 
heart of a potential ICC case is being deliberately shielded by a State. 
These include manifestly insufficient steps taken towards prosecution; 
deviations from standard practices and procedures; ignoring evidence or 
giving it insufficient weight; intimidation; findings that are irreconcilable 
with the evidence; inadequacies in charging and in the application of 
modes of liability; flawed forensic examinations; failures related to dis-
closure; fabricated evidence; manipulated or coerced witness statements; 
undue admission or non-admission of evidence; lack of resources; and 
failure to co-operate with the Court.97 
Open source investigative techniques can provide information on 
many of these indicators. For instance, information on the more difficult-
to-ascertain, such as deviations from procedure or intimidation, may be 
available via national non-governmental organizations. Open source mon-
itoring can supplement such sources. Given that potential ICC cases tend 
to be high-profile, there is likely to be significant reporting and other 
online information available to the OTP in near real time.  
In the absence of information from a local non-governmental organ-
ization, assessing whether there has been an unjustified delay can be 
greatly assisted with open source information. For example, open sources 
can help the Office understand the context in which a potential case is 
playing out as well as the actors involved and their relationships. In addi-
tion, official government information accessed through open information 
portals can feed into an assessment of the national process, including the 
                                                   
96 Ibid., para. 56. 
97 Ibid. 
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allocation of resources and other organizational factors, even in the ab-
sence of co-operation with the ICC.  
34.3.2.2.1.2. Independence and Impartiality of National Proceedings 
Indications of the independence of national proceedings include the in-
volvement of State organizations or personnel in alleged crimes; the struc-
ture of the criminal justice system; appointments and dismissals impacting 
on proceedings; the application of immunities and privileges; and political 
interference and corruption. The indicia of impartiality can include con-
nections between the accused persons and the authorities charged with 
proceedings and “public statements, awards, sanctions, promotions or 
demotions, deployments, dismissals or reprisals in relation to [the] inves-
tigative, prosecutorial or judicial personnel concerned”.98  
Open sources, especially news reports, but also information public-
ly available via social media, can shed light on negative indicators regard-
ing the independence and impartiality of those involved in national pro-
ceedings. In the absence of the collation of such information by national 
actors or other relevant organizations, or in a situation where there is no 
co-operation from local authorities, the OTP can access much relevant 
information online. 
34.3.2.3. Phase 4 
If the admissibility and jurisdiction requirements are met, the preliminary 
examination moves to phase 4, during which the OTP considers the inter-
ests of justice and produces what is known as an Article 53(1) report.99 
There is a presumption that any investigation will be in the interest of 
justice “unless there are specific circumstances which provide substantial 
reasons to believe that the interests of justice are not served by an investi-
gation at that time”.100 As part of this assessment, the OTP is particularly 
charged with considering the gravity of the alleged crimes and the inter-
ests of victims, as well as the views of “community, religious, political or 
tribal leaders, States, and intergovernmental, and non-governmental or-
                                                   
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., para. 80. See also OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, 2007 (http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/bb02e5/).  
100 OTP 2013, para. 67, see supra note 1. 
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ganisations”.101 Assuming there is no justice-based reason to prevent mov-
ing to an investigation, the resulting report will include an initial legal 
characterization of the alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and a basic statement of the facts, detailing the places the alleged crimes 
took place, the time or time period in which they took place, and the per-
sons or groups involved.  
Open source information may be quite helpful to both the interests 
of justice assessment and the Article 53(1) report. In the CILRAP-
conference in The Hague in June 2017 titled “Quality Control in Prelimi-
nary Examination: Reviewing Impact, Policies and Practices”, an OTP 
analyst emphasized the importance of thinking through what both the 
OTP could do internally – and what modifications external actors could 
make – to enhance the quality of the preliminary examination process. 
She noted the potential value of systematically soliciting the impressions 
of survivors and other stakeholders as to what they perceive as satisfying 
the needs of ‘justice’ in a particular situation in order to determine wheth-
er a case at the ICC would potentially compete with (and/or support) those 
interests. While she proposed creating a survey to gather those perspec-
tives, a systematic combing of open source materials could fulfill a similar 
function and/or be used to support any survey that might be employed.102  
34.3.3. Policy Considerations 
In addition to contributing to decisions around whether to launch a full 
investigation, the 2013 Policy Paper mentions other potential uses of open 
source information. Specifically, the Paper outlines an “early warning 
function” as within the Office’s mandate, noting that the OTP “systemati-
cally and proactively collect[s] open source information on alleged crimes 
that appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court” in order to gauge 
potential spikes in violence around the world.103 The monitoring of open 
sources is thus seen as central to the Office fulfilling not only its mandate 
to combat impunity but to prevent future violence, with the Policy Paper 
noting that such monitoring will “allow the Office to react promptly to 
upsurges in violence by reinforcing early interaction with States, interna-
                                                   
101 Ibid., para. 68. 
102 Gawronski, “ICC Statute Article 15”, see supra note 94. 
103 OTP 2013, para. 104, see supra note 1. 
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tional organisations and non-governmental organisations in order to verify 
information on alleged crimes, to encourage genuine national proceedings 
and to prevent reoccurrence of crimes”. Thus, the Policy Paper foresees 
that open source information may be used in preparing and issuing “pub-
lic, preventive statements”104 that put perpetrators ‘on notice’ and encour-
age national jurisdictions to act. 
34.4. Conclusion 
As indicated above, significant changes in the means of information dis-
semination, especially online, have facilitated the sharing of data related 
to core international crimes. Much of this information is publicly accessi-
ble. The growing quantity and quality of online sources – and practices of 
harvesting information derived from those sources – has considerable 
potential to strengthen the quality of information feeding into the prelimi-
nary examination stage of situations that are being considered by the ICC. 
Ultimately, open source-derived information is an under-utilized resource 
that is quickly expanding in importance. When considering standards and 
initiatives for improving the quality of preliminary examinations, a careful 
look at the open source fact-finding process is essential. 
                                                   
104 Ibid. 
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35. ICC Preliminary Examinations 
and National Justice: 
Opportunities and Challenges for 
Catalysing Domestic Prosecutions 
Elizabeth M. Evenson* 
The International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) is a court of last resort. Under 
the principle of complementarity, the ICC can only take up cases where 
national authorities do not; these national authorities have the primary 
responsibility under international law to ensure accountability for atrocity 
crimes. Where States have an interest in avoiding the ICC’s intervention, 
they can do so by conducting genuine national proceedings. This means 
that the leverage of the Court’s Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’) with na-
tional authorities to press for domestic proceedings can be significant in 
countries where it is considering whether to open an investigation, that is, 
in what are known as ‘preliminary examinations’. 
The OTP has recognized this opportunity. In policy and in practice, 
the OTP is committed, where feasible, to encouraging national proceed-
ings into crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction in preliminary exam-
inations. This makes the OTP an important actor in what has come to be 
known as ‘positive complementarity’ – that is, the range of efforts by in-
ternational partners, international organizations, and civil society groups 
to assist national authorities to carry out effective prosecutions of interna-
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tional crimes. These efforts include legislative assistance, capacity build-
ing, and advocacy and political dialogue to counter obstruction. 
Translating this commitment into successful practice is far from 
easy. Domestic prosecutions of international crimes face a number of ob-
stacles. Political will of national authorities to support independent inves-
tigations is needed, but often in short supply given that these prosecutions 
will likely touch on powerful interests opposed to accountability. Prosecu-
tions of mass atrocity crimes also require specialized expertise and sup-
port, including witness protection, but countries are often ill-equipped to 
meet these challenges. The OTP, like other complementarity actors, needs 
to have strategies geared towards bridging these two pillars of ‘unwilling-
ness’ and ‘inability’.  
As challenging of a task as it may be, the stakes for the OTP’s suc-
cess in this area are no less profound. In the long term, bolstering national 
proceedings is crucial in the fight against impunity for the most serious 
crimes and is fundamental to hopes for the ICC’s broad impact. 
Indeed, the demands for justice for atrocity crimes have far out-
stripped the capacity of the ICC; the number of situations in which the 
ICC could and should act simultaneously are probably far more than what 
the Court’s founders envisioned. And this is not likely to improve any 
time soon, with a multiplication of human rights crises and an all-too-
limited appetite on the part of ICC States Parties to fund a court that can 
go beyond a handful of investigations in any given year. 
The OTP’s commitment to encouraging national proceedings in sit-
uations under preliminary examination therefore holds out significant 
potential to meet victims’ rights to access justice, by bridging some of this 
capacity gap. Prospects for success should be realistically understood and 
appraised, however.  
As a follow-up to our 2011 briefing paper on the OTP’s approach to 
situations under analysis, “Course Correction”, 1  Human Rights Watch 
undertook fresh research between 2015 and 2017 on aspects of national 
proceedings in situations in four countries that are or were the subject of 
OTP preliminary examinations – Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and the 
                                                   
1 Human Rights Watch, Course Correction: Recommendations to the Prosecutor for a More 
Effective Approach to “Situations under Analysis”, 16 June 2011 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/43aefb/). 
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United Kingdom. Our research aimed to understand both the limits of 
what the OTP can reasonably be expected to accomplish through its pre-
liminary examinations when it comes to catalysing national justice and 
areas where the OTP could strengthen its impact in future practice. We did 
not seek to evaluate numerous other aspects of the OTP’s approach to 
preliminary examinations, which, of course, have as their primary aim the 
determination of whether or not to open a full ICC investigation. Catalys-
ing national proceedings is only a secondary aim. 
Our case studies in these four countries are the subject of a forth-
coming Human Rights Watch report, to be published in 2018. This chapter 
does not deal with the findings of the research. Instead, it provides the 
conceptual background against which these case studies were carried out. 
It first looks at the OTP’s approach to positive complementarity in its 
preliminary examinations, and then identifies the key challenges that run 
across efforts to implement this policy commitment in practice. This chap-
ter is an expanded version of a background section to be published as an 
appendix in the forthcoming Human Rights Watch report. Some of these 
observations have also previously been set out in “Course Correction”, 
cited above. 
It is important to note that regarding most, if not all, of the chal-
lenges referenced below, the OTP has relevant strategies. The absence of 
reference to these strategies in this chapter should not be understood to 
suggest that the OTP is unaware of or not actively seized of these issues. 
Our full report assesses the OTP’s approaches and strategies, and makes 
recommendations as to how the OTP and other complementarity actors 
can strengthen practice. 
35.1. Overview of the Preliminary Examination Process 
’situations under analysis’ or ‘preliminary examinations’ are a specific set 
of events in a given country that the OTP is assessing to determine wheth-
er to open a formal ICC investigation.2 It is important to note that the 
                                                   
2 ICC jurisdiction can be triggered in one of three ways: ICC member states or the Security 
Council can refer a specific set of events – known as a situation – to the ICC prosecutor or 
the ICC prosecutor can seek to open an investigation on their own initiative (‘proprio mo-
tu’) with the authorization of an ICC pre-trial chamber. See Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 
1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, Article 13. Regardless of how the Court’s jurisdiction 
is triggered, however, the Office of the Prosecutor first analyses the information it has be-
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OTP’s approach to the preliminary examination process has been consoli-
dated over a number of years; the approach described below reflects cur-
rent practice and dates to 2013, when the OTP issued a revised policy on 
preliminary examinations.3 
Information about possible crimes falling within the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion first comes to the OTP through one of two channels: communications 
and referrals. These channels relate to the three mechanisms that can trig-
ger ICC jurisdiction: proprio motu investigations (Rome Statute, Articles 
13(c) and 15), Security Council referrals (Article 13(b)), and State Party 
referrals (Article 13(a)). 
‘Communications’ are information received by the OTP under Arti-
cle 15 of the Rome Statute, which permits the prosecutor to open an in-
vestigation proprio motu (“on one’s own initiative”) with the authoriza-
tion of a pre-trial chamber. Not all such communications, however, will 
lead to a preliminary examination. Instead, and consistent with Article 
15(2)’s instruction that the prosecutor “analyse the seriousness of infor-
mation received”, the OTP first filters out information regarding crimes 
manifestly outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. This is known as Phase 1. Situa-
tions that survive this initial filter then enter Phase 2 and become formally 
‘situations under analysis’.4 
By contrast, situations referred to the ICC prosecutor by the Securi-
ty Council or a State Party are automatically considered to be situations 
under analysis and directly enter Phase 2. In addition, the prosecutor has 
indicated that situations directly enter Phase 2 when a declaration has 
been lodged under Article 12(3), which permits a State to temporarily 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.5 This is the case even though an inves-
tigation opened following an Article 12(3) declaration is done so pursuant 
to the prosecutor’s proprio motu powers under Article 15.  
Beginning with Phase 2 – which marks the formal start of a prelim-
inary examination – the OTP, through its Situation Analysis Section with-
                                                                                                                        
fore it regarding a situation to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for initiating a 
formal investigation. This process is known as ‘preliminary examination’.  
3 Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/).  
4 Ibid., para. 80. 
5 Ibid. 
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in the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division, examines 
the factors listed in Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute that control the 
prosecutor’s determination as to whether to initiate an investigation. 
Those are: 
• whether there is “a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed” (Arti-
cle 53(1)(a)); 
• whether “the case is or would be admissible under article 17” (Arti-
cle 53(1)(b)); and 
• whether “taking into account the gravity of the crime and the inter-
ests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe 
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice” (Arti-
cle 53(1)(c)).6 
Admissibility – assessed in Phase 3 of the examination – has two 
components, consistent with the requirements of Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute. First, a potential case must be of sufficient gravity to justify fur-
ther action by the ICC. Second, the principle of complementarity must be 
satisfied; that is, national authorities are not conducting national proceed-
ings or, if they are, they are unable or unwilling to carry out genuine in-
vestigations and prosecutions.7 
At the conclusion of Phase 2 and, again at the end of Phase 3 should 
the examination proceed, the Situation Analysis Section prepares an inter-
nal report – an Article 5 report for Phase 2, referring to the Rome Statute 
article governing the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction, and an Article 17 
report for Phase 3, referring to the Rome Statute provision governing ad-
missibility – assessing the relevant criteria and submits the report to the 
prosecutor. If the examination proceeds further, at the conclusion of Phase 
4, the Situation Analysis Section submits an Article 53(1) report. The de-
                                                   
6 Ibid., paras. 34–71, 80–83.  
7 Given that at the pre-investigation stage there are no cases (understood to mean an “identi-
fied set of incidents, individuals, and charges”), the Office of the Prosecutor examines the 
admissibility of “potential cases that could be identified in the course of the preliminary 
examination based on the information available and that would likely arise from an inves-
tigation into the situation”. Ibid., para. 43.  
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cision of the prosecutor as to whether to open an investigation – or to seek 
authorization to investigate, as needed – is based on this report.8 
Phases 2 through 4 are conducted sequentially, although there may 
be a certain fluidity in the OTP’s approach, given that information rele-
vant to more than one phase may be received by the OTP at any point. 
Only decisions not to proceed with investigations following a State 
or Security Council referral, or where the OTP has based its decision sole-
ly on the interests of justice, are subject to judicial review. Review of the 
former must be requested by the State or Security Council, while the latter 
may be reviewed at the initiative of the Pre-Trial Chamber, and if re-
viewed, will only be effective if confirmed by the judges.9 
35.2. Overcoming Inability and Unwillingness through Positive 
Complementarity 
There are often several obstacles to effective national investigations and 
prosecutions of mass atrocity crimes. Tracking the language of the Rome 
Statute in Article 17, these challenges can be described as falling into one 
of two categories: unwillingness on the part of national authorities to gen-
uinely investigate and prosecute, or an inability to do so. 
Unwillingness refers to an absence of political will by national au-
thorities to support genuine proceedings. Unwillingness, of course, can 
result in no proceedings at all. Where there are proceedings, Article 17(2) 
of the Rome Statute refers to the following aspects of unwillingness to 
conduct genuine proceedings: proceedings undertaken to shield the person 
concerned from justice; unjustifiable delay in proceedings that is incon-
sistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; or proceed-
ings lacking independence or impartiality, and conducted in a manner 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. The 
OTP has articulated several indicia it considers in assessing these different 
dimensions of unwillingness, ranging from too limited investigations to 
witness intimidation to political interference with investigations.10 
Inability refers to a lack of capacity within a national jurisdiction to 
conduct genuine proceedings. The Rome Statute in Article 17(3) defines 
                                                   
8 Ibid., paras. 81–83.  
9 Rome Statute, Article 53(3)(a)–(b). 
10 Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, 2013, paras. 50–55, see supra note 3. 
35. ICC Preliminary Examinations and National Justice 
Publication Series No. 33 (2018) – page 717 
inability by reference to “a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of 
its national judicial system” that renders the State “unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to 
carry out its proceedings”. The OTP has also developed a limited set of 
indicia for assessing inability; they are, among other things, “the absence 
of conditions of security for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors and 
judges or lack of adequate protection systems; the existence of laws that 
serve as a bar to domestic proceedings in the case at hand, such as amnes-
ties, immunities or statutes of limitation; or the lack of adequate means for 
effective investigations and prosecutions”.11 
The definitions or indicia of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ con-
tained in the Rome Statute and elaborated on in the OTP’s policy state-
ments are there to guide the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction, that is, to 
determine which cases remain admissible before the ICC, and which, be-
cause of genuine national activity, are inadmissible.  
It is important to note that difficulties encountered or imposed by 
national authorities and which may need to be addressed to ensure credi-
ble justice may go beyond the Rome Statute definitions of ‘unwillingness’ 
and ‘inability’. The ICC appeals chamber, for example, in assessing an 
admissibility challenge mounted in the Abdullah Al-Senussi case by the 
government of Libya noted that the ICC “is not primarily called upon to 
decide whether in domestic proceedings certain requirements of human 
rights law or domestic law are being violated”; rather, in its view, admis-
sibility is concerned with guarding against sham proceedings that lead to 
the evasion of justice. While violations of fair trial rights are not irrelevant 
to the court’s consideration of admissibility, the appeals chamber held that 
only “violations of the rights of the suspect [that] are so egregious that the 
proceedings can no longer be regarded as being capable of providing any 
genuine form of justice to the suspect” will be, in the language of Article 
17(2), “inconsistent with an intent to bring that person to justice”.12 
In addition, admissibility before the ICC is case-specific; the exist-
ence of national proceedings that could preclude ICC jurisdiction is de-
                                                   
11 Ibid., paras. 56–57.  
12 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 
entitled “Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi”, 24 July 
2014, para. 230 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ef20c7).  
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termined by reference to an actual (or, at the situation phase, potential) 
case, defined by the person charged (or groups of persons who could be 
charged) and the conduct charged (or the kinds of conduct that may be 
charged). Admissibility assessments before the ICC are “not a judgement 
or reflection on the national justice system as a whole”.13 
Nonetheless, the concepts of “unwillingness” and “inability” con-
tained in the Rome Statute have been useful to broader efforts to map and 
address obstacles to national justice.14 Such efforts to encourage and assist 
national investigations and prosecutions – which range from legislative 
assistance with capacity building to political dialogue for countering ob-
struction – have come to be known collectively as ‘positive complementa-
rity’. The first ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, introduced the con-
cept of ‘positive complementarity’ – although he did not use that term – at 
a public hearing when he took office in June 2003, referring specifically 
to the role of the ICC.15 The term has since evolved, particularly leading 
up to and after the 2010 ICC review conference in Kampala, Uganda. 
While momentum has been difficult to sustain since Kampala, the term 
has come to encompass initiatives by a range of actors to encourage na-
tional prosecutions of international crimes.16 
                                                   
13 Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, 2013, para. 46, see supra note 3.  
14 See, for example, Open Society Justice Initiative, International Crimes, Local Justice: A 
Handbook for Rule-of-Law Policymakers, Donors, and Implementers, Open Society Foun-
dations, New York, 2011; High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and European Commission, “Joint Staff Working Document on Ad-
vancing the Principle of Complementarity: Toolkit for Bridging the gap between interna-
tional and national justice”, SWD(2013)26final, 31 January 2013; Assembly of States Par-
ties, ICC, “Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity”, ICC-ASP/8/51, 18 
March 2010.  
15 Statement made by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of 
the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, The Hague,16 June 2003, p. 3; 
see also Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of 
the Prosecutor”, September 2003, p. 5 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f53870/); Silvana 
Arbia, “The Three Year Plans and Strategies of the Registry in Respect of Complementari-
ty for an Effective Rome Statute System of International Criminal Justice”, Consultative 
Conference on International Criminal Justice, 2009 conference.  
16 See Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou, and Annika Jones, “Complementarity After Kam-
pala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools”, in Goettingen Journal of Internation-
al Law, 2010, vol. 2, pp. 793–803; Olympia Bekou, “The ICC and Capacity Building at the 
National Level”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Crimi-
nal Court, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 1252–54. 
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The ICC is now considered just one actor in this landscape, which 
also includes assistance between States, international organizations, and 
civil society groups.17 Indeed, some ICC States Parties – citing budgetary 
or mandate concerns – have steered the ICC away from taking on a more 
robust role on positive complementarity.18 To be sure, successfully shift-
ing the political will and capacity to permit national prosecution of inter-
national crimes, particularly in circumstances of entrenched impunity, is 
likely to require strategic alliances between a number of different stake-
holders. The ICC is not a development agency, and does not have re-
sources to contribute directly to rule-of-law programming. 
And yet, the role of the ICC could be central to positive comple-
mentarity in situations pending before the court.19 In these situations, the 
OTP’s engagement around justice with a range of domestic actors promis-
es to be a powerful catalyst for national proceedings. Human Rights 
Watch’s previous reporting and ongoing monitoring of situations under 
analysis, as well as its broader work on complementarity, suggest a few 
possible pathways in this regard. These relate to both overcoming political 
obstruction and addressing capacity gaps, and include: 
• Focusing public debate through the media and within civil society 
on the need for accountability; 
                                                   
17 This approach is clear from reports of the Assembly of States Parties facilitation on com-
plementarity issued since the Kampala review conference. See, for example, Assembly of 
States Parties, ICC, “Report of the Bureau on stocktaking: Complementarity”, 2010, see 
supra note 14.  
18 Unfortunately, the Assembly of States Parties – a natural ally – has not taken up this role. 
See Elizabeth Evenson and Alison Smith, “Completion, Legacy, and Complementarity at 
the ICC”, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), 2015, p. 1274, see supra note 16.  
19 The Office of the Prosecutor’s commitment in practice to positive complementarity has 
been much more evident in its preliminary examinations. But in ICC situations under in-
vestigation, the Court’s clear knowledge of what is needed to try grave crimes coupled 
with its understanding of the capacity limitations in countries where it is active means it is 
well placed to help donor states efficiently identify existing gaps and target their assistance 
to strengthening national prosecutions. Court staff can also directly lend expertise and, 
subject to protecting witnesses and other vulnerable sources, the Office of the Prosecutor 
may be able to share information gathered during investigations, including non-
confidential material and broad pattern analysis of crimes. Field-based staff, in particular, 
may be particularly well-placed to broker positive complementarity efforts through rela-
tionships between national authorities and rule-of law actors.  
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• Serving as a source of sustained pressure on domestic authorities to 
show results in domestic proceedings; 
• Highlighting to international partners the importance of including 
accountability in political dialogue with domestic authorities; 
• Equipping human rights activists with information derived from the 
OTP’s analysis, strengthening advocacy around justice; and 
• Identifying weaknesses in domestic proceedings, to prompt in-
creased efforts by government authorities and assistance, where rel-
evant, by international partners.20 
                                                   
20 Other authors have also addressed strategies available to the Office of the Prosecutor to 
advance positive complementarity, including several authors in this volume. William 
Burke-White’s article was among the first on positive complementarity, although not spe-
cific to the preliminary examination phase, see William Burke-White, “Proactive Com-
plementarity: The ICC and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice”, 
in Harvard International Law Journal, 2008, vol. 49, pp. 53–108; see also Carsten Stahn, 
“Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2008, vol. 19, pp. 
87–113; Carsten Stahn, “Taking Complementarity Seriously”, in Carsten Stahn and Mo-
hamed M. El Zeidy, The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 233–82; Justine Tiller, 
“The ICC Prosecutor and Positive Complementarity: Strengthening the Rule of Law?”, in 
International Criminal Law Review, 2013, vol. 13, pp. 507–91. Mark Kersten and Thomas 
Obel Hansen have sought to further theorize the mechanisms through which the Office of 
the Prosecutor can influence national actors in preliminary examinations, whether to bring 
about proceedings or to deter abuses. Of them, Kersten emphasizes, as we do, the im-
portance of strategic alliances and the Office of the Prosecutor taking a bolder approach 
with governments, under certain circumstances: see Mark Kersten, “Casting a Larger 
Shadow: Premeditated Madness, the International Criminal Court, and Preliminary Exami-
nations”, in Morten Bergsmo and Carsten Stahn (ed.), Quality Control in Preliminary Ex-
amination: Volume 2, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018, chap. 33; Obel 
Hanson, whose study of the Iraq/United Kingdom situation is also included in this volume, 
while citing some exceptions, notes that, generally, there have been “few existing studies 
[to] examine the extent to which this goal is being effectively pursued by the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the preliminary examination phase and how ICC preliminary examinations 
may affect national authorities’ commitment to domestic accountability processes and oth-
erwise impact the scope, nature, and conduct of such process”, see Thomas Obel Hansen, 
“The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: Ending Impunity Through ‘Positive 
Complementarity’?”, Transitional Justice Institute Research Paper No. 17-01, 22 March 
2017 (on file with the author). One of the exceptions cited by Hansen is Christine Björk 
and Justine Goerbertus, “Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the 
ICC Ruel of Law Strengthening in Kenya”, in Yale Human Rights and Development Jour-
nal, 2014, vol. 14, pp. 205–29. Other authors have examined what approach the Office of 
the Prosecutor should take to its legal analysis during the preliminary examination in order 
to advance complementarity. See Paul Seils, “Putting Complementarity in its Place”, in 
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While these strategies are shared, for the most part, with other com-
plementarity actors, the OTP’s leverage – that is, that it can open investi-
gations where national authorities fail to act and where it has jurisdic-
tion – is unique.  
35.3. OTP’s Approach to Encouraging National Proceedings in 
Preliminary Examinations 
As already indicated above, during its preliminary examinations, “[w]here 
potential cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Court have been iden-
tified, the Office [of the Prosecutor] will seek to encourage, where feasi-
ble, genuine national investigations and prosecutions by the States con-
cerned in relation to these crimes”.21 
As the language makes clear, this is not an unqualified commitment 
to encouraging national proceedings in every circumstance. The OTP’s 
practice is to do so “where feasible”, and, in addition, to focus, for the 
most part, on situations in Phase 3, that is, only after the OTP has con-
cluded in Phase 2 that a reasonable basis exists to believe that crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction have been committed. This current statement 
of policy and practice reflects an evolution in the OTP’s approach, part of 
its overall consolidated practice in situations under analysis, memorialised 
in its 2013 “Policy on Preliminary Examinations”.22  
Where it does seek to encourage national proceedings, the OTP has 
identified a number of different forms of engagement: “report[ing] on its 
monitoring activities, send[ing] in-country missions, request[ing] infor-
mation on proceedings, hold[ing] consultations with national authorities 
as well as with intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, 
participat[ing] in awareness-raising activities on the ICC, exchang[ing] 
lessons learned and best practices to support domestic investigative and 
                                                                                                                        
Carsten Stahn (ed.), 2015, pp. 305–27, see supra note 16. Seils has also written a hand-
book with guidance for national prosecutors seeking to avoid an ICC intervention, see In-
ternational Center for Transitional Justice, Handbook on Complementarity: An Introduc-
tion to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes, 2016, 
p. 79. 
21 Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, 2013, para. 101, see supra note 3.  
22 See also Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, “Results of the Strategic Plan (June 2012-2015)”, 
annex 1 to “Strategic Plan 2016-2018”, 6 July 2015, para. 18 (http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/7ae957/).  
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prosecutorial strategies, and assist[ing] relevant stakeholders to identify 
pending impunity gaps and the scope for possible remedial measures”.23 
35.4. Key Challenges 
Our observation of the OTP’s practice and our research for our forthcom-
ing report highlight several consistent challenges in strengthening the 
influence of the OTP with national authorities. 
35.4.1. Context Matters 
It is clear that context will influence the likelihood of successful positive 
complementarity activities by the OTP. Context here includes the underly-
ing alleged crime base; public demand for accountability, where high pub-
lic interest providing more fertile ground for engagement; the availability 
of other partners on complementarity, particularly among international 
donors; and, most significant of all, the posture of national authorities. 
The OTP can take steps to influence context – in fact, that is the entire 
premise of positive complementarity strategies – but there will be objec-
tive challenges to its ability to do so. To a certain extent, it has to take 
situations as it finds them. 
That context matters is an obvious point, but it may have some im-
plications for practice. 
In Human Rights Watch’s 2011 report on OTP practice in prelimi-
nary examinations, we criticized the appearance of inconsistent treatment 
of situations, which tended to undermine the OTP’s credibility with poten-
tial complementarity partners and its leverage with national authorities. 
Inconsistency can be problematic, but when it comes to having an impact 
on national justice efforts, differences in context mean that there may be 
                                                   
23 Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, 2013, para. 102, see supra note 3. A number of the Office of 
the Prosecutor’s activities during the preliminary examination – in particular, collecting in-
formation and consultations with national authorities and other stakeholders with an in-
formed perspective on the commission of crimes or the status of national proceedings – re-
late to the primary aim of the preliminary examination, that is, the determination as to 
whether or not an ICC investigation in a given situation is warranted. Regular reporting al-
so leads to increased transparency, which serves an important end: responding to interests 
of affected communities in knowing the status and eventual outcome of the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s preliminary examination. Increased public understanding of the criteria guid-
ing the Office of the Prosecutor’s decision-making process also should help combat accu-
sations of selectivity or bias in the court’s investigations.  
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differences in the OTP’s approach. How the OTP can navigate the need 
for tailored approaches that give rise to perceptions of inconsistent treat-
ment and, therefore, raise credibility risks may be a significant challenge. 
35.4.2. Importance of Strategic Alliances 
Given the steep obstacles to national justice, it is likely that the OTP can-
not go alone and will have more influence where its efforts are amplified 
by others, including local and international non-governmental actors, in-
ternational donors, and intergovernmental partners, like the UN or region-
al organizations. Under some circumstances, the OTP’s engagement with 
these other actors can stimulate collective efforts; in other circumstances, 
these actors may need to proactively develop approaches that take into 
account the potential to make us of the preliminary examination as a pres-
sure point on national justice efforts. Depending on context, the media, 
too, can be an important source of attention to the issue of accountability. 
35.4.3. Passive v. Active Effects 
To what extent does the OTP need active strategies around positive com-
plementarity or is the existence of the preliminary examination itself suf-
ficient for impact? The emphasis in our research is on the former – what 
steps the OTP can take to actively increase its impact. But this is not to 
overlook the possibility of more passive effects. 
The strength of such passive effects may have some implications 
for assessing the OTP’s current phased approach to preliminary examina-
tions. The OTP’s current focus on encouraging national proceedings 
largely after moving from Phase 2 to Phase 3 has significant advantages, 
in that it limits the appearance of OTP engagement as amounting to an 
empty threat, a concern we had raised in our 2011 report.24 At the same 
time, a delay may also have opportunity costs, given uncertainty as to 
how long moving from Phase 2 to Phase 3 may take (on the absence of 
timelines, see below). To the extent there are passive effects even in the 
absence of active strategies, however, this may provide a greater flexibil-
ity and momentum on complementarity than the division between Phase 2 
and Phase 3 suggests. 
                                                   
24 See Human Rights Watch, 2011, Part III.D, see supra note 1. 
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35.4.4. Effects of the ICC’s Admissibility Regime and OTP’s 
Prosecutorial Policies 
As noted above, the ICC is a court of last resort. Under the principle of 
complementarity, cases are only admissible before the ICC where national 
authorities have not conducted genuine domestic proceedings. 
On the one hand, that the ICC’s jurisdiction is complementary to 
domestic jurisdiction is what, in the first place, makes space available 
during the preliminary examination to seek to catalyse national proceed-
ings. Where States have an interest in avoiding the ICC’s intervention, 
they can do so by conducting national proceedings. This can mean that the 
OTP’s leverage over national authorities is or can be made to be signifi-
cant.25 
On the other hand, however, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction 
means that the OTP will need to be prepared to prove to the judges that 
there are no national proceedings that would render potential cases inad-
missible. Efforts by the OTP to stimulate national proceedings can pro-
duce domestic activity that will make it more difficult for the OTP to meet 
this burden. Where that activity leads to genuine national proceedings, 
this is positive. But there is an equal risk of domestic authorities produc-
ing a certain amount of activity – opening of case files and limited inves-
tigative steps – to starve off ICC intervention, but without following 
through to prosecutions. 
In this scenario, the preliminary examination period may be manip-
ulated by national authorities, leaving it in limbo: the domestic activity 
may be too much to warrant OTP actions, but too little to close out the 
preliminary examination in deference to genuine national proceedings. As 
a result, ICC action could be delayed where it is ultimately needed, both 
making it more difficult to investigate long after crimes are committed 
and deferring the access of victims to justice. 
                                                   
25 It is important to note, however, that the degree to which states care about avoiding an ICC 
intervention is highly contingent on context. ICC states parties through their membership 
in the ICC may have a stronger incentive to carry out national prosecutions than non-states 
parties that are the subject of Security Council referrals. ICC states parties may even al-
ready have relevant national legislation (laws embodying the provisions of the Rome Stat-
ute through ‘implementation’ of the treaty) and, through the ratification and implementa-
tion processes, pro-accountability constituencies within parliament or civil society. 
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This catch-22 applies, primarily, to situations where the OTP would 
need to act proprio motu under Article 15 to open investigations. For these 
investigations, the OTP needs to seek authorization from the court’s judg-
es, which includes a positive determination that there are no national pro-
ceedings that would render potential cases inadmissible. The judges’ remit 
to look at the admissibility of potential cases – which has been defined as 
the “groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an inves-
tigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and … the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the inci-
dents that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of 
shaping the future case(s)”26 – means that there is a wide scope of national 
investigative activity that could be deemed to render ICC action imper-
missible.27 Again, where this serves to promote genuine national cases, 
this is a strength of the ICC system. But it can offer national authorities 
space to manipulate the admissibility regime. 
This was perhaps a particular risk in the court’s earliest years. As 
with many aspects of the Rome Statute system, the court’s case law on 
complementarity is a work in progress. It may have been difficult for the 
OTP to predict just what it would need to show the judges to satisfy the 
statute’s admissibility requirements. It was only with the first Article 15 
investigation, in Kenya in 2010, where judges had the opportunity to clar-
ify what admissibility would look like at this phase of proceedings, name-
ly, that it would be measured with regard to potential cases, rather than a 
more abstract assessment of the situation as a whole. The requisite gravity 
of potential cases – the other admissibility requirement – continues to be 
debated.28 
                                                   
26 ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
31 March 2010, para. 50 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/338a6f/).  
27 Once specific charges are pressed against specific individuals, the court’s case law invokes 
a ‘same person, same conduct’ test, requiring a successful challenge to admissibility to 
show domestic activity with regard to the same incidents and persons against whom the 
prosecutor seeks to press charges. For an overview of the ICC’s case law on complementa-
rity, see Seils, 2016, Part V, see supra note 20; see also, Carsten Stahn, “Admissibility 
Challenges Before the ICC: From Quasi-Primacy to Qualified Deference”, in Stahn (ed.), 
2015, pp. 228–59, see supra note 16. 
28 See, for example, ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros et 
al., Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s deci-
sion not to initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/2f876c/). 
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The OTP needs to carefully determine when deferring to national 
authorities and deploying positive complementarity strategies is the right 
choice, and when this will only delay ICC action without any reasonable 
prospect of national justice. Getting that call right and avoiding instru-
mentalization is perhaps the OTP’s paramount challenge when it comes to 
encouraging national proceedings in situations under analysis. 
Finally, as indicated above, ICC judges have not interpreted the 
court’s admissibility regime in a manner that seeks to safeguard the quali-
ty of national justice. Their examination of the ‘genuineness’ of proceed-
ings aims at ensuring that proceedings are not undertaken to shield perpe-
trators from justice, rather than a concern for protecting the fair trial rights 
of defendants, in all but the most egregious circumstances. Whether the 
OTP ought to consider increasing its focus on the quality of these pro-
ceedings as a matter of policy may be a relevant question for future con-
sideration. 
35.4.5. Absence of Timelines 
The ICC’s legal texts do not prescribe any timeline for taking decisions 
regarding preliminary examinations. The absence of timelines can provide 
a helpful flexibility to the OTP, when it comes to carrying out its analysis, 
as well as implementing its policy commitment to encourage domestic 
proceedings; the time necessary to catalyse national proceedings is likely 
to vary greatly depending on context.29 
                                                   
29 The Office of the Prosecutor has provided some generic guidance on the length of Phases 
1–2 and 4, but when it comes to Phase 3, has stated that the phase “often entails the as-
sessment of national proceedings which inevitably makes it impossible to establish a defi-
nite duration of this phase”. See Assembly of States Parties, ICC, “Resource justification 
for mandated activities”, annex 2 to “Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of 
the Prosecutor”, ICC-ASP/14/21, 17 September 2015, p. 37. Human Rights Watch has 
previously recommended that the Office of the Prosecutor develop general guidance on 
how long preliminary examinations can be expected to take. A certain flexibility, of course, 
is also necessary for the primary purpose of the preliminary examination, that is, to reach a 
decision as to whether an ICC investigation is merited because the time required for as-
sessing the article 53(1) factors is likely to vary from situation to situation. For example, 
information about alleged crimes may be difficult to obtain. And a determination as to 
complementarity may be more straightforward where there is a complete absence of na-
tional proceedings as opposed to where there are proceedings that need to be evaluated for 
their relevancy and genuineness. See Human Rights Watch, 2011, Part III.C, IV, see supra 
note 1. 
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The absence of timelines, however, could exacerbate some of the 
risks identified above. That is, the OTP cannot resort to pre-set timelines 
in order to put national authorities under pressure to produce real results, 
nor can it rely on these timelines to help it make crucial and difficult de-
terminations regarding whether prospects for national investigations are 
sufficient to justify deferring ICC action. In addition, the OTP’s ability to 
influence national authorities can be amplified through civil society ac-
tions. But civil society groups may lose confidence in the OTP’s process 
due to the prolonged nature of preliminary examinations. Strategies to 
increase transparency with these key partners may be critical to address-
ing this challenge. 
35.4.6. Maintaining Leverage and the Use of Publicity 
While the fact that a situation may come before the ICC can initially pro-
vide an incentive for national authorities to start their own investigations, 
that leverage is likely to wane with the passage of time. Authorities can 
become desensitized to impending ICC action. And with a number of 
pending situations being analysed simultaneously by the OTP, with lim-
ited resources (see below) national authorities may judge that the chances 
a situation will be selected for investigation do not warrant changes in 
behaviour. 
In our 2011 report, following a period in which the OTP sought to 
raise the public profile of preliminary examinations, Human Rights Watch 
welcomed increased transparency, but expressed some concern that cer-
tain kinds of publicity could actually undermine, rather than sustain lever-
age with national authorities.30 One risk we noted is that where the OTP’s 
preliminary examination is protracted, as has often been the case, repeated 
public statements but no apparent action on investigations can give rise to 
perceptions of the ICC as a paper tiger, lessening the weight future state-
ments of possible ICC action may carry.31 
                                                   
30 We also noted that there were limits to the resources the Office of the Prosecutor had 
available, and therefore it needed to strike a proper balance between the primary aim of 
reaching a decision as to whether or not to open an investigation, and efforts, including in-
creased publicity aimed at positive complementarity. This increase in publicity also related 
to potential deterrent effects. Ibid., Part II.  
31 Ibid., Part IV.  
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Publicity can be a powerful and important medium to maximize 
leverage on national authorities, and to a certain extent, these risks are 
inherent to its use. At the time, we recommended a few steps the OTP 
could take in its public statements on preliminary examinations to miti-
gate these risks. First, we called on the OTP to increase its regular report-
ing on its substantive assessment of the Article 53(1) factors – including 
admissibility – in pending situations under analysis. Among other things, 
we thought this would help demonstrate more credibly that the OTP is 
actually proceeding with the analysis, and could have helped counteract 
perceptions of what appeared at that time to be an inconsistent treatment 
of different situations, with some receiving considerable public attention 
or public missions by the OTP, and others comparatively little. Second, 
we recommended that public statements provide additional context about 
the preliminary examination process, and not go beyond where the OTP’s 
own examination stands, in order to inform and manage expectations as to 
the prospects of ICC action. Third, we recommended that the OTP take 
care to avoid improperly publicizing aspects of a possible investigation – 
such as the names of possible suspects – in a manner that could under-
mine the due process rights of potential accused or the reputation of others 
and call into question the impartiality of any subsequent investigation.32 
The OTP’s current approach to publicity in preliminary examina-
tions has since changed, and incorporates some of these recommendations. 
First, while the OTP issued a draft policy on preliminary examina-
tions in 2010, it finalized the policy in 2013, setting out in detail the prin-
ciples and processes governing situations under analysis. It also now pub-
licly identifies on the ICC’s website and other public materials where a 
situation falls in the four-phased approach, which is also explained in that 
policy paper.33 
Second, it has also increased substantive reporting on its prelimi-
nary examinations. In December 2011, the OTP issued its first annual 
report spanning all preliminary examination activities over the previous 
year. These annual reports have become increasingly more detailed with 
                                                   
32 Ibid., Part IV.  
33 See ICC, “Preliminary Examinations” (available on its web site). 
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each year. In 2012, the OTP also issued a lengthy ‘interim report’ on Co-
lombia, covering both subject matter and admissibility issues.34 
The OTP has also made public an internal Article 5 report when 
moving from one phase to the next (Nigeria, Phase 2 to Phase 3). Deci-
sions not to move a situation under analysis forward into the next phase or 
to open an investigation – because the OTP considers that the legal crite-
ria are not met – are also communicated publicly, and since 2013 have 
been accompanied by publication of the relevant report (to date, an Article 
5 report for South Korea and Honduras, and an Article 53(1)) report for 
Comoros). Decisions to open investigations in non-proprio motu cases 
have been accompanied by a public Article 53(1) report since 2013 (Mali 
and CAR II). 
35.4.7. Limited Resources  
At this writing, there are 13 staff members within the Situation Analysis 
Section. Of these 13 positions, two are at the P-1 level, six are at the P-2 
level, four are at the P-3 level, and one position is at the P-5 level. This 
staffing size falls below the 17 staff members the OTP has indicated ought 
to be the “basic size” of the Situation Analysis Section.35 
But even with 17 staff members, by the OTP’s calculations this 
would translate into an average of 1.5 full-time P-2 or P-3 analysts to 
work on each situation, assuming an average of nine preliminary exami-
nations at any given point of time. These 1.5 staff members, with support 
from P-1 analysts and under the supervision of the P-5 head of section, are 
responsible for a wide range of activities in their assigned situations – 
from analysis necessary to support determinations regarding investiga-
tions, to public information, to efforts to deter crimes or encourage na-
                                                   
34 These reports are available from the Court’s web site, ibid.  
35 Assembly of States Parties, ICC, “Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of 
the Prosecutor”, ICC-ASP/14/21, 17 September 2015, para. 19. The “basic size” of the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor, presented to ICC member countries in 2015, is the size it considers 
necessary “not only [to] ensure that the Office attains a staffing size which is stable for the 
foreseeable future, but also one with sufficient depth to absorb new demands without hav-
ing to continue the present unsustainable practice of repeatedly postponing new investiga-
tions which must be pursued in accordance with the Office’s mandate, or constantly strip-
ping ongoing activities of critical resources so as to staff the highest prioritised activities”. 
Ibid., para. 3.  
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tional proceedings, along with the associated field missions, consultations, 
and other activities necessary to support these functions.36 
Particularly in preliminary examinations with widespread allega-
tions of crimes, extending over a long temporal period, or where signifi-
cant national proceedings are under way, the OTP’s resources are highly 
limited as compared to the quantity of needed analysis, let alone the steps 
that may be necessary to engage national authorities in a way that can 
effectively catalyse national prosecutions. These resources are also limited 
as compared to the diplomatic or resources that some governments are 
likely to allocate to engage with the OTP. 
These limited resources give reason to pause in considering what 
strategies the OTP can reasonably be expected to pursue on positive com-
plementarity. It is worth bearing in mind that these strategies are, appro-
priately, only secondary to the Situation Analysis Section’s primary role 
of analysis to support decisions regarding whether or not to open ICC 
investigations. 
                                                   
36 Ibid., paras. 14–21.  
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